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
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Canadian
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A Comparative
Study

Marcel Trudel

and

Geneviève Jain

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Canadian History Textbooks

A Comparative Study

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Studies of the
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Canadian History Textbooks

A Comparative Study


Marcel Trudel

Professor of History
University of Ottawa

and

Geneviève Jain

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I should like first to express my thanks to my colleague Professor Léon Dion of Laval University for his advice and continuing interest throughout the various stages of this work.

In addition, I must convey my profound gratitude to my assistant and fellow history teacher, Mme Geneviève Jain. It was she who did most of the research work on the textbooks and assembled the material in preparation for writing; this report is therefore as much hers as mine.

M.T.

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This study was undertaken at the request of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism. Its subject is the teaching of Canadian history at the elementary and secondary levels, which includes such institutions as the French *collèges classiques*. In order that the study might be complete, the original intention was to make a survey of the objectives of the various teaching institutions, as well as an analysis of official courses of study, a thorough examination of textbooks used, an evaluation of methods, an appraisal of the quality of teaching, and finally a scientifically conducted poll among students upon completion of their studies in history, to test the results. With little time at our disposal, however, it has been impossible to accomplish a task of such magnitude.

The Commission has therefore restricted its objective to "a comparative study of Canadian history textbooks in use across the country," that is to say the study of only one of the above-mentioned points. This does not mean, however, that the other aspects have been entirely neglected; to the extent that they may be linked in one way or another to our more limited subject, we have taken them into account.

Whatever criticism may have been levelled at textbooks, they are essential; all teaching is centred on them; it is their content rather than the teacher's commentary which is retained by the student, particularly if he does not pursue his studies beyond the tenth or eleventh grade. Since only a small minority of students reaches the university level, we can see how the majority is educated in history by restricting our inquiry to the elementary and secondary levels. In this sense, the Commission's objective was well founded.

To begin with, it is difficult to determine the influence exerted by any particular textbook. In many cases, in fact, the views advanced by school authorities go farther than those in the textbook. Programme directors tend to take great liberties with a prescribed text; in deciding, for example, how much time should be spent on one section or chapter, it is possible to effect a complete change in the author's weighting of the various parts of the book. This tendency is often reinforced by explanatory notes presenting a particular department of education's "official point of view," which is not necessarily that advanced

by the textbook. Very often, besides, school authorities are not content with choosing a textbook, but recommend certain methods intended to free the teacher and student from subservience to the text. The teacher, too, may take it upon himself to modify and interpret the material contained in the text, and may thus inculcate in his students' minds an attitude quite different to the author's. There is also the other extreme. For reasons which are not within our province to discuss here, experienced historians are very rare among history teachers at these levels. The result is that a great many teachers, through ignorance, timidity or negligence, adhere slavishly to their textbooks; of these, the more efficient are sometimes obliged to do so to give their students a better chance of passing examinations. (The examinations that we have had occasion to observe commonly indicate to markers that the student's answer to a question should reproduce the material found on a stated page of the textbook, a system which has been pushed to extremes in the province of Quebec.) Given such conditions, how can we even begin to evaluate the influence of a history textbook?

The choice of a textbook is not always a matter of ideology. More often than not, a department of education or school board decides to adopt a new textbook or keep the old one for practical reasons. For example, one may be more convenient to use, but another less expensive; yet another may fit better into the course of study set by the educational authorities. Further analysis of the motives behind the choice of one textbook over another would be interesting, but that is beyond our scope; we mention the point only to illustrate one of the intangible aspects of the problem. Many such considerations, however, render our conclusions far more hypothetical than positive.

The proliferation of textbooks throughout a country where education is decentralized presented a very basic problem at the outset. To reduce it to workable proportions, we had first to take an inventory of the textbooks and then resign ourselves to making a selection.

It was the Commission's wish that, in examining the Canadian history textbooks in use throughout the country, we should select those which were most representative of texts used by a cross-section of the population. In order to arrive at such a choice, various preliminary steps were taken. First of all, the Commission conducted a brief inquiry among provincial departments of education in order to draw up lists of books by provinces, used by each grade, along with the number of students and the number of books ordered by school boards. Only very incomplete statistics were obtained. We continued this inquiry through correspondence and, when possible, personal contact. In this way we obtained additional information on the two language groups of each province, and also information concerning students of the classical colleges and secondary public schools of Quebec. Provincial authorities provided us with their programmes of study, their teachers' manuals, and sample examinations. Finally, an exchange of letters with textbook publishers brought this phase of the work to a close. All the publishers did their best to provide us with the information we requested. Despite their understandable hesitation to divulge sales figures, they enlightened us greatly on the peculiar conditions of the school textbook market.

At one point consideration was given to a statistical analysis of the data received in order to obtain a strictly scientific sampling, but it was decided that this method would

be less than useful because of the fragmentary nature of the data available at that early stage. It was decided, too, that it would be impractical to try to supplement the basic data through a questionnaire addressed to some 1,600 school boards and 400 independent schools and colleges. The results would only have complicated the data to be considered, and we already had enough information on which to base our choice of typical textbooks.

The selection was difficult, since from some 50 books we had to cull about 15, taking care that the 15 were properly representative of the whole. The diversity of textual material further complicated the task. For example, the great discoveries are sometimes presented in the limited context of America and sometimes integrated with worldwide discoveries on a very broad scale from the fifteenth century to the present day. This diversity crops up again in courses of study. The textbook for the sixth and seventh grades by Guy Laviolette, for example, is much more advanced in style, concepts and vocabulary than its counterpart *La Nouvelle-France*.^{*} School curricula vary between one province and another, making it extremely difficult to establish a correlation between levels, curricula and subjects applicable to the whole country. In sixth grade, a schoolchild in Nova Scotia studies the history of his own province; at the same level, a French-speaking Roman Catholic child in Quebec is expected to digest the entire history of Canada; in Ontario, the French-speaking Catholic has only New France to contend with; a child of the same age in Alberta studies ancient history; and in British Columbia he is only just being introduced to world geography. It would be worthwhile evaluating the psychological effects of these wide variations. In most of the English-speaking[†] provinces, children rarely study Canadian history for more than two years—at the seventh and eighth grade level—while French-speaking pupils in Quebec spend at least six years on the subject, beginning at the tenderest age. All of which must have a profound influence on the attitudes of these children to their country.

The “jungle” impression we get when examining textbooks and school programmes by no means dissipates when we start looking for the biggest and strongest trees as landmarks. Not only are statistics on textbook sales incomplete, but all the publishers we have written to assure us that these figures are not very significant. This, they explain, is the result of the peculiar conditions of the textbook market. When a province adopts a new textbook, a publisher will receive a large order which is not necessarily renewed the following year, because some provinces distribute books to children on loan. A large order for the year 1963-4 may therefore mean that a province has changed textbooks; a reduced order a year later does not necessarily mean that the book is reaching a smaller group since only a small number of copies may be needed to replace those lost by the children. The previous year's purchase will still be in use.

Another factor difficult to gauge is the number of books ordered for a school library or a teacher's collection. The indications are that the contents of these books do reach the students, either because the teacher refers frequently to them or because he requires his students to use them for research or for additional reading.

^{*}Intended for French-speaking Roman Catholic students in Ontario.

The number of students registered in each class does not offer a reliable yardstick either. It means nothing at all in those provinces where the schools have a choice between five or six textbooks, as is the case in Quebec and Ontario, the most populous of the provinces. In the others, where the number of students registered should, in principle, correspond with the distribution of a prescribed textbook, we encountered the same difficulties: variation in school curricula and diversity of subject matter at a given school level.

If we try to distinguish between the two main language groups, the task is no easier. On what basis should it be done? By the language in which textbooks are written? In that case there would be only Quebec textbooks to be compared with those of the English-speaking provinces. We would then have to consider all nine of the latter as a single ethnic and cultural entity, which would distort our perspective.

Should we rather consider geographic, cultural or religious factors? We would then be confronted with the most bewildering multiplicity. For example, English Roman Catholic schools at the elementary level in Quebec have their own Canadian history textbook, while English-speaking Catholics at the same level in Newfoundland have a completely different one; among the Acadians of New Brunswick, some textbooks come from Quebec, others from the French schools of Ontario, and still others are translations of English-language books; while in Manitoba and Nova Scotia French-speaking children use the same books as English-speaking children. Thus geographic, cultural or religious criteria, considered separately, would only have led us up a blind alley.

In making our choice of textbooks, we attempted to resolve the numerous difficulties as follows.

First we arranged the actual school levels in four groups or divisions, establishing, as far as possible, a correlation between study programmes. We began with Grades V and VI, the level at which the study of history begins in most provinces, except Quebec and British Columbia. More advanced levels were grouped in the same manner: Grades VII and VIII, during which Canadian history is studied in most provinces (though for a varying duration according to the course of study); Grades IX and X (the beginning of secondary school), during which the rest of the world is the principal object of study in history; Grades XI, XII and XIII (the end of secondary school), which bring the students back to Canadian history in one form or another. With this arrangement, our divisions correspond both to school levels and to the general programmes of study.

For each division, we selected as far as possible books published in large numbers or those which, although they may not be widely distributed, are used in more than one province as basic textbooks or reference works.

Secondly, after careful consideration, we divided our selection equally between books in French and English, despite the much larger English-speaking population. This is because, in the broad sense, English-speaking Canadians share a homogeneous culture and recognize a single heritage whose manifestations are more or less similar from one end of the country to the other. For French-speaking Canadians, moreover, history is normally a major cultural tool and occupies a place of great importance in school programmes. It should be noted that we have seen fit to include a number of French-language books representing new ways of thinking alongside works of the traditional type.

Thirdly, other factors we took into account were religion (for English-speaking Roman Catholics), ethnicity (for the Acadians), and geography.

These various considerations led us to formulate the following rule: to select, as far as possible, textbooks of wide distribution for each level, maintaining a balance between French and English books, except for the addition of one or two representing important religious, ethnic, cultural or regional minorities.

However, if we had adhered strictly to this rule our list would have been too long. We had therefore to eliminate a number of books, and this we did by reducing the scope of our study. Although a survey over a period of 15 years (a complete school generation) would have been of great interest, we decided to restrict ourselves to a single year, 1963-4. We also decided not to include books used in normal schools, although the training of teachers has a direct influence on the teaching of history.

There are numerous series covering the various periods in the history curriculum. In such cases we limited our examination to a single volume rather than attempt a complete study of the entire series, since the thinking of the author or authors is not likely to change very much from one volume to another. Nevertheless we consulted the other volumes of a series whenever it appeared useful to do so.

In order not to exceed the maximum of four books for each of our divisions, we eliminated a few important ones some because they are of purely regional interest (as in the case of *Living in Canada*, by Alex. A. Cameron and others, which is only used in Saskatchewan), but generally because we already had too many books in one language for a particular division. For example we eliminated *Land of Promise* by John L. Field and Lloyd A. Dennis in favour of *The Story of Canada* by George Brown and others, used by the provinces of an entire geographic region, in order to include a book used in British Columbia. In other cases, certain old textbooks still in use seemed to be the direct progenitors of more recent ones; thus, the Farley-Lamarche text seemed in a sense to survive through *Mon pays* by the Abbés Plante and Martel.

The results of our inquiry are set forth in two main parts. Part 1 is a study of the general orientation of teaching: first, how the material is organized and then how it is presented. Part 2 is devoted to the most important themes; one chapter in this section deals with the themes of particular interest to the Commission. In conclusion, we propose some solutions to the problem of teaching Canadian history for the country as a whole.

The following is a list of the 14 textbooks which we selected as suitable for the Commission's purpose.

Grades V and VI

Guy Lavolette, f.i.c., *L'épopée canadienne* [The Canadian Epic] (Laprairie, Procure des frères de l'instruction chrétienne, 1954).

This textbook, used in Quebec in the sixth and seventh grades, is the fifth volume in a series of seven. Since this series closely resembles two others used almost equally in Quebec, we selected books from the other two series for another division. This volume covers the history of Canada from its discovery to the present day.

Frères Charles and Léon, é.c., *La Nouvelle-France* (Toronto, Nelson, 1960). Cited hereafter as "Charles".

This book is also part of a series; it is very new and much in favour. We chose it because it is intended for the French Roman Catholic minority of Ontario, and because its publisher stresses its "completely bicultural approach." The authors, we are told, "have gone to great lengths to trace the historical, cultural, judicial and other roots of our country through the parallel study of French and English history." The publisher's principal competitor agrees with this appraisal. The book covers Canada from its origins to 1763.

Marjorie W. Hamilton, *Pirates and Pathfinders* (Toronto, Clarke, Irwin, 1954), latest edition, 1963.

This volume appears to be typical of English-language textbooks for this level. Of the books recommended for Grade V in Ontario, this is the one that sells most widely. It deals with all the great discoveries from the time of Marco Polo to the ascent of Everest.

Phyllis Ruth Blakeley, *Nova Scotia, A Brief History* (Toronto, Dent, 1955), latest edition, 1964.

The Grade VI textbook in Nova Scotia, this is one of a series on the histories of the provinces. We selected it to illustrate the regional and cultural point of view of Nova Scotians, who, by their own admission, constitute a truly distinct people with a cultural and economic outlook preserved by their traditional conservatism. In this book, the history of the province covers the period from the seventeenth century to the twentieth century.

Grades VII and VIII

Frères des écoles chrétiennes, *Mon pays* (Montreal, F.E.C., 1954). Cited hereafter as "FEC".

This book, the seventh of a series, covers the history of Canada from its origins to the present.

Lester B. Rogers [and others], *Canada in the World Today* (Toronto, Clarke, Irwin, 1950), latest edition, 1963. Cited hereafter as "Rogers".

This book is used in Grade VIII in British Columbia and according to the publisher, it is also used in other provinces. We selected it for its regional character and above all because it introduces schoolchildren in British Columbia to Canadian history. It deals also with the history of Great Britain, France and the United States.

George W. Brown, Eleanor Harman, and Marsh Jeanneret, *The Story of Canada* (Toronto, Copp Clark, 1950). Cited hereafter as "Brown".

Used in Grade VII by schoolchildren in New Brunswick, Nova Scotia and Alberta, this book is also used, in its French version by Charles Bilodeau, by the French-speaking children of New Brunswick. An additional reason for selecting it was that Mr. Brown was the author of several textbooks widely distributed for many years. This volume covers the history of Canada from its origins to the present time.

Murray Ballantyne and Paul Gallagher, *Canada's Story for Young Canadians*, I: *New France*; II: *1763 to the Present* (Toronto, Dent, 1962), second edition, 1963. Cited hereafter as "Ballantyne".

This book was chosen because it is typical of how Canadian history is taught to the English-speaking minority in Quebec. It covers Canada from its beginnings to the present day.

Grades IX and X

This section differs somewhat from the others. At this level, children study very little Canadian history as such, but the prescribed curricula do seem to illustrate in one way or

another the theme of our historic heritage. In any event, the prescribed textbooks while they are, properly speaking, general world histories, place considerable emphasis on Canada and a study of events and problems as related to our own country.

For all practical purposes, therefore, we consider these books of significance in the teaching of Canadian history and appropriate for clarifying several points of concern to the Commission.

We selected the following books:

Gérard Filteau, *L'héritage du vieux monde* [Our Old World Heritage], *Manuel d'histoire générale à l'usage des écoles secondaires publiques* (Montreal, Centre de Psychologie et de Pédagogie, 1956). Cited hereafter as "Filteau, *Hér.*"

This book, which is used in Quebec and New Brunswick, is typical of the underlying attitude in the teaching of Canadian history in the French-speaking milieu. It deals with European history up to the beginning of the seventeenth century, but always in relation to the history of the New World.

John T. Saywell, John C. Ricker, and Elliot E. Rose, *The Modern Era* (Toronto, Clarke, Irwin, 1960), latest edition, 1964. Cited hereafter as "Saywell".

This book is used in Grade X in Ontario. About a third of its contents is devoted to Canadian history. It appears to us to be the English counterpart of the preceding work.

Grades XI, XII and XIII

Abbés Hermann Plante and Louis Martel, *Mon pays, Synthèse d'histoire du Canada* [My Country, A Synthesis of Canadian History] (Quebec, Éditions du Pélican, 3rd edition, 1963). Cited hereafter as "Plante".

This text illustrates very well how Canadian history is taught in the classical colleges of Quebec. Without making a break with historiographic tradition, it attempts to rethink certain minor aspects.

Gérard Filteau, *La civilisation catholique et française au Canada* [Catholic and French Society in Canada] (Montreal, Centre de Psychologie et de Pédagogie, 1960). Cited hereafter as "Filteau, *Civ.*"

Filteau's work corresponds exactly to the guidelines laid down by the Quebec Department of Education at the time of its publication. His book has become a kind of bible, a perfect example of history put to the service of an ideology.

J. M. S. Careless, *Canada, A Story of Challenge* (Toronto, Macmillan, 1953), latest edition, 1964. Cited hereafter as "Careless".

This work was not written as a textbook; its author intended it for general public consumption. In the province of Saskatchewan it serves as the textbook for the final year

of high school. It appears to be quite typical of the teaching of Canadian history in the western provinces.

Edgar McInnis, *The North American Nations* (Toronto, Dent, 1963). Cited hereafter as "McInnis".

The work of a prolific and highly-regarded author, this book is used in Grade XIII in Ontario. It covers Canada and the United States from colonial times to the present.

The purpose of our study is to demonstrate the degree of variation, in content and interpretation, in the teaching of Canadian history across the country. We do not attempt to furnish a critique of the kind undertaken by Maurice G. Baxter, Robert H. Ferrel and John E. Wirtz in *The Teaching of American History in High Schools* (Bloomington, 1964); our analysis is restricted to the letter and spirit of textbooks in use during the single year 1963-4.

Part I, on the general orientation of teaching in Canadian history, is divided into three chapters. In Chapter I we deal with the objectives of the authors who wrote the textbooks. In Chapter II we examine the arrangement of the material, and in Chapter III we describe briefly the way in which the authors have presented their subject.

Among the general studies that we have used as guides, three are of particular interest: *The Canadian School History Textbook Survey*, published in 1934 by the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, Baptist Bookroom, Toronto; *Report of the Committee for the Study of Canadian History Textbooks*, by the Canada and Newfoundland Education Association, *Bulletin*, vol. I, no. 1, Oct. 1945, 1-38; *History Textbooks and International Understanding*, by J.A. Lauwerys, "Towards World Understanding" series, XI (Paris, UNESCO, 1953). Two other works are useful in a general way: *The Nature of Prejudice*, by Gordon W. Allport (New York, Doubleday, 1958) and *Understanding History*, by Louis Gottschalk (New York, Knopf, 1958).

In writing a textbook, an author's criteria for organizing his material and the way he presents it are generally determined by the objectives he has chosen to pursue. When we come to study the general themes and the contents of particular textbooks, a number of prejudices become apparent; these are perhaps not so much the result of chauvinism as of each author's idea of the function of Canadian history teaching.

For this reason we felt it necessary to begin this report with an examination of the objectives of each of the textbooks we selected, or at least what appear to be their objectives. Since the authors do not always clearly indicate their particular conception of Canadian history teaching or its purpose, it was necessary in some cases to proceed by deduction from the way in which the material was presented or the interpretation of events. Even where an author's conception is clearly expressed, we hesitate to label him in a particular way, be he a professional historian or otherwise. We are simply trying to understand why there are such divergencies between one work and another, apart from those caused by the authors' different origins. The brief survey that follows should reveal something of the authors' views as indicated by the contents of their books.

We might have conducted our examination by author, alphabetically, but since the authors' objectives correspond, in final analysis, to their language ties, we considered it more convenient to divide the authors into English and French language groups.

A. English-Language Textbooks

In our English-language group, the textbook intended for beginners, in Grade V, is Marjorie W. Hamilton's *Pirates and Pathfinders*. This book, a history of exploration in general, has the single aim of awakening its young readers to discovery and to "the lives of the adventurous men who travelled to the ends of the earth" (xi); the author also expresses the hope that the book will facilitate "a new understanding of the people of other parts of the world and their way of life" (xi).

Nova Scotia by Phyllis Blakeley, for pupils in Grade VI, states its objectives only in the conclusion, when the author twice exhorts her young readers to play a part in the building of a strong and united nation:

Nova Scotians have gone out to all parts of Canada to help build a strong and united nation. In Nova Scotia men and women and children whose ancestors belonged to many races live peacefully together. Nova Scotians of olden times have done great deeds. We should be proud of them and carry on what they have begun so nobly. You boys and girls of today are the men and women of tomorrow who can help build a better Nova Scotia and a strong and united Canada (Blakeley, 209).

At the seventh and eighth grade level, the English-language textbooks state their aims more frequently. *Canada in the World Today* by Rogers, which is much more a textbook of social studies than of history, declares at the outset that the purpose of its teaching is to "make us all better citizens" (xiii). Besides the sections on geography and on the history of England, France and the United States, there is an extensive one entitled "Citizenship in Canada." According to this book, the study of Canadian history can prepare the future adult for his role as a citizen by giving him an understanding of his country (xiv, 98) and implanting in him the idea that progress for the entire society is accomplished by its individual members, providing that they work together democratically and with respect for all, minority and majority alike. The book expresses the hope that the child will have "a desire to share in the task of making Canada the country that we all want it to be" (xv, 297, 312, 322 ff., 330, 338 ff., 355, 357ff.). In the introduction it stresses many times over that Canada should become "a truly great nation." Moreover, it says, the unity of Canada has a special significance: "our provinces are alike in more ways than they are different," and, because we have all shown good will toward one another, Canada has become something like a "miniature United Nations" which has succeeded in holding its own: "There is no magic or secret about the way in which we have accomplished the task. The methods used were simple. They were a willingness to cooperate with others different from ourselves, to give everyone a square deal, and to obey the rules of democracy" (Rogers, 338).

The position adopted by the authors of this book appears to be somewhat shaky, however. The examples they give of this unity tend to be materialistic rather than illustrative of the underlying principles at work. The authors seem to take no account of the existence of apparently irreconcilable conflicts between the objectives of groups of different ethnic origins.

In Brown's *The Story of Canada*, and even more insistently in the teacher's manual that goes with it, we find the same idea of democracy at the service of Canadian unity as an objective in the teaching of history. A sense of democracy, the book maintains, takes precedence over patriotism, or, better still, it is one's sense of democracy that makes one a good patriot. In order to develop one's sense of democracy, history should lead one to a thorough understanding of the present:

Can history teach us to understand the present? To help the child understand, so far as he can, the world in which he lives, and to train him to take his place in it to the best of his ability along with his fellows, are among the primary aims of

education in a democracy. The present must, therefore, bulk large in any consideration of the school curriculum. History at every level of instruction can make a contribution to these aims in at least two ways: . . . it can arouse the imagination, train the judgment, and stimulate the power of logical thought and expression. . . . Secondly, history can show us the present in perspective. The present is confusing, and although in perspective much detail is lost, much that is important stands out. Indeed we cannot really understand or appreciate (that is make valid judgment about) the situations around us unless we know something of their historical backgrounds (Brown, *Teacher's Manual*, xii-xiii).

Therein lies an essential ideal for society: "No society, whatever its material power, is stronger than the attitudes of its people, or than the faith which it has in itself, its institutions and ideals" (Brown, *Teacher's Manual*, viii). On this, the teacher must take a stand: "The school cannot avoid teaching attitudes and points of view even if it wished to do so. Consciously or unconsciously they will permeate the classroom. . . . On the teacher more than on anyone else rests the responsibility which our democratic society has thrust upon the schools" (Brown, *Teacher's Manual*, ix-x).

Despite the importance given to an understanding of the present, nowhere is there any mention of the problems that divide Canadians today. As far as this book is concerned, Canada's human conflict appears to be a problem already resolved.

Canada's Story for Young Canadians by Ballantyne, used at the same level, takes a much more realistic stand. Three times on the same page of the introduction, the authors apply the word *drama* to our history, with its connotation of human conflict and the occurrence of distressing events. This word *drama* appears to us to be an excellent illustration of the message projected by this book: the human conflict underlying our society has not come to an end; the realization of Canada's promise is in the hands of the rising generation. The authors cite D'Arcy McGee: "I look to the future of my adopted country with hope, though not without anxiety; I see in the not remote distance one great nationality, bound, like the shield of Achilles, by the blue rim of ocean. I see it quartered into many communities each disposing of its internal affairs—but all bound together by free institutions, free intercourse and free commerce" (quoted in Ballantyne, II, 161).

There is still much to be done, declare the authors in a chapter with the revealing title, "The Future is Yours." Many problems must be faced, in particular that of disunity. In this domain, errors have been committed and victories won by others in the past, and it is useless to dwell upon them: "Canada's past and Canada's present have been the work of others. You can and should learn from the past and the present, but they are beyond your control. It is the rest of Canada's story that is yours to write" (Ballantyne, II, 208).

In any event, we must accept the basic duality of the country: "Laurier was a man like Baldwin and Lafontaine. He saw that history had made Canada both English and French, and he felt that Canada's growth and glory must lie in the acceptance of this fact" (Ballantyne, II, 208).

In the other English-language textbooks used at senior levels, the situation is seen with the same realism. *The Modern Era* by Saywell and *The North American Nations* by

McInnis both show very well that yesterday's problems are not yet solved. In *The Modern Era* we read:

The Modern Era makes no pretensions to have an answer for the problems facing man today. The authors hope, however, that by stating some of the most important of these, explaining their background and discussing their implications, their book will help the student of today and the citizen of tomorrow to inform himself and reach his own conclusions about many complicated and vital questions which inevitably will confront his generation (Saywell, x).

McInnis, for his part, writes that, to achieve understanding, we must appreciate "... the basic formative factors—the internal dualism of race and language, the traditions inherited from the past, and the external influences, including the constant and pervasive influence of the United States" (McInnis, 395).

There is, nevertheless, a persistent underlying feeling of national identity, despite the divisive factors of geography, ethnic origin and religious belief (McInnis, 385). There exists too a body of common interests, and this must be brought forth in teaching:

Canada's concept of her basic national interests was now firmly established. Democratic government, social welfare, economic expansion through the joint efforts of public and private enterprise—these were the bases for progress accepted by the great majority of Canadians. They represented a consensus on fundamental purposes and aims, and the only room left for serious controversy was the means by which they should be achieved and the size of the effort that should be undertaken" (McInnis, 384).

Canada, A Story of Challenge by Careless is another book in which the teaching of history presents an opportunity for looking squarely at the problems with which Canada continues to be faced: "deadly world danger, economic dependence, the possibility of American absorption, debt, unemployment, sectionalism"; but these are not new problems and the present generation is just as capable of solving them as was that of the 1860s. That being so, the study of the past can provide stimulation:

A historic parallel might strengthen Canadians for their newest time of troubles: the comparison of their country in the 1860's and in the 1960's... Assuredly, conditions one hundred years later offered no exact comparisons—but the parallel still might be suggestive. At any rate, as Canadians faced the problems that lay between them and their centennial year of 1967, they could yet look for support to the most distinctive thing about them: their history (Careless, 433).

B. French-Language Textbooks

While the intention of English-language textbooks is generally to educate the citizen of tomorrow in a political or social sense, French-language textbooks tend to be preoccupied with his moral education. The Charles and Plante works, however, deserve recognition for avoiding this moralistic current.

In *La Nouvelle-France*, Charles assigns a purpose to the teaching of history which corresponds fairly well to the requirements of the discipline as such: to acquaint the student with the figures of our past and to recall them to memory. The book also tries to inspire the student to "aimer la belle terre canadienne, notre patrie à tous" (to love the fair Canadian soil, our homeland; Charles, 3) but this is clearly secondary and in no way interferes with the treatment of the subject; facts are always presented in a straightforward way and the interpretation rarely seems tendentious.

Plante states his conception of the role of history in the last section of the book *Mon pays*: "Il ne reste plus qu'à esquisser un *tour d'horizon*, à réfléchir sur la situation présente, à conjecturer l'avenir. L'histoire qui se nourrit du passé, éclaire les problèmes actuels et doit conduire à l'action. La nôtre, toute pleine de grandes réalisations, nous inspire la fierté et l'optimisme (Plante, 351).¹ When he states that "l'histoire, qui se nourrit du passé, éclaire les problèmes actuels et doit conduire à l'action" (history rich with the past throws light upon the problems of today and should point the way for action), the author is expressing the same idea as his English colleagues, and this is perfectly justifiable. The following sentence, however, reveals the influence of traditional ideologies: our history, "toute pleine de grandes réalisations, nous inspire la fierté et l'optimisme" (brimming with great accomplishments, fills us with pride and optimism). This is restated later in the context of French Canadian literature: "C'est là que sont conservés les souvenirs du passé, que sont racontés et exaltés les actions de nos pères, leurs moeurs, leurs espoirs, leurs craintes, leurs deuils; c'est là que la génération présente puise des lumières qui donneront un sens à son action patriotique" (Plante, 409).²

The teaching of history is therefore not to be restricted to a simple explanation of problems through an understanding of the past. Nevertheless, this book is set apart because, like the work by Charles, it does not have the sermonizing tone that pervades the rest of the French textbooks.

The latter, in fact, have clearly been written with the moral education of tomorrow's citizen in mind. In *L'épopée canadienne* by Guy Laviolette, for Grades VI and VII, the intention is to mould Canadians who will be enthusiastic, directed towards a great ideal, whose desire is to become "généreux, vaillants, conquérants, de vrais patriotes, quoi!" (generous, courageous, victorious, true patriots, in short; Laviolette, 4). The author reveals his intention from the very beginning. This book, he writes, "... n'a d'autre but que de vous donner une magnifique *vue d'ensemble* de notre histoire de manière à faire aimer notre pays, Dieu qui l'a créé, et les hommes qui l'ont transformé" (Laviolette, 3).³

We need not pass judgment here on whether the *vue d'ensemble* is magnificent or not, but after such a pronouncement we should hardly be surprised to find that the book's teaching consists of a series of exhortations. We must bring our ancestors back to life, writes the author; they must rise from the grave to exhort the Canadians of today; or, he continues, spellbound, should some bronze statue (of Father Labelle, for example) suddenly come to life and begin giving orders, "on sent bien qu'il faut lui obéir" (we would know we must obey; Laviolette, 289). More exhortations are forthcoming from the poet Crémazie himself:

Restez dans la patrie où vous prîtes le jour,
Gardez pour ses combats votre ardeur enivrante,

Gardez pour ses besoins votre force puissante,
Pour ses saintes beautés, gardez tout votre amour!
(quoted by Laviolette, 322)⁴

This kind of history is only good for turning out fine, upstanding boy scouts.

The same preoccupation with moralistic education is found in *Mon pays* by the Frères des écoles chrétiennes, for Grades VIII and IX. This book reaches a higher standard than the preceding work, but the purpose it assigns to the teaching of history is the same: to sermonize. Why teach history? The authors reply, "Former des hommes, à la fois Canadiens et catholiques convaincus, telle est l'ultime fin de l'enseignement de notre histoire nationale" (FEC, 5).⁵ Because, as we read on page 304: "... l'histoire du passé, c'est la suite ininterrompue d'exemples d'efforts patients, de courage tenace, de volonté ardente de la part des découvreurs, des explorateurs, des défricheurs, des colons, des marins, des soldats, des évêques, des missionnaires, des mères de famille incomparables."⁶

For an even more certain attainment of the aim in view, the book makes a point of indicating to teachers, not how they should instruct their pupils, but how they should go about motivating them:

La formation de la VOLONTÉ, de première importance évidemment, ne s'avère pas toujours facile. Le livre d'Histoire pourra y contribuer par les exemples d'énergie tenace qu'offrent les colons, les missionnaires, les hommes d'État. Ces héros entrevoyaient un noble but, ils l'ont poursuivi malgré tout, sans défaillance, sans respect humain, sans crainte des souffrances et de la mort même. L'application personnelle d'une pareille force d'âme dans leurs devoirs propres d'étudiants s'imposera aux enfants, surtout si les éducateurs, à la suite du manuel, multiplient les rapprochements (FEC, 4f.).⁷

It follows naturally that the authors should add, along with many other words of advice, the following gem: "Après votre catéchisme, votre manuel d'Histoire du Canada doit être le plus aimé de vos livres" (after your catechism, your Canadian history textbook should be the most precious of all your books; FEC, 7). They might just as well have said that it could substitute for the catechism.

With Filteau, the history book looks less like a catechism as its exhortations take on a more sophisticated tone. Here we have didactic history; elevating, self-improvement history. If you apply yourself to knowing yourself, your neighbours and "les autres peuples de l'univers" (the other peoples of the world), the study of history, writes the author, "... deviendra ainsi une merveilleuse aventure qui vous permettra de faire connaissance avec de grands hommes, des héros, des saints parmi lesquels vous trouverez de nombreux exemples de courage, de patriotisme, de pratique des plus belles vertus naturelles et surnaturelles" (Filteau, *Hér.*, 8).⁸

The author is even more religiously didactic in his other book, for Grade XI, the title of which gives a good indication of its orientation: *La civilisation catholique et française au Canada*. On page 11, he states that the role of history is to explain the present and the future, but later he writes: "Il n'est pas nécessaire de réfléchir longtemps sur le sens de notre histoire pour nous convaincre que nous avons un rôle à jouer dans le monde, même une vocation à suivre" (Filteau, *Civ.*, 469).⁹

Note the word *vocation* used in the religious sense. To make himself even better understood, Filteau adds the words of a bishop: "Le plus sûr moyen de rejoindre la trajectoire du vouloir divin, c'est d'être soi-même, de se développer, Dieu aidant, en tablant sur ses propres richesses" (quoted in Filteau, *Civ.*, 469).¹⁰ This book is more than a catechism, it is the theology of history.

How do our textbook authors divide up Canadian history? How much of their text do they assign to Canada and how much to other nations? How much consideration do they give to the various regions of Canada? What are the things that command their particular attention? These are the questions we shall attempt to answer in this chapter.

A. *The Main Periods of History*

For practical purposes there are four broad and easily distinguishable periods of Canadian history. The first, the period of early French colonization, corresponds with the era of administration by commercial companies, and extends from the earliest times to 1663. Next comes the period of crown administration, the century of French rule ending with the conquest. We should note in passing that French occupation in Acadia came to an end in 1713, except for Île Royale (Cape Breton), which remained French until 1758. After French rule came the British regime, from 1760 to Confederation. Finally, we have the years after Confederation, known also as the contemporary or national period. The duration of each of the last three periods is roughly a century, which to some extent facilitates comparison.

The period of French colonization, which French-language textbooks like to call the "heroic period," is ignored by all but two of the English-language textbooks; the Blakeley history of Nova Scotia devotes 10 per cent of its text to this period, and *The Story of Canada* by Brown gives it 8 per cent, the latter delighting in the picturesque sagas with which this era abounds. In the few pages given over to this period, the English-language textbooks pay considerable attention to the Indians, British exploration of Canada and even Spanish exploration, as well as the history of Acadia, all of which the French-language textbooks tend somewhat to overlook. The latter generally devote a proportion varying between 16 per cent and 25 per cent to the colonization period which means that, in some cases, the period previous to 1663 receives as much attention as the century

following Confederation. We note, however, one exception among the French authors; in *La civilisation catholique et française au Canada*, Filteau considers the contemporary period as the most important because it is the one in which “la nationalité canadienne-française” is at last able to defend itself against the British conquest.

When we pass on to the period of French rule (1663-1760), we find that the variation still exists but is less marked. The English-language authors give it 10 to 20 per cent of their text (Brown even devotes as much as 30 per cent to it), while the French-language authors allow upwards of 30 per cent, and in one case as much as 48 per cent. This demonstrates the importance attached by French Canadian authors to the century of the French regime. There emerges moreover a curious situation that warrants attention. While the English Canadian authors have a tendency to consider these first two periods (colonization and French rule) as a single one, there is a corresponding tendency on the part of the French Canadian authors to disregard the 1867 dividing line and consider the contemporary period as a prolongation of the British regime.

These variations fade, though only on first sight, when we come to the two final periods, the British regime and the period after Confederation. Generally speaking, all authors give about 30 per cent of their space to these two periods together. Differences show up once again on detailed examination. The English Canadian authors, at last finding themselves on familiar ground—political history—give a well-coordinated chronological sequence of events, while the French Canadian writers retain only what interests them in particular, leaving much by the wayside. The best example of this is *L'épopée canadienne* by Guy Laviolette. After reading this book, an adult, and much less a child in Grade VI or VII, would be incapable of retracing even roughly the sequence of events in Canadian history in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

In dealing with the first two periods (colonization and French rule), both French- and English-language authors tread virtually the same ground as far as pure content is concerned. They cite the same names and report the same events; the only noticeable difference is the pleasure taken by the French-language writers in recounting their history and the haste of the English-language writers to be finished and done with it as quickly as possible. When they come to the periods of the British regime and Confederation, however, one has the impression that the two sets of authors are not even writing the history of the same country. This is particularly true of certain older books for elementary classes, like the histories of the Frères des écoles chrétiennes and the Frères de l'instruction chrétienne [in comparison with their English Canadian counterparts]. As an example at the secondary level, Filteau and Plante grapple head-on with the “English problem” for French Canadians, while English Canadian authors like Careless and McInnis are much more concerned about American influence.

There are two special observations to be made before ending this section. First, in the textbook on the history of Nova Scotia, only 10 per cent of the total text is given to the period after Confederation, while 65 per cent is taken up with the British colonial period. The subtleties of provincial politics have apparently been considered beyond the grasp of Grade VI children, and economic and cultural development since 1867 has not been thought sufficiently important to be given extensive study. Secondly, Filteau's *L'héritage du vieux monde*, which deals with world history from earliest times to the seventeenth

century, carves out historic periods that fit the pattern of a particular concern: ancient history (Egypt, Greece and Rome) takes up only 30 per cent of the book, whereas the middle ages and the renaissance occupy 70 per cent. For moralistic reasons, the heritage of the ancient civilizations has been passed over, leaving the limelight to the feudal middle ages and the period of counter-reformation, whose links with French Canadian culture are constantly stressed by the author.

B. Allotment of Space to Canada and Other Nations

In more than half the English-language textbooks under study, the history of Canada is integrated with that of other nations, in particular Great Britain, France and the United States, while only one of our six French-language textbooks uses this method.

The space given to each nation is yet another indication of how the authors view their Canadian heritage. In all cases, Canada occupies the most space (about 40 per cent) followed by the United States.

There are interesting variations for Great Britain. Either it ranks third after the United States, or else its place of importance is inconsistent with reality. In Saywell's *The Modern Era* (for Grade X in Ontario), Great Britain has second place with 34 per cent, considerably ahead of the United States, which has 28 per cent, and yet the period concerned (1900-1960) is one in which Britain's role diminishes progressively; no other European country is accorded any place worth mentioning. We concede that Saywell's approach is justifiable in that the book is intended for students of British origin, but Marjorie Hamilton's approach in *Pirates and Pathfinders* we find quite unacceptable. This book, supposedly a history of exploration from the thirteenth century to the present day, devotes 60 per cent of its text to the achievements of British explorers alone and completely ignores the French.

If there is a presentation of the English Canadian point of view that tries to be fair in this respect, it is to be found in Rogers' *Canada in the World Today*; here, when our European heritage is dealt with, the space given to Britain (59 per cent of the text) is still considerably greater than that given to France (41 per cent). In English textbooks as a whole, however, Britain ranks far behind the United States.

With a French Canadian author, the shoe is very much on the other foot. In *L'héritage du vieux monde*, Filteau gives three chapters to England out of a total of twenty-nine, while France has six to itself and predominates in five others. Paradoxically, the American work that Filteau draws upon (with surprising fidelity) gives the leading role to Britain.

C. History of Canada and the Provinces

In general, Canadian history is taught not from the national standpoint but from the provincial. Fewer than half of the chapters in the textbooks under study treat Canada as a whole, and then only when economic upheavals or institutional changes take place.

When we examine the treatment given the provinces, we find an astonishing situation: French-language textbooks pay very little attention to the Atlantic provinces. We note here one exception, *La Nouvelle-France* by Charles, the reason being that this book, which is intended for a minority, has an eye on the textbook market for the schools of that region.

In the textbooks used in Quebec, it would seem that English-language authors have taken pains to follow the recommendation that equal treatment be given to Quebec and Upper Canada, but this is not the case with French-language authors. The latter rarely throw more than a few crumbs to Upper Canada, giving more substantial consideration to the western provinces.

On this subject we shall say no more at this point, for there will be many further opportunities to discuss the matter one way or another.

D. Other Areas of Concern

In concluding this chapter we shall limit our remarks to commenting briefly on the differences shown by the authors of textbooks, regarding other major areas of concern.

English-language textbooks pay little attention to religious history, while those in French always give it very generous treatment. From a French textbook's table of contents alone, an unbiased reader might be led to think that religious history plays a rather small part; only on careful reading will he realize how closely the history of the Roman Catholic Church is interwoven with that of the people.

The same may be said of economic history, which permeates the entire story told by English Canadian authors, while French Canadian authors introduce it only at certain times and places.

One may likewise find fault with the space given by one group or the other to political events (half in books by English-language authors, never more than a third in the works of French-language authors), or again to military events (for English authors a quarter, and for French authors a fifth at the secondary level and a third at the elementary).

In the final analysis, what counts most is not the number of pages devoted to a particular category, but the atmosphere a book creates and the tone it adopts (apologetic or detached, analytic or not, as the case may be). In other words, the most important aspect to be examined is the manner in which historical material is presented; that will be our subject in the chapter that follows.

The arrangement of historical material may be revealing, but the way in which it is presented is far more so. For example, a word here and a word there is enough to convey quite a different slant to a book than its space-distribution might suggest. A number of writers have already pointed this out:

Difficult though the problem of space-distribution may be in a historical essay, it is simple compared to the subtleties of emphasis raised by the choice of words. . . . Innocent and colorless words like *though*, *while*, *and*, and *but*, when they serve as conjunctions between facts, may assume a telling or misleading character (Gottschalk, *Understanding History*, 206).

Thus each label we use, especially those of primary potency, distracts our attention from concrete reality. The living, breathing, complex individual (the ultimate unit of human nature) is lost to sight . . . the label magnifies one attribute out of all proportions to its true significance, and masks other important attributes of the individual (Allport, *The Nature of Prejudice*, 175).

The stereotypes found in [history textbooks] are much more subtle, involved, difficult to describe—but they are probably no nearer to the infinitely changeable and differentiated reality. The primary stage is the one at which the stereotypes receive their initial form. Later corrections are made only with difficulty. Now the formation of stereotypes is a necessary stage in mental growth: the danger, however, is that if untrue or distorted national stereotypes are accepted as correct pictures of reality, then the harmonization of the national groups is made difficult or impossible. For instance, if one national group thinks another typically treacherous and unreliable, what degree of support will be granted to statesmen who endeavour to make agreements with that group? Let us remember that atavistic traits of human nature lead us easily to attach denigrating, insulting, derogatory attributes to groups other than our own. The fact that the resulting stereotype is an evil caricature of reality in no way guards us against its pernicious effects. Let us by all means tell “the truth” in history books about the faults and defects of other nations—but let us be certain it is the truth and a balanced truth. And, in doubt, let us abstain. Generosity towards other nations would not harm the growth of loyalty to our own (Lauwerys, *History Textbooks and International Understanding*, 59-60).

With these principles in mind, we shall endeavour to see how our textbooks present historical material. We should like to study this question at length, but an extensive examination would take us beyond our terms of reference. Therefore we shall simply make a brief study of the authors' techniques: the use of words, the visual message, the general tone of the text, the small and seemingly innocent devices used to advance one's own point of view; we shall also endeavour to single out passages whose clear intention is to be conciliatory.

For a valid comparison of English- and French-language textbooks, we should find texts containing exactly the same information and differing only in the language in which they are written. Unfortunately, our selection of books, while all dealing with the history of Canada, differ so much, both in general and in detail, that it is impossible to place them in juxtaposition for comparative purposes.

A. *He Who Translates Betrays**

Luckily, one of our chosen textbooks, *The Story of Canada* by Brown, has been translated into French by Charles Bilodeau and published under the title *Notre histoire*. Here we have the same historical material, but in different languages, and this will facilitate our study of differences in wording.

We observe at once that the translation strays from the original most of all where the original is unfavourable to the French; consciously or not, the translator has toned down or even modified the English Canadian author's thinking.

Here is how Brown recounts Cartier's departure for France after the winter of 1535-6 (italics are ours):

The little band of Frenchmen was glad to set sail again for France the following spring. With them they took many valuable furs that the Indians had traded to them during their stay on the St. Lawrence. *Indeed they took more than furs.* Before setting sail, Cartier invited the Indian chiefs aboard his ship. Of those who came, several were not allowed to return to shore. *Instead, they were kidnapped* and taken to France. Unfortunately, they were *never* to see Canada again, for they all died in the strange land of the white man (Brown, 16).

Bilodeau's translation reads as follows:

Au printemps le petit groupe de Français fut heureux de se rembarquer pour la France. Ils apportaient avec eux de riches fourrures qu'ils avaient échangées avec les Indiens pendant leur séjour, *mais ce n'était pas tout*. Avant de mettre à la voile, Cartier invita les chefs indiens à bord de son navire. De ceux qui vinrent, plusieurs furent *gardés de force* et transportés en France. Malheureusement, ils ne devaient plus revoir le Canada, car ils moururent tous dans le pays étrange de l'homme blanc (Bilodeau, 16).

Here the translator has softened the English wording: "indeed they took more than furs" becomes *mais ce n'était pas tout*; "never" has been rendered simply as *ne plus*,

*From the Italian *traduttore, traditore*.

whereas one would have expected *jamais plus*; these are certainly small details, but when we come to the more touchy part of the story the difference becomes considerable. Brown writes: "Of those who came, several were not allowed to return to shore. Instead they were kidnapped and taken to France." The translator, for French Canadian consumption, writes: "De ceux qui vinrent, plusieurs furent gardés de force et transportés en France" (of those who came, several were kept aboard by force and taken to France). It is Brown, however, who is closer to the truth; we know that, in accordance with Cartier's carefully-laid plan, the Iroquois were in fact kidnapped on the occasion of a cross-raising ceremony.

There is a similar toning-down when Brown recounts Cartier's refusal to go back up the St. Lawrence with Roberval in 1542. In the English text we read: "that night under cover of darkness he gave orders to raise the anchor" (17); Bilodeau translates: *durant la nuit, il donna ordre de lever l'ancre* (17), eliminating the expression "under cover of darkness" which has sinister overtones.

The views expressed about the French attacks on the Hudson Bay forts in 1686 provide another example. Brown writes: "*France and England were at peace with one another. Even so, the governor of New France decided to take action*" (Brown, 101). The passage is rendered as follows in French: "*Bien que la paix régnât entre la France et l'Angleterre, le gouverneur de la Nouvelle-France décida d'agir*" (Bilodeau, 101). The translator has softened this; *bien que* and *agir* are not nearly as strong as "even so" and "take action."

Two other French textbooks also play down the breakdown in peaceful relations between England and France, and try to justify the governor's decision. Charles writes: "*La France s'intéressait particulièrement à l'immense territoire de la baie d'Hudson. . . . L'Angleterre, on le savait, y faisait un commerce important. Mais la France ne pouvait tolérer cet état de choses dans une région qui lui appartenait*" (Charles, 95).¹ We find the same tone in *Mon pays* by the FEC: "*Mais la France revendique les territoires du Nord et ne peut supporter indéfiniment ce qu'elle considère un empiètement sur son domaine. En 1686, le gouverneur confie au chevalier de Troyes la mission de chasser les intrus de leurs comptoirs de traite*" (FEC, 84).² In *Mon pays* by Plante, the author at least has the good grace to recognize openly England's rights over the territory in question (109).

When *The Story of Canada* discusses the discoveries in the West, there is more playing-down by the translator. Brown writes: "*It is interesting to think that what is now one of the Prairie Provinces, Manitoba, was visited by Englishmen so early in our history!*" (Brown, 21). The translator eliminates the exclamation mark and replaces the admiration expressed with a simple statement of fact: "*C'est ainsi que tout au début de notre histoire, des Anglais mirent pied dans l'une des provinces actuelles des Prairies, le Manitoba*" (Bilodeau, 21).

Britain's political system and her respect for individual liberties are among the most cherished inheritances that she has left to her former colonies. Brown concludes his chapter on the American Revolution with these words: "Many of the laws and liberties that the people of the United States still *treasure* are the laws and liberties of *England*" (Brown, 174). The translator writes: "*Beaucoup de lois et des libertés dont jouit le peuple des États-Unis sont des lois et des libertés d'origine anglaise*" (Bilodeau, 174). For him, of

course, British enthusiasm is less compulsive: "England" which means so much for Brown, becomes "*d'origine anglaise*," and the word "treasure" is simply dropped.

Another difference between the original and the translation is found in the account of the Battle of Châteauguay. Brown writes:

In the fall of 1813, an American army of some five thousand men moved north from Lake Champlain towards the St. Lawrence. On the Châteauguay River, just south of Montreal, it was met by *a smaller British army, which included a number of French-Canadian troops* under de Salaberry . . . After a short fight, in which the French-Canadian troops *shared* fully in the victory *with their British and Canadian comrades*, the Americans ordered a retreat and fell back towards Plattsburg (Brown, 219).

The translator dispenses with all reference to the British at Châteauguay:

Sur la rivière Châteauguay au sud de Montréal, elle rencontra une petite armée *formée de trois cents soldats canadiens-français* commandés par de Salaberry . . . Après une courte bataille, où les *Canadiens français* se distinguèrent par leur bravoure, les Américains ordonnèrent la retraite et reprirent le chemin de Plattsburg. Les *Canadiens français* avaient vaincu une armée au moins quinze fois supérieure en nombre! (Bilodeau, 219).

This same battle is recounted quite differently in French- and English-language textbooks, moreover, the former giving all the credit for a spectacular victory to de Salaberry and his French Canadians, and the latter, those of Careless and McInnis, for instance, simply refusing to see any importance in it as a feat of arms.

A final example clearly shows on what side Brown's sympathies lie; he writes of the conquest of 1760: "New France had fallen *at last!*" (Brown, 156). The translator heaves a sigh, too, but his is not one of jubilation: "La Nouvelle-France était tombée!" (Bilodeau, 156).

The translation of an English-language textbook for the use of French Canadians is indeed no easy task.

B. By Their Fruits Ye Shall Know Them

It is interesting, when reading through a textbook, to take note of titles and subtitles, introductions and recapitulations, chapter openings and closings; usually they reveal quite clearly which camp, French or English, the author belongs in. We have already mentioned Brown's exclamation, "New France had fallen at last!" Here and there we find other such involuntary revelations, each belying the historian's impartiality.

Some examples: in Rogers, the year 1759 is "the Wonderful Year" (119 and 121); Careless writes triumphantly that, after the final capitulation, "they transferred Canada to Britain, and the fleur-de-lis of France at last came down from the headquarters of the great French fur trade . . . The day of New France was over. A new age had begun in Canada's history, *the age of British North America*" (93); McInnis expresses relief: "The

English colonies were *at last* free from the menace that had hung over them for the better part of a century" (29).

The French-language authors, on the other hand, do not hide their despair when they come to the conquest. Take first the account of the fall of Quebec. In *Mon pays* by Plante, for example, we find an abundance of dramatically coloured terms evoking deep tragedy (our italics):

1759, l'année *funeste*. Les Anglais *s'acharnent* sur leur *proie* . . . Formidable *ruée* que ne peut contenir l'héroïsme français . . . L'ennemi *resserre ses griffes* autour du Saint-Laurent. . . L'île d'Orléans, la côte de Beaupré et la Baie Saint-Paul puis la côte sud sur une distance de soixante milles, *flambent* dans l'incendie qu'allume l'*impitoyable colère* de l'ennemi. . . Si ce coup hasardeux avait raté, on l'eût taxé de folle témérité: couronné de succès, il passe à juste titre pour un coup de maître. Toutes les circonstances ont par ailleurs secondé cette entreprise *désespérée* (Plante, 163 ff).³

Or else the spectator shudders at seeing his favourites lose the game, as does Filteau: "Grâce à un coup *d'audace inouï*, l'armée anglaise avait réussi à prendre pied sur les plaines d'Abraham. . . *Épuisés* par une *tension nerveuse* qui durait depuis cinq ans, les officiers français *perdirent la tête* et leur *précipitation* transforma ce qui aurait pu devenir un *désastre* pour l'armée anglaise en une défaite décisive pour la France" (Filteau, *Civ.*, 137).⁴

French Canadian authors are deeply moved by the conquest. Here, for example, is how the authors of *Mon pays* (FEC) speak of it:

Au milieu des inquiétudes qui suivent la capitulation de Montréal, les Canadiens gardent le *secret désir* de passer, dans un avenir prochain, sous l'autorité de la France. *Hélas!* ce pays se trouve parmi les vaincus de la guerre de Sept ans! . . . les nouvelles si *avidement* attendues arrivent au printemps de 1763 avec les premiers voiliers. Dans toute la vallée du Saint-Laurent, une phrase passe *tristement* de bouche en bouche: "Le Canada devient une colonie de l'Angleterre." *Perdu l'espoir* de vivre de nouveau sous la domination de la France (151).⁵

For Filteau, it was "une véritable *catastrophe* pour notre peuple"; it was "l'*agonie* du régime français au Canada" (a real *catastrophe* for our people . . . the *death-throes* of the French régime in Canada; *Civ.* 135 and 137). Guy Laviolette quotes poetry (192):

Et notre vieux drapeau, trempé de *pleurs amers*,
Ferma son aile blanche et repassa les mers.⁶

Curiously enough, bitterness shows through only in textbooks for secondary schools.

The English-language textbooks, in contrast, put less emotion into their accounts of this period; they say no more than that the French fought courageously everywhere and that their leaders were beyond reproach, but were simply at the end of their resources. They spend little time on the details of events, moreover.

C. Telltale Illustrations

As with style, a textbook's illustrations often reveal the feelings of the writer. Thus, in the Brown textbook (wherein the author breathes a sigh of satisfaction over the

conquest), an illustration shows an English soldier rejoicing at the arrival of the British fleet in the spring of 1760 (Brown, 159); in the translation, since the soldier's smile would seem sarcastic to French Canadians, this has been replaced by a picture of Murray setting fire to the farms of the St. Lawrence. Or there may be an ugly photograph of Louis Riel, or a poster offering a reward for Papineau's capture, or even a Krieghoff painting showing the inside of a habitant house beside a charming engraving of an English colonial interior (see McInnis, *The North American Nations*). We hasten to add, however, that such a slanted choice of illustrations is exceptional.

In the French-language textbooks there is little to note regarding illustrations except a pronounced predilection for military subjects and, particularly at the elementary level, an excessive enthusiasm for religious illustrations; in Filteau's *L'héritage du vieux monde*, more than half the illustrations are of a religious nature.

One English-language textbook, Rogers' *Canada in the World Today*, deserves special attention. Its illustrations of Canadian history are dreary and poorly reproduced, but its choice of illustrations for European history suggests bias. Each national section opens with a symbolic design: England's is *Pax Britannica* symbolized by an Admiral of the Fleet posed in front of a file of soldiers in bearskin caps, with a trading ship in the background; the impression is entirely one of power, ready but in repose. France's image, on the contrary, is all action: Joan of Arc, mounted on a horse, against a background of cathedrals and medieval houses, ready to charge, surrounded by a battalion bristling with swords and spears. By comparison, Canada's image seems very commonplace, while that of the United States is quite simply futuristic. The chapter illustrations are traditional in the English section (mostly pictures of kings and queens), while in the French section all are landscapes, except for two which show violent scenes from the Revolution. In the chapters summing up the histories of the two countries, for England the illustrations are all of positive accomplishments, while for France more than half recall misdeeds or errors of French policy.

A similar partiality in reverse is found in Filteau's *L'héritage du vieux monde*; 63 illustrations bear on French subjects compared with 11 on English.

D. A French Tone and an English Tone

We do not consider it an exaggeration to insist that there is a French or English tone in history textbooks. With all due reservations, it seems that the English tone may be characterized as follows: realistic, sometimes trite, devoid of emotionalism, confident, proud, but generous on occasion, as those who consider themselves naturally endowed with all the virtues can afford to be towards those less fortunate. The French tone seems to us to be rarely realistic, sometimes heroic (reading like a fairy tale or a succession of miracles), and sometimes rancorous or vengeful, particularly in Filteau's books.

As we close this chapter, there are two observations to be made which apply not only here but equally to the rest of this study. First, in books for the elementary level there are more constructive than destructive prejudices. These constructive prejudices can lead to a very strong identification with one language group without producing an aversion for

the other; it may even be that the impressions of the past are as well balanced as it is possible to make them at this level. It is at the secondary level that the atmosphere becomes tainted, particularly in the French-language textbooks; here the entire intellectual apparatus serves to reinforce the author's one-sided message. The English-language textbooks certainly have their prejudices too; they are less obvious but they are there, like the very grain of the paper. With the French-language authors they cannot be missed.

Secondly, our technique of lifting sentences or parts of sentences out of their context may appear both dangerous and subjective: dangerous because an unfortunately-worded sentence might stamp an author in a way that he does not entirely deserve: subjective because it might be thought that we had picked and chosen fragments of text purely to suit our purpose. We hasten to assure our readers that we have done our best to avoid such pitfalls, selecting only quotations which we have judged to be truly representative of the author's thought. It has not been our intention to determine whether or not a particular sentence distorts an author's thought; our role has been limited to reading the text which the thought has produced.

In Part 2 we shall examine the most important themes in the teaching of Canadian history. It should be remembered that the texts under study are not erudite works but school textbooks that emphasize historical themes chosen for their pedagogical value in a well-defined Canadian context.

In Chapter I we shall study a number of general themes: survival and the conditions bearing upon it; the "frontier" in the American sense of the word, that is to say, the search for adventure and the conquest of new horizons; religious matters—including the role of religion in history and more particularly the role attributed to Providence—and finally economic matters, ideal goals for life, great men, and "race."

Chapter II will deal with special themes: men about whom opinions may differ regarding their role in Canadian unity, events in our history that have been marked by crises in relations between the two main language groups, and finally, institutions.

In the third and last chapter we shall discuss themes which are likely to be of immediate interest to the Commission: on the one hand, nationalism as reflected in history textbooks; on the other, the options envisaged by the authors in relations between the two cultures, namely assimilation and cooperation.

History, particularly at the school level, consists mainly of relating the activities of a given nation or ethnic group over a given period of time. If that nation or ethnic group ceases to exist as a distinct entity, the continued account of its activities will no longer be necessary. From this point of view it may therefore be said that the notion of survival is fundamental to the teaching of history. In Canada, where we have more than one main ethnic group, as a result of the British having joined the French after the conquest, this notion of survival has become crucial. In European history, survival would be a problem only on the national level. Has national survival been a problem in Canadian history? Do English- and French-language authors differ on this subject?

A. National Survival

The first point to be considered under this heading is territorial defence, a critical matter for Canada from the very earliest times to the beginning of the nineteenth century. New France was threatened from two quarters, separate at first and then combined: the Indians and the English colonies.

All the textbooks under study agree that the threat from the Iroquois was extremely grave; where the authors disagree is in their analysis of the reasons for Iroquois hostility. French-language texts cite the Iroquois passion for pillage and massacre as the principal cause (*see, for example, FEC, 51; Charles, 23; Laviolette, 39*); they regard commercial rivalry as of lesser importance, whereas the English-language textbooks consider it the primary cause (*see, among others, Rogers, 105 ff. and McInnis, 22*). The two extremes are well illustrated by the following quotations:

The conflict had been long developing, and it had not been caused merely by Champlain's unwise skirmishing with the Iroquois, nor by their desire for revenge. The whole pattern of the fur trade, and of the relations of red men and white, had been far more significant in bringing on war (Careless, 44).

La haine souleva les Cantons iroquois contre les établissements français, alliés à leur ennemi ancestral, le Huron. La vengeance aussi: les Iroquois n'ont pas oublié la panique que leur inspirèrent les mousquets de Champlain. Et enfin la cupidité: les Français détournent à leur profit une part considérable des fourrures, alors qu'eux-mêmes bénéficieraient davantage d'un commerce orienté vers les postes hollandais ou anglais (Plante, 37).¹

New France succumbed not to the Iroquois but to the English. Our authors have very definite ideas on the causes of the conflict between the French and the English. Take first those who write purely from the French point of view, without any consideration of the opposing view. For them (*see*, among others, Lavolette, 156 and 193; FEC, 73; Filteau, *Civ.*, 135), France's accomplishment in America was peaceful conquest through the cross and the plough. Colonization meant civilization; each new exploration, each new fort or trading post was a step from which to spread this beneficence even further. The rulers' dreams of creating an empire were therefore good in themselves, and expansion was totally justified. It follows that English opposition, English reprisals or English aggressions were inspired by covetousness and a desire to win out over "l'ennemi séculaire" (the age-old enemy). The French military leaders were therefore engaged in purely defensive operations. The sole concession that such authors deign to make to Great Britain is to point out the vagueness of frontiers, but they avoid observing that it was the expansionist drive of the French as well as of the British that made this vagueness a continual source of conflict.

Some French and English Canadian authors agree, however, in condemning the French expansionism. For Plante, it represented imperialism and profit-seeking, both detestable and disastrous in their results: "De l'expansion française, boîte de Pandore, sortira la guerre. Le projet était grandiose, voire logique . . . Au fond, ce qui a manqué, ce fut une métropole plus généreuse en hommes et en argent. Les vrais responsables de l'échec habitaient Versailles" (Plante, 82).² Expansion is condemned here, but its failure is regretted. There is similar condemnation in an English-language textbook, but the tone of the conclusion is quite different: "Can you imagine what might have happened in North America if all the money and time and effort that went into these wars had been spent on developing and expanding French claims in the New World?" (Ballantyne, I, 125).

Given the commercial context, conflict was unavoidable, most of the English-language authors agree, but one of them introduces the idea of inevitable cultural conflict: "As the French and English settlements consolidated and expanded, the almost inevitable result was a steadily growing rivalry between them. Their difference might have given rise to this in any case—difference in race and language, in religion and forms of government" (McInnis, 21). We find this idea echoed in a French-language book, too: "Or, dans ce temps-là, la France et l'Angleterre étaient souvent en guerre. Les deux pays différaient beaucoup par la langue, la religion et les coutumes. Rien de surprenant qu'il y eut aussi des guerres entre les colonies" (Charles, 88).³

During the half century following the British conquest, Canada's territorial integrity continued to be threatened, this time by the Americans. The survival of British North America was twice at stake, in 1775 and again in 1812. According to some English-language textbooks, the American invasion was intended only to weaken England's military and political resistance (Blakeley, 134 ff.; Rogers, 123; Brown, 169),

while others see in it a desire for total conquest (Careless, 108; Ballantyne, II, 41). The French-language authors generally hold the latter opinion (Plante, 217; FEC, 162; Laviolette, 235).

English and French Canadian authors show similar concern over national survival in this period. During the war of 1812 Canada was simply a battlefield, according to Ballantyne (I, 72), FEC (169), Blakeley (140) and Brown (208), while others think the invasion was a move towards the annexation of Canada: Careless (131-4), McInnis (78), Plante (79) and Rogers (134). For most of the authors, Confederation was the product of this same fear. Thus the American threat is seen as the motivation behind Confederation by the following: Laviolette (298), FEC (228), Plante (300), Ballantyne (II, 152) and Careless (236-40). This threat is overlooked by Rogers (159) and Brown (301).

Concern for national survival reappears in the contemporary period during the two World Wars and the cold war. Two French-language authors ignore the question completely: Filteau (*Civ.*) and Laviolette. A third refuses to consider Canada's involvement as a matter of national security: "La participation du Canada à ce conflit était un corollaire de la déclaration de guerre de l'Angleterre à l'Allemagne. Dès le 10 septembre 1939, notre pays se rangeait librement aux côtés de l'Angleterre" (Plante, 385; also 355, 389, 398).⁴ In several English-language textbooks, on the other hand, Canada's security from 1914 to the present day is considered to have been seriously endangered (Careless, 328, 375, 392; Saywell, 78, 195, 238, 306, 339; Ballantyne, II, 211, 239, 254). Brown's *The Story of Canada* may be included in the foregoing, despite its sentimentality: "In 1914, a terrible war broke out in Europe. For years Germany had been preparing for the day when she would try to conquer the world . . . The Canadian people were horrified by the actions of Germany, and decided to send soldiers to help the Allies, as the nations fighting on our side were called" (344).

B. Cultural Survival

For the English-language textbooks, then, national survival is a matter of great concern, while the French-language books show little or no regard for it. On the question of cultural survival, however, the French texts lay emphasis to the extent that it becomes the main focus of their attention, while their English-language counterparts—but it is absurd to wonder whether English Canadians have ever worried about their survival as a cultural group! Do they show more concern for the survival of the French? Saywell, surprisingly enough considering the subject of his book, says nothing at all about it. In short, in the English textbooks, the survival of the French as a group is not a cause for concern. The rights of the French Canadians have been upheld time and again by the English-speaking authorities, and the existence of numerous pockets of French Canadians outside Quebec seems a source of irritation rather than of rejoicing. Careless, for his part, openly regrets that the law has encouraged Quebecers in "their feeling of separateness" (104).

At the elementary level, Blakeley's *Nova Scotia* is the only English-language book to consider the problem of French Canadian survival—in this case, the Acadians. It is perhaps

the docility of the Acadians, a quality that the English like to see in a minority, that earns them grace in the eyes of the author:

For two hundred years now they have lived in peace, farming their marshlands and meadows, fishing, speaking the tongue of their ancestors and preserving the way of life of their forefathers. Today most of them speak both English and French. They are fine citizens, good farmers and fishermen. Many have served Canada loyally as soldiers, sailors, statesmen, clergymen, and businessmen—good citizens all. Today no one would think of questioning their allegiance to the Queen and to their native land (Blakeley, 93).

This may be the very reason why so little attention is paid to the problem of the Acadians by the French-language textbooks of Quebec. In the latter, the survival of the French cultural group is constantly expressed in terms of peril. There are so many quotations to illustrate this that our only difficulty is in choosing between them. For example, "Ils avaient aussi lutté pour la défense de leurs droits menacés" (they had also fought in defence of their imperilled rights; Laviolette, 268); and in Plante:

Plus inquiétants, plus intolérables sont les paragraphes qui font table rase des lois françaises Dans le Bas-Canada, en particulier, l'oligarchie, bien loin d'appliquer une politique d'association, poursuit sans ménagement une politique d'assujettissement, d'ostracisme et d'assimilation Les Canadiens français furent complètement démoralisés. Après les jours sanglants de 1837, après l'affreux Rapport de Durham, c'était l'unique bill de l'Union [qui] devait être le tombeau de notre nationalité Le lieutenant-gouverneur R. Shores Milnes jugea l'heure venue d'abattre l'école française et catholique. Le bill de l'Institution royale, cuisiné par la Bureaucratie, établissait une sorte de commission à prédominance anglo-protestante Quoi qu'il en soit, la tutelle financière signifie pour Québec, non seulement la perte de l'autonomie législative et administrative, mais encore un péril pour ses institutions, sa foi, sa langue et sa culture (Plante, 180, 233, 280 and 401).⁵

And more dramatic still:

Notre peuple devait désormais affronter la domination d'une nation puissante, longtemps ennemie, animée de vifs sentiments anticatholiques, dont la politique commerciale ne pouvait guère favoriser le relèvement canadien. L'opposition d'idées, de sentiments, d'intérêts, devait nous placer devant un péril extrême pour notre survivance La résistance à l'assimilation constitue la lutte la plus dure de notre histoire, la plus exténuante aussi parce qu'elle se prolonge toujours. Même au cours de périodes calmes, le milieu anglo-saxon qui nous entoure exerce sans cesse son action et nous force à une vigilance de tous les instants (Filteau, *Civ.*, 135 and 227).⁶

For the English authors, then, survival means adaptation to the environment, an evolution that preserves the essentials of life, but it also means a vigorous response to challenge (superbly expressed in *Canada, A Story of Challenge* by Careless). The French authors, on the other hand, see survival as something static.

Filteau borrows a paragraph from the historian Chapais to describe the psychological shock of the conquest, an event which left French Canadians stunned and paralyzed: "Une solution de continuité tragique coupait soudain toutes les artères par lesquelles [la

France] leur transmettait sa vie. Séparés, isolés, privés de tous moyens de communication avec la nation-mère que la défaite forçait à l'abandon, ils se voyaient réduits à leurs propres forces, ou pour mieux dire à leur navrante faiblesse, sous le joug de l'ennemi séculaire, complètement et irrévocablement vainqueur" (quoted by Filteau, *Civ.*, 141).⁷ For Filteau, there were two solutions open to the French Canadians: "Au lendemain de la Conquête, il semble, à première vue, que nos pères avaient le choix entre s'assimiler aux vainqueurs ou s'enfermer dans un irrédentisme ou une résistance à outrance qui leur ferait rechercher toutes les occasions possibles pour se soustraire à la domination anglaise et effectuer un retour vers l'ancienne mère-patrie" (Filteau, *Civ.*, 186).⁸

This same author rejects the first of these solutions for religious reasons, and also because of "la force d'inertie inhérente à tout groupe ethnique, qui pousse instinctivement à persévérer en lui-même" (the force of inertia which is inherent in every ethnic group and which produces an instinctive urge to persist in its self-containment). He also rejects the second, for practical reasons and also because the attitude of the clergy had conditioned the attitude of the French Canadian people. What then was the "féconde" (fruitful) solution according to Filteau? "Dans leur esprit de loyauté envers le pouvoir civil et de fidélité à leur foi religieuse, les Canadiens trouvèrent ainsi la réponse au défi posé: collaboration loyale avec le nouveau pouvoir, adaptation sur les points de nature indifférente ou sans réelle importance, lutte pacifique et légale, mais sans concession sur le respect des capitulations et en vue d'obtenir certaines libertés non garanties, mais jugées d'importance primordiale et essentielle" (*Civ.*, 187).⁹

Without considering the contradictions in terminology and errors in logic here, we cannot help observing that this option as defined is only another form of irredentism.

Even when the French textbooks borrow English terminology and talk of "défi" (challenge), which, one would think, implies dynamic response, all they do is preach the continuance and repetition of the past. They show how French Canadians have drawn together in self-defence for the preservation of their social structure, the religious hierarchy, the family, the parish and their farm-based economy:

En attendant, les Canadiens *se serrent* autour de leurs curés et de leurs seigneurs, sous l'œil sympathique des militaires britanniques (FEC, 151).¹⁰

Après 1760, le seigneur, découronné de toute influence politique, ruiné par la banqueroute, se sentait incapable d'organiser la lutte. Mais la *paroisse* est restée debout et, à l'intérieur de ce *bastion* fermé aux nouveaux maîtres, les vaincus se sont serrés autour de leur curé et ont résisté victorieusement à l'assimilation. Si le vainqueur n'avait pas trouvé ici cet organisme paroissial, il en aurait établi un à sa façon, ordonné à ses fins (Plante, 89).¹¹

La famille et la paroisse ont fourni les cadres sociaux et l'*armature* de notre nationalité, et lui ont donné une telle impulsion et une telle puissance que cette organisation est devenue, au cours de notre histoire, notre *bastion imprenable* . . . une *ligne de résistance* est demeurée *inexpugnable*, celle des clochers échelonnés sur les rives de notre grand fleuve . . . C'est la paroisse qui devint le *château fort* partout dressé pour la *lutte* et pour la *victoire*. Chaque clocher fut le *point de ralliement* des forces généreuses de la race; chaque pasteur actif et clairvoyant devint un *chef* de la cité. Et nos paroisses partout échelonnées, transformées en *lignes de combat*, dessinaient à travers la patrie le *rempart invincible* de nos essentielles libertés

(Filteau, *Civ.*, 80; the last three sentences are taken from a text by Mgr Camille Roy).¹²

The most striking feature of these quotations is the profusion of military terms (indicated by italics); the resistance is portrayed as an armed one, even though the armament is only symbolic. We are also struck by the terms borrowed from mediaeval military arts. Some English-language textbooks in fact make a point of seeing French Canadian society as a distinctly mediaeval one; the Church, they say, has made sure that it should remain so (Brown, 75; McInnis, 260; Careless, 59 and 61).

This withdrawal of the society into itself is accompanied by violent denunciation of any of its members who have chosen to take a more positive or dynamic course; typical words used are "défections," "apostasie" (Filteau, *Civ.*, 136 and 229) and "transfuges" (turn-coats; Filteau, *Civ.*, 196; Plante, 185); mixed marriages are blamed on "aristocrates décaqués" (impoverished aristocrats; Filteau, *Civ.*, 196).

Survival is therefore not the product of structural change; it is assured simply by the natural growth of numbers, aided by the vitality of the race (Filteau, *Civ.*, 44, 101, 182; Plante, 127, 336), the celebrated "revanche des berceaux" (revenge of the cradle). The surplus will take root in the virgin lands of Quebec, to the west and the north, and this colonization will be the new "forteresse de notre nationalité" (fortress of our people); "s'emparer du sol" (take possession of the soil), and build a church on it. "La cloche sonnera; elle attirera le pionnier" (the church bell will ring and the pioneer will answer its call; Laviolette, Chapter VIII). It is this return to pioneer life that will assure the survival of the [French] Canadian race. Any who might choose to move elsewhere instead are accused of betrayal (Laviolette, 268, 322; Plante, 226, 320, 329; Filteau, *Civ.*, 312-13).

C. The "Frontier" or the Spirit of Adventure

A second general theme that deserves attention is the "frontier" in the American sense, or the spirit of adventure, the yearning for life of a different kind away from an organized environment.

Our English-language textbooks attach great importance to the frontier, just like American writers, for whom it exerts a particular influence on the character of the people and on their institutions and culture. Rogers sums up its characteristics:

The influx of people . . . was bound to have a great effect on the character of the new nation. In the west, the struggle of pioneers for survival against wild animals, hostile Indians, and a stubborn soil created a hardy individual, self-reliant, independent and ingenious.

What motives caused people to leave settled communities and go into the wilderness? Love of adventure and dislike of the settled life of an older community were two powerful motives. Explorers sought knowledge of new routes to the treasures of Asia; missionaries set out to bring the Christian Gospel to heathens. Often it was the fur trader or hunter who went into the wilderness following the animals driven back by the progress of settlement. In the path of the adventurous, the explorer, the hunter, the missionary, came the settler with axe and plough, to carve for himself a home (Rogers, 250 ff.)

These frontiersmen were realists; as Rogers writes: "The western settlers, however, wished to be represented by men like themselves who understood their problem and could fight for their needs. They preferred to put their faith in a man who could plough, use an axe or fire a gun. They disliked high sounding phrases which they rarely understood" (Rogers, 254). According to McNnis, they were also rugged individualists: "This spirit of independence was increased by the persistent influence of the frontier. . . . It created a spirit of individualism and independence and a strong tendency toward democratic equality. The frontiersman demanded personal freedom and full political rights" (McNnis, 32).

Another of the frontiersman's characteristics was his sense of superiority to those who preferred a stable, settled life, and even more to those who had stayed in the Old World (McNnis, 83; Saywell, 46 ff.) His mode of life tended to create a new and distinct culture (McNnis, 11). It is recognized, too, that the frontier moves as formerly uninhabited lands become settled; when the frontier ceases to exist it is because the country has reached full development.

1. *The spirit of adventure and New France*

The above quotations refer to the history of the United States and serve here only as an introduction to our comments on our own history. We shall see whether our textbook authors have taken account of the frontier notion when treating of New France, and what role they assign to it. It is certain that, for the French who came to settle in Canada, their new home was indeed a frontier by comparison with Europe. The fur traders preceded the farmers, who themselves preceded any form of government. The English textbooks ignore this, at which we should not be surprised, considering the little space they give to this early period.

As for the French textbooks, the picture they paint is very different to that evoked by the quotations above. Strongly backed by quotations, they explain that the dominant motive was mystic and missionary, and that the spirit of adventure, individualism and the lure of gain played only a very small part (Plante, 21, 29; Filteau, *Civ.*, Chapter I; FEC, 15, 20; Lavolette, 10, 21). In all the French textbooks, in fact, the ideal colonization was a planned, organized and structured one, not a thing to be left to individual initiative, but an "affaire de roi" (an enterprise suitable for a king to undertake; Plante, 22). As an example of this ideal, they point to the foundation of Montreal, which was literally the transplanting of an urban nucleus, complete with community services.

What was the influence of this environment, in which the French authors decline to see "frontier" characteristics? Was the typical "habitant" a product of it? The two French secondary school textbooks do not recognize any such influence. For them, the colonists were not made; they were born with the desirable qualities—Minerva springing ready-armed from the head of Jupiter:

Des colons de qualité. Issus, pour le plus grand nombre de la paysannerie et de la classe des artisans, ces colons reflétaient les qualités de leur milieu [du milieu d'où ils venaient]. Des bras forts, mais surtout des âmes bien trempées . . . Peut-être étaient-ils pauvres ou peu instruits, quoiqu'il ne faille pas généraliser trop vite, mais

ils pouvaient s'enorgueillir d'une richesse supérieure, celle d'un passé sans tache, d'une conduite honorable (Plante, 36).¹³

Le motif apostolique, par sa noblesse même, ne pouvait trouver d'écho que chez une élite. . . . Cette difficulté même fut cause d'un choix de premier ordre . . . [Les Normands] apportaient aussi leurs coutumes, leurs traditions, leurs chansons, leur langage et les qualités et défauts de leur milieu: une forte mentalité religieuse, le goût du travail, le sens de la propriété particulière, source d'un esprit d'indépendance et d'un individualisme accusé (Filteau, *Civ.*, 23, 28).¹⁴

Here Filteau has missed a superb opportunity to explain this independence and individualism in terms of the new environment the French had come to live in. In fact, only one French textbook comes close to the truth, pointing out the almost equal roles of atavistic traits and this new environment: "Le type ancestral français a d'ailleurs légué à son rejeton canadien plusieurs de ses caractéristiques: bravoure, politesse, bonhomie, gaieté de cœur, sens de l'hospitalité, esprit d'indépendance. Et la vie au Canada a accentué l'amour de la liberté et des grands espaces inconnus" (FEC, 98).¹⁵

During the century of French crown rule, Quebec, Trois-Rivières and Montreal were no longer frontier posts; the frontier had moved to the "pays d'en haut" (country to the west and north), and there the explorers, coureurs de bois and missionaries braved the elements to survive. Did this frontier have the same effect on men as it did in the United States? According to our English textbooks it did indeed; the explorers and coureurs de bois matched the American frontiersmen, played the same role and were similarly motivated: "Many adventurous young colonists found that they preferred life as voyageurs or coureurs-de-bois to the more prosaic existence of the habitant" (McInnis, 16).

The French authors do not share their English confrères' indulgence for these adventurers, who, in their eyes, were a negative factor in colonial life; they were undesirables, and became irretrievable outcasts unless they mended their ways. In short, the spirit of adventure was reprehensible (Plante, 82, 128; Filteau, *Civ.*, 27, 97; Lavolette, 116, 125; Charles, 124; FEC, 106-9). As for explorers and missionaries, they were by no means independent agents, but official envoys fulfilling specific missions that had nothing to do with the spirit of adventure.

For a massive migration to the wilds to have taken place, as it did in the United States, there would have had to be overpopulation of the settled areas, as well as institutions allowing for independent organization of new settlement. The French-language authors are happy that such a thing did not occur, while the English authors regret it. On both sides, however, there is agreement that the frontier phenomenon, the call of adventure and a life of independence did not contribute to the development of New France, and, in fact, worked to its detriment (Plante, 82; Careless, 60).

And yet the frontier did play a role, for pioneer life continued throughout a major part of the French regime; the characteristics of the frontiersman were clearly discernible in the habitants of New France. Our authors all recognize this, just as they recognize the development of an autonomous culture. They disagree, however, when they come to study the effect of the frontier phenomenon on institutions or on the form of government. According to the English textbooks, it was this phenomenon that was, more than anything else, responsible for the liberalization of the seigneurial regime (Ballantyne,

I, 106; Careless, 63), while for certain French authors French Canadians developed their spirit of independence and sense of social equality because of their liberal system of government (Plante, 145; Filteau, *Civ.*, 86-8). Filteau goes even further, holding that, if the arbitrary royal power diminished, it was the king's pleasure that it should do so, and not because of pressure from colonists imbued with the frontier spirit (Filteau, *Civ.*, 84 ff.). He has a surprise up his sleeve, moreover, for he declares that the environment did indeed exert an influence on the colonists, but quite the opposite to what we might expect; the frontier, he maintains, had a stabilizing effect: "Les précautions prises par les recruteurs ne purent toutefois empêcher le passage au Canada de quelques indésirables. L'atmosphère du pays agit heureusement sur plusieurs qui se rangèrent. Quant aux réfractaires, ils furent forcés de rentrer en France, ou bien ils se perdirent au milieu des nations indiennes" (Filteau, *Civ.*, 27).¹⁶

Another French-language textbook concedes that the frontier did exert an influence, but in this case it is said that the phenomenon caused a superhuman, heroic society to flourish, one that should serve as an example to the French Canadians of today (FEC, 98).

2. *Adventure in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries*

In the United States, according to historians, the frontier moved with each generation. In Canada, it was not until the beginning of the nineteenth century, with the establishment of Upper Canada, that there was again a frontier atmosphere comparable to that of New France.

To be sure, Upper Canada's frontier was not exactly in the image of the American wild West. The Indians were no longer a danger, and there was an established government which encouraged and directed immigration. And yet, though the age of exploration was over, the frontier was a reality, with its primitive living conditions, its isolation, and its stream of immigrants looking for better conditions or cheaper land. This, in any case, was the situation as described by our English-language textbooks (Careless, 113, 160; McInnis, 239-41; Blakeley, Chapters XV and XVI; Ballantyne, I, 61-6). In the type of life it offered, the Canadian frontier was indeed similar to its American counterpart.

However, the English-language textbooks do not attach great importance to the influence of the frontier on the character of the people, pointing out only certain religious and cultural factors. They pay more attention to the influence of frontier life on institutions, for it was directly linked with demands for autonomy and efforts aimed at democratizing institutions:

Even if people like the Moodies had been able to recreate a miniature Britain in Upper Canada, this kind of Upper Canada would not have lasted long. In the first place, Upper Canada received many American settlers who believed that all men were socially equal. . . . Upper Canada was a wilderness. It would have been impossible to transplant one in the other. Upper Canadians—no matter where they had come from—had to carve a new way of life out of the forest. Under these conditions, a man's muscle and his willingness to work meant much more than background and education. . . . Naturally they thought much about how taxes should be collected, how money could be obtained to build roads and canals, and how lands should be granted (Ballantyne, II, 66 ff.).

Out of the pioneer age there came a growing self-conscious spirit, impatient of outside direction, that turned itself towards the goal of self-government for British North America Yet the people of the advancing colonies, becoming conscious of their own power, and generally living a life of equality in the wide, free countryside, objected more and more to this rule by their "betters." Influenced by American democracy and by the rising British reform movement, they began to seek a larger share for themselves in the affairs of government There were not the same local cross-currents [in the Maritimes] nor was the yeasty ferment of the frontier as strong within them (Careless, 163, 167 and 183).

The heritage of British political ideas and institutions had to be adapted to the North American environment in which the pioneer communities were taking shape. Proximity to the United States, a country which had developed under similar conditions, meant that American political ideas and methods made a considerable impression on Canada, and this was especially true during the era of Jacksonian democracy These factors had a direct bearing on political struggles in the various provinces, as different groups sought power in order to control policy and safeguard their own interests. Usually the struggle ended as a contest between the legislature and the executive (McInnis, 259).

The only two French-language textbooks that describe the political history of Upper Canada view the events of the day from a different perspective. For them, the conflict was sparked not by the people themselves but by the Assembly; they do not differentiate between the various groups in the population of early Ontario, nor even between the reform movements of Upper and Lower Canada: "*Les même causes de malaise, quant aux rapports entre la Chambre élue et le représentant de la couronne britannique, existaient au Haut-Canada et au Bas-Canada*" (FEC, 195; *see also* Plante, 236, 245, 247).¹⁷ Once again, they are satisfied to interpret a situation they do not understand in terms which are familiar to them.

In the English-language textbooks, we should add, Ontario as a frontier gets far more attention than anything farther west. The Riel affair, for example, although it invariably takes up a great many pages, is never treated as a manifestation of the frontier spirit, which is surprising to say the least; perhaps the authors, seeing other aspects dearer to their hearts, have a blind spot there. Generally speaking, the prairie frontier and even the mining frontier are presented in the books only as stages of economic development in Laurier's day.

The present-day frontier of the Canadian North, too, is regarded above all as an economic frontier (Saywell, 103; Rogers, 199). This is understandable, considering the economic and administrative paternalism behind the development of the North, as well as the lack of interest on the part of the majority of the population in the colonization of the region. And yet these textbooks tell us that this is indeed a new frontier, "the true north, strong and free" (Rogers, 199), where life is not dissimilar to that of bygone days (Rogers, 170; Lavolette, Chapter VIII), and nature's last challenge offers freedom and adventure to those with no taste for the ordinary life of today, and offers, too, a chance to contribute to the development of the country. Careless writes:

On the whole, before 1914, Canadian politics had been far less concerned with democratic progress or social advance than with the problems of developing half a continent. Canada seemed to have plenty of room to expand, and rather accepted

the North American idea of "go west, young man" as the answer to the troubles of society By 1950 Canada was close to maturity The typical Canadians were no longer the settlers and pioneers seeking new homes in the wilderness This did not mean that the people of Canada had ceased to look for broad horizons The "true North, strong and free" was always at their backs . . . and the northern bush flyer ranged as free as the *coureurs-de-bois* or the Nor'Westers had ever done And finally, there was the thoroughly Canadian influence of the greath north country, which was all her own. The North was a reservoir of national strength for the future, for new Canadian growth. All these things marked Canada off from the United States and gave her reason for her separate and still developing national identity (Careless, 357, 401, 402, 405).

What is the conclusion? The writers of English-language textbooks subscribe in large measure to the American "frontier" thesis; they attribute to it a major role in the development of attitudes, democratic institutions and a feeling of national identity. The French-language authors, on the other hand, distrust unbridled individualism and reject this aspect of pioneer life; what they call the heroic life is not a function of conditions and circumstances alone. Above all, as far as they are concerned, what the English Canadians call "grass-roots democracy" simply does not exist; democracy is a gift from on high. Altogether, we have been quite surprised to find how little importance is attached to the frontier by the textbooks as a whole. With fuller development, the frontier concept might lead to a more objective analysis of a number of episodes in Canadian history. Since the spirit of adventure and the struggle for survival have been at play all through our history, this twofold theme, it seems to us, might provide the basis for a single history text that would be acceptable to French and English Canadians alike.

D. Concerning Religion

The word "religion" implies the concept of a bond of communication between man and a divine personality. This communication works both ways, from man to God in the form of prayer and acts of faith, and from God to man through providential events.

Acts of faith are mentioned in all the textbooks, but their significance is not the same for all the authors. In the English-language textbooks, they are simply individual acts (hastily brushed over, at that), all admirable in themselves but affecting only the participants: "But the missionaries knew that God did not judge their work by whether or not it succeeded. They offered up their sufferings to their Master. The Martyrs gave themselves to Christ, lived in Christ, and died for Christ" (Ballantyne, I, 73). Each of these acts had no other consequence than spiritual reward in the next world. Careless does, in fact, give them a degree of further significance, but only inasmuch as they provided an example to other men: "Yet . . . the courageous example of the men who had worked for the glory of God remained to strengthen the colony in its struggle for survival" (Careless, 44).

The French-language authors, for their part, delight in the description of these acts of faith, but furthermore see in them the price to be paid for the success of colonial endeavours. The fact that our forebears generously gave of themselves to assure the existence of Canada has left a burden of debt, so to speak, owed by Canadians of today

to those of the past: "Chaque goutte de leur sang est une semence dont les fruits ont mûri tout au long de notre histoire. La grâce méritée par les missionnaires ne connaît ni le temps, ni l'espace; l'historien doit témoigner de son existence" (Plante, 41; *see also* 43 ff.; Filteau, *Civ.*, 67; FEC, 48, 304).¹⁸

1. *Providence as an activator*

This concept is based on the belief that God takes an active part in the affairs of men, presides personally over them, and rewards and punishes in this world. This belief is expressed nowhere in the English-language textbooks, but is constantly in evidence in different forms in those written in French.

There is of course a mysticism surrounding the careers of certain individuals (Lavolette, 26, 28; Charles, 15), but beyond this God accords special protection to French Canada:

Si le Canada a pu se développer en dépit de l'opposition des trafiquants, il le doit à une protection spéciale de la Providence sans doute, mais aussi aux prières, aux sacrifices et à la vie héroïque des pionniers (FEC, 48).¹⁹

Or la même Providence qui a déjà permis la rencontre de messieurs de la Dauversière et Olier, envoie aussi le conducteur désiré: Paul de Chomedey, sieur de Maisonneuve (Lavolette, 33; *see also* 12, 31 and 48; Charles, 102).²⁰

The same protection was also accorded in military engagements:

Jeanne le Ber, la recluse, ranima les courages en disant: "Nous ne devons rien craindre: la très sainte Vierge aura soin de ce pays, car elle en est la gardienne."

De sa meilleure main, Jeanne écrivit sur l'étendard de Ville-Marie, qu'un soldat devait porter en tête du bataillon: "Nos ennemis mettent toute leur confiance dans leurs armes, mais nous mettons la nôtre au nom de la Reine des Anges, que nous invoquons. Elle est terrible comme une armée rangée en bataille; sous sa protection, nous espérons vaincre nos ennemis."

Or, une nuit que la flotte de Walker n'était plus qu'à cinq cents milles de Québec, le vent s'abattit soudainement sur elle, avec une telle violence que vingt navires s'écrasèrent avec un bruit sinistre sur les récifs de l'Île-aux-Oeufs: . . . la flotte de Walker se perdait corps et biens! (Lavolette, 100 ff.; *see also* 159 and 168; Plante, 107).²¹

The purpose of this protection was to allow Canada to accomplish its "mission providentielle" (Filteau, *Civ.*, 45, 469).

Even in the French-language textbooks, nevertheless, such direct intervention on the part of Providence is rare; particularly in books for the secondary level, God acts most often through His earthly intermediary, the Church—the Roman Catholic Church, obviously—for nowhere in the French textbooks is an intermediary role between God and man attributed to any Protestant body.

2. *The importance of the Church*

All our textbooks give consideration to the role played by religious communities, but it is the Roman Catholic Church which is in the limelight.

Except for Miss Blakeley, all the English-language textbooks give the Catholic Church credit for the part it played in the colonization and development of New France, stressing, however, the services it rendered to the new society: the recruitment of colonists, medical care, spiritual ministry, social and moral support, charitable works (Ballantyne, I, 59; Rogers, 107, 114; Brown, 56; McInnis, 15, 20; Careless, 41, 43, 67). But amid this chorus of praise, there are some discordant notes. For instance, the missionaries and fur traders were “poor partners” (Rogers, 105). On the exclusion of the Huguenots, opinions appear to be divided:

In Champlain’s day, the King of France had forbidden any Protestants to go to New France. Consequently, the colony avoided religious strife which would have sapped its strength. However, the policy had a serious drawback in that it hindered the colony’s growth. The English colonies in America would never have grown so rapidly but for the large numbers of Puritans who left England for reasons of religion (Rogers, 113).

But the earnestly Catholic Champlain had urged that the new land be kept free from heresy, and the king’s minister, Cardinal Richelieu, had listened. He wanted no such difficulties with Huguenots in New France as the crown was facing in Old France (Careless, 64).

The distinguishing features of the French-language textbooks are above all the space they give to the Church’s positive contributions, and their assumption that the association between the Church and the colonists was essentially a happy one. The principal, even the central theme, is peaceful conquest “par la croix et la charrue” (through the cross and the plough; FEC, 15). The entire development of New France may be summarized in a few simple words, perfectly illustrated by the following:

“Une grande institution se détache en plein relief sur le tableau de l’histoire du Canada: c’est l’Église de Rome. Plus encore que la puissance royale, elle a modelé le caractère et préparé les destinées de cette colonie. Elle a été sa nourrice et pour tout dire sa mère.” Ce jugement de l’historien Parkman est vrai* et pour les débuts mêmes de la colonie (Plante, 38).²²

La modeste et indispensable chapelle, sans laquelle aucun essai de colonisation ne peut prospérer (Filteau, *Civ.*, 79; see also in the same vein 14, 15 and 67; Plante, 39; Charles, 45).²³

The French Canadian authors do not discuss the pros and cons of religious exclusiveness in New France. In *Mon Pays*, Plante barely mentions the exclusion of the Huguenots in passing, without taking a position on the question. Others make only indirect reference to it when they stress the necessity of religious unity in the colony, a unity seen as “la force du peuple canadien” (the strength of the [French] Canadian people; Charles, 183; Plante, 85).

They vigorously take sides with the Church in its stand over the trading of alcohol. They find moral arguments that go somewhat beyond simple concern for their fellow men: “[Mgr de Laval] doit parfois se montrer énergique. C’est ainsi qu’il entre en lutte contre le gouverneur quand celui-ci permet la vente de l’eau-de-vie aux Indiens. Rien ne le

*A clever technique consisting of drawing praise from one’s opponents.

fera hésiter à accomplir son devoir: le bien spirituel de ses ouailles le préoccupe plus que les intérêts financiers ou politiques des marchands et des administrateurs" (FEC, 54).²⁴ Or else they turn to psychological and economic arguments:

Pendant l'occupation du pays, de 1629 à 1632, les commerçants anglais avaient introduit l'usage de l'eau-de-vie en échange des fourrures. Les trafiqueurs français ont maintenu et aggravé ce commerce infâme. D'Avaugour, Talon, Frontenac soutenaient qu'il était impossible d'interdire absolument ce trafic; que d'ailleurs il était nécessaire au commerce . . . nécessaire au progrès de la colonisation . . . À ces motifs ou prétextes, l'évêque répondait: a-t-on le droit de sacrifier pour un intérêt matériel même légitime le salut des âmes, de violer la loi naturelle et la loi divine? . . . Le commerce des fourrures était possible sans eau-de-vie. Les Anglais n'avaient-ils pas du reste proposé aux Français d'interdire la vente des boissons enivrantes et adopté même une ordonnance prohibant ce commerce? Bien loin de favoriser le progrès de la colonie, le trafic de l'alcool décimait les rangs des défricheurs, diminuait les naissances et corrompait les mœurs publiques. Que pouvait la raison contre l'intérêt? (Plante, 86 ff.)²⁵

The French-language textbooks place the fur trade and the missionary ideal in opposition to one another. Some authors attempt to put the fur trade in a subordinate position: "Nos pères prenaient possession du sol en fixant une croix sur la cabane-chapelle. Sans doute, s'occupaient-ils du trafic des fourrures, puisqu'il fallait bien amasser quelque argent pour subvenir aux besoins de la maisonnée. Mais ce qu'ils ambitionnaient, par-dessus tout, c'était d'accompagner le prêtre, messenger de la bonne nouvelle et planteur de croix" (Laviolette, 321; see also Filteau, *Civ.*, 15).²⁶ One author refuses to accept the possibility of cooperation between the two: "Le seul instinct de ces marchands a été l'appât du gain, leur seul objectif, l'exploitation commerciale. . . Champlain, au contraire, rêvait de 'proviser une Nouvelle France' en Amérique, de 'faire fleurir les lis de France' au Canada. À ses yeux, le salut d'une âme valait mieux que la conquête d'un empire. Comment, avec des sentiments et des vues aussi opposés, aboutir à l'unité d'action?" (Plante, 21)²⁷

This author sees the only solution as the abandonment of the fur trade and dedication to an activity better suited to the ideals of both religion and colonization: "Les coureurs de bois sont autant d'hommes perdus pour les travaux de la colonisation. Il y a là de l'énergie gaspillée. Au lieu de défricher plus de terres, trop de jeunes gens s'adonnent au commerce des fourrures. Ensorcelés par l'aventure, ils lâcheront la proie pour l'ombre, sacrifiant à un gain facile mais éphémère une fructueuse carrière de laboureurs" (Plante, 82)²⁸

3. *An omnipresent role*

The role of the Church was an important one, for it bore upon the daily lives of the colonists, on their culture and their education. Of all the English Canadian authors, Careless alone considers this role at length (Chapter VI), showing the extent of its influence on the behaviour of French Canadians:

Yet the ignorance among the masses was no worse than in many other countries of the age. And certainly the Church laboured hard to reduce it. Religious orders sought to establish schools as well as missions and hospitals, and several famous

schools were founded that still endure. The names of Mother Marie de l'Incarnation and Marguerite Bourgeoys, two great nuns who worked to educate young girls, will never be forgotten in Quebec. The teaching provided, however, was largely religious or classical, and the lore of Greece and Rome did not filter down to the ordinary habitant. Still, this was the usual form of education in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and there was no belief in that time in general popular education.

Hence ignorance in New France did not follow from the Church's control of education. The nature of that education, however, theoretical and classical rather than practical or scientific, remained firmly fixed in French Canada, to affect the thinking and outlook of its people for centuries thereafter (Careless, 66).

The other non-Catholic English-language textbooks completely overlook the religious life of the habitants of New France; when Blakeley, in *Nova Scotia* (Chapter VII) and Brown, in *The Story of Canada* (Chapter VI), study the mode of life of the French Canadians in particular, they find nothing at all to say about religious activities. Even Ballantyne, in his Catholic-oriented *Canada's Story*, does no more than talk about the parish as the hub of community and social life (I, 159, 209, 210; II, 140).

There can be no doubt in anyone's mind, however, that in early Canada the Roman Catholic Church imposed itself to a considerable degree on what we consider today the civil domain: "The English colonist wanted not only to share in deciding what his government should do, he insisted on deciding what he himself should do in his daily affairs. The French colonist found the government and the Church constantly trying to make such decisions for him" (McInnis, 20).

Among the English-language authors, it is Careless who perhaps most forcefully and clearly describes this imposition:

Its catholicism was more devout and the power of the Church greater than in old France Thanks both to the energy and determination of the religious leaders, and to their early hold in New France, the Church came to occupy a place of great authority in the colony. Much of that authority was unquestioned. . . . Laval, the Jesuits' ally, bishop in New France from 1659 to 1688, maintained the dominant place of the Church even when strong royal government was introduced. Far from letting the Church fall under the power of the state, he insisted on a large share in shaping policies of government The Church there turned its eyes only to Rome, and maintained considerable influence over policies of government. French Canada became and remained an ultramontane citadel. After Laval, quarrels continued in the government of the colony as the claims of church and state to control clashed repeatedly. By the eighteenth century a compromise was gradually reached. In fact, the Church ceased to press for as much influence in state affairs (Careless, 64 ff.; see also 42 ff., where the author develops the theme of Jesuit domination).

The French Canadian authors recognize the Church's influence on the government of the country, but they treat the question as one of rivalry, as though it were a matter of determining which, the Church or the state, should dominate the other, and this leads them to defend the Church's right to maintain its independence vis-à-vis the government: "Mgr de Laval lutta aussi contre les gouverneurs pour maintenir son rang dans le Conseil. Il n'y avait pas là qu'une futile dispute de préséance et de protocole En même temps qu'il sauvegardait son indépendance vis-à-vis du pouvoir civil, le prélat défendait les droits

supérieurs de l'intérêt public" (Plante, 87; *see also* 136, 137, 271).³⁰ Plante does not question how Monseigneur de Laval came to have a seat on the Council; he only shows him fighting to protect that seat. For Filteau, the Church was constantly in a defensive position:

[Mgr de Laval] sut encore déjouer habilement les tentatives des autorités civiles qui désiraient restreindre son autorité Il put ainsi préserver son Église des aventures du gallicanisme (Filteau, *Civ.*, 46; *see also* 71).³¹

Le césarisme, l'exercice de la suprématie royale sur les questions religieuses inscrit au traité de Paris, n'est qu'un héritage du gallicanisme Dès les débuts du régime anglais, les gouverneurs essayèrent d'intervenir dans les détails de l'administration religieuse Mgr Briand se montra inflexible Les attaques se renouvelèrent à maintes reprises par la suite. Assez accommodants sur d'autres points, nos évêques résistèrent catégoriquement à une telle ingérence (Filteau, *Civ.*, 203 ff.).³²

Having demonstrated that the Church exerted its influence only in self-defence, the French-speaking authors go on to show that this influence was always salutary: "Le prestige [des Jésuites] dans la colonie a été qualifié de théocratie. Ce fut à tort, car les Jésuites n'ont jamais été les maîtres politiques de la Nouvelle-France. Parlons plutôt d'influence, remarquons qu'elle fut grande et ajoutons qu'elle fut bienfaisante. Trois personnages synthétisent cette période de l'enracinement français en Amérique: le marchand, le gentilhomme, l'apôtre. Le plus désintéressé, le plus clairvoyant, ce fut l'apôtre" (Plante, 39; *see also* 132 ff.; Filteau, *Civ.*, 46, 67).³³

Let us not forget, however, that from the time of the conquest the non-Catholic churches were in a position to exert their own influence. Neither English- nor French-language textbooks overlook this fact, but they do not see such influence as having anything like the importance of that of the Roman Catholic Church. The reason may perhaps have been the absence of a single, centralized organization among non-Catholics, and also the sometimes serious rivalry between the various groups; unless we are much mistaken, only Orange Protestantism might compare in influence with the Catholic Church.

The tone of the French-language textbooks is very different. The books by clerics show that the religious atmosphere pervaded the entire life of the colonists, giving long descriptions of processions, benedictions, celebrations of holy days and other ceremonies in the lives of the pioneers. With Filteau and Plante, the parish takes precedence even over the family, though the family is regarded as an institution whose purpose is primarily religious. In any event, a new trinity emerges: the parish, the family and the school (Plante, 89; Filteau, *Civ.*, 64, 73, 75). In these books credit for the country's cultural development, too, goes to the Church (Plante, 140; Filteau, *Civ.*, Chapter VII), and satisfaction is expressed over the Church's continuing influence in this domain even to the present day.

But the Church's role went even further, for it was active in politics and government. In our day the governmental system rests on the democratic ideal that demands, among other things, separation of church and state; in other words, the laws of the land require each to occupy entirely separate and distinct domains. But Canada was founded in an era when the civil and religious domains were interwoven; the notion of the separation of the two is relatively recent and not yet universally accepted. We should therefore not be

surprised to find authors differing on the subject. Sometimes they discuss the matter from a purely theoretical point of view. For Ballantyne, in *Canada's Story*, authority rests with God, but is delegated to men:

Although God is the final authority for all things, He sometimes entrusts His authority to men. Thus the Church exercises God's authority in all matters concerning faith and morals, and parents exercise God's authority over their children in the home. . . . There is one kind of authority called political authority. You know that people do not normally live shut off from other people. They live together and form what is called a society or state. And you see that there must be some way of deciding who should exercise God's authority in each group (Ballantyne, II, 55 ff.).

According to this view, the separation of the two domains is quite clear. Filteau advances an opposing view with the model of the Middle Ages (where society kept in step with the Church in all things, since the Church had authority over peoples and kings alike); his enthusiasm is such that he declares we continue to benefit from this model to this day, leaving us somewhat perplexed:

C'est [Charlemagne] qui créa le système politique du Moyen âge. Ce système consistait dans la réunion de tous les peuples en une grande famille collaborant avec l'Église, sous la direction du souverain pontife, vicaire du Christ, qui exerçait l'autorité sur les peuples et les rois. Rome était le centre de cette société et le Saint-Siège était le tribunal suprême qui devait arbitrer les différends . . . Avec eux, [nos ancêtres] apportèrent en notre pays, l'héritage de civilisation chrétienne du Vieux Monde, dont nous bénéficions encore (Filteau, *Hér.*, 163, 421).²⁹

4. *The Church and education*

How, according to our textbooks, did the churches, both Roman Catholic and Protestant, exert their influence? Before all else they sought, through confessional schools, to have "le contrôle des esprits" (control of the mind). This is the expression used by both camps when referring to the other: "The Church also exercised power over men's minds through controlling teaching and the institutions of learning. . . . The Church, moreover, carefully censored thought and reading for laymen, and no newspaper or other organs of public opinion developed. Once more this air of quiet and obedience to authority was very different from the free and lively mental climate of the English colonies to the south" (Careless, 65 ff.).

Here again, according to Plante, the Catholic Church, in its efforts to keep control of education, had to defend itself, this time against another church which threatened to take control: "*Au contrôle de l'esprit*. Pour parvenir à ses fins assimilatrices, Londres comprit l'importance de contrôler l'éducation. On peut lire dans les instructions à Murray: Et afin de parvenir à établir l'Église anglicane . . . nous déclarons que tout l'encouragement possible soit donné à la construction d'écoles protestantes" (Plante, 183, 187).³⁴

The English-language textbooks remain neutral on this point; they do not reproach Catholic parents for wanting confessional schools, but they take refuge behind the principle of majority rule and practical considerations (Rogers, 184; McInnis, 314, 335; Careless, 226, 293 ff.). Making a distinction between "the clergy" and the faithful (a

distinction unfavourable to the former), they take issue, not with the principle of confessional schooling, but with the methods used to obtain it. Take, for example, the Manitoba school question:

French Catholic bishops wrote Laurier a letter, telling how he **MUST** change his mind or they would do everything in their power to defeat him and help Bowell. Here was a strange spectacle.

What would Laurier do? . . . The Liberal leader said that he was loyal to his religion. But must he obey the bishops, he asked, when they told him what to do in PARLIAMENT? He knew how angry the bishops would be if he did not obey. Yet, with splendid courage and patriotism, he gave the answer he thought best for the country. No! he declared, as leader of a party including both Protestants and Catholics, English and French, he would do only what could be approved "by all men who love justice, freedom, and toleration" (Rogers, 184).

Once more the Quebec clergy threw their influence behind the Conservatives on whom they relied to take federal action in support of their demands and warned the faithful against the sin of voting Liberal . . . [Laurier] held firmly to his policy in spite of violent clerical attacks and the electorate in Quebec stood loyally by him in defiance of clerical authority (McInnis, 314; *see also* Careless, 294).

To McInnis it appears that the Catholic clergy wanted to have their cake and eat it too; he accuses them of defending provincial rights over education in Quebec while at the same time insisting on the right of federal intervention in the other provinces when it suited their own purpose (McInnis, 309 ff.).

Saywell, Blakeley, Hamilton and Brown pay no attention to confessional schools, while the other English Canadian authors deal only with the Manitoba and Ontario school questions during the war of 1914-18. In the French-language textbooks, on the other hand, the school question crops up constantly.

French-language books for the elementary level deal particularly with the establishment of new schools and the expansion of Catholic education in the West; they stress positive accomplishments and completely ignore the aspect of conflict (FEC, 218; the same applies to Laviolette). Books for the secondary level make a great deal of the conflict; here we find the entire chronicle of the struggle for confessional schools, from the Royal Institution* to the threat presented by public schools of the present day; they even take exception to the practice of studying abroad:

Un moment distraite, la Chambre vota ce bill [de 1801]. Puis, sous l'impulsion du clergé, elle s'employa à réparer son erreur . . . Une nouvelle tentative d'assimilation par l'école marque les débuts de l'Union; encore une fois, la vigilance du clergé dissipe le danger (Plante, 280).³⁵

Aussi, les étudiants, qui vont chercher un perfectionnement dans les universités étrangères, souvent reviennent au pays avec un accent exotique [celui du français de France?], une mentalité de déracinés, quand ils n'affichent pas du mépris pour leur propre culture (Plante, 399).³⁶

*The Royal Institution for the Advancement of Learning (1801) was intended to introduce a state system of education.

And Filteau is prepared to ring the death-knell for intellectual endeavour in general: "Les Canadiens préfèrent l'ignorance à l'apostasie" ([French] Canadians prefer ignorance to defection from their religion; Filteau, *Civ.*, 229 ff.).

Ballantyne, an English-speaking Catholic, has taken the trouble to examine the question of confessional schools in depth. In the following excerpt from his book, he shows the same openness of mind that underlies his discussion of relations between Church and state:

Until the 19th century, most Christians everywhere . . . would have agreed that governments should have little to do with education, other than to assist parents and the Church to do their work.

As you will remember, the task of providing schools in New France before the conquest had been left almost entirely to the priests and nuns: the Church. This worked well in New France as long as it remained French and Catholic, and as long as most people took no part in choosing those who were to govern them.

But by the 19th century, much had changed: New France had become part of a New Canada; Canada had people who were Catholic and Protestant, French and English. Later, many people arrived who were neither French nor English. And Canadians had obtained . . . the right to choose government representatives with real power.

The Canadian French could hardly be expected to give up the kind of schools they had had in New France. But the Canadian English Protestants had other ideas about education. They could hardly be expected to want the Roman Catholic Church to share in the education of their children. Many of them first wanted to give the task to their own churches, but their churches were so divided that before long most thought it better to hand over this work entirely to the governments in the various provinces.

The idea of having the provincial governments provide schools fitted very well with other increasingly popular ideas: schools should train people to make wise choices of people to represent them; and schools should be used to train the several waves of immigrants to Ontario and the West so that they could become "Canadians".

As you can see, the ideas of many Canadian English Protestants began to differ from those of the Canadian French and English Catholics (Ballantyne, II, 187-9).

5. *Religious survival*

The powerful influence shown by the Catholic Church in its relations with the state has naturally been exerted also to assure its own survival. This is an aspect which is completely overlooked by the English-language authors. As far as they are concerned, the survival of Catholicism in Canada is quite simply assured both by British law and the religious ideals of English-speaking Protestants: "Canada today is a monument to Cartier's passionate belief that under the British flag, the French Canadian would have the greatest possible freedom of language, religion and customs" (Rogers, 160); "The Catholic Church in Quebec became a body backed by the State" (Careless, 103; *see also* Brown, 341). This is also more or less the thinking of two Catholic authors, one English Canadian (Ballantyne, II, 13 ff.) and the other French (FEC, 152).

Plante and Filteau have a different view of religious survival. Episcopal succession, for instance, one of the first important questions to be tackled early in the British regime, is

for them a matter of life or death for the Catholic Church (Filteau, *Civ.*, 147-9, 189; Plante, 183-5). The slackening of religious fervour in that period appears to them just as dangerous: "L'Église canadienne, sans évêque de 1760 à 1766, passait un moment difficile: le nombre des prêtres diminue subitement, les communautés religieuses d'hommes ne sont pas reconnues et n'ont plus le droit de se recruter, l'apostasie de deux religieux déconcerte la population et les mariages mixtes se multiplient depuis l'automne de 1759. Enfin, l'unité religieuse a été rompue, et les erreurs pernicieuses des philosophes français circulent en certains milieux" (Plante, 185).³⁷

It is understandable in the circumstances that the French-language textbooks should give rather excessive attention to the religious revival of the mid-nineteenth century (the role of Monseigneur Bourget, the missionary revival, the establishment of religious retreats), to the extent of giving it more space than any other question of the period. This resurgence of strength does, however, deserve study (the English-language textbooks ignore it, wrongly, it seems to us), because it had important repercussions on political history. We may recall, for example, the clergy's condemnation of Papineau for largely religious reasons: "Le clergé n'avait pas longtemps tardé à embrasser la cause des Patriotes. Mgr Plessis témoignait à Papineau, en 1823, son admiration et son appui moral . . . Papineau montra par la suite que son patriotisme n'était pas pur de tout alliage: il s'y mêlait des doctrines fausses, de violentes passions. Aussi, l'enthousiasme du clergé à son égard se refroidit graduellement et devint une antipathie déclarée, pour plusieurs raisons, notamment à cause du bill des Fabriques, que Papineau fit voter en 1832" (Plante, 243).³⁸

The Papineau case is only one of a long series of conservatively-oriented moves by the Church in support of established authority against independent and progressive elements.

The English-language textbooks in general have taken note of the Church's extreme rightist stand, but, despite the advantage they might have taken of it, they speak of it with a degree of moderation:

The battle of the Papacy against modern liberal ideas . . . was waged by the Quebec clergy with particular intensity. . . . Some of their activities went too far even for Rome, which stepped in to impose a greater moderation. . . .

The rationalism of French thought in the eighteenth century, the anti-religious aspects of the French Revolution, the element of atheism in nineteenth-century radicalism, were all looked on askance by the leaders of French Canada. The Roman Catholic church especially was opposed to these disturbing ideas and tried to set up barriers that would shield French Canada from modern intellectual trends (McInnis, 309, 387 ff.; see also Careless, 297; Saywell, 88, 198).

The English-language textbooks go on to say that with each clash between modern thinkers and the clergy, the people have drifted further and further away from the clergy, and that the latter have had only themselves to blame. The most typical example of this is the victory won by Laurier in 1896. "[Laurier] sought to show that his party in Canada was not in the anti-religious, revolutionary tradition of the Liberals of Europe, but in the Christian, tolerant and moderate tradition of British Liberalism. Laurier put his faith in British political ideas of freedom and justice. His ability to set them before his fellow French Canadians did much to save his party and to give it a new lease of life in Quebec" (Careless, 287).

Careless makes rather sweeping condemnation of the brand of liberalism that emanates from continental Europe while expressing complete admiration for the English brand; the other English-language textbooks are generally more moderate on the subject of European liberalism.

While the English-speaking authors make a distinction between one kind of liberalism and another, and try to show how liberalism has evolved, the French-speaking authors unanimously condemn liberalism of any kind, English, French or whatever; no less astonishing, they identify liberalism with modernism, liberal thinking with modern thinking. In their view, all such thinking is subversive, pernicious, venomous and anticlerical, whether it derives from French philosophy or Protestant propaganda based on “libre examen” (freedom to question):

De la rancœur existe entre les différentes classes de notre société, même entre certains citoyens et le clergé. L'introduction de livres dangereux ou irréligieux ébranle la foi des faibles. Beaucoup de chrétiens ne fréquentent plus les sacrements. Ajoutons que depuis l'arrivée des Loyalistes, la propagande protestante est considérable (FEC, 211; *see also* 116, 256).³⁹

L'élite, que gangrenaient les idées libérales avancées, était plus malade encore que le peuple . . . Les évêques avaient déjà fustigé les fautes, dénoncé les erreurs. Ils s'étaient montrés fermes à l'endroit des Patriotes, trop facilement leurrés par ces funestes théories. Mais, sournoisement, le mal se propagea (Plante, 276; *see also* 252, 277, 334, 378, 412).⁴⁰

Les principes subirent à leur tour un assaut bien plus subtil et bien plus dangereux par la fondation, sous Haldimand, de la bibliothèque de Québec. On y rassembla les ouvrages des philosophes français les plus pernicioeux, qui s'étaient tous employés à saper l'autorité religieuse. Plusieurs Canadiens s'y laissèrent prendre et s'abreuèrent à ces sources empoisonnées. Le mal étendit ses ravages sourdement d'abord, puis éclata vers 1830, pour aboutir à une violente crise d'anticléricalisme dont nous aurons l'occasion de constater les effets (Filteau, *Civ.*, 205, 228, 277).⁴¹

Such uncompromising condemnation of all forms of liberalism may be owing to the belief that, in order for the society to survive as a distinct entity, it must retain its homogeneity. Filteau takes up Garneau's celebrated watchword: “Que les Canadiens soient fidèles à eux-mêmes; qu'ils ne se laissent pas séduire par le brillant des nouveautés sociales et politiques! Ils ne sont pas assez forts pour se donner carrière sur ce point.” And he adds, with complete assurance, “à un siècle de distance, ce mot d'ordre reste toujours d'actualité” (*Civ.*, 482).⁴² We find the same rejection of “nouveautés” (novelty) in other French-language textbooks (Plante, 85, 185, 281; FEC, 151, 153).

6. Roman Catholicism as seen by Protestants

In seeking to ascertain the attitudes of Protestant authors towards religious groups, we note first of all that some of them express their neutrality by abstaining from comment: Blakeley in *Nova Scotia*, Hamilton in *Pirates and Pathfinders*, Saywell in *The Modern Era* and Brown in *The Story of Canada*. Only one English-language textbook identifies closely with the Protestant religion and with the Church of England in particular: Rogers' *Canada in the World Today*, the Grade VII textbook used in British Columbia. In this book,

democratic government and Anglicanism are one and the same, in contrast to Catholic absolutism as embodied in the institutions of France.

In fact, we read in this work, the history of England is a long evolution leading to the establishment of democratic government and the Anglican religion, founded in the spirit of tolerance. Henry II, for example, for his efforts to weaken the Church of Rome for the benefit of the state, is treated as a hero whose every act was done for the good of the English people and the greater glory of England (Rogers, 18). The same goes for Queen Elizabeth I; while the Catholics worked to restore the power of the Pope in England and the Protestants were sorely persecuted in the process, Elizabeth made up her mind to govern for the good of her people and to defy the influence of Rome. She trimmed the power of the nobles and re-established and strengthened the Church of England. Having recounted the bitter struggles she was forced to wage against Rome and Catholic Spain, the book concludes: "As a result of these many religious differences, the English people gradually came to see that there should be freedom of religious worship for all. We may consider this principle of religious freedom another contribution of the English peoples to the progress of civilization. Today throughout the British Empire we can find many different faiths each of which is allowed to worship as it sees fit" (Rogers, 25-7).

In France, on the other hand, under the influence of the Church of Rome, the evolution was towards absolutism:

In the middle of the 8th century the king's minister, Pippin, grew so powerful that he was able to sweep away the old line of kings begun by Clovis. But first he asked the permission of the Pope. This point is more important than it seems at first, for the new king thus became in theory a representative of the Church. Thereafter it became a religious duty to obey the king, an early instance of the "divine right" idea which later kings in France and elsewhere were to adopt and to try to impose upon their people (Rogers, 59).

And so the kings of France, like certain English monarchs who had attempted to oppose democracy, came to regard themselves as the embodiment of the state, with the king's will sufficient justification for anything (Rogers, 64 ff.); and the author holds forth at length on the sufferings imposed on the French people by the selfishness and extravagance of these absolute monarchs (Rogers, 65-72).

Finally, we note that this author reproves the clergy of France for its attachment to the tithe; it was the poor unfortunate people who paid, while the clergy itself had nothing to pay (Rogers, 68-71). However, the author quite overlooks the tax that the Church of England could collect, both in England and Canada.

7. Protestantism as seen by Roman Catholics

Among the French-language textbooks, there are two that abstain altogether from commenting on Protestantism and its adherents: *La Nouvelle-France* by Charles and *L'épopée canadienne* by Laviolette. In the latter, however, there are a number of allusions suggesting a rather sentimental kind of mutual assistance. *Mon pays*, by the FEC, very clearly expresses a desire for tolerance and respect towards others:

Il ne s'agit pas de former des surhommes, mais des Canadiens catholiques, aimant leur patrie et leur foi. Les auteurs, pour aider les maîtres à atteindre ce but, leur

présentent un texte propre à éveiller LE SENS DE L'HONNEUR, LE SENS NATIONAL ET LE SENS CHRÉTIEN. Ils ont cru nécessaire de donner à ces termes une interprétation large, la plus juste sans doute en l'occurrence Le Christianisme est à l'échelle du monde et tissé de charité, il ne souffre ni mépris des coutumes indigènes ni bigoterie étroite. Les rapports de notre peuple avec les gens de langue anglaise proposent, en ce sens, un moyen idéal de formation. Le manuel ne voile pas les heurts historiques, mais les expose sans rancœur hargneuse, dans une atmosphère de compréhension réaliste et chrétienne (FEC, 4).^{4,3}

Throughout their book the authors adhere to their expressed intention, but they have not carried their Christian charity so far as to provide their readers with an understanding of Protestants and their religion, much less to present them in a favourable light.

These remarks apply to French-language textbooks of the elementary level. Those for the secondary level take a much harder line toward Protestants, even to being downright aggressive. Filteau's treatment of Protestantism and its effects, in *L'héritage du vieux monde* (350 and 380), offers ample illustration:

[Après le grand schisme] le doute s'était insinué dans bien des âmes et en beaucoup il avait jeté des germes d'indifférence et de rébellion. À la faveur de ces troubles, de graves abus s'étaient introduits, en particulier, l'esprit d'indiscipline Les révoltés protestants prétendaient réformer l'Église et la ramener à sa pureté primitive. Cette réforme fut simplement une révolution dans la doctrine, le culte et la discipline du catholicisme On n'habitue pas impunément les foules à discuter de ce qui doit être indiscutable, à mettre en doute la légitimité de leurs chefs. L'habitude de la critique et l'esprit d'indiscipline persistèrent même après la restauration de l'unité de l'Église (Filteau, *Hér.*, 353 and 380).^{4,4}

Thus for Filteau, Protestantism can only give rise to indiscipline among its own adherents and others too. It is apparent that the author has made no attempt to understand the movement from the Protestant point of view, so it is hardly surprising that he should dismiss virtuous behaviour on the part of heretics and pagans as pure affectation (297 and 380); according to him, people who become converted to Protestantism do so because that religion corresponds to their own defiance of authority and their cupidity (384 and 407). When dealing with the wars of religion, he makes a point of mentioning Henry VIII's 72,000 victims (388), but when he comes to the massacre of St. Bartholomew he only mentions vaguely that there were "un grand nombre" of victims, particularly among the entourage of the Protestant leader Coligny (410). And all through the two chapters where Protestants figure he uses the most tendentious language. For example:

En 1528, [les huguenots] poussèrent l'audace jusqu'à mutiler et profaner une statue de la Vierge, qui ornait une rue de Paris. En même temps, ils affichaient par toute la ville des placards blasphématoires contre la messe. Le peuple parisien entra en fureur et réclama un châtiement exemplaire. François 1^{er}, pour le satisfaire, dut condamner les sacrilèges au supplice habituel, le bûcher. . . . Calvin et ses adeptes, réfugiés à Genève, désirant se venger, inondèrent la France de leurs écrits et de leurs prédicants. . . . Par esprit d'opposition, par jalousie, plusieurs grands personnages passèrent au parti protestant. . . . La régente se montra tolérante envers les huguenots. Ceux-ci en profitèrent pour propager leurs erreurs. Ils devinrent bientôt d'une audace qui exaspéra les catholiques (Filteau, *Hér.*, 407).^{4,5}

To account for this lack of understanding, if not supreme contempt for anything Protestant, we must remember that in the French-language textbooks, religion and the French Canadians are continually identified. Numerous indeed are such expressions as "notre sainte religion," "notre précieux héritage spirituel" (our holy religion; our precious spiritual heritage; FEC, 304), "la véritable Église" (the true Church; Filteau, *Hér.*, 203), "notre trésor le plus précieux" (our most precious treasure; Filteau, *Civ.*, 472). With Filteau in particular, there is a constantly recurring association of the terms *Catholic* and *French* as if it were an obsession. Loyalty to the Church is considered as imperative a duty as devotion to the homeland and French culture. The Church is the mother of Canada, and to abjure her would be monstrous and sinful: "Elle a présidé à sa naissance, elle a soutenu son enfance, elle a fait son éducation. . . . Après avoir uni les éléments divers et modelé l'âme de la race, l'Église a été la gardienne vigilante et fidèle qui réprimait les abus dès leur naissance et écartait les éléments de désordre Les Canadiens d'autrefois ont su reconnaître leur dette de reconnaissance envers l'Église. Aussi lui ont-ils toujours montré une indéfectible fidélité. Rien d'ailleurs ne pouvait ébranler leur confiance en elle, ni atténuer leur amour" (Filteau, *Civ.*, 67).⁴⁶

Elsewhere, Filteau reiterates a passage by Chapais: "Maintenant que nous sommes parvenus à l'âge viril, nous ne saurions, sans la plus grande aberration, laisser se rompre ou même s'affaiblir les liens qui nous unissent à elle. Que dis-je, nous ne saurions, sans être infidèles à nous-mêmes, nous montrer infidèles à l'Église" (Filteau, *Civ.*, 461).⁴⁷

This terminology is all borrowed from the mysticism of family, and Filteau has already used it to describe Canadian motherhood (*Civ.*, 74, 101, 201, 277, 348). For him, the Catholic Church may be compared to a mother widowed by the conquest (the expiration of the French regime symbolizes the death of the father); it is she who assures the survival and continuity of the family; in the end she clings to her children, for by now she needs them more than they need her; and she cannot bear the thought of seeing them break away.

E. Economic Matters

All the textbooks that we have studied take account of the economic aspects of history to some extent, but there are differences both in the quantity and the quality of material. Here the division is not so much between French and English books, as between books for the elementary and secondary levels.

At the elementary level, economic history is touched on only in a descriptive way: cost of living, railway development, statistics—all disposed of in a short sentence or a brief paragraph; only rarely are such facts considered at length, the exceptions being found in English-language books (Ballantyne, Rogers and Brown). At the secondary level, a great deal of space is given to economic factors, and sometimes even the theoretical aspect of economic questions is considered. It is in method and approach that there is a major difference between English- and French-language books. For French-speaking students economic questions are presented as though they were something added, a sort of appendix, like literature and the arts in history. English-speaking students, on the other

hand, approach economic questions as a point of departure, a base on which events are built, a continuous thread constantly visible as the story unfolds.

The most frequent theme is that of factors contributing to the economic development of the country, that is to say, its natural resources. But how much space is given to individual initiative in the English-language textbooks? Very little, and what there is consists only of descriptions of pioneer activity in agriculture and fishing (the role of fishing is generally very much neglected, however, except by Careless); the only English-language book which gives much importance to this activity is *Nova Scotia, A Brief History*, which, since it is devoted mainly to the period of "beginnings," might be expected to do so.

1. *Government and the economy*

The theme of pioneer activity is very important in the French-language textbooks. For them, Canada's prosperity during the French regime was based on agriculture and small industries, leading to a closed, self-sufficient economy (Plante, 18), the principal objective of the Intendant Talon (FEC, 48, 62, 63; Charles, 37). This restricted framework of the economic life of New France is held up as an exemplary model, and to it is attributed the economic emancipation of the individual and the community:

Il fallait compter sur la mère-patrie pour une grande partie des approvisionnements et les colons ne disposaient que de peu d'argent pour payer les importations. Talon voulut immédiatement affranchir le pays de cette dépendance ruineuse (Filteau, *Civ.*, 43).⁴⁸

L'action de Talon en poussant l'habitant à ajouter, à l'exploitation agricole, l'atelier familial destiné à lui permettre de suffire à ses besoins les plus variés, a contribué pour beaucoup à lui assurer l'indépendance économique . . . En vendant le plus qu'il peut et en achetant le moins possible, l'habitant augmente son aisance (Filteau, *Civ.*, 93).⁴⁹

According to the French-language textbooks, this form of economic life also contributed to the stability and equilibrium of the population (Filteau, *Civ.*, 86; FEC, 191), as well as to its vitality: "Cette politique eut des conséquences immenses; elle fut à la source de la prospérité paysanne et constitua l'un des principaux facteurs de notre survivance." (Filteau, *Civ.*, 44).⁵⁰

However, the French-speaking authors are obliged to recognize that, left to their own initiative, the French Canadians were not able to bring their country to full flower. Therefore they attach a corollary to their thesis: government intervention. They apply a very modern theory to the past, namely that the government is responsible for the prosperity of the people; their conclusion favours governmental paternalism. They roundly reproach the French government for its "incurie" (indifference), and for neglecting its task (Plante, 128; FEC, 125); Plante condemns in very broad terms: "Les dix mille colons que la France avait envoyés au Canada; elle les a laissés se débrouiller seuls et s'éparpiller aux quatre coins du continent, en quête de fourrures" (Plante, 166; see also 127, 151, 161).⁵¹

As for the stagnation in industry and financial difficulties following the conquest, the French-language authors lay the blame on the British government: "Cette politique devait

tenir en échec le développement de l'industrie canadienne durant près d'un siècle. On songe même, à un moment, à restreindre l'industrie domestique et à prohiber les métiers à tisser de nos grand'mères" (Filteau, *Civ.*, 175).⁵² Filteau has not missed the opportunity to inject a note of sentimentality.

All the textbooks, both in English and French, agree in recognizing the preponderant role of government in promoting increased economic activity; the creation of a single economic framework for the entire country, for instance, through trade agreements, customs duties, immigration policy, etc. Filteau alone reserves this protective role for the provincial government (*Civ.*, 333).

Two English-speaking authors, Saywell and McInnis, attribute particular importance to the government's part in the economy. In their view, it is this preponderant governmental role that constitutes the principal difference between our economy and American capitalism, and as such is one of the essential elements of Canadian nationalism.

The greatest difference of opinion between French and English Canadian authors, however, is over the beneficial or harmful effect of commercial and industrial capitalism. This sets the scene for a kind of never-ending jousting match: under the French regime, farmers against merchants, individuals against companies, small companies against big ones; after the conquest, French Canadian farmers against English merchants, French workmen against English bosses, and so forth.

2. *The merchants: heroes or scoundrels?*

When Canadian history began, the economic revolution was already an accomplished fact, and had been for at least a century; commercial capitalism was established and accepted, and had already brought prosperity to a number of European countries through the commercial company system. In fact, the role of these companies in the colonization and development of Canada is more open to dispute than any other subject. Their role spans an extremely long period, for companies were active first in the fur trade, then in finance, in grain, lumber, the development of transportation, and finally in industrial growth.

The English-language authors do not try either to magnify or minimize the positive contribution of the early "company system," and they attribute its failure to geographic and economic conditions. They see the big fur traders who took over from the companies as important and even essential figures in New France. "The fur trade was the life-blood of New France," writes McInnis. "It overshadowed all other economic activities and set the pattern of commercial life" (McInnis, 15). According to most of the English-language textbooks, the whole economic life of the country hinged on the fur traders, and it was the fur trade that led to governmental imperialism, exploration and the establishment of distant posts (Rogers, 105; Ballantyne, I, Chapters XV, XVIII, XIX; Brown, 113, 122; Careless, 52).

The position taken by the French-language authors is very different. Plante does seem, briefly, to recognize the importance of economic vitality. He writes, "Voici le motif capital: l'intérêt économique" (economic gain: this was the greatest motivation; 73), but, in his chapter on French exploration in the West and North the profit motive gives way to

others: religious, imperialistic and military. When companies fail he is quite ready to admit unfavourable circumstances, but his premise is that commercial companies are tainted from the very beginning by the pursuit of profit and are consequently unfit for the grandiose and heroic work of colonization.

All the French-language textbooks refer to the fur traders disparagingly: all these “brasseurs d'affaires” (wheeler-dealers; Laviolette, 13, 23, 47), these “trafiquers” (traffickers; Plante, 86), these “parvenus” (vulgar rich; Plante, 145) “défendent avec âpreté leurs intérêts” (ruthlessly guarded their own interests; Plante, 20) and showed only self-seeking and indifference to the common good. Their most heinous crime was luring young men to the life led by the coureurs de bois, robbing the colony of its already weak manpower and retarding the development of agriculture. Farming and farm life are glorified while commercial capitalism is damned for its evil works. And—a curious contradiction found in two books (Filteau, *Civ.*, and Plante)—if the population of Quebec was confined to agriculture following the conquest and hence doomed to economic stagnation, it was because of the disintegration of trade and the financial ruin brought on by defeat; agriculture could do no more in the circumstances than make it possible for the French Canadians to survive as a group (Filteau, *Civ.*, 158-61; Plante, 176-9).

After the conquest, of course, it was British capitalists who took over: fur merchants, land settlement companies, Montreal wholesalers, canal and railway promoters. How are they judged? In the English-language textbooks, the Montreal merchants played the starring role from 1763 to 1860; their enterprises were heroic achievements and their story is a veritable epic told in terms just as extravagant as those used by the French-language textbooks in describing the exploits of the pioneers of New France (Rogers, 128-32; Brown, 188-93). Every English-language textbook devotes one or two whole chapters to them, full of local colour and written like adventure stories. We should add that these books make much of the bicultural character of these undertakings, the courageous, picturesque and well-paid French voyageurs apparently cooperating freely with enterprising British sponsors who had a flair for business.

The French-language textbooks ignore this chapter of Canadian history. Not a word do we find on it in Filteau's *Civilisation* or in Laviolette; Plante and FEC each give it a page and recognize the cooperation between the English and the French. We cite the following selection in particular: “Seize partenaires (ou bourgeois), tous Anglais ou Écossais, fournissent la mise de fonds. Pour eux travaillent commis et voyageurs, ordonnés en une pittoresque hiérarchie, presque tous Canadiens français” (Plante, 205).⁵³ Neither of these authors sees anything epic about it, however; as far as they are concerned, the British merchants, like the merchants of the French regime, were driven by “l'appât du gain” (greed for gain; Plante, 206).

Much as one might hope to find a clear assessment of this economic activity, attempts at evaluation are few and far between. “Western Canada is born,” writes Ballantyne (II, 98). The rivalry between the two great merchant groups had two good effects, according to Plante (206), “de nouveaux voyages de découverte, une connaissance plus précise de la géographie de l'Ouest et du Nord canadien” (new voyages of discovery and more detailed knowledge of the geography of western and northern Canada). For McInnis (247), the

colonization of the West led the Montreal merchants to abandon the already decadent fur trade and turn to building a new commercial empire in wheat and lumber.

3. *The troubles in Lower Canada*

The period that follows is far more complex; it was one of bitter conflict in which economics and politics were closely interwoven. Here again there is a marked difference between French- and English-language textbooks.

In general, the English Canadian authors severely criticize the Family Compact in Upper Canada, and take sides with the rural and popular democratic movement (*see*, for example, Ballantyne, II, 100; Rogers, 144; Careless, 164-8; McNinnis, 261). On the other hand, they are full of indulgence for what the French-language textbooks call "*la clique du Château*" in Lower Canada. Rogers writes: "These energetic businessmen (the Protestant traders of Montreal and Quebec) wished to push ahead with great plans to improve the province—new roads, new industries, new immigrants. The French Canadians were satisfied with the old way of living and disliked the merchants" (Rogers, 147; *see also* Ballantyne, II, 102; Brown, 252; Careless, 178; McNinnis, 266-79).

In short, in the conflicts of Lower Canada, the English-language authors tend only to see efforts on the part of the French Canadians to assure their own predominance. This is how Careless views the situation:

In consequence, the political quarrels grew as the assembly sought both to advance French power in government and to defend French society by restraining English commercial development. Although the French Canadians in politics called themselves Reformers, it should be remembered that in many ways they were very conservative. In commercial matters, at any rate, the "British party" stood for change and growth. The French certainly wanted political reform, but they wanted it in order to break the hold of the English-speaking minority, so that their old way of life could be maintained. The French Reformers really sought self-government in order to preserve the old world of New France in a fast-altering British North America (Careless, 178).

McInnis holds more or less the same view: "The division between French and English coincided with the division between two cultures and two sets of economic interests and gave to the political struggles in Lower Canada the colour of a conflict between races" (McInnis, 261).

The French-language authors ignore economic motivation or simply talk about the economic oppression suffered by the French Canadians; for them, as in FEC, for instance (168, 187 ff.), the Patriots were concerned only with democratic principles.

After this period, all the authors, both English and French, seem to agree in their approval of the country's development along capitalist lines. For the purpose of our study, therefore, the subsequent periods are of less interest.

4. *Economic themes*

Before passing on from our review of economic interpretation, we should try to summarize the economic themes played up by the French- and English-language textbooks.

The English textbooks give a profusion of detail on economic history in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Their authors seek out cause-and-effect relationships between business fluctuations and domestic politics. They find connections between economic crises and crises in political parties (Saywell, 170; McNinnis, 260, 345; Careless, 356), and between economic crises and the rise of French Canadian nationalism (Saywell, 186). They study closely Canada's economic relations with Great Britain, to which they attribute the loyalty of the Canadian colonies in 1775 and 1812 and the preservation of Canada as a distinct entity (Blakeley, 135; Rogers, 124; Careless, 106, 164). In their view, it was economic development that promoted a feeling of national identity (McNinnis, 271), and national unity implies first and foremost a national economy: "This meant first of all the building of a national economy. The belief that Confederation would bring material advantages had been one of the big factors in rallying support for the project . . . If they could be realized, Canadians would more and more learn to think for themselves as citizens of a single national community in whose fortunes every individual Canadian had a stake" (McNinnis, 297; *see also* 345, 384, and Saywell, 275).

Economic relations with the United States also preoccupy the English Canadian authors; they attach great importance to the seriousness of competition from the United States and the threat from that quarter for the survival of Canada as an economic entity.

The French-language textbooks have their own economic themes. The one that preoccupies them most is the effect of the conquest as experienced by the French Canadians. Filteau writes, "Ainsi, sans qu'il soit nécessaire de taxer le vainqueur de malveillance, les nôtres, par les circonstances, se trouvèrent pratiquement exclus du commerce" (Filteau, *Civ.*, 160; *see also* 162, 164).⁵⁴

Others look for more sinister intentions on the part of the English (FEC, 188; Plante, 225, 226, 234 ff., 379). The imperialistic mercantilism of the English was disastrous for Canada in any event (Plante, 230, 341-5; Filteau, *Civ.*, 173-7, 343); not only were the French Canadians confined to agriculture, but being so confined were in such desperate straits that they lost a priceless potential in men and resources to other countries (Plante, 329; Filteau, 309-13; FEC, 210; Laviolette, 268). Today, however, the French Canadians are ready to take their requital on the economic front (Filteau, *Civ.*, 415, 458).

F. *Ideals for Living*

Our textbooks are intended to play a formative role. In one of them we read: "Édifier un ouvrage vraiment formateur fut le principal souci [des auteurs de ce manuel]. En théorie, tout le monde convient de la primauté de l'éducation sur l'instruction. Mais comme cette dernière offre des résultats palpables, pouvant se résoudre en notes scolaires, elle détrône indûment, trop souvent du moins, la véritable formation. C'est contre cette tentation que les auteurs ont voulu réagir" (FEC, 4).⁵⁵

The authors therefore have certain ideals for living to propose to their young readers. They go about it in two ways, either directly with advice ("do this, do not do that; this is good, that is bad"), or more subtly with praise or blame, for which historical material is used at least indirectly. The English-speaking authors stick to the second method, and the

higher the school level the less they preach. The French-speaking authors use both methods, and the older the pupils the more persistent are their exhortations.

In order best to observe how the authors go about this, we first drew up a list of qualities they stress the most. Some of these qualities are essentially individual ones, while others relate more to group life. This division has determined our plan of observation.

1. *Individual qualities*

All the textbooks put courage, either moral or physical, at or near the top of their list. The English authors tend to prize boldness, daring and determination in particular; if they had a slogan it would be "daring leadership." The French authors lean more to physical bravery, gallantry, energy, moral courage; Plante sets the tone when he writes, "Un homme vaut par sa morale" (morality makes the man; 208). Authors of both groups remind their readers that courage is not a virtue that just happens, but one that comes with tenacity (*see*, for example, Careless, Hamilton, Blakeley, Ballantyne, Rogers, Brown, Plante, FEC, Laviolette, Charles—all authors for whom courage and tenacity are major themes).

Besides courage, work, the hard life and constant effort are also idealized. Thrift and hard work, writes Blakeley several times in *Nova Scotia*, guarantee success for the future; these qualities are also recommended by Plante, Filteau and Laviolette. Ballantyne sees an essential distinction between wealth acquired by windfall and wealth acquired through hard work, which is the only true wealth; *Canada in the World Today* denounces the immorality of the luxurious living of the French aristocracy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in contrast, it seems, with the stability and sense of duty of the English middle class of the same period.

On this point it is the French-language authors who write in greatest detail and most frequently. The life of hardship and struggle, they say for the edification of their students, is an ideal that must be pursued and practised, following the example of the ancient Romans (Filteau, *Hér.*) or the Acadians before the conquest (Charles). This life is symbolized by the hands, "rudes, gercées et grillées" (rough, chapped and scorched), of French Canadian mothers (Filteau, *Civ.*, 57); its aim is a simple happiness that is the more easily achieved the less one expects from life (FEC, 48, 101). To make sure that the message gets across, these authors rail at length against worldly self-indulgence and the comfortable life of the rich and aristocratic, their principal target being the French nobility (Filteau, *Civ.*, 123; Plante, 64, 151, 201, 253; Charles, 83). Splendour and luxury corrupt the morals and integrity of humble men and of great men too, Laurier for example: "Cette âme noble se laisse griser par les splendides déploiements de ce pageant. Le premier ministre proclame son loyalisme et engage son pays dans le rouage de la défense commune de l'Empire" (Plante, 342, 398).⁵⁶

For the English Canadian authors, another quality essential to the individual and one which brings a sense of purpose to courage and tenacity, is the tendency to build dreams of the future; without it courage and tenacity lead to nothing. As Ballantyne writes: "All people at some time dream of an ideal they want to grasp. Some of them, like the Upper

Canadians, place their dream in the unknown future and try to struggle toward it. Others, like the Lower Canadians, place it in the familiar past and try to get back to what they fondly imagine to have been 'the good old days'. . . . Their dream was in the past, not the future" (Ballantyne, 60 ff.; *see also* 153).

The French-language textbooks talk rather of a mission to be fulfilled, which is somewhat different. Turning one's dreams to the future is something an individual does of his own free will when he adopts a goal; a mission comes from outside, from an authority, and is an obligation for the individual. It is in religious terms that the authors talk of this, moreover; it is the *gesta Dei per Francos* (the work of God through the French; Filteau, *Civ.*, 469; *see also* FEC, 6 ff.).

Another virtue is individualism, but this is preached consistently only by the English-speaking authors. Under this heading, they extol initiative and self-confidence, qualities so lacking in the French (Careless, 59, 71, 102; Rogers, 10), "rugged individualism" and "leadership" (Hamilton); for a leader anything is permissible, provided he makes good his dream (Hamilton, 38, 45, 76, 83, 159).

French books, such as *La Nouvelle-France* by Charles, *Mon pays* by FEC, and even *Mon pays* by Plante, do indeed praise emulation, but that is not really individualism. As though following Filteau's lead, in fact, the French-speaking authors are unanimously opposed to individualism. Filteau manages to avoid mentioning either Socrates or Galileo in his *Héritage du vieux monde* (73, 377); in his *Civilisation* he declares time and again that the group takes precedence over the individual (27, 78, 375, 484), that the free-thinking and individualism of the Americans are deplorable (372, 411, 412), and even goes so far as to condemn economic individualism (101, 375).

The spirit of adventure is another quality to which the English authors attach great importance (McInnis, Hamilton and Ballantyne, for example), while the French authors denounce it with every ounce of energy they have. The coureurs de bois are a particular case in point; the English-language writers study these men from a purely historical point of view, while the French spurn them out of hand and without reservation:

Ensorcelés par l'aventure, [les coureurs de bois] lâcheront la proie pour l'ombre, sacrifiant à un gain facile mais éphémère une fructueuse carrière de laboureurs (Plante, 82).⁵⁷

Maître de ses activités, il se croit le plus heureux des hommes Le coureur de bois retire une somme rondelette de la vente de ses produits. Il l'emploie à se vêtir comme les nobles du pays. Lorsqu'il fréquente la société, il affiche des bas de soie, une culotte de velours, une chemise brodée et un chapeau à plume. Il porte l'épée et affecte de passer pour un gentilhomme. Il méprise les gens des villes, ces sédentaires qui n'ont pas comme lui parcouru les Pays d'en Haut! . . . Ses économies dissipées, le coureur de bois n'a qu'un désir: repartir vers la grande aventure (FEC, 108 ff.).⁵⁸

Les coureurs de bois, vagabonds professionnels en rupture avec la vie civilisée L'essor des familles et même de la nation a été retardé et entravé par ces vies sans foyers et désastreuses pour elles-mêmes surtout au point de vue de la morale (Filteau, *Civ.*, 97).⁵⁹

If we wished to enumerate the virtues dear to the French authors' hearts, it would almost do to take the opposite of all the things they abhor in the *coureurs de bois*. In any event, for them the first, the most highly esteemed virtue is without doubt, selflessness; if the French settlers earned a little money from fur trading, for example, it was as though they were reluctantly making a concession to the necessity of earning a living: "Sans doute, s'occupaient-ils du trafic des fourrures, puisqu'il fallait bien amasser quelque argent pour subvenir aux besoins de la maisonnée" (Laviolette, 321; elsewhere we find a similar tone: Plante, 18, 39, 281; Filteau, *Civ.*, 14, 27, 376, 471).⁶⁰

This high regard for selflessness makes personal ambition seem like a most unfortunate trait (Charles, 183), and greed, it is thought, leads to treachery (Filteau, *Civ.*, 196). This frame of mind is revealed in none of the English-language books.

Among the virtues particularly prized by the French-speaking authors, we find the spirit of sacrifice. While only one English-language book mentions this (Ballantyne), all the French textbooks treat it as an essential part of character-building. This spirit even requires personal mortification, the sacrifice of physical well-being and of money; the context is distinctly religious (Plante, 139).

Finally, the French-language books constantly stress good moral behaviour; this theme recurs again and again in books for the secondary level, as though the authors are trying to forewarn students against the temptations of their age. They condemn alcoholism, for example; they formulate warnings, in deliberately vague and veiled terms, against sexual liberty. With this kind of treatment history ends up sounding like a catechism.

2. *Social qualities*

Besides the virtues an individual ought to have, there are what might be called social virtues; we consider these the most important for the purpose of our study.

First of all there is respect for established authority, a vitally important theme in all the textbooks. In the forefront, from the viewpoint of the English-language authors, comes obedience to the law and government, along with abhorrence of revolt and all forms of violence. This is mentioned no less than eight times in a single book (Ballantyne, 57, 59, 107, 126, 149, 151, 169, 196). The others are no less insistent; they play endlessly on the themes of duty to one's country, loyalty, and change of government by peaceful means.

Loyalty in the English-language textbooks seems to mean loyalty to England and its sovereign, while in the French textbooks this is so only on the occasion of the invasions of 1775 and 1812. While the French-language texts take loyalty for granted and therefore consider it unnecessary to dwell on the subject, the English textbooks find a constant need to stress it at every opportunity. Patriotism does not seem to be enough; there must be loyalty too.

Loyalty and respect for authority go hand in hand with respect for law and order. This is clearly seen in the importance attributed by the English-language texts to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, which the French-language books do not even seem to know exists. In commenting on the force's motto *Maintiens le Droit*, Brown writes: "These three French words, when translated into English, mean 'Maintain the right'. But ever

since the force was first formed in 1873, it has had such a fine record for keeping law and order that the motto we usually hear is 'the Mountie always gets his man' " (Brown 327). On the same subject Rogers says, "It means 'maintain the right,' but perhaps it can better be translated as 'wherever I am, there is law and order' " (Rogers, 180).

It is not that the French Canadian authors disregard respect towards authority; quite the contrary, but they see much more in authority than the mere maintenance of order. Authority for them is a society's firmest foundation, and is essential because the society's stability must be preserved before all else. Government is not the only organ of authority; religious leaders, the family and even the society's elite have sovereign authority in their respective domains (see, for example, Plante, 182, 277, 336; Filteau, *Civ.*, 27, 78, 80, 375, 484; FEC, 98, 116, 256, 267, 273, 278; Charles, 35, 110, 113, 132).

In the English-language textbooks another social virtue is eagerness to cooperate in the pursuit of higher aims, like the welfare of the nation and the preservation of human values. This spirit of cooperation does not shrink from compromise (Saywell, 93; Rogers, 193-355); qualities that must be cultivated are moderation (McInnis, 327; Careless, 314, 319; Ballantyne, II, 107, 128, 151, 156, 186, 195), fair play (Ballantyne, II, 101, 170) and tolerance (Rogers, 27, 36, 320). The last two, fair play and tolerance, are held up to English-speaking students as the product of the English heritage (Rogers, 154).

When the French-speaking authors approach this subject their attitude is rather negative. Instead of urging tolerance and fairness, they attack the English for their tendency to identify might with right (Plante, 314, 321), for behaving like conquerors (Plante, 235, 255), and for indulging in religious or racial fanaticism (Filteau, *Civ.*, 204, 227, 316, 318, 321, 343, 352). For these authors compromise is fatal; it does not mean give and take but abject surrender (Plante, 87, 178, 185; Filteau, *Civ.*, 187, 232, 319, 325, 341); the only exception on this point is FEC (230).

If follows that a fighting spirit and will to resist are held in high esteem by the French-language textbooks. For them, French Canadians who associate with the conqueror are unworthy of their race. A striking example of this is the scorn heaped on the seigneurs whose children intermarried with the English: "Écartés des fonctions publiques qu'ils avaient occupées durant le régime français, dépourvus de vocation terrienne et de goût pour le travail quotidien, ils vivaient du labeur des colons ou courtoisaient le vainqueur, en lui livrant [leurs] fils et [leurs] filles. Désormais, ils ne seront plus les chefs de la nation" (Plante, 201).⁶¹

A firm stand must be taken against any abuse from any quarter (Plante, 145, 252), and one must fight for whatever one wants (Plante, 137, 258). Filteau is particularly insistent on this point; he calls upon young French Canadians to throw off the mentality of a conquered people: "Étienne Parent, un instant prostré lui-même, se reprenait pour lancer dans *Le Canadien* ce mot d'ordre: 'Un peuple ne doit jamais donner sa démission.' Malgré les apparences, la victoire était beaucoup plus proche qu'elle ne le semblait" (Filteau, *Civ.*, 245; see also 143, 318, 342, 463).⁶² He urges them to keep up a constant struggle (*Civ.*, 227, 354, 359, 393, 483) and to avenge themselves, if only in the economic sense (301, 389).

Though this fighting spirit is found most of all in the French-language texts for the secondary level, the family and ancestor cult pervades every page at all levels. In the English-language textbooks this is only hinted at, the accent being placed on what might

be called the family ties between colony and mother country, and on brotherhood between the various nations of the Commonwealth. What are these family virtues preached by the French-speaking authors? They are born above all of reverence for one's ancestors and the sanctity of their heritage (FEC, 198, 117, 304, 306; Laviolette, 4; Filteau, *Civ.*, 63, 64, 117, 206, 359, 471; Charles, 115). They imply absolute submission to paternal authority and an almost religious homage to motherhood and its preeminent role in the preservation not only of family ties in time and space, but also of human and moral values. The cult of family underlies a conservatism expressed in the French textbooks by the ceaseless repetition of the watchwords "Gardons, conservons, préservons!" (Protect, conserve, preserve).

It would appear from the textbooks that all these social and individual virtues should come to flower in some ideal context. One thinks, in particular, of rural life which continues to be portrayed in literature as the ideal environment for the virtuous life. The French-speaking authors (for it is they who persist most in considering farm life as a kind of earthly paradise) paint an idealistic picture of such life in bygone days, magnify its role in history, regret "le bon vieux temps" (the good old days; see, for example, Plante, 336; Filteau, *Civ.*, 372), and they deplore the kind of life our industrial and commercial society has engendered. Only one, however, subscribes completely to the rural ideal and preaches a return to the land: Laviolette, in *L'épopée canadienne*, the last chapter of which, on colonization, reads like a promotional tract leaving no alternative for the young people to whom it is addressed; it describes only one kind of life, farm life, complete with edifying pictorial illustration (318).

G. Heroes

A hero is the incarnation of both personal and social ideals. English-language textbooks for the elementary level have a great many: men who "dared to dream" (Ballantyne, II, 179), who stood out from the crowd (I, 136), and who, because they were "true gentlemen . . . were not afraid to work" (II, 48). The hero is distinguished by his devotion to duty (Rogers, 40), and by his triple qualities of "courage, wisdom and vision" (Rogers, 159, 188) or "courage, patriotism and faith" (Rogers, 63). The English authors' choice of heroes is quite varied: explorers, military leaders, statesmen, businessmen, and colonists too, regardless of ethnic origin; in short, all those who have laboured for the progress of their country, the advancement of learning, or better living conditions for their contemporaries. A fact that bears noting, however, is that the hero as portrayed by these authors remains very human. As for the books at the secondary level, the authors are very sparing of praise and hero-worship. They say simply of Champlain that he was a great and able man who could learn by experience, a leader dedicated to the purpose of his mission (Careless, 39). Of the soldiers of the two World Wars, they write only that "many of them [were] the finest men in the country" (Saywell, 130).

The heroes of the French-language textbooks, as in the English books, are men and women of devotion, courage, faith and perseverance, but, besides, they are endowed with

moral and even physical qualities beyond those of ordinary mortals—supermen who surmount crippling obstacles and surpass themselves in order to accomplish a mission; often it is they who make the survival of their people or their country possible. Books for both the elementary and secondary levels abound in such figures. These heroes, all of them French, are soldiers, explorers, religious leaders, colonists and mothers with children clustered about their knees. But the French-language authors go even further; heroism is for them a collective phenomenon which may embrace an entire generation, the pioneers, for example (FEC, 48), or even the whole French Canadian society because it has withstood the trial of the conquest (Plante, 169). Thus it is that all French Canadians become players in the “Épopée canadienne” (Canadian epic) and the people of today are urged to follow the example of all those heroes of the past:

Le livre d'Histoire pourra y contribuer [à la formation de la volonté] par les exemples d'énergie tenace qu'offrent les colons, les missionnaires, les hommes d'État. Ces héros entrevoyaient un noble but, ils l'ont poursuivi malgré tout, sans défaillance, sans respect humain, sans crainte des souffrances et de la mort même. L'application personnelle d'une pareille force d'âme dans leurs devoirs propres d'étudiants s'imposera aux enfants, surtout si les éducateurs, à la suite du manuel, multiplient les rapprochements (FEC, 4; see also Lavolette, 4).⁶³

H. “Race”

In view of the French authors' adulation of heroes as superhuman beings, and particularly their penchant for seeing collective heroism at all stages of history, we should hardly be surprised at their very high regard for “la race française.”

Both the English and French textbooks, instead of distinguishing the two groups by language and culture, indiscriminately use the terms “race,” “nation” and “people,” so that, in general, when the authors speak of “race” they mean “ethnic group,” as was common in the nineteenth century, and not “anthropological group.” Now, today, “race” generally has an anthropological connotation, and those who use it in the nineteenth-century sense of “ethnic group” run the risk of being stamped as racist, all the more if this equivocal terminology is used in a context where the author claims purity of lineage for his own group. It can be said that, in this sense, the French-speaking authors (mistakenly according to fact, moreover) do display a degree of racism; they may not be consciously racist, but the language they use is racist and they therefore leave themselves open to the accusation. For example, Guy Lavolette's book opens with these words: “Ce qui importe plus que la mémorisation des textes, c'est l'intelligence de ce qui constitue l'essentiel de notre histoire: la pureté et la noblesse de nos origines” (Lavolette, 4).⁶⁴ Heroism and epic struggles are also essential ingredients for this author (*essentiel* italicized in the text), but purity of race comes first.

Plante admits that eighteenth-century immigration brought rather less desirable elements to the country, “engagés, soldats vieillissants, braconniers, faux-sauniers, criminels, jeunes libertins, transfuges anglais et quelques nègres” (Plante, 127),⁶⁵ but Filteau declares flatly that, despite all, the “race” remained pure and unadulterated:

Dès 1680, les caractères généraux du peuple canadien étaient esquissés. La diminution sensible de l'immigration allait leur permettre de se fixer sans être

affectés sérieusement par les nouveaux venus. Le peuple canadien allait désormais se développer beaucoup plus par les naissances que par l'immigration. Ce n'est d'ailleurs qu'après 1730 que celle-ci allait reprendre avec un peu d'ampleur, mais insuffisamment pour modifier le fonds original de la population (Filteau, *Civ.*, 34; see also 179 and 181).⁶⁶

And what happened when the English came to join the French? We know that the rate of intermarriage between the two groups took a sharp upswing. The Plante textbook condemns this intermarriage; the French Canadian seigneurs, it says, "courtisaient le vainqueur, en lui livrant [leurs] fils et [leurs] filles" (curried favour with the conquerors by delivering up their sons and daughters to them; 201). As for Filteau, he virtuously shuts his eyes and ignores the mixed marriages: "Ces races composantes sont, au Canada, la française et l'anglaise. Et c'est parce que nous, d'origine française, nous ne voulons pas de fusion de notre race avec l'autre, qu'il nous arrive encore de nous appeler nous-mêmes 'Canadiens français'" (Filteau, *Civ.*, 457).⁶⁷

All these racist-flavoured declarations, however, do not prevent the French Canadian authors from taking the English to task for their belief in the superiority of their own race. But in fact, even though the English-speaking authors use the term "race" when they mean "ethnic group," we must recognize that they do not stoop to racism as the French authors do; for example, when Rogers talks about the diversity of races to be found in Canada—"The traveller will see Anglo-Saxon faces, French faces, Chinese, Jewish, Negro, Ukrainian faces" (Rogers, 320)—his observation has absolutely no racist connotation.

How do the French and English authors, really of the same race in the proper sense of the word, deal with the Amerindian race that was here when the Europeans came? Generally speaking, they serve up the same fare: the American Indians were fierce, bloodthirsty and treacherous (Rogers, 101, 106, 173; Plante, 25, 37, 50, 92, 105; FEC, 41, 49). But it is the French-speaking authors who go into the greatest detail and amass the most severe accusations. The characteristics of the American Indians, they write, were underhandedness, hatred, greed, arrogance. The life they led offered a deplorable example to the Europeans; there was complete licence in their family life, women were slaves, the men were addicted to violence and dissipation, and their beliefs and superstitions were primitive and crude (Plante, 25-40, 105; FEC, 50, 67, 77, 183; Laviolette, 22, 23, 29, 30, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 47; Charles, 11-16, 24); they were "âmes rebelles à la civilisation," "natures revêches," "demi-démons" (souls ill-suited for civilization, surly dogs, half-demons; Plante, 40, 50). They are however given credit for some admirable qualities: love of freedom, courage, self-respect, hospitality, loyalty, common sense, complete adaptation to their environment.

Only Ballantyne and Gallagher, in *Canada's Story for Young Canadians*, really make an effort to convey an understanding of the American Indian. These authors take great care to explain the ethnological and sociological significance of the Indian customs that so offended the European observers of the seventeenth century (Ballantyne, I, 19, 48, 68); they do their utmost to instill respect in their readers for the Amerindian civilization:

But some of the French at Quebec wanted to blend the Indian life with their own. They thought the Indian way of life was so bad that the best thing would be to have the Indians learn the French way of life, become like Frenchmen. The Jesuits

did not like this idea. They knew that when Indians met the French way of life, they were just as likely to copy its weak points as its good points. The Jesuits felt that all people should try to develop their own customs and fit their way of life to their own needs (Ballantyne, I, 67).

Both French- and English-language authors conclude, finally, that the best attitude with regard to the American Indians was a paternalistic one, backed by mistrust; they must be protected from themselves and raised to the dignity of the white man. As Filteau writes, with some justification, "les fondateurs du Canada entretenaient une généreuse illusion à l'égard des Indiens; ils croyaient à la possibilité de les assimiler et même de les élever à une complète égalité Les indigènes ne se soucièrent aucunement de se prévaloir de ces avantages et se montrèrent réfractaires à la vie civilisée." And Filteau the "racist" seems quite happy to conclude, despite a great deal of evidence to the contrary, that "Il ne résulta ainsi ni fusion ni métissage, mais simplement des relations d'amitié entre les deux races" (Filteau, *Civ.*, 19).⁶⁸

In the preceding chapter we have examined a number of general themes developed in Canadian history textbooks. We now turn to special themes, which we have arranged in three categories: outstanding figures in the history of Canada, events relating to crises between the two language groups, and institutions on which opinions are divided.

A. Historical Figures

We have not attempted to study all the figures who have left their mark on Canadian history. We have deliberately omitted those on whom the two cultural groups generally agree, such as Talon, La Salle and Lord Strathcona. Certain others we shall consider in another section; Durham and Riel, for instance, are dealt with in relation to the crises with which they are associated. Our list of those to be studied here is nevertheless long and varied.

John Cabot

All the English-language textbooks, when dealing with discovery, give a great deal of space to Cabot; they credit him with the discovery of the Grand Banks of Newfoundland and the wealth derived from them for England (Hamilton, 95; Ballantyne, I, 25; Rogers, 206), but above all they give him credit for having established England's rights over Canada (Careless, 26; Hamilton, 96; Blakeley, 8; Rogers, 38; Brown 21). Brown writes, "We cannot be certain of the exact place where Cabot landed, but the flag of England flew over Canadian soil only five years after the discovery of the New World by Columbus" (Brown, 10).

Among the French-language books that deal with discovery only one mentions Cabot, and then only in passing, giving him two and a half lines, mainly to point out the uncertainty surrounding his voyages and to brand England's claims as "prétentions" (pretentious: Plante, 10).

Jacques Cartier

Conversely, the English-language authors pay little attention to Cartier, while the French textbooks cover his career at great length. For the French-speaking authors, the crosses Cartier raised along his path of discovery symbolized possession and also showed him to be an ideal evangelist (Plante, 5; Filteau, *Civ.*, 14; FEC, 13; Laviolette, 9-13). Cartier, indeed, is the personification of France's role and mission in the New World: "Quelle oeuvre magnifique de colonisation et d'évangélisation la France ne pourrait-elle pas réaliser sur les rives du Saint-Laurent! Il rêve d'une conquête pacifique par la croix et la charrue, tout à l'honneur de sa patrie. . . . Quelle foi admirable en cet homme! Les croix, l'Évangile, la messe, la prière à Marie, servent à immortaliser sa mémoire et ouvrent la voie à la propagation de la vraie religion dans notre pays" (FEC, 15).¹

Only one English-speaking author recognizes Cartier's voyage as tantamount to taking possession (Rogers, 104); the others say only that Cartier was a great explorer; they conclude that his attempts at colonization ended in total failure, and furthermore that he was responsible for Roberval's failure too.

Samuel de Champlain

The English-speaking authors see Champlain as the founder and father of New France (Careless, 37; Blakeley, 19; Ballantyne, I, 39; Rogers, 103; Brown, 55). His contribution centres on three main points: 1) exploration and the beginnings of colonization (Careless, 38; Rogers, 104; Brown, 48); 2) the friendly relations that he established with the Algonquins and Hurons (Ballantyne, I, 53-6; Blakeley, 26-30), but in this connection he is accused of making a serious mistake in arousing the hostility of the Iroquois (McInnis, 22; Ballantyne, I, 48; Brown, 50) and he is excused only because of the necessity to protect the fur trade; 3) organization of the fur trade (Careless, 39; Ballantyne, I, 60). Ballantyne, on his part, evaluates Champlain's accomplishment thus: "Champlain did not leave much of a colony for all his work. Farm work has always been hard, and the Frenchmen hoped to have an easier and richer life trading furs with the Indians" (Ballantyne, I, 74).

The French-speaking authors explain Champlain's failures differently: the merchants were "la cause de ses déboires" (the cause of his frustrations; Plante, 14, 21); one author writes that Champlain was obliged to take action despite the king's indifference and the merchants' opposition (FEC, 21); the purpose of his policy toward the Hurons and Algonquins was to defend the colony (FEC, 21; Laviolette, 21). If Canadians owe gratitude to Champlain, according to these writers, it is for reasons other than those given by the English-language textbooks. He was the originator of French colonial policy (a French empire built on agriculture: Plante, 18; Filteau, *Civ.*, 17; FEC, 35); he contributed more than any other man to settlement of the colony, drawing from wholesome sources (Plante, 127; Filteau, *Civ.*, 23); he was the first Canadian, the first to think and act as a Canadian (Filteau, *Civ.*, 37); his apostolic role was admirable (Filteau, *Civ.*, 17; Laviolette, 21). Plante evaluates his work with great emotion:

Quelqu'admirable que fût ce déploiement d'énergie, il n'a pas donné des fruits immédiats d'importance. . . . L'importance de l'oeuvre de Champlain ne tient pas à

l'ampleur des résultats acquis; cette oeuvre vaut par sa portée lointaine et par la somme des sacrifices qu'elle lui a coûtés. Sans l'aide de la mère-patrie, malgré l'opposition constante des marchands, en dépit de la guerre anglaise, il a poursuivi jusqu'à la fin, avec un minimum de résultats, un idéal élevé et généreux: l'implantation de la civilisation française en Amérique (Plante, 28 ff.).²

Bishop Laval

The English-speaking authors recognize the importance of Mgr de Laval's role in the establishment of religious and educational structures (Ballantyne, I, 113; Rogers, 114) and in the foundation of a strong Roman Catholic Church. Careless writes, "[He] made his office a force to be reckoned with" (49); "he built a strongly ultramontane Church in New France" (65); while there is no criticism anywhere of his fight against the brandy trade, there is some amusement over the austerity that he sought to impose on the society (Rogers, 113).

Here the French-speaking authors raise their trumpets high. With profuse detail they describe Laval's role in the organization of religious life, the establishment of schools, the struggle to safeguard moral values; he is among the greatest of "builders" (Plante, 89; Filteau, *Civ.*, 45, 47, 49), but we owe him much more besides:

Sa présence au Conseil Souverain et sa participation active à ses délibérations a inauguré chez nous l'étroite alliance qui a généralement régné entre l'autorité civile et l'autorité religieuse pour toutes les matières qui sont d'une juridiction commune. Cette collaboration a grandement contribué à assurer la paix intérieure et à éviter à notre peuple les aventures désastreuses de certaines idéologies modernes. . . . Il sut encore déjouer habilement les tentatives des autorités civiles, qui désiraient restreindre son autorité (Filteau, *Civ.*, 47).³

En fondant l'Église canadienne sur la vie paroissiale, scolaire et familiale, Mgr de Laval a rendu possible la survivance des Canadiens français. . . . Mgr de Laval a posé les fondations des trois piliers qui ont soutenu, depuis près de trois siècles, l'édifice de la nationalité canadienne-française. "Nous devons," écrit l'abbé Groulx, "à ce constructeur l'empire du catholicisme sur notre vie nationale, la membrure d'acier où aime à s'appuyer notre jeune race" (Plante, 89 ff.).⁴

Radisson and des Groseillers

Although it was with Radisson and des Groseillers that the Hudson's Bay Company originated, these two Frenchmen receive only passing mention in the English-language textbooks (Careless, 53; Rogers, 107; Brown, 100). This seems to be because the struggle for the fur trade in Hudson Bay appears less important to the English-speaking authors than that waged on the Great Lakes and the Mississippi.

The French-speaking authors pay even less attention to these "célèbres coureurs de bois, passés au service de l'Angleterre" (renowned coureurs de bois who went over to England's service; FEC, 84), or else their names are brought up only as an excuse for finding fault with the "maladresse du gouvernement" (government's blundering; Plante, 75). Only one French text gives them credit for having "travaillé à étendre les frontières de la Nouvelle-France" (worked to extend the frontiers of New France; Charles, 49).

D'Iberville

Above all it is d'Iberville's aggressiveness that the English-language textbooks stress: he was a conqueror (Brown, 101), a "Viking" (Rogers, 115), a man who loved a fight and thirsted for personal glory (Ballantyne, I, 143, 144), a man capable of "thrilling and sometimes ferocious deeds" (Rogers, 115), a figure of foremost importance in the French imperialistic plan of expansion (Careless, 53; Ballantyne, I, 144; Brown, 107).

In the French textbooks he is quite the contrary: a defender who stood for "libération de l'influence anglaise" (liberation from English influence; FEC, 85); each of his expeditions was perfectly justified in its purpose, even his raids on English colonies (FEC, 80; Laviolette, 79-81; Charles, 89-91); he was a military genius (Charles, 99). The fleeting nature of his victories is passed over, for he fought only in self-defence.

Vaudreuil-Cavagnial

Vaudreuil-Cavagnial is a pale figure indeed in the English-language textbooks. Careless (90) considers him to have been "meddlesome and overbearing," without saying another word about him. He is held responsible for the withdrawal of troops from Quebec City at the time of the siege (Rogers, 118). We found only one really good point to his credit: he was the first governor to resist the interminable interference from the mother country (Ballantyne, I, 187).

But happily there are the French-language textbooks! For them Vaudreuil was a "Canadien d'abord" (Canadian above all):

L'opposition ne fit que s'accroître entre Canadiens et Français pour dégénérer parfois en rivalités assez âpres Le conflit atteignit son point culminant avec la guerre de Sept Ans, en opposant un gouverneur canadien à un intendant et à un état-major français Représentant du roi de France, mais en même temps fils du pays, Vaudreuil dut faire son choix dans ces conjonctures difficiles. Dans sa correspondance avec la Cour, il voulut établir une distinction entre ce que lui commandait "son zèle pour le service du roi et son attachement à sa patrie."

Patrie! Vaudreuil fut probablement l'un des premiers Canadiens à cristalliser le patriotisme canadien et à lancer l'emploi du mot *patrie* en l'appliquant à son pays (Filteau, *Civ.*, 129 ff.; see also Plante, 123; Laviolette, 158).⁵

His role in the battle of Quebec is indeed open to conflicting interpretation: Vaudreuil committed "une erreur funeste" (a fatal error) writes Laviolette (180), but elsewhere this is refuted with the contention that in Vaudreuil's view, the decision one way or the other was no longer important, since the battle was lost even before it began (Plante, 161).

Regardless of the battle, Vaudreuil's role was very great in the final analysis: not only did he decide to capitulate and so avoid useless sacrifice of life (Plante, 165; FEC, 145; Laviolette, 190), but he also obtained conditions that made it possible for the French to safeguard the essence of their culture (Plante, 165; Filteau, *Civ.*, 139-49; FEC, 149). The English Canadian authors attribute these favourable conditions to Amherst's generosity.

Montcalm

We had expected to find great divergence between English- and French-language textbooks on the subject of Montcalm, but we found that in fact the authors agree in praising him. He was a tragic hero, we read in the English textbooks, who gave up his life to postpone the inevitable when there was no longer any remedy for the weakness of New France (Rogers, 119; Brown, 156). In the French textbooks he is a hero too, but, as we have already observed regarding the historical figures of New France in general, he is a hero identified with New France itself. Laviolette (183) recalls the words of an Ursuline nun: "On dirait que la Nouvelle-France est descendue dans la tombe avec la dépouille du général."⁶

James Murray

Two of the English Canadian authors who cover this period, McInnis and Brown, have nothing to say about Murray, and the three others differ in their evaluation of him. In the view of Careless, Murray posed honourably as the champion of the rights of the French, but he committed a serious error in refusing to back the Montreal merchants who were fighting for the principles of democratic government. On the other hand, Laviolette (209) rejoices to see Murray spurn these "marchants crapuleux" (foul merchants). According to Careless, Murray involved the English government in a vicious circle by supporting the French institutions, since the French element, rather than being won over, was thereby reinforced in its "feeling of separateness" (Careless, 102, 104). For Rogers (124) and Ballantyne (II, 5-20), Murray prevented an uprising and prepared the way for cooperation, thanks to his tolerance and kindness. Ballantyne in particular gives many examples of Murray's acts of kindness and his efforts at conciliation; the General, he writes, felt at home in Canada and with the French; he spoke their language and his Scottish troops followed his example.

This, in short, is how most of the French-speaking authors judge this man (Filteau, *Civ.*, 157, 189; FEC, 153, 154; Laviolette, 205, 206, 208, 210, 211). Plante's admiration, however, is very sparing: Murray's "quelques marques de sympathie" (few signs of sympathy) were offered in obedience to the policy laid down by London and produced only "palliatifs" (palliatives; Plante, 167, 182, 183).

The French authors acknowledge particular gratitude to Murray for a reason totally foreign to the English Canadian authors, namely the continuance of the episcopate (Plante, 184; Filteau, *Civ.*, 189; Laviolette, 215).

Sir Guy Carleton

In the French-language textbooks Carleton enjoys as much popularity as Murray. In *Mon pays* by the FEC we read: "C'est un esprit droit et clairvoyant, qui veut juger de la situation sans parti pris et en connaissance de cause" (FEC, 159).⁷

It was Carleton whose efforts won the Quebec Act for French Canadians (Plante, 189; Filteau, *Civ.*, 216; FEC, 159), and furthermore he sought to reconcile the aims of English policy with the justice due to the French Canadians and later to the Loyalists (FEC, 166).

At least two English-language textbooks condemn Carleton's political role; while recognizing the Quebec Act's merits, they reproach Carleton for his authoritarian and pro-aristocratic attitude, which the Act endorsed, so to speak (Ballantyne, II, 28, 29, 32; Careless, 102-4).

Bishop Briand

We have already noted that religious history has very little place in the English-language textbooks; they do not mention religious leaders unless the latter have some direct relationship with political, economic or military events, and even then they are only interested in the degree of loyalty. About Monseigneur Briand we read: "Bishop Briand was such a good friend of Governor Murray, and he proved to be so discreet and loyal, that soon even the restriction about his title was forgotten" (Ballantyne, II, 14).*

The French-speaking authors are concerned primarily with the Bishop's religious works; one of them even hails him as the "second fondateur" (second founder) of the Canadian Church:

Monseigneur Briand s'emploiera à relever l'Église canadienne de ses ruines matérielles et morales; il mérite le titre de second fondateur. Il fallait rebâtir la cathédrale et les églises incendiées, il était urgent de réformer les mœurs. L'évêque se met à la tâche: dès son arrivée, il commence la visite de son diocèse, il la continue dans les années qui suivent. Malgré la pénurie de prêtres, il fonde de nouvelles paroisses, installe des curés. Dans ses lettres pastorales, il exhorte ses ouailles à la vertu, leur prêche la tempérance. Les fruits ne sont pas longs à mûrir (Plante, 187; see also the panegyric by Laviolette, 215-17).⁸

James Craig

Governor James Craig is mentioned in only two of the English-language textbooks. One of these passes on quickly after a brief mention (Careless, 178); the other reproaches him severely for his antagonism to Catholicism, for his suspicion, and his hostility towards the House of Assembly: "He dared to call on London to repeal the Constitutional Act itself. Craig had gone too far"; his behaviour in fact produced precisely what he was most afraid of, an increase in French-Canadian nationalism (Ballantyne, II, 67, 68).

As might be expected, the French-language texts also denounce Craig vigorously, but in different terms: "Ce vieux soldat, susceptible et cassant" (this old soldier, irritable and imperious), "le régime de la terreur" (the reign of terror; Plante, 237). In their view, Craig's governorship was an ordeal from which the French Canadians emerged triumphant, a magnificent opportunity for exercising their powers of resistance on both the political front and the religious.

*Briand was officially not "Bishop" but "superintendent of the Romish Church."

Louis-Joseph Papineau

The English-and French-speaking authors do not differ very much in their estimation of Papineau, either of the man himself or of his works. All agree that he was a great orator, a zealous patriot, an outstanding leader, whose aims were the establishment of British parliamentary institutions in Canada and the defence of French interests (Careless, 179; McInnis, 262; Ballantyne, II, 106; Rogers, 147; Plante, 240; Filteau, *Civ.*, 236; FEC, 188). The English books add, however, something on which the French books are silent: that Papineau hoped for the adoption of an American form of government and the rejection of English domination (Careless, 180; McInnis, 262; Ballantyne, II, 107).

As for the methods he resorted to, all the authors, both English and French, agree in judging them severely; they were clumsy, inspired by the "doctrines fausses" (false doctrines) of the French Revolution, and unlawful (Careless, 179, 180, 181; McInnis, 262; Ballantyne, II, 106-8; Brown, 252; Plante, 242, 243, 244, 245, 249; FEC, 188). They assert that he did not want rebellion at first, but that he was unable to restrain his followers once he had aroused them with his inflammatory speeches. Ballantyne writes: "At first he was a great admirer of the British way of doing things, but he became suspicious of British schemes with the attempt to join Upper and Lower Canada. He then turned enviously to the "American" way, and demanded independence from Great Britain for the Canadas. When he was opposed by his own priests, his pride and impatience led him to turn on them as well. Papineau never really wanted bloodshed, but his violent words led eventually to violent action" (Ballantyne, II, 107).

We find more or less the same evaluation in the French-language books: "Après des années de lutte pour demander la surveillance des deniers publics, il se voit toujours incompris—pour ne pas dire méprisé—des autorités anglaises. Son caractère s'aigrit à la longue et il verse dans la violence. Entraîneur remarquable, il aura grand'peine à maintenir dans les strictes limites de la légalité les partisans que son éloquence virulente aura soulevés" (FEC, 188; *see also* Plante, 244 and 245).⁹

All the authors consider Papineau in the long-term perspective of the march towards autonomy. The French-speaking authors are most interested in the results for Canada: "Pourtant, [les luttes de Papineau] n'ont pas été stériles: elles ont réduit les dépenses de l'administration, hissé des Canadiens à des postes importants, éveillé l'instinct politique de la population et préparé le triomphe d'Hippolyte LaFontaine" (Plante, 252, 253; *see also* FEC, 203).¹⁰ The English authors, however, tend to make more of the rebellion's effect on Britain: "Thus the reform movement in Lower Canada had also apparently ended only in bloodshed and defeat. Yet this rising, too, affected Britain. In fact, by its greater bloodshed it aroused Britain more than that in Upper Canada" (Careless, 182; *see also* Ballantyne, II, 108; Rogers, 148; Brown, 249, 252).

The English-speaking authors also go further in their study of the long-term consequences of the rebellion. Papineau's failure launched Canada once and for all on a course of political moderation, closing the door to such prospects as political radicalism or American annexation; at the same time, through reaction against the rebels, these events had the effect of strengthening Canadian loyalty to England, and of reinforcing the ties between colony and mother country: "In actual fact, the rebellion marked the end of

any serious plan to use the American republican system as a model for the structure of Canadian government. The rebellion had alienated the more moderate reformers. They drew back not only from violence, but also from any repudiation of the British connection (McInnis, 263 ff.; see also Rogers, 148; Brown, 252; Careless, 180).

Despite all the criticism, at least one French-language textbook sees Papineau as a hero identified (like all the French textbook heroes) with an entire generation. Lavolette (238) reminds his readers that one day these words would be said of Papineau:

Il fut toute une époque, et longtemps notre race
N'eut que sa voix pour glaive et son cœur pour cuirasse! ¹¹

William Lyon Mackenzie

Mackenzie and Papineau, one might say, are both judged the same way by the English and French Canadian authors as far as aims and methods are concerned, as well as the consequences of their activities. The French books, however, are more severe with Mackenzie than with Papineau; like Plante, they put him a notch below his counterpart in Lower Canada: "Son manque de tact et de mesure l'empêcha de jouir d'un prestige 'à la Papineau'" (Plante, 247).¹²

Joseph Howe

Joseph Howe is completely ignored by the French-speaking authors with the exception of Plante, who gives him a few lines and describes him as a leader of great mettle (Plante, 231).

The English books deal with him at length and with great admiration. Howe was the man who succeeded where Mackenzie and Papineau had failed; his image is in complete contrast to theirs: "Like William Lyon Mackenzie, Joseph Howe had to struggle against the governor and a Family Compact. Like Mackenzie, Howe was an editor and a printer, and sat in the assembly elected by the people. But in no other way were they like one another" (Brown, 255).

Howe was the ideal reformer. His aim was to adapt the British parliamentary system to Canada, unadulterated by any foreign taint whether American or French (Careless, 205; McInnis, 268; Blakeley 187; Ballantyne, II, 156; Rogers, 151; Brown, 256). His methods were legitimate and parliamentary; his weapons were "his brilliant mind, eloquent tongue and powerful pen" (Rogers, 152). It was owing to his "energy, moderation and unquestioned loyalty" that he succeeded in getting what he wanted (Careless, 206; Rogers, 152; Brown, 256). Loyalty! It seems indeed that this is what sets Howe apart from Mackenzie and Papineau, and, for the English-speaking authors, puts him among the great Canadians: "It was Howe's great loyalty, as much as his ability as a speaker and a writer, that led men in the colonies and in England to believe in Joseph Howe and the cause for which he fought" (Brown, 256).

His most important contribution may be that he combined two elements that are contradictory at first sight: a desire for autonomy on the one hand, and loyalty to England and the Empire on the other. The two together could bring an effective system of government adaptable to peaceful evolution and to changing political conditions. In

short, this was the solution that led to the formation of the Commonwealth: "The son of a Loyalist, Howe had a constant vision of a united British Empire—but an empire united through freedom" (Careless, 185; *see also* Rogers, 154; Brown, 256).

Louis Hippolyte LaFontaine

The French-language textbooks present Louis Hippolyte LaFontaine as the man who, together with Baldwin, gave Canada responsible government and led "la lutte pour la reconquête de nos droits" (the struggle for the recovery of our rights; Filteau, *Civ.*, 246); another Papineau, but one unsullied by rebellion, failure or radicalism.

Filteau gives him the credit for the alliance with Baldwin (*Civ.*, 246), while others attribute the initiative to Baldwin (Plante, 258; FEC, 201). In any event, working hand in hand with Baldwin, LaFontaine displayed political genius.

Though LaFontaine's immediate objective was responsible government, his principal objective was always the protection of the rights of French Canadians, the rights that were placed in jeopardy by the Act of Union. He had "l'attitude audacieuse de la victime qui brise dans la main de l'assaillant l'arme dont il veut le frapper" (Plante, 258);¹³ ingeniously, he discovered a flaw in Durham's plan, with the result that the Union became different from what was originally intended: "D'une union législative entre les individus de deux nationalités différentes, elle devenait l'union de deux provinces distinctes sous une seule législature. Cette forme d'union devait bientôt être renforcée par le principe de double responsabilité d'après lequel le Ministère devait posséder non seulement l'appui de la majorité des députés, mais aussi la majorité dans chaque province" (Filteau, *Civ.*, 250; *see also* FEC, 202).¹⁴

LaFontaine is also hailed as one of the great defenders of the French language; Plante attaches great significance to a famous speech of his: "La session de 1842 fournit à LaFontaine l'occasion de s'illustrer par une attitude courageuse lorsqu'il fit un discours en français, le 13 septembre, en face des tories hostiles. Son attitude fière redonna aux Canadiens français audace et confiance et signifiait à l'oligarchie qu'ils ne consentaient pas à se laisser angliciser" (Plante, 263; *see also* FEC, 202).¹⁵

Filteau gives the most dramatic account of this occasion, punctuated with words well calculated to arouse the reader's reaction:

Mis en demeure d'expliquer son attitude, LaFontaine se leva. C'était la première fois qu'il prenait la parole dans le Parlement du Canada-Uni. Toute la députation attendait ses déclarations avec anxiété. Son début fut une véritable bombe . . . et, suprême audace, dans un parlement d'où la langue française était bannie, lui, député d'un comté anglais du Haut-Canada, il fit cette demande en français . . . Quelques minutes lui suffirent pour prononcer le plus grand discours de sa carrière et remporter une victoire sans précédent (Filteau, *Civ.*, 247).¹⁶

In vain may we look for similar exaltation of LaFontaine in the English-language textbooks. They are interested in him only to the extent that it was the Baldwin-LaFontaine alliance that obtained responsible government; once this goal was achieved, writes one author, the alliance soon broke up, and both LaFontaine and his colleague disappeared from the political arena: "The Baldwin-LaFontaine alliance, that had formed

a strong majority and carried through responsible government, rapidly crumbled away. In 1851 its two leaders retired from parliament. They had had enough of the bewildering new state of politics. Many English-speaking Reformers in Canada West wanted to press on with a reform programme, in which the responsible system had been only the necessary step" (Careless, 223).

Robert Baldwin

The French-language texts pay little attention to Baldwin and heap praise on LaFontaine, while the English ones do the opposite. Of the three French authors who mention Baldwin, two (Filteau and FEC) do so only in connection with LaFontaine; for the third, Baldwin was simply a moderate reformer who worked honestly and courageously to obtain responsible government (Plante, 247, 262-4, 266).

Baldwin, the English-speaking authors write, was very different from that other important personage, Mackenzie, in being unshakably dedicated to the British parliamentary system; like Howe, he advocated an empire "held together by freedom not force, bound by 'ties though light as air, as strong as links of iron'" (Careless, 172, 173, 191; McNinnis, 265; Ballantyne, II, 107). While Howe's activity was restricted to Nova Scotia by force of circumstance, Baldwin had the advantage of initiating action, that affected the whole of Canada and, through Durham, the mother country itself.

Lord Elgin

The French-speaking authors usually give only the faintest outline of the great English figures in Canadian history (except when denouncing "evil" characters like Metcalfe, Gosford, Colborne and Sydenham), and Lord Elgin is no exception. The two French authors who mention him see him only as the tool and mouthpiece of policy emanating from London: his stand over the signing of the Rebellion Losses Bill was dictated by his superiors; his only merit was, at long last and through force of circumstance, to have granted responsible government (Plante, 265, 266; *see also* FEC, 202, 203).

As seen by the English-speaking authors, Lord Elgin was a great statesman on several counts: he stood firm against a pressure group that stopped at nothing, even violence; he believed in the ability of Canadians to accept the principles of true parliamentary government and to govern themselves (Careless, 203; Ballantyne, II, 123; Brown, 267; Rogers, 153); he was even convinced that the French Canadians were "the one sure guarantee that British North America would not be absorbed by the United States," and it was he who wondered whether the last hand to wave the British flag on American soil might not be that of a French Canadian (Ballantyne, II, 137). He was, moreover, responsible for improved relations with the United States, and it was he who obtained the Reciprocity Treaty in 1854: "He believed, indeed, that only reciprocity could prevent annexation, by filling the colonies' need for new trade outlets" (Careless, 209 ff.). For the English authors, in short, he was an "imperial statesman," a worthy son-in-law of Durham (Careless, 203; *see also* McNinnis, 269).

Lord Selkirk

The French-language textbooks speak of Lord Selkirk only as one of the least important of the nineteenth-century colonizers (Plante, 223; FEC, 178-80), while the English books, particularly at the elementary level, tell his story in great detail and generally consider his role to have been of supreme importance. Thanks to him, we read, "Western Canada is born" (Careless, 143; Ballantyne, II, 98; Brown, 222-7); he was among those who helped to "keep the North-West for Britain" (Rogers, 168); in particular he was one of the leading figures in the fur-trade drama that came to a climax in the West, and it was his enterprise "that led to the final collapse of the Canadian fur-trade kingdom" (Careless, 142).

James Douglas

Only the English-language books mention James Douglas, the man who kept British Columbia under the British flag by insisting on "British rule and British law," and who prevented it from falling into the hands of the roughnecks of the gold rush and under American domination (Careless, 218; Ballantyne, II, 149, 150; Rogers, 133; Brown, 271).

Sir Georges-Étienne Cartier

The duo of Cartier and Macdonald (whom we shall consider separately) is not dissimilar to the LaFontaine-Baldwin team.

We note first of all that in the two most important French-language textbooks (Plante and Filteau), the authors are less interested in the individual contributions of the Fathers of Confederation than in the constitutional aspect of Confederation.

Not that the French authors neglect Cartier; quite the contrary. They present him as one of the first advocates of the union of the provinces and one of those who worked the hardest to bring it about and to persuade the people to accept it (Plante, 306; FEC, 226, 229, 230; Laviolette, 304). Laviolette, for his part, lauds Cartier to the skies: he alone was the architect of Confederation, of national expansion, and of the development of the railways; it was he who made all the speeches, chose the new country's name, and who, in short, did everything (Laviolette, 300-11). He had passionate faith in a Canada *a mari usque ad mare*, and he worked assiduously for its realization (Plante, 317; FEC, 233, 234; Laviolette, 307-9), but in doing so he made every effort to defend the "droits de ses compatriotes du Bas-Canada" (rights of his compatriots in Lower Canada; Filteau, *Civ.*, 251; FEC, 226, 229).

However, these French Canadian authors do direct some criticism at Cartier. According to them, he was perhaps wrong to have led Lower Canada into Confederation, waving aside the fears expressed by certain elected representatives that "... le pouvoir central aura tendance à tout centraliser, à empiéter sur les droits des provinces et à mépriser leurs garanties . . . Ces députés n'avaient peut-être pas complètement tort, mais à la session de janvier 1865, Cartier prit sur lui d'entraîner les hésitants à sa suite" (Laviolette, 304).¹⁷

Even worse, Cartier refused to back those who called for the continuance of free schooling for the Acadians: "Georges-Étienne Cartier, sur lequel on comptait pour défendre les Acadiens, se rallia à cette thèse et ne voulut pas se désolidariser de Macdonald. Cartier et ses partisans payèrent par la défaite aux élections qui suivirent, le prix de leur manque d'énergie, mais le changement de gouvernement n'améliora pas le sort des Acadiens" (Filteau, *Civ.*, 319).¹⁸

The English-speaking authors readily accord Cartier one of the leading places among the Fathers of Confederation (Careless, 235; McInnis, 279; Ballantyne, II, 157; Rogers, 160; Brown, 303). They do not praise him beyond that, however, except for one, who, with an enthusiasm matching Lavolette's, declares:

Sir Georges Cartier was descended from the family of the famous explorer, Jacques Cartier. The 19th century Cartier, born and raised in the land discovered by the 16th century Cartier, was also, in a way, an explorer. He courageously led his French-speaking fellow-countrymen into unknown paths of government. Canada today is a monument to Cartier's passionate belief that under the British flag, the French Canadian would have the greatest possible freedom of language, religion and customs (Rogers, 160).

Sir John A. Macdonald

Most of the French-speaking authors unhesitatingly recognize that John A. Macdonald stands head and shoulders above the others of his team and even above most other great Canadians:

Parmi ces derniers [les Pères de la Confédération], mentionnons Georges-Étienne Cartier, défenseur des droits de ses compatriotes du Bas-Canada, et John Alexander Macdonald, le plus remarquable représentant du Haut-Canada et sans doute l'homme politique le plus influent de son siècle (FEC, 226).¹⁹

Macdonald fut toutefois le plus prestigieux, au point qu'il est resté le prototype du premier ministre canadien. Ses successeurs étudieront sa carrière, copieront souvent ses attitudes et lui emprunteront même ses tactiques électorales (Plante, 317).²⁰

Macdonald, Plante continues, was one of the first to defend Canadian nationalism against English imperialism (Plante, 342, 346), and he also created a stable national party: "Mais ce grand corps [le Canada] était sectionné; il fallait lui greffer des muscles et lui tendre des nerfs. La création d'un parti national stable servira d'agent d'unification. Par sa souplesse, Macdonald réussit à grouper, dans les cadres d'un même parti politique, des hommes que séparaient la langue, la foi et les intérêts financiers" (Plante, 319).²¹

But this glowing picture has a dark side too. Filteau regards Macdonald's flexibility more as a weakness of character, a source of errors harmful to the nation; Macdonald bought the support of the people with fine words that were later belied by events; he made rosy promises that he would not keep when the time became ripe (*Civ.*, 319, 340). Another author points out that Macdonald was incapable of learning a lesson from the first Riel affair in order to find a solution to the Métis problem (FEC, 255). For Lavolette, finally (301-2, 312-13), Macdonald is little more than a name among many others; his only important contribution was to have persuaded Parliament to vote the funds for the railway to British Columbia.

On the whole, the French authors say little about Macdonald himself, but this is not a sign of either neglect or ignorance; in this period of Canadian history, no matter which language group a prime minister belonged to, the French writers are less interested in the man than in his government's performance.

In the English-language textbooks, on the other hand, everything hinges on the prime minister, and as such Macdonald occupies a very important place. The qualities attributed to him by common accord are dazzling in their profusion: intelligence, ingenuity, competence, magnetism, a sense of humour, charm, political judgment, determination, courage, vision (*see*, for example, Careless, 225, 236, 265, 266, 270, 290, 292); in short, Macdonald was the builder of Canada. He is praised for his role in three domains in particular: Confederation, administration and external affairs.

Macdonald was the "guiding genius" of Confederation (Careless, 258), the "chief mover" (McInnis, 283), the "most responsible" (Ballantyne, II, 151), the man who gave "magnificent leadership" (Rogers, 161); it was he who did the preliminary work, participated in a succession of conferences, drafted bills and persuaded the people's representatives and the people themselves to accept them.

Once this goal had been reached, Macdonald "with might and main . . . strove always to keep Confederation alive and growing" (Rogers, 167). The preservation and development of a great and united Canada, these authors say, were part of a superhuman task accomplished by Macdonald; among other things, he was also responsible for the creation of the Conservative party, and the expansion of the economy, immigration and trade (Careless, 265, 276-80, 285; Saywell, 54; McInnis, 279, 299-303; Ballantyne, II, 152; Rogers, 180; Brown, 314, 322-6, 338).

Finally, in external affairs, Macdonald, while jealously guarding Canada's interests, maintained a deep sense of loyalty toward the British Empire:

The Dominion was gaining fuller control of its own affairs, but ties with the mother country remained close. As Sir John said: "We are content; we have prospered under the flag of England. I say that it would bring ruin and misfortune, any separation from the United Kingdom" (Brown, 338).

Macdonald made clear that he wanted Canada to be treated now as a grown-up nation. "Instead", he said, "of looking upon us as a merely dependent colony, England will have in us a friendly nation—a subordinate, but still powerful people—to stand by her in North America in peace or in war" (Ballantyne, II, 161).

Most of the authors point out the irony of Macdonald's destiny; at the time of his death, everything he had built seemed on the point of crumbling (Careless, 293; Saywell, 56; McInnis, 307); but, they add, for this he was not responsible, since the country's dire situation was owing to a combination of economic factors. Similarly, on the outcome of the Riel affair the English-language books are indulgent towards Macdonald:

If Macdonald's government deserves blame for not meeting the Métis' grievances in time, Riel brought no benefit to his followers (Careless, 281).

Macdonald made the mistake of thinking that the Métis were not important To avoid losing favour in Ontario, Prime Minister Macdonald talked about how much he would like to try Riel if only he could catch him; actually he was paying Riel to stay away Macdonald did not know which way to turn. Again he tried

every possible means of delay Sir John A. Macdonald was bound to be unpopular with many Canadians if Riel were hanged, and just as unpopular with just as many if he were not (Ballantyne, II, 164, 171, 183, 184).

In spite of these reservations, it is safe to say that all the English-speaking authors evaluate Macdonald's accomplishments in the most laudatory terms, and expect the course of the future to do him justice as a statesman (*see*, for example, Careless, 295, 300; Saywell, 56; McNinnis, 317; Rogers, 188; Brown, 302).

George Brown

If French-speaking students know nothing of George Brown, they must blame their textbooks for it. The French-language book that has the most to say about this man shows him only as one of the most firmly-convinced partisans of Confederation and the initiator of the coalition between Upper Canadian Liberals and Conservatives (FEC, 228, 230); in Laviolette Brown is only a name (303), and in Plante and Filteau he does not appear at all.

On the English side, George Brown is a leading figure who played a very important part in bringing the Confederation plan to realization: "As hopeless deadlock settled down on the province of Canada in 1864, George Brown carefully but firmly stepped forward. He proposed a parliamentary committee to discuss the problem on a non-party basis and suggest the best solution. Here was a statesmanlike act, seemingly unlike Brown He had decided that the dangerous question of the union must now be settled, and could only be settled by moderation and a turning-away from sectional and party strife" (Careless, 233, 234; *see also* McNinnis, 282; Ballantyne, II, 156; Rogers, 159; Brown, 304).

His nationalism, like Macdonald's, was of the kind dear to the English-language texts: "In addition, Brown, as a British American nationalist (though none the less devoted to the imperial bond), could enter eagerly into the project for building a continent-wide union" (Careless, 235). Like Macdonald, too, he contributed greatly to the formation of a firmly-based political party.

Sir Wilfrid Laurier

Of the four French-language textbooks that cover Laurier's period, Laviolette's *L'épopée* does not mention him by name and *Mon pays* by the FEC refers to him as "l'un des plus remarquables premiers ministres canadiens" (one of the most notable of Canadian prime ministers; 261); the other two condemn him, denouncing him for having committed himself to defend the interests of the British Empire and for not being able or willing to defend the French schools in Manitoba (Plante, 324, 342, 343, 344; Filteau, *Civ.*, 321, 344).

Only in the English-language books is he a "great man." Saywell summarizes his achievements as follows: "Reciprocity was not the only issue before the Canadian people in the election of 1911. The voter was presented with the equally fundamental question of Canada's relations with Great Britain and the relations of French- and English-speaking

Canadians within the nation itself. Since these were the most difficult questions Laurier faced and the way in which he answered them was his greatest contribution to Canadian history, we must now turn our attention to them" (Saywell, 71).

The English-language texts do observe, as do two of the French books, that Laurier was favoured by exceptionally healthy economic conditions, but they praise the way in which he used them to best advantage; they see proof of his clear-sightedness and wisdom in the way in which he carried on Macdonald's policy of expansion (Careless, 292, 301, 312; McInnis, 325; Ballantyne, II, 202; Rogers, 185; Brown, 342).

Laurier, besides, did for the Liberal party in Quebec what Brown had done under the same conditions in Ontario:

An able young Liberal, Wilfrid Laurier, who had been reared in English as well as French thought, began a campaign, to align Quebec Liberalism with British Liberalism. He sought to show that his party in Canada was not in the anti-religious, revolutionary tradition of the Liberals of Europe, but in the Christian, tolerant and moderate tradition of British Liberalism. Laurier put his faith in British political ideas of freedom and justice. His ability to set them before his fellow French Canadians did much to save his party and to give it a new lease of life in Quebec (Careless, 287).

Laurier worked long and tirelessly to bring the two language groups together (Careless, 295; Saywell, 73; McInnis, 314; Ballantyne, II, 194, 195, 208; Rogers, 188; Brown, 340), always trying to find a compromise, which he saw as the only effective way to protect minority rights (Saywell, 73; McInnis, 314). Did he succeed? According to Careless, he rebuilt the nation: "Laurier's policy of protecting the provinces was necessary to calm angry feelings and reunite the Dominion. In his own way Laurier, too, was a nation-builder, one who had other tasks than Macdonald to accomplish for Canada. Above all, he had to bring the two peoples in the country together through policies of moderation, tolerance and co-operation" (Careless, 295).

For Brown, Laurier is still the flesh-and-blood symbol of a total reconciliation between French and English: "Once French and English had fought each other for possession of Canada, and more than once French-speaking and English-speaking Canadians had quarrelled bitterly. But all that was now forgotten" (Brown, 340).

If, as other less optimistic English-speaking authors think, Laurier did not effect a total and lasting reconciliation, he at least brought about a sufficient degree of unity to enable Canada to survive as a nation:

When Laurier left office in 1911, French and English Canadians were as far apart as ever. He had not been able to bring the Canadian people "long estranged from each other gradually to become a nation." Yet he had shepherded the nation through a number of painful crises, and without his guiding hand matters would have been even worse. Men of a later day were to see more clearly that his policy of compromise was best for Canada (Saywell, 79).

Laurier was unable to persuade Manitoba to do much about restoring justice to her Catholics, which showed that Canadians were still not ready to live with their differences. But Laurier was not discouraged. He still believed in reason and persuasion. He still believed that the Canadian people would grow wiser in time (Ballantyne, II, 196; *see also* 200, 207).

There were black marks on the record which might cause trouble later. But Canadians in 1911 felt justified in looking backward with pride and forward with confidence. They agreed with the great Laurier who proclaimed that "the twentieth century will be Canada's" (Rogers, 189).

For having resisted England's imperialistic designs as well as for his efforts to maintain an imperial bond that would respect the independence of the Empire's self-governing colonies, Laurier ranks with Howe, Durham, Baldwin, Brown and Macdonald (Careless, 315, 319, 333; Saywell, 72, 77, 78, 128; McInnis, 324, 325, 326, 335; Ballantyne, II, 198, 200, 207; Rogers, 187; Brown, 341).

Henri Bourassa

Of the four French-language textbooks that cover Henri Bourassa's period, two, FEC and Lavolette, do not even mention his name. The two others see Bourassa as the man of the hour, the only one who was able to uncover the machinations of the imperialistic conspiracy and warn the Canadian people of the dangers of becoming involved in ruinous wars that had nothing to do with them (Plante, 345; Filteau, *Civ.*, 345). Bourassa's thesis found approval with French Canadians and at first infuriated English Canadians, but "plus tard, il se trouvera bon nombre de Canadiens anglais qui sauront reconnaître le patriotisme éclairé et sincère de Bourassa" (Plante, 345; Filteau, *Civ.*, 352).²² We note besides that for Filteau (452) Bourassa was the leader of the separatist party.

The English-language books liberally quote Bourassa's appeals for a purely Canadian patriotism, but though they accept them they denounce his methods, his alliance with the "clerical and racial extremists of Quebec," his intolerance, which was a contradiction of his professed faith in liberalism, his attacks on Laurier, his exploitation of dramatic eloquence (Careless, 324; Saywell, 76, 78), and his excessive nationalism. One of them writes as follows: "Criticism of this action in Quebec [the sending of volunteers to the Transvaal] found a leader in Henri Bourassa. A grandson of Papineau, he made himself the champion of the fullest preservation of French cultural separation and French racial and religious privileges. Once again, as earlier under Mercier, there evolved in Quebec a narrow and tenacious nationalism whose concern was with French Canada and which showed indifference to the wider national interests of the Dominion" (McInnis, 326).

William Lyon Mackenzie King

Only a thorough combing will bring to light anything about Mackenzie King in the French-language textbooks, and what does appear is very meagre: two excerpts from speeches during the Second World War (FEC, 281, 293), praise for his efforts to bring the country through the great depression (Plante, 381), and finally, bitter criticism of his policies during the war: "Politique de volte-face, de compromis, d'accrocs à la liberté, mélange de prudence et d'audace, série de mesures gouvernementales, qui tenait à la fois de la dictature mitigée et du machiavélisme démocratique. Elle n'était pas franche, pas toujours nécessaire peut-être, mais elle était sûrement réaliste et elle réussit à sauvegarder la paix intérieure, en bâillonnant la presse, en contrôlant les nouvelles et en utilisant la radio pour sa propagande" (Plante, 389).²³

The English-language texts, which see King as a worthy successor to Laurier, study him much more closely; according to them, King's objectives were the same as Laurier's: to preserve national unity, assure economic prosperity and lead the country to independence. The personalities and methods of these two men were very different, however; not that King was averse to Laurier's brand of constructive compromise, but, rather, he made tactical delay his own specialty (Careless, 344, 386; Saywell, 177, 192, 193; McInnis, 364; Ballantyne, II, 246).

These books pay tribute to King's courage in the difficult years:

What he could do, and what he did, was to ensure that in the early days of Canada's fully autonomous nationhood nothing should be permitted to weaken the foundations of unity upon which the greatness of all nations is built. The tribute that can be paid to his leadership in the difficult, dangerous years before the Second World War is that with a painstaking care that amounted almost to genius he fostered a unity of outlook which, when the hour of decision came, brought a united people into a war against aggression on the side of Britain, when no other independent nation of the Americas felt a call to action (Saywell, 195, 227; *see also* Careless, 370, 371, 374, 387; McInnis, 365; Ballantyne, II, 246; Rogers, 192).

In external affairs, it fell to King to guide the fortunes of the Canadian people during the period of transition from colonialism to independence; it was he, the grandson of William Lyon Mackenzie, who made Canada an independent country, but he did it without resorting to rebellion and without trying to break completely with Britain (Careless, 344; Saywell, 194; McInnis 348). To him we owe the establishment of normal relations with the United States (Careless, 374; Rogers, 195-7), and also Canada's first appearance on the international scene, modest though it may have been (Careless, 372; Saywell, 228 ff.). Finally, these books recall, his administration brought in economic and social measures of the greatest importance. In short, Mackenzie King should be ranked among Canada's great prime ministers: "King had little of Laurier's charm of manner nor his splendid powers of oratory. Yet he showed political skill matched only by Macdonald. This quiet, reserved, plump little man turned out to be the most successful party leader Canada has yet seen, and this in an era when sectional strains were often acute. As a result, he made a period of Canadian history as much his own as Macdonald or Laurier had ever done" (Careless, 343).

Summary

From this review of outstanding figures in our history as presented by the textbooks under study, we are justified in concluding that the English-language books have their own particular way of looking at people and the French books have theirs, and often enough the two approaches are very different. For example, the French-speaking authors neglect men like Cabot, Radisson, Howe, Baldwin, Elgin and King, while the English authors do likewise with Vaudreuil and all religious leaders except Bishop Laval. Where some historical personages are concerned, their evaluation may not differ much, but what a striking difference there is in the amount of space they give them! Jacques Cartier, Champlain and LaFontaine are considered at great length in the French-language texts, while the English books skip over them with hardly a change of pace; conversely, Elgin

and King receive lengthy study from the English Canadian authors, while the French Canadians barely give them a nod in passing.

This is because the authors, both English and French, are interested in historical figures only to the extent that the interests of their own language group are involved. The Baldwin-LaFontaine duo, and even more that of Macdonald and Cartier, illustrate the pattern very well—the English give all the credit to Macdonald and the French can only see Cartier. As further illustration, take a statement by McInnis (326) on Bourassa: “There is in the French textbooks a narrow and tenacious nationalism whose concern is with French Canada and which shows indifference to the wider national interests of the Dominion,” and compare it with a saying by Bourassa quoted by Ballantyne (II, 200): “The authors of English textbooks have two countries, one here and one across the sea.”

B. Crises

In this section we shall consider a dozen events of major importance, each one a crisis, either for Canada's very existence or in relations between the two language groups: the expulsion of the Acadians, the conquest, the American invasions, the rebellions of 1837-38, the Durham Report, the Act of Union, Confederation, the Riel affair, the Manitoba separate school question, the 1917 conscription crisis, the 1929 depression and the Quebec “revolution.”

1, The expulsion of the Acadians

The expulsion of the Acadians is not represented as a totally unprovoked act, but as an attempt at resolving a difficult situation, so that those responsible for the situation were also to some degree responsible for the solution. As stated in at least one French-language textbook (Plante, 153) and in some of the English books (Careless, 89; Ballantyne, I, 179; Brown, 141), the government of New France and its agents had their share of responsibility. Careless writes (89): “If France now had not sought to incite the Acadians against Britain, the British authorities in Nova Scotia might still have accepted this long established situation.”

Although they recognize that there were “nécessités stratégiques” (Plante, 155) and that the English had some foundation for their fears (Charles, 175; FEC, 134), the French-language texts hold the English authorities largely to blame. They stress the cruelty and injustice of the measure (Plante, 155; FEC, 134; Charles, 175). All, with the exception of Laviolette, put the blame on [Governor] Lawrence alone:

Aux yeux de Lawrence, la déportation apparaît comme une nécessité stratégique. Dans la guerre de plus en plus imminente, les Acadiens lui semblent un mauvais risque; la prudence exige cette mesure de précaution. Prudence où se devinent la haine et la cupidité, car la conduite antérieure des Acadiens ne justifiait aucunement la décision du gouverneur (Plante, 155).²⁴

Lawrence entreprit ensuite de vider le pays de ses pionniers . . . Mais garder cette population au pays, au moment où la guerre paraît sur le point d'éclater, leur semble également dangereux. Reste donc un autre procédé, assez odieux, il est vrai, la déportation. Solution idéale au problème acadien . . . d'après Lawrence, d'autant plus qu'elle offre un moyen rapide de procurer à bon compte des terres

défrichées aux colons anglais qui viennent remplacer les premiers maîtres (FEC, 134; *see also* 153; Charles, 175).²⁵

The English-language books recognize that the expulsion was tragic, but are careful to add that "there are two sides to the story" (Brown, 145), and that the Acadians themselves were largely responsible for their fate, the deportation being rather a "harsh sentence that was passed on them." These texts point out that for forty years the Acadians had taken advantage of the government's indulgence and had chosen to ignore the threat that they would be deported if they refused to take the oath of allegiance. Lawrence resolved to carry out this long-standing threat only under pressure of events and after trying one last time to convince the Acadian leaders: "In 1755, after fighting had begun in America, the British took Beauséjour and found Acadians in the garrison. The British governor at last decided that for the safety of Nova Scotia, Acadians must take the oath or be deported. He expected only to have to deport a few, but the Acadians, not believing after many years that the threat was real, still refused the oath" (Careless, 90; *see also* McNinnis, 24; Blakeley, 86; Ballantyne, I, 173-80; Brown, 141).

If the Acadians stayed the British would be running a serious risk, and enough of them had already collaborated with the French to justify the deportation (Careless, 90; Blakeley, 85 ff.; Ballantyne, I, 180; Brown, 141, 142, 143, 145).

As for the account of the expulsion itself, the French- and English-language texts differ greatly in tone. Two French authors, true enough, avoid the dramatic in style and illustration, stating only that the English soldiers were "strict" and the Acadians "malheureux" (unhappy) and that this episode was "un des plus tristes" (one of the saddest) in the history of Canada (Charles, 177 ff.; FEC, 134 ff.), but the others give free reign to emotionalism: "Maintenant, sans crainte de représailles, on peut se débarrasser des Acadiens. . . . 'Le grand Dérangement' séparait impitoyablement les membres d'une même famille . . . 7,000 Acadiens environ furent dispersés dans les colonies américaines et en Louisiane où un grand nombre mourut de misère; quelque 2,000, échappant à leurs bourreaux, se sont réfugiés dans la Nouvelle-France" (Plante, 155 ff.).²⁶

Guy Lavolette gives colour to his picture by evoking sacrilege and making a comparison with the agonies of Christ:

Winslow venait occuper l'église de Grand-Pré, qu'il transformait en caserne Debout sur les degrés de l'autel, Winslow commença par leur rappeler les bienfaits dont ils étaient redevables à Sa Majesté; dépliant ensuite une grande feuille, il leur déclara qu'il avait un "désagréable devoir" à remplir On devine les cris, les pleurs et les gémissements qui retentirent alors dans l'église de Grand-Pré. Heureusement que le prêtre était là pour rappeler à ses paroissiens les leçons de l'Évangile et leur redire la célèbre parole du Christ: "Père, pardonnez-leur" Ce soir-là et les soirs suivants, la cloche de l'angélus resta muette, et les animaux guettèrent inutilement l'arrivée de leurs maîtres. Puis, le tambour résonna de nouveau, comme il l'avait fait quelques jours auparavant, lors de la convocation générale des hommes et jeunes gens de Grand-Pré, et les portes de l'église livrèrent passage au douloureux cortège des prisonniers, qu'encadraient deux rangs de soldats (Lavolette, 153 ff.).²⁷

The English-language books, on the other hand, recount that no effort was spared to make the expulsion as unobjectionable as possible:

[Winslow] felt sorry for the Acadians and did not want to drive them away from their homes, but he was a soldier and had to obey orders. As Winslow did not have enough soldiers to expel the Acadians by force he decided on a plan which would avoid bloodshed. Winslow moved into the priest's house and asked the Acadians to remove all sacred objects from the Church. Then he formed a camp around it and waited until the Acadians had finished their harvesting . . . [They] would be taken away from the province. They would be put on vessels with their families and would be allowed to take their clothes, money, and some furniture. To keep their families from worrying while they were waiting to go on board the ships, twenty men were allowed to go home each day to bring back food for all . . . Governor Lawrence had tried to get enough ships so that the Acadians could take their clothes and some furniture with them. He had arranged also for plenty of beef and bread to feed them on the voyage. Strict orders had been given that each family should be kept together on the same ship but unfortunately there were not enough ships and these orders could not always be obeyed. Some families were separated when they were on board ship; others were separated in the colonies. There were many tragic stories (Blakeley, 87, 90 ff.; *see also* Brown, 143-5).

Finally, we note that, in at least one author's opinion, this episode did have some salutary effect in that later the [French] Canadians were spared the same fate: "The British people were displeased by what had been done to the Acadians, especially by the cold way in which they had been expelled. The British felt that such a thing should not happen again, and you will see how important this feeling was a few years later" (Ballantyne, I, 181).

2. *The conquest*

Our attention is focussed not on the train of events leading to the conquest, but on its consequences. In what way was the conquest a "drama" and "catastrophe" for the French Canadians?

According to the French-language textbooks, this event had serious consequences economically and for the rights of the people. As far as the economy is concerned, they point to the ruin left by the war, the collapse of French currency and the predominance that the English assured for themselves (Plante, 167; Filteau, *Civ.*, 135, 154-64; FEC, 145, 159 ff.). With the exception of Ballantyne (II, 6), none of the English-language books consider these results.

But it is when they come to the question of rights that the French-speaking authors most lament the conquest; up until 1760 fundamental rights were exercised as a matter of course, but after the conquest "notre peuple devait désormais affronter la domination d'une nation puissante longtemps ennemie, animée de vifs sentiments anticatholiques" (Filteau, *Civ.*, 135).²⁸

The French Canadians did not admit defeat:

Pour les Canadiens français, le traité de Paris fut un défi qu'ils ont accepté et une épreuve qu'ils ont surmontée. 1763, c'est la fin de la Nouvelle-France; dans l'histoire du Canada, ce n'est qu'une étape (Plante, 169).²⁹

Notre nationalité s'engagea sur la voie périlleuse qui devait la mener éventuellement à la victoire (*Filteau, Civ.*, 136).³⁰

Depuis ce jour surtout, les Canadiens réalisent l'importance pour eux de prendre en main leur propre destinée s'ils veulent conserver le magnifique héritage spirituel dont ils sont les possesseurs (FEC, 153; see also Lavolette, 208, 210, 213).³¹

The French-language texts do not go so far as to say that the conquest deprived French Canadians of their rights; they take full note of the terms of the capitulation of Montreal and the Treaty of Paris (Plante, 166; *Filteau, Civ.*, 137-40, 144-51; FEC, 152), but they repeatedly say that there was always the fear that the stipulated guarantees would be ineffectual under English rule.

Finally, the French-language books recognize that the effects of the conquest were alleviated to some extent by two factors: on the one hand, the honesty and adaptability of the French Canadians, and on the other, the moderation, discretion and sympathy of the conquerors (Plante, 166, 167; *Filteau, Civ.*, 186 ff.; FEC, 149; Lavolette, 203-8).

In the English textbooks, the conquest, although a cruel blow for the French Canadians, posed no threat whatever to their rights; these rights were entirely and irreversibly guaranteed by England (Ballantyne II, 14; Brown, 160), and it was this very situation that deprived England of the fruits of its conquest and was to be an endless source of problems for the future:

Nevertheless, trouble was being stored up for the future. Outside of the fur trade, all-important as it still was, and within the colony itself the two peoples were travelling separate paths. The French majority were engaged mainly in agriculture, the English minority in trade. Both sides were acquiring different interests; each began looking down on the other's way of life. The seeds of racial strife were being sown (Careless, 101).

Though Britain had new opportunities, she also faced new problems. These involved the adjustment of her relations, not only with her new colonial possessions, but with her older ones as well (McInnis, 29).

"Canada Puzzles Great Britain" (Ballantyne, II, title of Chapter II).

The English-language authors are interested most of all in the effects of the conquest on the overall history of Canada and the American continent, for example, Pontiac's revolt (Ballantyne, II, 8; Brown 161), the resumption of the fur trade (Careless, 101-7), Canada's integration into an advantageous economic system (Careless, 98; McInnis, 45, 235 ff.), the American Revolution (McInnis, 29; Rogers, 121; Brown, 165). They even maintain that it was not the conquest that made Canada a British nation but the American Revolution, and that it was British rule, in short, that kept Canada separate from the United States and thus preserved the French civilization in North America; the English had taken over from the French and assumed the task of defending Canada (Careless, 108, 115; McInnis, 43, 48).

Nevertheless, for the English authors the conquest is still a most important event; here Careless expresses a view not dissimilar to that advanced in general by the French-speaking authors:

The war did not officially end until the Peace of 1763, although New France had fallen three years earlier. The struggle of empires had closed by creating British

Canada. Yet French Canada would not die. The sure strength of its people, rooted in the St. Lawrence land, their long memories, their French language, their Catholic faith, would still preserve French Canada. Nevertheless an age had ended. The day of New France was over. A new age had begun in Canada's history, the age of British North America (Careless, 93).

3. *The American invasions*

When they examine the underlying reasons for the American invasions, our textbooks show great diversity. For some, the responsibility for the invasions before 1760 lay with the European mother countries, and this was still the case in 1775 and 1812, since the United States hoped to strike a blow at Britain through Canada. For others, the conflict was due to rivalry, first of all between the two colonies and then between Canada and the United States; competition in the fur trade and in the expansion towards the West. Again, others maintain that the [French] Canadians could hardly wait for the Americans to arrive so they could join the United States. In their search for general causes, we see little difference between the English- and French-language books.

Differences between the two appear when the authors turn to explanations of specific points. Why did the [French] Canadians refuse to take sides with or join the United States? The French Canadian authors reply that the Americans had always been enemies, and that the soil of *la patrie* was endangered. The English Canadian authors also give this explanation, but carry it a step further: the economic ties with England that assured Canada's prosperity were threatened, and also the British laws that protected the French-speaking population.

What effect did the invasions have on the Canadian people? The failure of the 1812 invasion in particular, writes a French-speaking author, led to "l'écroulement d'un rêve" (the collapse of a dream), an age-old dream of conquest, and to lasting peace with the United States (Plante, 217, 220); there was also a psychological effect:

Les Canadiens de différentes races et de différentes langues ont combattu côte à côte, dans un pur esprit de dévouement. De ce fait, ils se sont sentis plus unis, et l'idée de la patrie canadienne s'est ancrée davantage dans les cœurs (FEC, 174).³²

Durant ces années, les Canadiens anglais prirent conscience d'eux-mêmes. Ayant souffert pour leur pays, ils l'aimèrent davantage, et, pour beaucoup d'entre eux, ce fut une raison de s'y attacher. Peut-être aussi la guerre de 1812 servit-elle à unir les deux nationalités française et anglaise (Plante, 221).³³

This corresponds to the thinking of the English-speaking authors: the War of 1812 brought the two groups together, strengthened their determination not to become part of the United States, and did much to lay the foundations of a Canadian nationalism (Careless, 136 ff.; McInnis, 241; Ballantyne, II, 74, 76; Rogers, 136). Careless writes: "The war of 1812 thus tended to bring British North America together and strengthened the bond with Britain. Any common feelings among the colonists, however, were largely directed against the United States. This anti-American spirit was still a narrow basis on which to build a Canadian nationalism . . . Nevertheless, on the whole these reactions to the strain of the war of 1812 were understandable; and not an extreme price to pay for the survival of British North America" (Careless, 136).

4. *The rebellions of 1837-38*

Most of our authors, both English and French, make no distinction between the Upper Canada and Lower Canada rebellions; both came of a single reform movement. These same authors denounce the rebels more or less severely but at the same time try to find excuses for them; the authors consider the rebels' cause in the beginning to have been a just one, and their grievances every bit as valid as those of the American colonies on the eve of the American Revolution (McInnis, 262; Ballantyne, II, 108; Rogers, 146 ff.; Plante, 233, 234, 252; Filteau, *Civ.*, 237; FEC, 188 ff.). The immediate causes they give are as follows: [Lord John] Russell's ten resolutions which were a "piège des bureaucrates" (bureaucratic trap; Plante, 249, 252; Filteau, *Civ.*, 237, 239; FEC, 190; Rogers, 148); Sir Francis Bond Head's "foolish and despotic actions" (Rogers, 148); the British Government's refusal to accept any kind of change (McInnis, 262); and the despair to which the population was driven by the economic crisis (McInnis, 262).

Two English-language authors, Careless and Brown, take a different view from the rest. They try to show that the Lower Canada rebellions were quite distinct from Upper Canada's, and that whatever justification there may have been for the one was not necessarily valid for the other. They treat each rebellion as a separate phenomenon. Careless shows considerable sympathy for the reform movement in Upper Canada, espousing the rebel cause, so to speak:

In the stormy elections of that year (1836), Head virtually made himself a candidate and loudly proclaimed that the issue was one of loyalty or republicanism. This appeal to the British tie, and against American influences, resulted in a Tory election triumph. Head had won his victory; but he had practically driven Mackenzie and the radicals to rebellion. They saw that reforms, apparently, could not be achieved by peaceful processes, and they knew now that the Colonial Office had declared itself against self-government in the colonies. And, exasperated by Head, they were ready to take up the role of disloyalty that he had cast them for (Careless, 173).

Careless then turns to the rebellion in Lower Canada. He spends six pages (175-81) outlining the circumstances leading up to it and maintaining that the so-called reformers of Lower Canada were in fact conservatives whose sole purpose was to protect their "special privileges," while the real partisans of progress were the Tories.

Brown denounces the Lower Canada rebellion because it attacked a government that, according to "many clear-thinking people," was protecting the rights of the habitants (Brown, 250-2), and he denounces the Upper Canada rebellion too: "Unfortunately, there are always some leaders who, if they cannot get their way by peaceful means, want to fight those who disagree with them. William Lyon Mackenzie was such a man, and it is hard to forgive him for what he did next. 'Will the Canadians declare their independence,' his newspaper screamed, 'and shoulder their muskets?' William Lyon Mackenzie had decided to lead an armed rebellion against the government of Upper Canada!" (Brown, 248)

While the English-speaking authors dwell on the causes of the rebellions at length and dispatch their accounts of the fighting in a few short sentences, the French authors are less profuse on causes and delight in recounting the action in great detail. For them, the

battles waged by the rebels in 1837 were purely defensive, and their accounts give the limelight to excesses on the part of the government troops:

Des groupes de Patriotes se préparaient au combat dans la région du Richelieu. Mais, avant même qu'on ait pu en armer plus du tiers, le gouverneur dépêchait des troupes, chargées de les écraser . . . Munis pour la plupart de fourches, de faucilles et de bâtons, les Patriotes arrêtent la marche du premier, à Saint-Denis, le 23 novembre, mais sont débordés par le second, à Saint-Charles, deux jours plus tard. Les vaincus courent se réfugier dans le comté des Deux-Montagnes, mais sont rejoints par les deux mille soldats de Colborne, qui incendièrent sans merci les villages de Saint-Eustache et de Saint-Benoît. Aucun de ces combats n'eut l'ampleur d'une véritable insurrection: ce furent des troubles localisés dans 9 comtés sur 46 et qui ne coûtèrent la vie qu'à une centaine de soldats; les chefs les plus déterminés qui commandaient les troupes ne furent pas des Canadiens français (Plante, 250 ff.).³⁴

Le 15 décembre, les soldats réguliers, sous la direction de Colborne, font leur apparition. Ils bombardent l'église, le couvent et les maisons où les patriotes se sont réfugiés. Ceux-ci tirent avec l'énergie du désespoir contre un ennemi dix fois supérieur. Les balles sifflent du clocher et des fenêtres de l'église. Bientôt, l'armée met le feu aux édifices. Chénier doit fuir en sautant dans le cimetière. C'est là qu'il fut abattu de deux balles. À la fin, ses compagnons se rendent. L'exaspération des troupes est si grande que des personnes sont fusillées à bout portant. Quelques fuyards sont rattrapés et liés par les pieds et les mains. Après le combat, les troupes pillent les fermes et incendient les maisons. Des soldats retournent chez eux dans des voitures chargées; ils apportent les meubles, les provisions, les animaux dont ils ont pu s'emparer (FEC, 193 ff.).³⁵

In general, the French-language books play up the large number of victims claimed by these encounters and the magnificence of the "sacrifice" made by the Patriots.

All the books, both English and French, concede that these rebellions had the effect of provoking Britain to initiate the Durham inquiry and to effect reforms.

5. *The Durham Report*

What do our authors think of the Durham Report, that diagnosis of Canadian problems and master plan for the shaping of a new imperial policy? All agree in recognizing Durham's talents and outstanding intelligence, but beyond that divergencies appear.

The French-speaking authors criticize certain characteristics of the man that tended to affect the soundness of his judgment and, consequently, to weaken the validity of his report:

Whig teinté de radicalisme, homme au tempérament violent, au caractère dominateur et aux goûts fastueux, tout en lui était excessif (Plante, 253).³⁶

Après avoir observé la situation, surtout en prêtant l'oreille aux représentations de l'administration, Durham croit découvrir que le désaccord qui se manifeste entre le gouvernement et le peuple provient de la mésentente qui existe entre les deux races du pays (FEC, 199).³⁷

The English-speaking authors take note of Durham's arrogance and impatience and admit that these flaws may have detracted from his effectiveness as governor, but

without affecting his judgment; on the contrary, they find qualities in him which they consider enhanced his intellectual faculties:

Handsome, arrogant, fiery, and impatient, Durham burned at the thought of being timid in thought or action. "Don't interfere with me while I am at work," he once said on being criticized. "After it is done, impeach me if you will" (Ballantyne, II, 112).

Durham was proud, arrogant and quick-tempered. But he also had many qualities which made him a good man for the job that he had to do. His fairness, energy, and keen powers of observation soon convinced the Canadians that Durham would do his best for the unhappy colonies (Rogers, 149 ff.).

Durham was a strange mixture of ardent democratic ideals and proud aristocratic behaviour. A believer in freedom who ruled with absolute authority, he had inevitably a short and stormy career as governor-general . . . He stayed long enough, however, to gather with his capable assistants a mass of valuable information on the Canadian problem (Careless, 192).

Then Lord Durham set to work to find out everything he could about Canada. He did not ask just the rich people, or those who lived in the towns, or those in the government. He also asked the poor people, the settlers in the backwoods, and the men who had been struggling for better government (Brown, 260).

Having read these commentaries, one is no longer surprised to find that the English-speaking authors wholeheartedly approve Durham's interpretation of Canadian problems, including those of Lower Canada; it must be noted, however, that none of them endorse his recommendations regarding the French population (Careless, 196 ff.; McNinnis, 265; Ballantyne, II, 114; Rogers, 151; Brown, 261; *see also* Saywell, 72).

There is, then, a measure of agreement in the feelings expressed by the French- and English-language textbooks concerning his interpretation of our problems. It is on the underlying spirit of his report that they are divided, on his inspiration and the mystique of glorification for the English nationality. For the English Canadian authors Durham was a "first rank imperial statesman" (Careless, 192), the man who advanced the British Empire mystique "in such a clear, constructive, and compelling way" (Careless, 192; McNinnis, 264); his report may be considered one of the great steps "in the development of Canadian self-government and the evolution of the British Commonwealth" (McNinnis, 264), and deserves to be ranked alongside the Magna Carta and the Bill of Rights (Rogers, 150).

Plante is the French-speaking author who most vigorously denounces this mystique of empire:

Il [Durham] voudrait que les colonies cessent d'être tenues en lisières par la métropole et soient intéressées à demeurer volontairement au sein de l'Empire. Les liens les plus forts étant souvent les plus subtils, il recommande de s'assurer la collaboration des têtes influentes des colonies par l'appât de l'or et des places, celle des riches et des puissants par l'intérêt et les exigences du commerce, celle de tous les Anglo-Saxons par l'exaltation du sentiment de la race et de la fierté impériale . . . Il a fasciné ses compatriotes en prophétisant à l'Angleterre un destin grandiose, celui d'un immense empire, lié à la métropole par les intérêts et les bons sentiments (Plante, 254 ff.).³⁸

With similar vigour, this author denounces Durham's insistence on the superiority of everything English:

Le Rapport de Durham est, en somme, la glorification de la nationalité anglaise et le dénigrement de la nationalité française; la morale politique qui s'en dégage est celle du droit du plus fort aux dépens du plus faible . . . Ce Rapport de Durham aurait été à l'origine de l'Union de 1840, du gouvernement responsable de 1848, de la Confédération de 1867 et de l'union législative que l'on essaie aujourd'hui de réaliser, toutes formes de gouvernement qui favorisent, au détriment de la nationalité canadienne-française, l'expansion du nationalisme anglo-canadien (Plante, 254, 256).³⁹

6. *Act of Union*

When they consider the Act of Union and the form of government it brought to Canada, English- and French-speaking authors are in agreement on a number of points. They all talk about French Canadian resistance, the attempt at assimilation and its failure, the absence of any parliamentary freedom, and the opportunity that arose for the reformers to join forces (Careless, 198 ff.; McNinnis, 266 ff.; Ballantyne, II, 117-21; Rogers, 151; Plante, 256-8; Filteau, *Civ.*, 243-6; FEC, 199-201). However, at least one English-language book slips in a note of regret that Durham's original intent was not fully realized:

Giving Upper Canada as many representatives as Lower was an attempt to ensure a definite English-speaking majority in parliament from the start. Yet such a plan destroyed Durham's very idea of a complete blending of the two peoples. It kept alive two distinct sections in the politics of the union: Canada West and Canada East.... Equal representation only fastened sectional division on the new union and fostered the French feeling of separateness in Canada East. In consequence, if the project of Union had ever had any chance of absorbing the French Canadians, as it was applied, it had none (Careless, 198).

Far from considering its provisions to have been favourable to the French Canadians, the French-language books look on the Act as an "inique" (iniquitous) arrangement (FEC, 200; *see also* Plante, 257; Filteau, *Civ.*, 245) which the French Canadians would never have foiled had it not been for LaFontaine, who discovered a "faillie dans le système" (fault in the system; Filteau, *Civ.*, 245). Nor do they miss the chance to denounce other injustices perpetrated by the Union, such as the proscription of French and the consolidation of the debts of the two colonies:

De plus, la langue anglaise devient la seule officielle dans tous les écrits et imprimés émanant du gouvernement; injustice manifeste à l'égard des Canadiens français (FEC, 201).⁴⁰

Lord Sydenham, le nouveau gouverneur, proclamait ce bill, le 10 février 1841. "C'est le jour des banquiers," écrivait alors P.-J.-O. Chauveau; avant lui, Gosford avait dit: "C'est le fruit d'une intrigue mercantile." La banque Baring de Londres avait investi de forts capitaux dans le Haut-Canada et la dette de cette province la menaçait de banqueroute. Baring, ministre du cabinet, sut sauvegarder ses intérêts, en secondant de toutes ses forces le bill de l'Union. Il va de soi que le Haut-Canada accepta l'Union comme "une bonne affaire." C'est donc par une grave injustice que l'on remédiait au malaise des deux Canadas (Plante, 257; *see also* FEC, 199, 201).⁴¹

7. Confederation

Confederation followed on the heels of a long series of crises and was itself a crisis. All the textbooks agree on the factors that contributed to the unification of the British colonies in North America: negative forces such as geography and the loyalty of certain groups to the Crown; positive forces such as the industrial revolution, economic necessity, the threat posed by the United States and the political chaos in United Canada. The English-language books add other factors: the need for expansion towards the West, great visions by great men, and more or less heavy pressure from Britain (Careless, 242; Saywell, 52; McInnis, 277 ff., 284; Ballantyne II, 149 ff., 160; Rogers, 157, 159, 162; Brown, 301, 302).

The pattern for the new constitution was worked out at the Charlottetown and Quebec conferences. Two French-language books give the impression that it was Cartier's views that prevailed, simply because they were the best; they give no indication at all that the English-speaking majority made any concessions to Quebec:

Quelle forme allait-on donner à la nouvelle constitution? Le Haut-Canada et certains délégués des colonies de l'Est penchaient en faveur d'une union législative, mais la majorité se rangea du côté des représentants du Bas-Canada, qui optaient pour la formule plus élastique d'une fédération, seule capable de s'accommoder avec le régionalisme des colonies de l'Atlantique et le nationalisme des Canadiens français. La fédération sauvegarderait les intérêts communs du pays et réserverait au groupe minoritaire la plus large part possible d'autonomie (Plante, 308 ff.; *see also* Filteau, *Civ.*, 251).⁴²

A single French-language book (FEC, 229 ff.) and all the English books stress the necessity at this time for each group to make some sacrifice in the common interest.

The English-language texts point out that the choice of Quebec as the site of a pre-Confederation conference was highly appropriate for an event of such importance. Rogers writes: "From the day when Champlain began his tiny settlement at Quebec to the day when Churchill and Roosevelt held a meeting there during World War II, the majestic fortress-rock on the St. Lawrence has been the scene of history-making events. But of all these happenings, none was so important as the meeting there in October, 1864" (Rogers, 161).

The feelings of the French-speaking authors about the final adoption of Confederation are rather varied. Some do not hide their apprehension (Plante, 293, 308, 313, 314; Lavolette, 304), and others show a note of optimism (Filteau, *Civ.*, 251, 253; FEC, 230, 231, 244). Their enthusiasm, in any case, is far from matching that of the English-speaking writers (Careless, 230, 243, 245, 249; McInnis, 283, 286, 288; Ballantyne, II, 161; Rogers, 155, 158, 160, 162, 163-6; Brown, 307). Rogers writes, for example: "When we look at the stories of how other nations were united, we see that almost always armies have been used, battles have been fought and much blood has been shed. But in British North America, the colonies were joined together without the loss of a single life or a drop of blood. Such an achievement may almost be classed as a miracle" (Rogers, 165).

8. The Riel affair

From the texts of the books under study, one might think that Riel's trial was still going on. To be sure, all the authors agree on the reasons for the Métis' discontent: the Métis had been within their rights, the land surveyors had been ruthless, the government bumbling and neglectful. But if there is unanimity here among both French- and English-speaking authors, when they come to the finer points of the affair they part company.

While they recognize Riel's intelligence and his devotion to his compatriots, the English Canadian authors loose a flood of unflattering terms on the Métis leader: "no more heroic than he was sane" (Ballantyne, II, 172), "fiery-tongued," "trouble-maker" (Rogers, 171, 183), "hasty, rash" (Brown, 310), "clever but unbalanced" (Careless, 261); Careless writes that Riel was perhaps "both a hero and a murderer" (252), and then goes on to show how he was a murderer without saying a word about what made him a hero.

The French-language books are much more subtle in their forms of reproach: Riel was the undisputed leader of the Métis because he was ardent, popular and eloquent (Plante, 321; FEC, 252); his disappointments of 1870 brought on "troubles de mémoire" (derangements of memory) which forced him to spend "une couple d'années" (a couple of years) in rest homes (FEC, 255); Filteau does not choose between the Riel whose "l'équilibre mental était rompu" (mental balance had snapped) and who might have escaped capital punishment on that ground, and the Riel who paid for his "patriotisme et son exaltation" (patriotism and exaltation) with his life (Filteau, *Civ.*, 317).

Above all it was the execution of Thomas Scott that aroused English feelings against Riel. What do the textbooks have to say about this episode? The French Canadian authors stress Scott's role as an *agent provocateur* and fanatic, as well as his highly reprehensible behaviour in prison (Plante, 321; Filteau, *Civ.*, 316; FEC, 253). The English authors, even though they admit extenuating circumstances, are not ready to excuse Riel so easily:

[Scott] brought down on himself the fury of the Métis leader, whose vanity could hardly bear opposition (Careless, 262).

There was surely little or no reason in all this for executing Thomas Scott, but that is just what Riel determined to do. Riel was impressed by his newfound power, and he was already showing signs of that lack of mental balance which later led him to a hospital for the insane. Scott was tried, found guilty, and executed (Ballantyne, II, 169).

Among the prisoners Riel was holding at Fort Garry was a young man from Ontario, Thomas Scott. Scott had refused to admit that Riel had any right at all to set up a government. He annoyed his captors so much that Riel—who was a hot-tempered man, too—had him put on trial, sentenced, and shot (Brown, 311 ff.).

And what of the rebellion of 1885? The French-language books pass over it without dwelling on the legality or illegality of the government established by Riel; most of the English books have no doubt at all: it was a real rebellion (Careless, 282; McInnis, 304; Ballantyne, II, 181; Rogers 183; *see also* Saywell, 56).

And yet there are doubts in the minds of some authors, for, when they are not sure what terms they should use they fall back on words in quotation marks, an admission of possible inaccuracy. For example, Careless writes: "Riel set up a 'provisional government' of his own" (261); "English Canada was determined that this time the dangerous 'fanatic' should pay the full price for two rebellions" (288). McInnis and Ballantyne do likewise: "Meanwhile, there had been demands for military action to subdue the 'rebellion' " (McInnis, 294); "He was threatened with arrest for the 'murder' of Scott" (Ballantyne, II, 171). Handy little quotation marks; they relieve an author of the necessity of making up his mind! But it must be admitted that the affair was not a simple one.

For a number of reasons, Riel's execution aroused public opinion throughout the country. How is it presented? Two French-speaking authors write that the affair fanned the "fanatisme" (fanaticism) of Ontario and aroused the anger (justified, obviously) of Quebec (Plante, 322; Filteau, *Civ.*, 316, 318). Another extreme position appears to us to be the one taken by Rogers, who cites, as an example of praiseworthy firmness, Macdonald's outburst: "He shall hang, though every dog in Quebec bark in his favour" (Rogers, 184). Generally speaking, however, the English-speaking authors do not take sides but simply describe the extremes of public opinion over Riel.

As to the consequences of this affair, all the authors agree that it led to the creation of Manitoba and the guarantee of Métis rights. But, of course, each language group shows a measure of regret; Filteau's is revealed when he quotes Jean Bruchési: "Mais c'en était fait de l'influence métisse dans les provinces de l'Ouest, influence que remplaça celle des Canadiens français, elle-même rapidement submergée par la vague anglo-saxonne" (quoted by Filteau, *Civ.*, 318).⁴³

9. *The Manitoba separate schools*

The French- and English-language textbooks do not see the Manitoba separate school question the same way at all. For the French authors (in fact only Plante and Filteau mention it), the matter hinges purely and simply on the inalienable rights of the French Catholic minority. They begin with a complete and very detailed chronology of the whole separate school question since the conquest (Plante, 278, 280-1, 323 ff., Filteau, *Civ.*, 229, 233, 265-8, 318 ff.); the English-language books leave this entire background blank.

The rights of the minority were violated, write the French authors: "L'ignorance et le fanatisme aidant, le gouvernement libéral Greenway du Manitoba viole, lui aussi, en 1890 les droits des groupes catholiques et français" (Plante, 324; *see also* Filteau, *Civ.*, 318-21).⁴⁴ And they were violated with the complicity of axe-grinding federal politicians: "Partout le problème est le même . . . La minorité, se fondant sur l'article 93 de la Constitution fédérale, réclame un désaveu de la part du pouvoir central. Ce dernier tergiverse . . . cherche à s'en tirer par un artifice ou un accommodement, d'où les spoliés sortent vaincus" (Plante, 325; *see also* Filteau, *Civ.*, 321).⁴⁵

As these textbooks see it, the crisis was not on a national scale but concerned individuals; Catholic parents were to suffer because they would have to assume heavy expenses in order to maintain the schools they wanted.

The English-language books do recognize that the situation imposed sacrifices on individuals and that Catholics, even though in the minority do have rights (Careless, 293; McNnis, 313 ff.; Ballantyne, II, 187-90; Rogers, 184 ff.). McNnis is careful to point out that, while the "Protestant stalwarts" of Ontario may have been bent on assimilation, the French Catholic groups themselves did not lack aggressiveness and worked industriously to spread French influence:

With Confederation, the Quebec nationalists had become aware of the French minorities in other provinces and sought to win for them the rights enjoyed in Quebec itself There was a keen desire to hold these groups loyal to their race and culture, not merely for reasons of sentiment but also to strengthen the solidarity of French influence at the national level. So there were demands for French-speaking schools, as well as separate Roman Catholic schools in the provinces and territories where they did not exist, and for the recognition of French as an official language in legislature and courts (McInnis, 309 ff.).

The English-language textbooks, however, view the Manitoba separate school question as a crisis of national proportions. It involved the principle of majority rule, provincial rights over education, the influence of the Catholic Church in politics and the unity of the country (Careless, 294; McNnis, 310, 314; Ballantyne, II, 189, 195 ff.; Rogers, 184 ff.).

There was a compromise solution, the English authors write, a solution that demonstrated Laurier's political genius, preserved the unity of the country and provided an example for the future. The solution was not such a bad one, they add, and it was approved by the Pope himself, so why should there be any complaint? (Careless, 295; McNnis, 314).

10. The 1917 conscription crisis

If Laurier had lost a battle with his compromise solution to the Manitoba school question, he won the war for national unity (Ballantyne, II, 196). In the case of the 1917 conscription crisis, it must be said that Borden won the battle but lost the war; on this all the textbooks agree.

The French-speaking authors let it be understood that conscription was not necessary, while the English authors say rather, "Will we ever know?" It is particularly interesting to note that the latter deal most sympathetically with the reservations of the French Canadians and remind their readers that English Canadians had a very different approach to the war:

It seems clear, as well, that French Canadians did not fully sense the meaning of the war: that their whole secure, isolated world would be in danger if the conflict were lost. Here English Canada showed more awareness. Yet at least the French attitude was understandable (Careless, 335).

Quebec had unanimously rejected a major measure overwhelmingly supported by all the other provinces, from a firm belief in its national necessity (McInnis, 336).

The crisis over conscription left behind a "legacy of bitterness," an observation made by all the textbooks, but above all it showed that Canada had become a much

more united nation than anyone had thought; this idea is clearly expressed in one French-language book and one English (Filteau, *Civ.*, 351 ff.; Careless, 338).

11. *The 1929 depression*

As with the American invasions, the depression of 1929 was a national crisis that had nothing to do with Canada's cultural duality, but it is of concern to us because it had repercussions on the attitudes of our two language groups.

Only one French-language textbook speaks of it, and then it is to provide an opening for a discussion of Quebec's autonomy in opposition to the federal government:

Dans la province de Québec, la crise économique fut attribuée à la grande industrie, monopole des financiers anglais. L'élément français n'en ressentit que plus cruellement son infériorité économique et sociale. Maurice L. Duplessis, politique habile, sut tirer parti de ce dépit et de cette amertume. Tout en rejetant l'idée de séparatisme, en faveur auprès de certains nationalistes outrés, il se fit le champion de l'autonomie de sa province, revendiqua pour ses compatriotes une plus large part dans l'exploitation et l'administration des richesses naturelles (Plante, 379).⁴⁶

In short, for this author, the most serious consequence of the depression was the increased dependence of the provinces on a federal government whose tendency was unmistakably in favour of centralization (Plante, 381).

The English-language books are happy with this tendency, because for them such dependence is by no means undesirable (Careless, 370; Saywell, 185; McInnis, 345, 354, 357). The English Canadian authors point out an aspect of these difficult years that escapes Plante: they provided fertile ground for the growth of new political parties. At the same time, even though Hepburn and Duplessis created difficulties for Mackenzie King, these new parties did not really endanger national unity.

As Plante and the English-speaking authors see it, then, the political consequences of the depression should be viewed as they affected relations between the federal and provincial governments; for them this crisis was no more than an episode, and a relatively unimportant one, in a conflict that began in 1867, often going far beyond the problem of relations between the two cultures.

12. *The Quebec "revolution"*

We use the word "revolution" with some trepidation, but take heart from the fact that in many quarters the term most used is "quiet revolution"; in any event, no one knows yet whether the change now going on will prove to have been sudden and total, or a simple evolution. And since it is history in the making, it would be surprising if our textbooks were more perceptive of it than of events in the past.

The French-language books do not deal with it at all, since they were published before the milestone year of 1960; the Plante work was in fact republished in 1963, but its authors did not see fit to go beyond the stage where they had stopped in their earlier edition.

However, on rereading the French texts we find it difficult not to suspect that the authors would have taken a stand against this “revolution” (quotation marks are handy for us, too):

Québec continue la lutte pour l'autonomie, par la voix de ses premiers ministres, avec l'appui de sa population. Une forte natalité, une position géographique exceptionnelle, des richesses naturelles incalculables lui donnent des armes puissantes. Les Canadiens français reconnaissent, comme leurs compatriotes anglais, que la Confédération a besoin d'être rajeunie. Comme eux et avec certains d'entre eux, ils travaillent à trouver une formule d'honnête conciliation. On ne l'a pas encore trouvée. . . .

Notre destin repose sur deux assises puissantes: l'Église et l'école pleinement autonomes. L'adoption, en 1948, du drapeau fleurdelisé par la législature provinciale symbolise notre volonté de sauvegarder notre autonomie, et partant, notre civilisation française (Plante, 401; *see also* 411-13)⁴⁷

Conciliation, not separatism; preservation of the traditional foundations of the society. Moreover, both Plante and Filteau show disapproval, sometimes harsh disapproval, of anything tending to change or upset the old-style life of French Canadians (Plante, 389, 412; Filteau, *Civ.*, 367, 380, 411-16); we may therefore presume that they would also disapprove of the “revolution.” And just think what they would have said of the Royal Commission on Education in Quebec, which actually recommended that the history textbooks hitherto in use be discarded!

Only two English-language books touch on these recent events (the Saywell work stops at 1958, even though an edition appeared in 1963). For them, Duplessis's death in 1959 and the coming to power of the Liberals in 1960 were decisive turning points:

Duplessis persistently attacked the centralizing policies of Ottawa as intrusions on provincial rights and opposed nearly every measure of a national character His death in 1959 at last opened the way for more co-operative policies by his successors, especially after the Union Nationale was overthrown by the Liberals under Jean Lesage in the provincial election of 1960 (McInnis, 381).

Quebec had undergone a new awakening since the death of Duplessis in 1959. It was as if an iron clamp had suddenly been released from French-Canadian society, and educational and social reforms, new energy, ideas and hopes, came bursting forth together The rapid sweep of change, the virtual social revolution in Quebec must be strongly identified with the Liberal provincial government of Jean Lesage Lesage was quite as much a believer in Quebec provincial autonomy and an opponent of Ottawa centralization as Duplessis had been; but he achieved a fairly successful basis of agreement with the federal authorities as his province surged ahead (Careless, 431).

All considered, however, this revolution is not thought to have destroyed anything; it has been a stimulant, rather, and relations between the province and the federal government are the better for it: “The natural result of the changes, however, was to stimulate the French Canadians' idealism and pride in themselves In Lesage and the majority of *Québécois* this spirit did not preclude working in partnership with the rest of Canada, though many said the partnership must be made more equal than it had been, and some looked for changes in the federal constitution to recognize French Canada's rights more fully” (Careless, 431).

If we compare this paragraph with the Plante quotation, we see that the thinking of French and English are not so very different. On the history of our own century, Canadians seem to be more in agreement; it is the past that divides them.

C. Institutions

The historian Chapais writes that institutions are an integral part of the life of a nation. Filteau quotes the following passage:

Pour un peuple, le système de lois qui le régit n'est pas une chose indifférente. Les lois d'une nation policée sont le résultat d'une succession séculaire d'expériences et de faits. Elles se sont élaborées et formulées lentement. Elles sont la consécration de longues habitudes sociales. Elles sont nées du tempérament, des mœurs, du caractère, des qualités spéciales qui distinguent une race. Elles correspondent à des coutumes, à une mentalité, à des conditions économiques qui lui sont particulières . . . Et pour toutes ces raisons, elles finissent par faire partie intégrante de la vie nationale. Il semble qu'on pourrait dire sans craindre la critique: "Les lois sont l'expression de la nation" (Chapais, *Cours d'histoire*, quoted in Filteau, *Civ.*, 149 ff.).⁴⁸

We conclude this chapter with an examination of the laws and institutions by which the lives of Canadians have been ruled in the past and are ruled today, or more particularly (consistent with our study of historical figures and events) those on which the authors of our textbooks tend to be divided in their opinions.

1. The institutions of the French regime

If there is a difference to be noted, broadly speaking, between the French- and English-language textbooks, one might say that the former compare the institutions of the French regime with those of France and find them infinitely better, while the latter compare them with those of New England and conclude that the Canadian institutions were infinitely worse.

Two French-language books (Plante and Filteau, *Civ.*) and four English-language ones describe New France's form of government. They agree that basically authority was at once too weak and too absolute (Careless 48, 49; Ballantyne, I, 102; Plante, 58; Filteau, *Civ.*, 83), but nevertheless it was effective over a long period of time (Plante, 59; Careless, 49). According to McNinnis, the principal defect of the French administration was that it destroyed the initiative of the colonists and their leaders, whereas the English colonists were free to act on their own:

Nothing brings out the difference between the two communities more strikingly than the contrast between the representative assemblies in the English colonies and the centralized authoritarian system in New France. Much more was involved than the mere form of government. The English colonist wanted not only to share in deciding what his government should do—he insisted on deciding what he himself should do in his daily affairs. The French colonist found the government and the church constantly trying to make such decisions for him. There was no lack of individual initiative in French Canada. It was shown not only in the fur trade, but

also in the readiness of the *habitant* to resist exactions that he felt to be unjust. The difference was that in New France the authorities tried to keep everything under their control, while in the English colonies it was looked on as natural and admirable that free men should be allowed to strike out on their own (McInnis, 20).

In Filteau's view, this was not the situation at all: "[La France] reconnaissait les Canadiens comme des sujets adultes et aptes à participer à leur propre gouvernement . . . la législation locale émise par l'intendant n'était pas le résultat de ses décisions personnelles. Dans toutes les matières importantes, l'habitude voulait que l'opinion publique fut sondée en consultant les notables ou même en soumettant la législation proposée à des assemblées des habitants" (Filteau, *Civ.*, 84 ff.).⁴⁹

This author goes further still; backing his thesis with a compatriot's statement, he maintains that in eighteenth-century America it was not New England but New France which "dans une si large mesure, jouissait déjà des bienfaits de l'autonomie" (in such large measure, already enjoyed the benefits of autonomy).

2. *The Sovereign Council*

Much the same divergence of interpretation is to be found over the Sovereign Council. The French-language texts look on it as only a court of justice, as it were, while the English books consider it to have had a much greater role in the sense of absolutism, no doubt because the bishop was a member; indeed, a constant theme with them is that the bishop "could wield power in far more than Church affairs" (Careless, 49; Ballantyne, I, 102). In any event, they consider this three-headed government (two-headed, according to the French books) to have been a manifestation of the king's firm intent to maintain his authority by making sure that its members were weakened by constant friction among them (Ballantyne, I, 103; Rogers, 119).

3. *The seigneurial regime*

Differences over the seigneurial regime are both wider and deeper. The French-language textbooks, to begin with, are not unanimous in defending the regime. Filteau and the FEC attack the urban aristocracy and consider the seigneurs' contribution to society to have been very slim indeed: they evolved a certain standard of courtesy and good manners, and encouraged the drift of many colonists into exploration (Filteau, *Civ.*, 86 ff.; FEC, 102 ff.). The two other French books side with the seigneurial regime. It was not feudalism, they write; the seigneur had heavy responsibilities towards his *censitaires* (tenants) and his returns were poor (Plante, 46, 48 ff.; Charles, 109 ff.). According to Plante, French Canadian society was saved by the regime:

Le régime seigneurial a rendu au pays d'appréciables services. Il constituait un cadre social; aux colons, il a fourni l'entr'aide, la protection et un centre de vie commune. Après la défaite de 1760, il opposera un obstacle à l'infiltration étrangère, puisque les immigrants anglais lui préféreront la tenure libre; grâce à lui, les jeunes Canadiens français, exclus du commerce et de l'industrie, trouveront leur gagne-pain, car environ la moitié du territoire des seigneuries n'avait pas encore été

défriché. Grâce au régime seigneurial, ces terres ont échappé à l'emprise du vainqueur (Plante, 49).⁵⁰

The English-language books do not overlook the good features of the seigneurial regime, the social function it performed, its contribution to the progress of the country, but they stress its inadequacy and identify it with the feudal regime of Old France:

The seigneurial system in New France represented the importation of feudalism into America. Feudalism was dead in England by the seventeenth century, but particularly on the lower, or seigneurial, level it was very much alive in France (Careless, 61).

New France had brought from Old France the feudal system of land-holding. A large piece of land was granted to some army officer, government official or rich merchant. He became a seignior and allowed farmers called habitants to use pieces of his land in return for taxes and work. On the other hand, the English freehold system allowed a farmer to own his land and do with it what he wished (Rogers, 122).

Brown is even more explicit in identifying the seigneurial regime with feudalism: "This was the system of land-holding which grew up in France during the thousand years that passed before the discovery of the New World. It was known as the *Feudal* system" (75). Ballantyne has a more understanding and much less mediaeval view of it: "The way of settling land that had been used in most of Europe was brought to New France. You read before that the Company of New France had used the 'seigneurial system.' . . . Our country does not have the seigneurial system any more. But in some parts of Canada, there are 'company towns' which in some ways follow much the same system" (Ballantyne, I, 103, 108).

4. *The social order in New France*

Careless, in describing the seigneurial regime, designates it as an important factor "in making the society of New France authoritarian and hierarchical in character," and explains his thinking as follows: "To begin with, life in New France was fashioned on authoritarian lines: that is, power was concentrated at the top of society, and the mass of the colonists were used to obeying authority, not to governing their own lives Accordingly, with hardly any middle class between upper and lower orders in French Canada, the division in society was clear cut, indeed" (Careless, 59 ff.). The Plante and Filteau works advance quite the opposite view:

Les classes sociales, étroitement hiérarchisées, sont proches les unes des autres; pas de fossé, comme en France, entre la bourgeoisie et la noblesse Les états de service [du seigneur], plutôt que ses titres, le rangent au niveau de la classe privilégiée Les "habitants" ne ressemblent guère aux paysans de France. Ce sont des propriétaires de ferme et non les esclaves d'un seigneur À force de travail et d'économie, un bon nombre de ces "habitants" ont acquis un fief ou un arrière-fief. C'est ainsi que, vers 1700, ils possèdent déjà le tiers des seigneuries (Plante, 144 ff.).⁵¹

Aucune classe sociale ne pouvait exciter l'envie, comme telle, par sa fortune, ou prendre, vis-à-vis des autres, figure de parasite. C'est ainsi qu'au Canada, on ne

pouvait à proprement parler, distinguer des ordres, mais tout au plus deux classes sociales, l'aristocratie et le peuple, avec des différences parfois si ténues de l'une à l'autre, qu'elles donnent l'impression de groupes juxtaposés plutôt que d'une hiérarchie L'habitant canadien jouit, en effet, d'un sort enviable, et il est loin d'exciter la pitié comme le paysan français. Il est propriétaire de sa terre et ne peut s'empêcher de songer avec satisfaction à la grande liberté dont il jouit Par ces divers traits, il s'apparente beaucoup plus à la petite noblesse rurale de France qu'aux paysans. Il est un véritable gentilhomme campagnard (Filteau, *Civ.*, 86, 89 ff.).^{5,2}

5. *Integration into British rule*

When French Canadians became British subjects, a *modus vivendi* had to be found for their institutions that would satisfy both their own requirements and those of the empire they were henceforth part of. This was the goal pursued from the period of the Test oath* until the passage of the Quebec Act. For the French textbooks, this was the critical period; the most important thing as far as they are concerned was whether the French Canadians would be able to resist anglicization and whether their rights and culture would be protected; in short, whether their own, distinct nationality would be recognized. The French-language authors are not as interested in democratic government as in guarantees for the French language and laws; they are quite happy with Murray's and Carleton's aristocratic paternalism, for it worked to the advantage of the French Canadians and was in the tradition of the French regime, too. They claim the same rights for French as for English subjects (Filteau, *Civ.*, 149), but do not consider the rights of the English minority; the latter they refer to as "la coterie des marchands anglais" (the English merchant clique; Plante, 180). What holds their attention above all in this period is the English policy of assimilation, which they denounce, citing the French Canadian numerical majority and the terms of the capitulation of Montreal and the Treaty of Paris, both of which they analyse in detail (Plante, 165; Filteau, *Civ.*, 139 ff.; FEC, 149, 152).

It follows that they regard the Quebec Act as a measure of justice that the English were obliged to concede, but the abolition of the Test oath counts less for them than the restitution of "nos libertés civiles" (our civil liberties) and "l'admission officielle du fait français et catholique" (the official recognition of the French Catholic fact; Filteau, *Civ.*, 217). Plante writes: "L'Acte de Québec demeure la grande Charte des Canadiens français. Ainsi l'ont considéré . . . les orateurs canadiens-français qui s'y référeront et y puiseront des arguments d'autorité en faveur de leur cause; ainsi l'ont considéré les historiens qui voient en ce document la reconnaissance officielle de la nation canadienne-française" (Plante, 191).^{5,3}

The English-language books see the concessions made to the French majority with a very different eye. The concessions were only justified, they write, by practical considerations, for example, the near impossibility of introducing English law without causing chaos in the judicial system, and the necessity of appeasing the French element

*Under British law no person could hold office without taking an oath recognizing the supremacy of the Church of England.

on the eve of the revolt of the American colonies. Nowhere is there any question of rendering justice to a wrongfully-oppressed French-speaking group, except in the Ballantyne work, where an attempt is made to understand both sides of the question:

Naturally, the British merchants objected to all this, and you cannot help feeling some sympathy for them. They saw the immense opportunities for commerce that the St. Lawrence promised, and they longed to be free of the laws and customs which held them back. They sought their kind of progress. The Canadians, with the fears of a conquered people, sought to preserve what they had.

Two different views of life were clashing, and the clash was made bitter by the differences of religion and race (Ballantyne, II, 20 ff.).

Usually in the English-language books, the rights of the merchants, the sacred rights of the English, have the limelight: "The cry of 'rights of Englishmen' was being raised in Quebec and Montreal as well as in New York and Boston. After the conquest of Canada, traders from the colonies to the south and from England had settled in the two chief Canadian cities. The newcomers had been accustomed to the use of English law and to an elected assembly. They expected these in their new home" (Rogers, 121).

Not only were the merchants right in fighting for democracy and parliamentary rule but they deserved to be granted what they were asking for because they were the only progressive element in the colony, the one that had built the new St. Lawrence fur-trade empire. Under the circumstances, the Royal Proclamation that had been modified by the Quebec Act was not as unjust as was believed; it was Murray and Carleton who were to blame for not having applied it:

Yet Murray was also much influenced by the prejudices of a soldier and official against noisy civilians and quarrelsome tradesmen. He preferred the placid French Canadian habitants and their authoritarian feudal system to the merchants and their dangerous democratic notions about self-government. As quarrels between merchants and governor grew, Murray made himself the champion of French Canadian rights. His position did him much credit. Still he blocked the introduction of British institutions in Quebec at a time when the French were not really aroused to seek special treatment. This led to further difficulties in later years (Careless, 102; *see also* Ballantyne, II, 19, 28; Rogers, 122).

In any event, the integration of this French colony into British rule required the creation of a special form of government through the Quebec Act: "Under this measure, Quebec received distinctive treatment, indeed . . . In the second place, and more important for Canadian history, the Quebec Act meant that the province of Quebec had been put on a special basis by an imperial act of parliament" (Careless, 103, 104).

Careless, in particular, devotes a number of paragraphs to the theme that this special treatment was not really necessary. This is what seems to vex the English-language authors most; according to them, it was hoped that the French majority would be won over, or at least it was thought that the French Canadians would be perfectly happy to live under English rule just as they had lived under French rule (Brown, 168). But, says Rogers (123), taking up a phrase of Carleton's, these "most ungrateful wretches" were still not satisfied.

6. *Parliamentary government*

The parliamentary government created for Canada in 1791 was an incomplete one. All the textbooks, English and French, agree on this, and also, generally speaking, in seeing England's motive in this measure as an attempt to keep its colonies weak and divided and without real control of their own affairs (Careless, 116, 118; McNinnis, 48; Rogers, 145; Brown, 242 ff.).

All recognize, too, that England was anxious to satisfy the demands of the Loyalists. The English-language authors see these demands as perfectly justified:

The newcomers were certain to demand changes. They would not be satisfied to hold land under a *seignior* or to live under French civil law, and they were certain to demand the type of self-government to which they were accustomed in place of the unrepresentative system of the Quebec Act (McNinnis, 47).

They had no intention of giving up the rights they had enjoyed before the Revolution: a voice in how they would be governed, their own language, and their own laws The British saw it (the Quebec Act) as a straight-jacket restricting their way of life (Ballantyne, II, 52 ff.).

The newcomers were used to elected assemblies and English law. They had fought and suffered for their king Here was a new problem even harder than the problem that the Quebec Act had been designed to solve (Rogers, 126).

While Filteau considers that the Loyalists “[avaient] parfaitement raison” (were perfectly right; *Civ.*, 219), two other French-language books regard them with a good deal of contempt, calling them “fugitifs” (fugitives). FEC observes sarcastically that these “fugitifs” made much noise and demanded “*privilèges*”. “Ils ne songent pas à s’adapter au régime de la majorité, se croyant assez puissants pour imposer aux autorités leur façon de penser” (FEC, 160).⁵⁴ And according to Plante (199), “Familiers avec le régime parlementaire, attachés aux lois anglaises, les fugitifs américains jettent le pays dans une confusion constitutionnelle et juridique.”⁵⁵

With the introduction of parliamentary rule, Canada was divided into two distinct colonies, one province with an English majority, the other with a French majority. Naturally, the French-language texts regard this as “la reconnaissance officielle de la nationalité canadienne-française” (official recognition of French-Canadian nationality); it was not only a linguistic group that was being recognized, but a nation (Filteau, *Civ.*, 220; see also Plante, 200). The English-language texts look at it from a practical point of view. It would have been difficult to keep the two groups together, writes Careless, “however beneficial it might have proved in the long run” (121); an attempt was made to accommodate both, it is generally agreed, “thus making it possible to leave the French with the privileges they had gained under the Quebec Act while the English in Upper Canada were freed from the seigniorial system and from French civil law” (McNinnis, 48; see also Ballantyne, II, 53).

The parliamentary regime was not much of a blessing, according to the French-speaking authors, since it was controlled by the oligarchy and was “assez éloigné d’une véritable démocratie” (pretty far removed from real democracy; Filteau, *Civ.*, 171; Plante, 180; FEC, 168), but they concede that it did have some salutary effects; for

instance, it put an end to the influence of the seigneurs, many of whom had betrayed their people (Plante, 201), and it gave French Canadians an awareness of their strength: "Maintenant qu'on nous accordait le droit de vote, il devenait plus facile de montrer à tous que nous étions, dans la province au moins, l'immense majorité" (Laviolette, 226).⁵⁶

But the regime also created closed camps of indomitable antagonists, and curiously balanced, with a French majority in the Assembly on one side and an English minority backed by the entire machinery of government on the other; "la force du nombre contre celle du pouvoir et de la richesse" (force of numbers against force of power and wealth; Plante, 200, 201). The inflexible ones were of course among the English minority (Filteau, *Civ.*, 221; FEC, 168, 187 ff.).

7. Ministerial responsibility

There is no disagreement of consequence over the attainment of ministerial responsibility. At most, the French-speaking authors tend to regard it as a truly Canadian accomplishment, while the English stress the active part played by England in bringing it about, and once again display the traditional feeling of attachment to the British Empire as a matter of loyalty rather than subjection (McInnis, 269).

8. Confederation

When they come to Confederation, the French Canadian authors reaffirm their conviction that the province of Quebec is a nation, and that the text of the constitution establishes the fact irrefutably:

Le Bas-Canada, lui, retrouve son individualité politique, ressaisit son état civil d'avant 1840, redevient province autonome, constitue un état souverain dans sa sphère (Plante, 314).⁵⁷

Un État français. La nouvelle constitution présentait, pour les Canadiens français, l'immense avantage de leur restituer en grande partie la maîtrise de leurs destinées propres (Filteau, *Civ.*, 251).⁵⁸

The phrases *dans sa sphère* (in its own sphere) and *en grande partie* (in large measure) indicate a restriction, of course, but do not for all that destroy the psychological effect of these affirmations.

All other commentaries in the French-language textbooks are in the same vein. Along with Plante the authors recognize that "le gouvernement central a prédominance sur le gouvernement provincial" (the central government has predominance over provincial governments; Plante, 310), but the writers are none the less emphatic in declaring, with the help of copious quotations from Ernest Lapointe, that "le pouvoir fédéral est l'enfant des provinces: il n'en est pas le père" (the federal government is the child of the provinces, not the father); it was the provinces which, after "mûre délibération, ont cédé une partie de leurs pouvoirs et gardé ceux de leur choix" (Plante, 311).⁵⁹ Confederation, continues this author, was "un véritable pacte auquel Londres a donné force de loi" (a true pact to which London gave the force of law), a pact concluded between "les quatre provinces constituantes" (the four constituent provinces; Plante, 310). Filteau, too, talks

about a "pacte", a "traité entre les races" (treaty between the races; Filteau, *Civ.*, 253-5, 452) and, using a text by [F. R.] Scott, he writes that while English Canada regards Confederation as a continuous process, French Canada does not see it "comme une chose absolument permanente, pas plus [qu'elle] ne commande chez lui d'attachement particulier" (Filteau, *Civ.*, 452).⁶⁰ Hardly enthusiastic!

There are indeed passages to be found in the French-language textbooks, that praise Confederation, but the praise is always for its form of government:

Malgré ses lacunes, la loi de 1867 est un monument constitutionnel d'envergure, une œuvre marquée au coin de la sagesse: elle donnait au Canada une forme de gouvernement qui possédait à la fois "la puissance d'une union législative et la liberté d'une union fédérale" (John A. Macdonald, in 1865, quoted by Plante, 313).⁶¹

La constitution élaborée par les Pères de la Confédération a permis au Canada de jouir d'un gouvernement stable. Celui-ci s'est ensuite appliqué à assurer la sécurité, le bonheur et la prospérité des Canadiens (FEC, 233).⁶²

We find unbounded enthusiasm in the English-language authors: "On the whole it has worked surprisingly well" (Rogers, 162); this remark is typical of their reaction. Nor is this the only point on which they differ with the French authors. They dwell at length on the superiority of the central government:

Obviously, the Dominion powers were wider and more numerous, as was fitting for the government of a large state. The Dominion was given a general authority over all matters affecting "peace, order and good government" except when they fell within the fixed provincial fields. It was made clear that any remaining (or residuary) powers lay within the central government. The provinces had no more than the set of powers definitely listed for them (Careless, 255).

Everything else is, by Section 91, handed over to the federal government. Certain subjects are specifically mentioned. . . . But it is specifically stated that these are merely listed as illustrations of the federal powers; the general principle is that the federal government has full powers over everything not specifically assigned to the provinces (McInnis, 289; *see also* Ballantyne, II, 154-8; Rogers, 162; Brown, 307).

Another difference in point of view is that for these authors Confederation is not a pact but the product of an act passed by the British parliament:

It was not done by a compact between independent states, as in the American case. Although the colonies did plan the federal union, and agreed to adopt it, in legal fact the union was enacted by the authority of the imperial parliament. A British Act created the Dominion of Canada. The right of framing colonial constitutions still lay with the British parliament (Careless, 257).

The Law that made a nation For it was the British government, of course, that had to pass any law changing the government of the colonies (Brown, 305).

Finally, a theme which the French-language authors do not consider: Confederation combines the principles of federalism and the British parliamentary system: "The great and original achievement of the fathers of Confederation was to harmonize the American federal system with British parliamentary government and to produce a new type of

constitution that not only answered the demands of the Canadian situation but which was adapted for use in other Dominions when the occasion arose" (McInnis, 288; *see also* Careless, 253, 256, 257; Brown, 306).

9. *The Statute of Westminster*

As with ministerial responsibility and Confederation, the French-speaking authors consider the accession of Canada to total sovereignty as "l'aboutissement d'une longue lutte paisible mais tenace . . . pour se gouverner eux-mêmes" (FEC, 278).⁶³ The Statute of Westminster, which was more a Canadian achievement than an English one, they say, "sanctionnait des libertés acquises . . . depuis le traité de Versailles . . . Les faits devenaient les lois" (Plante, 363).⁶⁴ The English-language textbooks talk not of "a determined struggle" but of "the climax of an evolution" (McInnis, 351). Brown writes, "the Canadian leaders were anxious to see these powers given to our country, not because they resented Great Britain, but because they believed Canada had earned the right to complete self-government" (Brown, 350).

The description of the new constitutional provisions varies little between the English- and French-language books. However, a fact worth noting is that the French authors divide them into two categories, on the one hand the provisions sanctioning Canada's independence, and on the other those determining the relationships with the British Crown and the nations of the Commonwealth, while in the English books there is no such distinction. This is a paradox which Ballantyne seems to have no trouble explaining:

How could British peoples (for all people of the Dominions were still British) have both unity and differences? How could one person be the Sovereign of many different countries?

You would probably say at this point that there was no possible solution to this problem. "You can't have your cake and eat it too!" Nevertheless, a satisfactory solution was found—illogical and impractical though it may sound. It was decided that the British crown was what is called "divisible."

The Dominions, then, were autonomous, that is to say, separate and independent nations: as such, they were free to conduct their own internal and external affairs as they saw fit. They were also equal in status—one did not have to follow the lead of the other: their relationship was one of brothers rather than father and sons. Yet they were united, one in their loyalty to the Crown, and held together by common interests and ideals in a new family to be called the "British Commonwealth of Nations" (Ballantyne II, 228 ff.).

The French-speaking authors, consistently with French logic, prefer to think of Canada as a nation independent both in fact and in law; for them, this nation also enjoys the advantages of belonging to a group of nations having common interests and traditions and a common sovereign. We have reason to believe that these authors consider this situation, like Confederation, a temporary one (FEC, 279, 281; Filteau, *Civ.*, 451).

Some French-language textbooks express admiration for the Commonwealth system (Plante, 367; FEC, 278 ff.); for Plante, this association "tient du prodige: elle est sans exemple dans l'histoire" (is a thing to marvel at: it is without equal in history; 367). "C'est le chef-d'œuvre des Anglais" (it is the crowning masterpiece of the English), he

continues, and then propounds at length on the hold that England continues to have over Canada. He regrets that a clean break was never made, and that allegiance to the Crown and imperial solidarity have thus created confusion in men's minds, and he adds: "Un statut politique ne peut, il est vrai, du jour au lendemain, soustraire le Canada à cette insaisissable pression, à cette subtile séduction. Conformément à une tradition séculaire, le sentiment et le loyalisme britannique des Canadiens anglais vont encore de pair avec leur attachement à la Couronne et à la solidarité impériale. Le temps pourra corriger ces anomalies" (Plante, 367).⁶⁵ He finds an example of this "insaisissable pression" (intangible pressure) in time of war: "Aussi, il n'est pas étonnant que nos relations avec la Grande-Bretagne comportent une alliance militaire tacite. Advienne une guerre de l'Angleterre avec l'une ou l'autre des grandes puissances de l'Europe et de l'Asie, le Canada sera en état de guerre. Il ne sera pas automatiquement en guerre, mais il sera nécessaire qu'il le soit" (Plante, 366).⁶⁶ Not so, declares Rogers. "The proof of how far Canada was now an independent nation came when the Second World War broke out" (Rogers, 194 ff.), for in Parliament Canada's participation in the war was debated at length.

In *Canada's Story for Young Canadians* we read: "The idea of having the provincial governments provide schools fitted very well with other increasingly popular ideas: schools should train people to make wise choices of people to represent them; and schools should be used to train the several waves of immigrants to Ontario and the West so that they could become 'Canadian' " (Ballantyne, II, 188). The author is describing the aims of late nineteenth-century educators in the English-speaking provinces. They do not necessarily conform with today's realities. Indeed, the purpose of teaching history has been and continues to be debated at length; there are those who feel that the subject should serve to promote Canadian nationalism, and those who consider history to be an intellectual discipline (as necessary to children as mathematics and science) and who will not countenance its use for any utilitarian end, even the cultivation of national awareness.

A. Nationalism

Undeniably, the authors of our history textbooks—at least those we have examined—bring the past to life with nationalistic aims in view. Let us examine this nationalism and see how present-day conditions in Canada, such as the coexistence of two cultures and Canada's growth of independence, are changing it.

1. Loyalty to the province and to the nation

Canada's federal constitution is relatively recent, but a number of the provinces have histories that reach back much further than Confederation. How important is loyalty to the province in relation to loyalty to the nation?

Most of our authors declare themselves for unreserved dedication to the nation as a whole rather than to its constituent parts. The purpose of Confederation, they write in short, was to create a nation within which the provinces would continue to exist only to

safeguard the interests of minorities, whereas the federal government was to be a source of strength through unity of action (Careless, 364; McInnis, 273 ff.; FEC, 234; Charles, 87). In some books the survival of a provincial nationalism is ignored (Ballantyne and Brown), while others say only that this kind of nationalism is disappearing (Rogers, 164; Saywell, 72). For most of the English-speaking authors, moreover, conflict between the federal and provincial governments is due to provincial sensitivities and distrust, which are harmful to the orderly functioning and progress of the country as a whole (Saywell, 298). The Nova Scotia textbook, however, puts loyalty to the province first. For its author, Nova Scotia is something like a microcosm of the entire nation, and loyalty to the nation is simply a larger-scale projection of loyalty to the province: "Nova Scotians have gone out to all parts of Canada to help build a strong and united nation. In Nova Scotia men and women and children whose ancestors belonged to many races live peacefully together. Nova Scotians of older times have done great deeds. We should be proud of them and carry on what they have begun so nobly. You boys and girls of today are the men and women of tomorrow who can help build a better Nova Scotia and a strong and united Canada" (Blakeley, 209).

This is also the feeling expressed in *Canada in the World Today*, the only book to devote a whole section to education in citizenship. Feelings of loyalty, writes Rogers, originate in the community and spread in concentric waves to the province, the nation, and then to the rest of the world.

Certain French-speaking authors, on the other hand, view loyalty to the province as having "priorité historique et politique" (historical and political priority; Filteau, *Civ.*, 450) over loyalty to the nation, the latter being only superimposed on the former for very limited purposes. In case of conflict, provincial interests must be protected first; some French authors even claim complete provincial autonomy (Plante, 400 ff.; Filteau, *Civ.*, 450, 452, 484; Laviolette, 304).

2. *The foundations of Canadian nationalism*

In defining nationalism, Filteau writes: "Une nationalité peut fixer le moment de sa naissance à l'instant où ses membres prennent conscience d'être différents et de posséder, en plus d'un habitat déterminé, des intérêts, des traditions et un idéal commun" (Filteau, *Civ.*, 128).¹ On what is Canadian nationalism founded? What do Canadians have in common, and where do their separate interests meet?

The physical environment is one of the most important things we have in common. The English-language textbooks show that geographical obstacles have hampered the unification of the country, but they also point out efforts made to overcome them; the success of these efforts has been one of the biggest unifying factors (*see*, for example, Careless, McInnis and Rogers). Similarly, the opening up of the West and North has been a task shared by all. At least one French-language text recalls that all Canadians, in one generation or another, have experienced pioneer life, and that as a result of this life the colonists became deeply rooted in Canadian soil and deeply attached to the country: "La plupart sont nés au Canada et y ont vécu une vie de lutte qui les a enracinés au pays . . . Les Loyalistes se montrent courageux dans l'épreuve. Ils mettent rapidement en

valeur les lots qu'ils ont obtenus. Par leur ténacité, ils finissent par vaincre tous les obstacles. Ils s'attachent profondément à ce sol qui les accueillit dans leur exil et sur lequel coula tant de leurs sueurs" (FEC, 98, 166).² The country's beauty and wealth in natural resources have also contributed to a deepening of this attachment (Brown, Laviolette, FEC, Charles).

But to what degree do Canadians feel that they share a common destiny? Do our textbooks mention some point about which the different elements of the country's history polarize, something similar to the parliamentary system in England or the democratic republican ideal in the United States? In Canada, such elements of historical solidarity have been largely economic: exploration, development, the fur trade, the railways, nation-wide economic integration. The English-language books are the most profuse with examples, but the French ones offer some too. McNnis gives the best illustration of this point of view:

The next task was to create a true national feeling in the face of the strong sectional sentiments that still survived and to develop a sense of common interests that would outweigh local or provincial attachments This meant first of all the building of a national economy If [this] could be realized, Canadians would more and more learn to think of themselves as citizens of a single national community in whose fortunes every individual Canadian had a stake The creation of a national economy had been accompanied by a growing sense of national identity. The essential foundations had been laid for the building of a prosperous and united nation (McNnis, 297, 345).

Politically, the meeting point has been autonomy. For the French-speaking authors, the desire for autonomy goes back as far as the French regime, which is something the English authors overlook. In the books of the latter, however, this desire, its growth and gradual transformation into a desire for independence, runs like a thread throughout Canada's political history; the development has taken place within the framework of parliamentary institutions and with proper respect for established authority. In the following passage *The Story of Canada* expresses a conviction shared by all:

Both Canada and the United States were at one time part of Great Britain's colonial empire. As colonies, they were allowed to make certain kinds of laws for themselves, but the law-makers of Great Britain decided what kind of laws they might pass. To-day, both Canada and the United States pass whatever laws they wish; they sign treaties with other countries, make their own decisions about peace and war, and run all their own affairs. We say that they are *independent* nations.

But Canada and the United States secured their independence by different means. The United States went to war with Great Britain in 1775, and not until after several years of fighting was it agreed that it should be a separate country, with the right to run all its own affairs. In Canada, on the other hand, the same important change was brought about much more slowly, and by peaceful means. No one can say exactly *when* Canada secured her independence from the mother country, but one can point to many small changes that have taken place, each of which marked another step towards nationhood (Brown, 347).

What precisely is the goal of this drive for autonomy? The French-speaking authors, Plante in particular, reply that it is "à confirmer le principe d'une nationalité canadienne-française" (to confirm the principle of a French Canadian nationality; Plante,

200). Significant titles for their chapters on the nineteenth-century political development of Canada are "Vers l'autonomie" (Towards Autonomy: Plante), and "L'émancipation nationale" (National Emancipation; Filteau, *Civ.*); in fact, for these authors, the desire for autonomy is for national independence on the provincial not on the Canadian scale; as witness the following two paragraphs:

Ce Rapport de Durham aurait été à l'origine de l'Union de 1840, du gouvernement responsable de 1848, de la Confédération de 1867, et de l'union législative que l'on essaie aujourd'hui de réaliser, toutes formes de gouvernement qui favorisent, au détriment de la nationalité canadienne-française, l'expansion du nationalisme anglo-canadien (Plante, 254).³

Les "Pères" avaient à résoudre trois principaux problèmes: la menace américaine, le marasme économique et politique, l'antagonisme des nationalités. Les deux premiers ont été résolus, au moins dans leurs données essentielles; le troisième ne le fut qu'à demi. Pour régler la question des nationalités, il aurait fallu redonner au Bas-Canada son indépendance (Plante, 313).⁴

Here mention has been made of "la menace américaine" (the American threat) which leads us to wonder if Canadian nationalism, as seen through our textbooks, is in reaction to external forces, especially to the three nations that have played a part in the development of Canada, namely France, England and the United States. Is Canadian nationalism marked by that psychosis of hostility common in colonies towards their mother countries?

3. Canadian nationalism and France

Consider first the period of the French regime. The French-speaking authors reproach France most of all for having neglected Canada. True, the elementary textbooks are inclined to excuse her (FEC, 151; Laviolette, 191), but the secondary school books, particularly Plante, treat the matter with a great deal of bitterness (Plante, 82, 127, 128, 151, 161, 166, 167). According to Filteau, even when France paid attention to Canada the colony suffered from it, because their interests were so different:

Le jeu des intérêts constitua la première cause d'opposition entre Français de France et colons installés au Canada.

Très confus d'abord, ces intérêts finirent par se départager et se préciser. Dès le début du 18^e siècle, on commença à parler d'intérêts purement canadiens et, pour les appuyer, on invoqua bientôt l'histoire canadienne . . .

Les malentendus des dernières années du régime français, l'abandon apparent dans lequel la France avait laissé le Canada au cours de la guerre, surtout la faillite du trésor, avaient passablement refroidi les sentiments des Canadiens, à tel point qu'un prêtre français pouvait écrire: "Il en coûtera peu aux Anglais pour leur faire goûter l'avantage d'avoir changé de maîtres, puisqu'ils n'ont qu'à faire le contraire de ce que nous faisons" (Filteau, *Civ.*, 128, 186).⁵

Moreover, and this feeling was apparent as well in the American colonies at the time of the War of Independence, Plante and Filteau consider that Canadian civilization was superior to the mother country's, from a social, religious, human and even military point of view (Plante, 145; Filteau, *Civ.*, 90, 128, 135 ff., 459, 469 ff., and all of Chapter VIII).

Is this to say that, according to the French language books, the Canadians were ready to revolt against France? No, because their feelings went no further than plain discontent, and nowhere will we find evidence of a real desire for independence among them (Filteau, *Civ.*, 141; Charles, 183). Besides, these authors see the conquest as a catastrophe for the Canadians not only because they were henceforth under the heel of the English, but also because they regretted no longer being ruled by France (FEC, 151; Laviolette, 191).

When France had left the scene, the Canadians felt orphaned, as though they had suffered a great loss: and yet, we are told, they were "Français de coeur, mais Canadiens avant tout" (Frenchmen at heart, but Canadians first). What precisely does this expression mean? Looking beneath the surface, we see that France had left its "image," its "empreinte" (stamp) on Canada (Laviolette, 193), that the Canadians harboured for France "un culte filial malgré ses fautes" (a filial devotion despite its faults; Filteau, *Civ.*, 141), that France was their revered master but Canada was their homeland (Charles, 183), and that they must venerate the "legs de la France" (legacy of France). This legacy, however, has always been very ill-defined; the authors do talk of language, faith, culture and the values of a civilization, but they hasten to assert that these values have become Canadian, and all the examples they give are Canadian. We begin to suspect that there may be a rejection of French heritage in all this, or, at the very least, a rather astonishing indifference to it.

The English-language books reveal much the same thinking. The culture of French Canadians is different to that of France, we read, a culture that derives from the environment and particular historical circumstances in Canada (Careless, 71 and Chapter V). Should they have been able to "throw off their English masters," they would not have sought to return to French rule (Careless, 106 ff.). From time to time they are indeed accused of being disloyal subjects, but never is it said that they wanted to return to French bondage. One English book even declares that after the conquest they preferred English rule (Brown, 160 ff.), for political reasons, their change of heart toward France dating from the French Revolution (251). On this point, then, there is no fundamental contradiction between English- and French-language textbooks.

4. *Canadian nationalism and England*

How do the French-language books see the relationship between the Canadian colony and England? To begin with they do not distinguish the English of Canada from the English of Europe or of the American colonies either. For them Englishmen were all of the same breed wherever they might be, and expatriate Englishmen were no different in their nationalism than those of Europe (Plante, 367). However, they do concede that there were "bons" (good) Englishmen (FEC, 150; Laviolette, 210), that their institutions had the virtue of making it possible for French Canadians to survive (Filteau, *Civ.*, 220, 227), and also that there were ties between England and Canada that could not be broken because they were beneficial to Canada (FEC, 278).

French Canadian loyalty differs from the crown-oriented loyalty of the English Canadians and while the former is considered steadfast and undying it has its limits,

namely the particular interests of French Canada. The French-language texts carefully note anything which might demonstrate England's oppression of French Canada. Thus, the turbulence that began in 1830 was due far more to obstinacy on England's part than to the existence of an ambitious and self-seeking local faction. Similarly, England's desire to maintain its hold over Canada was the result of a conspiracy intended to benefit "des riches et des puissants" (the rich and powerful) and "tous les Anglo-Saxons" (all Anglo-Saxons) on both sides of the Atlantic; it began at the time of the conquest and has continued to the present day in order to keep Canada in economic, political and military tutelage, and since the French Canadians are its most ardent opponents, England has sought to assimilate and anglicize them (Plante, 245, 254, 341, 342, 366; Filteau, *Civ. passim*: a very important theme).

French Canadians are ready to give proof of their loyalty on the field of battle whenever the defence of Canada is involved, but not when "essentiels" (essential) points are at stake. We perceive, moreover, that for certain authors the authority of the British throne is only temporary:

Puisque le Canada reconnaît *actuellement* la reine d'Angleterre comme sa souveraine (FEC, 281).⁶

Un statut politique [celui de 1931] ne peut, il est vrai, du jour au lendemain, soustraire le Canada à cette insaisissable pression, à cette subtile séduction [celle de l'Angleterre]. Conformément à une tradition séculaire, le sentiment et le loyalisme britanniques des Canadiens anglais vont encore de pair avec leur attachement à la Couronne et à la solidarité impériale. Le temps pourra corriger ces anomalies (Plante, 367).⁷

Contrast this with the emotionalism of some English-language authors:

On June 2, 1953, the magnificent spectacle of the Queen's coronation once again linked present, past and future in the history of the British. The whole world watched, dazzled by the colour and brilliance, impressed by the time-honoured ceremonies which date from Anglo-Saxon times, and struck by the youth and beauty of the central figure. To the Commonwealth it was more than a spectacle. It was the outward expression and reaffirmation of the silent, invisible but enduring unity of the Commonwealth nations and peoples The magic of television enabled her Canadian subjects to see their monarchy in action and to recognize its true value. Elizabeth II, Queen of Canada, but also Head of the Commonwealth, represents the association of many and varied nations; the living institution of the monarchy, far from being a mere survival of the colonial past, provides the common bond of love and loyalty, freely given and generously returned (Saywell, 283 ff.).

What do the words "Great Britain" mean to you? Perhaps they recall the story of Wolfe's soldiers, climbing to the Plain of Abraham to take part in the battle that was to make Canada a British country

Canada is a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations and is the oldest self-governing dominion of the Commonwealth. Much of our country was settled from Great Britain; many of the founders of our nation were British. The story of Great Britain, then, is especially interesting to Canadians. It gives us an understanding of the conditions that led to the forming of our own nation. It also gives a knowledge of the origin of some of our most treasured liberties and privileges (Rogers, 4).

What other links besides the Crown remain between the members of the Commonwealth?

Each Dominion has copied, to some extent at least, the British machinery for making and enforcing laws. In some of the Dominions, including Canada, more than one language is spoken, but the English language is spoken in all the Dominions. Moreover, many people of each Dominion can trace their families back to the British Isles. Like members of a family, the Dominions have often met together to discuss their common problems (Brown, 351).

Consideration of the Commonwealth is not always attended by such sentimentality. Very often the English-speaking authors are more restrained, writing that the institution has been a useful one, and that its character, once strongly British, has changed over the years (Careless, 382; McInnis, 351, 369 ff.; Saywell, 357; Ballantyne, II, 229).

The English authors urge a loyalty that is unconditional, and are not short on arguments in its favour: it is because England stayed so long in Canada that the latter has survived and become a powerful nation; England faithfully defended Canada's political, economic, military and cultural interests until Canada was able to defend them herself, and then she stepped gracefully aside (Careless, 118, 164, 261, 263, 274, 296; McInnis, 264; Brown, 341; Ballantyne, II, 231).

5. *Canadian nationalism and the United States*

Canadian nationalism is also apparent in attitudes to the United States. A speech in June 1965 at the University of British Columbia by the American, Mason Wade, then president of the Canadian Historical Association, prompted the journalist Keith Bradbury to write an article in the *Vancouver Sun* on June 11 of that year. The title of this article and some excerpts follow:

Hating the U.S. – "Favorite Sport"

If there had not been a United States, Canadians would have had to invent one so they could get mad at it, an American historian said here Thursday.

"Anti-Americanism is the one thing that French and English Canadians have always had in common," said Prof. Mason Wade, of the University of Rochester.

"Resistance to the American presence is the central thread of Canadian history from the early days . . . right down to the present."

As far as our fourteen chosen textbooks are concerned, this cannot be said to be entirely true. There is no doubt, however, that our authors, both English- and French-speaking, represent American influence as a menace. For the French authors, the threat from the United States is one of very long standing:

Quatre fois déjà les colonies américaines, maintenant les États-Unis, avaient envahi le Canada. Leur seul succès, celui de 1759-1760, avait profité à l'Angleterre. Mais le rêve n'était pas évanoui d'une Amérique arborant du pôle nord au golfe du Mexique le drapeau étoilé. En 1812, l'occasion s'offrit d'entreprendre la "guerre glorieuse" (Plante, 217).⁸

Si la guerre de 1756-1760 a fait tomber le Canada sous la dépendance anglaise, la guerre de 1939-1945 l'a dangereusement asservi à la tutelle américaine (Plante, 389; see also 215, 339).⁹

We find the same theme in some of the English-language books (Careless, 134, 237; Saywell, 290).

Some, however, maintain that there is no longer a danger in American influence, although they admit that there has been in the past (McInnis, 80, 281; Rogers, 195, 197; Ballantyne, II, 41). One, but it is the only one, goes so far as to deny that such a danger ever existed (Brown, 208, 210). In any event, the following paragraph from *Canada's Story* shows that we are less categorical in our anti-Americanism than Mason Wade's remarks would suggest: "The fact that Canada is so closely tied to the United States presents Canadians with a puzzling problem. On the one hand, Canadians owe a great deal to American strength, wealth, and 'know-how'; Canadians would be lost without their great neighbour. On the other hand, Canadians can remain 'Canadian' only by resisting American influence" (Ballantyne, II, 253).

6. *National awareness*

The fact that our authors are conscious of a continuing search for Canadian national identity indicates that they are indeed worried over the threat from the United States in our own time. This, at least, is what we conclude from their constant efforts to define this identity, and from the criterion common to all of them, namely the concept of ourselves as belonging to a nation distinct from others. In short, we are Canadian if we are different: different from the European French, from the Americans, and from the British.

At what period did we begin to feel different? There is no agreement on this. Some authors say the early eighteenth century (McInnis, Blakeley, FEC, Filteau, *Civ.*); others the late eighteenth century (Ballantyne, Brown) or the period following Confederation (Careless); one even maintains that it was not until the twentieth century (Rogers).

It would seem, from these books, that while Canadians do not bear the ugly scars visible in other colonial nations, we are still at the psychological stage of trying to define our identity by contrast (Careless, 71 ff.; McInnis, 19, 376 and Chapter 31; Blakeley, 51; Ballantyne, I, 202; Rogers, 120; Filteau, *Civ.*, Chapter 8; FEC, 98, 304; Laviolette, 69; Charles, 166, 183).

It must be said to the credit of our authors that they talk of national awareness without going to extremes and rarely stoop to chauvinism. There are two exceptions. One author writes: "Nous formons aujourd'hui un grand peuple, dont le sens chrétien, le respect des lois, l'énergie au travail suscitent le respect du monde entier" (FEC, 303).¹⁰ Another suggests as subject for an essay: "En vous servant de tout ce que nous avons dit cette année, pouvez-vous montrer que notre Histoire est réellement une ÉPOPÉE, une ÉPOPÉE MYSTIQUE?

"Ton histoire est une épopée
Des plus brillants exploits! "*(Laviolette, 319)¹¹

Though our textbooks as a whole do not indulge in chauvinism, this does not prevent them from trying to instil a well-informed national pride. There is nothing unhealthy

¹⁰The couplet is from the French version of "O Canada."

about it, however; the pride is for the land, for the people who inhabit it and for leaders, but very little for form of government, even in the English-language books. The authors of *Mon pays*, for example, could hardly be more modest in this respect: "L'idéal démocratique qui l'anime peut sembler un peu flou, mais il est dénué de toute visée impérialiste; voilà pourquoi les gestes du Canada peuvent être reçus sans faire naître d'acrimonie" (Plante, 391).¹²

Along with this feeling of national pride there is also some anxiety. Most of the authors do not cast doubt on the future of Canada (Blakeley, Rogers, Brown, Lavolette, FEC); some are optimistic despite the crises to be overcome:

In spite of the continuance of sectional divisions and the survival of controversies between the provinces and the federal government, the sense of nationhood now rested on firm foundations that were unlikely to be shaken by minor, even if persistent, differences of geography or race or creed.

There were inescapable limitations, but there were also achievements of no small merit; and the faith of Canadians in their own national destiny could find much to sustain it in the record of Canada's first century as a Dominion from sea to sea (McInnis, 385, 395; see also Careless, 427, 432, 433).

The twentieth century dawned bright with hope for the young Canadian nation. For almost as long as men could remember, the shadow of failure had hung ominously over Canada's destiny. Indeed, many men had come to feel that the creation of the nation had been a mistake, and that Canada might be better off as part of the rich and powerful United States. Fortunately, however, there were people of greater faith who felt instinctively that Canada was a nation in the making (Saywell, 52; see also 57, 305).

Ballantyne, for his part, is convinced that Canada will survive as a nation, on condition that Canadians "learn to live with their differences."

In Plante we find a very pessimistic note; national unity, we read, is threatened from all sides and the situation looks quite insoluble:

Un grave péril menace la nationalité canadienne: c'est l'américanisme . . . De plus, le peuple canadien n'a ni l'homogénéité ni la culture qui lui permettraient de résister avec succès à l'absorption partielle. Entre les impérialistes anglais et les nationalistes canadiens-français se déroule toute la gamme des opinions et des sentiments. Un fossé large et profond sépare les uns des autres, catholiques et protestants, Anglais de l'Ontario, Canadiens français du Québec, Néo-Canadiens de l'Ouest. La Confédération n'est qu'une froide notion juridique, pour laquelle la plupart ne manifestent aucun attachement réel (Plante, 398 ff.).¹³

B. Relations between the Two Cultures

In most of our textbooks, there does exist a national awareness, an awareness of belonging to one and the same nation, even though two main cultures, English and French, live within it.

Before we examine the views of our textbooks on the relations between these two cultures, let us try to discern how they see each of the cultures separately. To proceed logically, we should begin by listing the characteristics that each author attributes to his own culture and that of the other group, but that would take us beyond the scope of

our inquiry, and to a repetition of what we have already said elsewhere in one form or another. Suffice it, then, to recall that the French-language books describe the culture of French-speaking Canadians at length and draw general conclusions that put the emphasis on moral and spiritual values. The English authors, in describing the culture of their own group, perceive a less clearly-defined cultural system. Also, just as nationalities often identify themselves through contrast, the authors have a tendency to define their own culture by showing what distinguishes it from the other. This is a rather insidious technique, because at almost every step it suggests judgment and condemnation of the other culture, and in some cases the distinction is one between black and white. (See, for example, Careless, 66, 101; McInnis, 19, 21; Ballantyne, II, 61, 114; Filteau, *Civ.*, 211; Plante, 182, 234, 297).

From the very beginning, then, the two cultures, by their very nature, are in positions of extreme opposition to one another, which leads the authors to consider only two possible solutions: one, the assimilation of one culture by the other, the one culture assuming the other's characteristics; the second, cooperation between the two cultures, each retaining its own essential characteristics. One might have expected a possible third solution, namely fusion, by which each culture would be transformed, giving birth to a single one sharing the characteristics of both; none of the textbooks we examined seem to have suggested this third solution.

1. Assimilation

Assimilation is of course rejected completely by the French-speaking authors:

Il y a dans un pays comme le nôtre, des races immigrantes qui sont inévitablement appelées à perdre leur identité, à s'effacer en quelque sorte dans le composé anonyme qui les absorbe; d'avance, elles y consentent, parce que déracinées de leur sol, elles ne peuvent songer à survivre. Mais il y a aussi, dans un pays comme le nôtre, des races composantes qui ont des droits à leur survie, qui tiennent ces droits de leur histoire, de la priorité d'occupation territoriale, de la conquête, et qui sont maîtresses de leur personnalité comme elles le sont des terres qu'elles ont découvertes ou qu'elles ont conquises. Il ne peut s'agir pour elles de fusion; il ne peut être question pour elles que de coopération (Filteau, *Civ.*, 456).¹⁴

It is resistance to assimilation that provides the basis of claims for provincial autonomy:

Quoi qu'il en soit, la tutelle financière signifie pour Québec, non seulement la perte de l'autonomie législative et administrative, mais encore un péril pour ses institutions, sa foi, sa langue et sa culture. Cette province, différente de toutes les autres, ne peut, sans un grave détriment, céder ses droits à Ottawa. À preuve, le traitement injuste que l'on a infligé à toutes les minorités, depuis 1867 jusqu'à nos jours. La province de Québec est le seul cadre naturel, où nous puissions efficacement défendre, maintenir et enrichir nos valeurs spirituelles. Notre destin repose sur deux assises puissantes: l'Église et l'école pleinement autonomes (Plante, 401).¹⁵

Already assimilation has accounted for heavy losses, according to Filteau:

Les minorités françaises des diverses provinces du Canada ont soutenu de dures luttes pour survivre et conserver leur culture. Les assauts subis et plus encore

peut-être l'isolement ont entraîné d'assez lourdes pertes. Sur le million de Canadiens français établis hors du Québec, un tiers environ auraient abandonné leur langue et peut-être un dixième ne pratiqueraient plus la foi ancestrale. Heureusement, les autres semblent vouloir poursuivre l'effort entrepris jusqu'à ce qu'ils aient obtenu la pleine reconnaissance de leurs droits (Filteau, *Civ.*, 359).¹⁶

On the English-language side, only Ballantyne takes the same position, at least implicitly:

He [an Irish Catholic immigrant] knew that he had something in common with each of the two different groups of Canadians—either language or religion . . . but that he differed from both of them as well—in either language or religion. In the end, Gerald Burke decided to remain in Quebec . . .

In whatever colony they lived, they [Irish Catholics like Gerald Burke] stood, in a sense, between the two larger groups, the Canadian French Catholics and the Canadian English Protestants; and most of them chose to resist being absorbed by either larger group and to remain themselves (Ballantyne, II, 140).

The other English-speaking authors think in terms of assimilation [of minorities] as far as language and institutions are concerned at least; at the same time they declare that the original cultures should be preserved, but it is clear that for them what is to be preserved is in the realm of folklore:

And as newcomers continue to arrive from Europe to make their homes in Canada, it is the duty of those who live here to make them welcome, show them our ways, and teach them our language [from which we deduce that the author sees only one way of life and one language in Canada]. For, as we read earlier in this book, we are all newcomers here. Some of us came early, and others late, that is the only difference (Brown, 337).

Ivan [an immigrant from eastern Europe] was not unhappy. His greatest satisfaction was to see his children go off to school where they could mix with Canadians and learn to speak their language.

People like Ivan could not forget the days before Canada. They were proud of their traditions and their history. They were proud of their beautiful handicraft, of their haunting folk music, and of their ability to work. At night, they spoke their own language, sang their old songs, and told their children of their old traditions. But they were glad . . . that their children would be real Canadians just like the other children.

Before long, Ivan lost a little of his funny accent and a great deal of his feeling of loneliness (Ballantyne, II, 204 ff.; see also in the same vein, Blakeley, 83, 175; Rogers, 300; Careless, 409; Saywell, 59; McInnis, 391).

These quotations, and the additional passages referred to, apply only to new Canadians and not to the French Canadians. Generally speaking, the English Canadian authors recognize that attempts to assimilate the culture of the French-speaking group have been in vain, or else that they had no chance of succeeding in any case:

But it was still the hope of the British government that the Canadian French would become so impressed by the British way of government and the British manner of life that before long they would abandon their own race, religion, and customs to share what they saw their English neighbours so fully enjoyed. It was hard for the British to see that not everyone would envy their way of life.

As it turned out, the Canadian French did not copy British ways. On the contrary, they showed great skill in turning such British customs as they had into a means of defence for their own way of life (Ballantyne, II, 55).

But a people that had grown like this on its own was never to be swallowed up (Careless, 71).

Considering the importance attached by the English-speaking authors to the assimilation of newcomers, it is hardly surprising that they should regret not having been able to assimilate the French Canadians. Careless states this feeling most unequivocally:

But in the second place, and more important for Canadian history, the Quebec Act meant that the province of Quebec had been put on a special basis by an imperial act of parliament. This would complicate the future development of Canadian government. The chance to fit Quebec from the beginning into the ordinary pattern of British institutions had been lost. No doubt there was never any likelihood of completely assimilating (which after all, meant swallowing) the French Canadians in an English-speaking Canada. But in some ways the future co-operation between the two language groups in Canada was made more difficult by this measure which increased the French feeling of separateness (Careless, 104).

2. Cooperation

Assimilation having proven impossible, there remains the other alternative: cooperation. This is the solution to which the English-speaking authors (regretfully, it would seem) and the French Canadian authors all rally. They accept it, but on condition that it be founded on mutual respect and understanding (FEC, 304; Ballantyne, II, 59, 121, 195, 208); that it not violate the respective rights of each (Ballantyne, II, 256; Lavolette, 225; Filteau, *Civ.*, 220, 341, 456; FEC, 150, 151); and that it benefit from the magnetism of great statesmen (Rogers, 160 ff., 188, 338).

What is the state of this cooperation between the two cultures today? Complete success, declares one book (Brown, 340). Negative results except in the economy, admit all the other authors.

It is on the political level that cooperation has encountered the most obstacles. The French-language books are pessimistic on this score (Filteau, *Civ.*, and Plante). A similar pessimism is revealed by a number of English-speaking authors. When two cultures have irreconcilable aims and ways of life, they say, all that can be done is to allow each to evolve by itself; if either is forced there will inevitably be armed conflict (Brown, 180 ff.; Saywell, 28; McInnis, 21, 106 ff.; Careless, 222): separatism, no less! True enough, the foregoing references apply not to the cultural problem in Canada today but to the past, or to the history of Ireland, or to the American Civil War, but the response is nevertheless surprising.

In all the English-language books, moreover, opposition between the two cultures appears as a major obstacle to effective functioning of the government, either because of the "legacy of bitterness" (an important theme in Saywell), or else because, say the authors, racial and religious differences are most likely to push the two sides to extreme positions (McInnis, 319; Ballantyne, II, 21; Rogers, 127, 166; Careless, 101, 175, 222).

Both English- and French-speaking authors nevertheless recognize that Canada benefits from its cultural duality or even multiplicity:

Truly, "variety is the spice of life" in Canada. Canadian life is no drab one-colour tapestry, but has vivid strands representative of many different lands and tongues. This varied pattern makes Canadian communities interesting and novel. Likewise, it should, and does, make Canadians more tolerant and broad-minded. We try to see the other fellow's viewpoint. If he likes a different kind of food, or speaks English with a strange twist, that's all the more reason to get to know the interesting background of your fellow Canadian. We should be the losers ourselves if we laughed at customs any different from our own, or if we ignored them (Rogers, 320).

Beyond these superficial benefits (which for Rogers serve only as illustration), there is the cultural richness that has fallen to Canada's lot:

Canada's life has thus been made richer because Canadians have known and admired the plays of Shakespeare and Molière, the paintings of Turner and Millet, and the novels of Charles Dickens and Victor Hugo (Rogers, 212; *see also* Ballantyne, II, 251; McInnis, 387 ff.).

Nos deux cultures constituent une double richesse qui donne au Canada son caractère particulier. Elles contribuent, chacune dans son genre, au progrès matériel, intellectuel et artistique du pays tout entier (FEC, 304).¹⁷

It is this cultural duality that gives Canada its distinctive identity vis-à-vis the United States:

Both Canadians and Americans, however, sensed differences between themselves that were small but significant, extending sometimes even to dress and speech. At the root of these differences, besides the great fact of Quebec's presence in the centre of Canada, there was the fact that Canada still represented a middle ground between Britain and the United States in ideas and institutions (Careless, 405).

Nos partenaires anglo-canadiens ont été lents à admettre que la dualité de culture pouvait constituer une richesse pour notre pays. Les luttes menées autour de l'école et de la langue au début du siècle actuel, les ont forcés à étudier nos problèmes; ils en sont venus à mieux nous comprendre. Puis l'américanisation, danger auquel ils étaient tout particulièrement vulnérables, les a amenés à considérer les facteurs qui nous permettaient d'opposer une résistance efficace à cette menace. Ils en sont arrivés à conclure que c'est en partie la culture française qui confère au Canada un cachet d'originalité qui s'oppose au matérialisme américain. C'est grâce à notre présence que le Canada peut communier à l'une des grandes cultures européennes. C'est grâce à notre groupe que la pensée française peut circuler d'un océan à l'autre et apporter un stimulant fécond, source d'originalité et de personnalité. La culture française fait ainsi partie du trésor de la nation canadienne. "Notre dualité de culture," disait l'honorable Lester B. Pearson, "sera toujours notre signe distinctif, voire un mur de barrage faisant échec au grand tout américain" (Filteau, *Civ.*, 477).¹⁸

As Careless sees it (432), this cultural duality, in final analysis, contributes to the consolidation of Canadian nationalism and also to the strengthening of order and stability: "Yet still the background of New France comes out. French Canadians

continue to show a greater respect for authority in government and thought, and still stress man's responsibilities rather than his freedoms. It is healthy, no doubt, for a country to have both sides stressed, and French Canada strengthens the Canadian nation to-day with its order and stability" (Careless, 71).

We conclude with this appeal launched by an English-language textbook:

Your Canada could be a haven of peace and an example of brotherhood to people of other lands. But if Canadian English and Canadian French cannot get along together in this beautiful and favoured land, if they cannot share it with other Canadians, what hope is there for all the crowded and mixed millions in less fortunate lands! Canadians have been given much and so they owe much. They owe aid to others and they owe an example of unity. This is their challenge and their destiny — YOUR CHALLENGE AND YOUR DESTINY (Ballantyne, II, 256).

We do not pretend that Canadian history is taught everywhere in the country exactly as it is in the fourteen textbooks we have examined. We are convinced, however, that these textbooks are thoroughly representative; they are the most widely distributed and they are written by the most prominent authors, who (alone or as part of a team) expound doctrines in keeping with the thinking and preoccupations of their particular milieux. These fourteen textbooks show therefore to what extent the content and interpretation of Canadian history differs across the country, and consequently what kind of education in history our future citizens receive. This has been the purpose of our study.

A. Objectives of the Textbook Authors

Comparing only the aims assigned to the teaching of Canadian history by these textbooks, two groups are distinguishable: one, consisting of the English-language books and the French work by Charles, considers that history is above all a field of study intended to give the future citizen a political and social education; the other, composed of French-language books, aims to inculcate a moral education. For the first group, history is a lesson in citizenship; for the second, it often turns out to be a catechism lesson or a grandiloquent sermon. There is, then, a marked difference between the two groups from the outset, and we begin to understand how impossible a reconciliation of their interpretations of the past may appear.

1. How the material is arranged

The period previous to 1663, the period of French colonization, receives very full treatment in the French-language textbooks; they refer to it as the "heroic period," and in some cases spend as much time on it as on the post-Confederation period. The English-language books barely give it a glance.

The next period, 1663-1760, New France's most important period as it seems to us, receives just about the same treatment in both English and French books, even though the latter devote more pages to it; the English books really do make a serious effort to convey a fair and balanced understanding of the history of New France in this period.

It is when we come to the periods of the British regime and Confederation that we begin to feel lost in the woods. Here the two groups do not even seem to be talking about the same country! The English-speaking authors do their best to give an overall history of Canada, while the French authors take less and less interest in regions other than Quebec. If the latter still talk about the Maritimes it is because of the Acadians; if they talk about the West it is mostly about the role played by French Canadians there; in short, they hardly talk about anything but the history of Quebec and its expansion beyond its borders.

2. *How the subject is presented*

When we compare the ways in which the historical material is presented, again we are in two different worlds.

Unexpectedly, this difference even emerges from the translation of the English-language book by Brown; the translator has not only toned down many of the author's statements, but in certain cases has even changed the thought, as though the book needed adaptation *ad usum Delphini*.*

A textbook's style (titles, sub-titles, choice of words, exclamations, illustrations) reveals clearly which camp its author belongs in. There is unquestionably an English tone and a French tone. The English tone is realistic and generally devoid of emotionalism, even though the authors occasionally give a sigh of relief to see their side win. The French tone often sounds like epic poetry, like heroic literature, or else like the indignant underdog howling his bitterness or thirst for vengeance (Filteau, the most representative of the French-Canadian mentality, goes furthest in this). Contrary to what was expected, it is at the secondary level, not the elementary, that the French-speaking authors surround the facts in an aura that makes for anything but a simple narrative of historical events; it is at this level that they most assiduously push the message they want to get across. The English-speaking authors certainly have their prejudices, but they never express them with such prolific verbiage or in the tub-thumping style that a number of French authors resort to.

B. *General Themes*

The broad-based themes that the textbooks are built around do just as much to reveal the extent to which the two worlds of thought differ.

In order to survive as a nation, Canada had first to contend with the Iroquois. Their attacks were motivated by hatred and a passion for destruction, explain the

*"For the use of the Dauphin," that is, for readers of delicate sensibility.

French-speaking authors; they were the result of commercial rivalry, write the English authors. Then New France fell before the English. According to the French-language textbooks, the colony had simply been pursuing its aim of peacefully civilizing the New World, and this had aroused "covetousness" in the English, while for the English-language books it was a matter of inevitable conflict between two commercial empires. Another threat to Canada's survival came with the two World Wars; a serious threat, according to the English-speaking authors; the French authors see nothing of the kind.

Canada has survived, but will its language groups survive? The English-language texts show no anxiety over this, either for their own group or for the French. The French-language books are continually anxious for their own group's survival, and this is the focal point of all their preoccupations. The survival of their group is repeatedly expressed in terms of resistance to a threat; as response to the challenge, they preach withdrawal into the collective shell and perpetuation of traditional structures, and they vigorously denounce any of their number who venture to offer a different, dynamic response; survival, they write, lies in "*la revanche des berceaux*" (the revenge of the cradle) and the return to pioneer life.

Indeed, pioneer life (or the "frontier" as it is also called) is yet another theme that accentuates the difference between French- and English-language textbooks. For the latter, this is a very important experience that has desirable effects on man; it develops his originality of culture, makes him realistic, gives him initiative, is a means of progress, makes an independent man of him, a better man than his Old World counterpart. The French-speaking authors, on the contrary, view the pioneer as a man who comes to the New World already formed, who enters his new environment without being changed by it; he does not submit to it, but dominates it at once. The French-language books maintain, moreover, that the spirit of adventure and individualism play only a small part in pioneer life; they denounce anything smacking of adventure and independence, which, they say, worked against rather than for the development of New France. And yet, since both English and French Canadians have had a long history of pioneer life, this is a theme which, properly developed, might lead them to a fuller acceptance and understanding of their common experience of the past.

Both English and French Canadians have had a long economic history, too, first separately and then together. This is another theme with potential for mutual understanding, but it has been used to no better advantage than pioneer life. For the English-language textbooks the economic theme is a constant and fundamental preoccupation. Capitalism as a doctrine is dear to their hearts: the door to individual initiative must be opened wide; merchants play a powerful and noble role in developing the country. The French-language books touch on economic history as something apart, an appendage, only because they cannot overlook it. For them, the ideal society is one which is self-sufficient, in a closed and strictly-controlled economy; they cherish the dream of an agricultural society where everyone, it seems, is virtuous and happy; merchants are despicable, grasping creatures, an evil influence; commercial enterprises are unfit for the grandiose and heroic work of colonization.

The fact is that in the French-language textbooks the constant and basic preoccupation is religion. The English-language books talk about religion too, but as

something which does not bear directly on history; or else, when they do regard it as important, as in the case of the Roman Catholic Church, it is because of the problem of Church-state relations or the social role of religion. For them, acts of faith are simply individual acts; they are not treated as a major historical theme, though they may be admired for their humanitarian value.

In the French-language books, religion appears on almost every page, if not explicitly then just below the surface. God's role through His intermediary, the Church (the Roman Catholic Church, of course), is demonstrated in every domain; God's role should enable French Canada to accomplish its "mission providentielle" (providential mission), peaceful conquest "par la croix et la charrue" (through the cross and the plough) and evangelization, for the missionary dream is infinitely nobler than the fur trade. This religious atmosphere pervades all the French-language textbooks, in varying degrees to be sure, but the Church is everywhere; the study of its role, in the nineteenth century for example, supplants the consideration of other very important matters. With Filteau in particular, the continual association of the adjectives "Catholic" and "French" recurs as if by obsession; given this identification of Catholicism and the French-speaking group, Protestantism is cast in the role of villain.

When we come to the ideals for living proposed by our textbooks, we know in advance what the French-language ones will advocate: courage, the hard and simple life of "nos pères" (our forefathers), unselfishness (also a characteristic of our forefathers), the spirit of sacrifice; the higher the level of schooling, the longer and more insistent the sermons. The English-language books recommend courage, too, but most of all individualism and the spirit of adventure, the very things so severely denounced by the French, and the higher the school level the less they sermonize.

Besides these individual qualities, what social qualities are recommended? All the textbooks advocate respect for established authority. To this the English-speaking authors add loyalty and the spirit of cooperation. The French authors, for their part, put the emphasis on the spirit of resistance toward the other group and above all on family virtues (absolute submission to the father, quasi-religious worship of the mother), all qualities which may come to flower only in an agricultural society, to which French Canadians must return.

It is the hero who incarnates the qualities advocated by the textbooks. The English Canadian authors indulge in some hero-worship, but they are sparing of adulation and their heroes remain human and individual. The French Canadian textbook hero, on the contrary, is a superman, a truly extraordinary being, whose role is always in direct relation to his entire group. Curiously enough, these heroes are anything but rare; they crop up at every turn in the history of French Canada. Really a very common phenomenon, this superman.

Finally, among the general themes, there is race. A "race" (meaning "ethnic group") so abounding in supermen is obviously a superior race: a French race, which, according to the French-language textbooks, was formed in Canada by immigrants all of the finest quality, a race which has kept itself pure, under the British regime and even to the present day. In the English-language books we may search in vain for a similar parading of English "purity."

C. Special Themes

In the course of our study we have also examined special themes to see how our textbooks describe certain historical figures, events and institutions that tend to be controversial. Here again, we find interpretations formed along two lines.

In general the French- and English-language textbooks study the same historical figures, but the minute any group rivalry is involved there are disagreements. In the view of the English-speaking authors, the discoverer of Canada was Cabot; it was Cartier, maintain the French. In the English-language books Iberville was an aggressor, while in the French, he was a defender. When they consider historical pairs (Baldwin-LaFontaine and Macdonald-Cartier), both English- and French-language books give the lion's share of attention to the representative of their own group. When the English Canadian authors neglect figures like Bishops Briand and Bourget, it is because they have little interest in religious history, or because they do not want to spend time on men whose impact was purely provincial; and when the French Canadian authors leave George Brown, Selkirk and Mackenzie King by the wayside it is because the national roles of these men appear to offer little of interest to the French group. A more astonishing observation is that Laurier, who was Prime Minister of Canada and is treated with a kind of veneration by the English-language books, is paid very little attention by the French-speaking authors; one has the impression that they do not regard him as one of their own.

Crises in our history also give rise to different interpretations. However, as we approach the present day these differences diminish, to the point, for example, where all the textbooks react similarly to the "quiet revolution" in Quebec, with both French- and English-speaking authors talking about conciliation and the preservation of traditional structures.

Further back in time the two sides drift far apart, and are in complete agreement only on the American invasions: "united we stand." The 1929 economic depression increased the dependence of the provinces on the central government; the only French-language textbook that talks about this is irritated by it, but the English books are happy with it. Conscription in 1917 was not necessary, the French-language books maintain; it was imperative, the English books reply. In the quarrel over the Manitoba separate schools the English-language books see a crisis of national scope that called the entire system of government into question; the French books study it only in relation to the individuals involved. In French Canadian judgment, Riel was a defendant who worked valiantly for his people and should have been given the benefit of extenuating circumstances; in English Canadian judgment, Riel was a rebel and a murderer. Dangerous Confederation, declare the French books; blessed Confederation, miraculous achievement, say the English books. Union, despite its faults, had useful consequences, assert the latter; the French Canadians triumphed over this "iniquitous" arrangement, we read in the French books. In the Durham Report the English-language books see a document that marked a great step forward in the history of Canada and the Commonwealth; the French-language books note above all that it glorified English nationality to the detriment of French Canadians. For the most part both French- and English-language textbooks err in seeing one and the same reform movement behind the revolts in Upper and Lower Canada, and

they attribute, broadly speaking, the same causes to both, but the French-language books part company with the English books over Lower Canada with their obvious sympathy for the Patriots, whom they regard as victims far more than assailants. According to the French-speaking authors, the conquest brought economic ruin to the French Canadians and no guarantee of their rights, even though its effects were mitigated by the loyalty of the new subjects and the moderation of the conquerors; in the view of the English-speaking authors, the rights of the French Canadians were perfectly safe with England, and it was England who found herself in a difficult position through over-generosity, for in assuring these rights she created long-lasting problems; it is in the long-term consequences for Canada that the English-speaking authors are most interested, moreover. Finally, the expulsion of the Acadians, regretted by both groups as a painful and inevitably cruel solution, is seen by the English-speaking authors as a measure necessitated by war, a measure for which the Acadians, by their conduct, were as much to blame as England; the French-speaking authors on the other hand, admit some fault on France's part and certain other circumstances, but maintain that the Acadians in no way deserved to be punished and driven out; they heap all the odium of this operation on Governor Lawrence, and apply themselves to a heart-rending description of it.

There are also differences over institutions. The English-language textbooks maintain that the institutions of New France stifled freedom, while those of the New England colonies left the colonists free to act on their own initiative; to which the French-language books reply that in the eighteenth century the land of liberty was not New England but New France. The English-speaking authors identify the seigneurial regime with mediaeval feudalism, while the French authors consider it an institution that placed heavy responsibilities on the seigneur and allowed him little return. An authoritarian and rigidly hierarchical society, the English books assert regarding New France; its social classes were hierarchical, admit the French books, but there was so little difference between the classes that the impression is not of a hierarchical class society, but of groups in juxtaposition. In the period of adaptation to English rule (the period of the Test oath ending with the Quebec Act), what interests the French authors most is not the search for a workable form of government but the attainment of guarantees of rights. What they have in mind are French Canadian rights, however; the rights of the minority do not concern them. For these authors, the Quebec Act, which the English were forced to grant, gave official recognition of French Canadian nationality; the English-speaking authors say only that the Quebec Act, the creation of a special form of government for the former French colony, was necessary for practical reasons.

The parliamentary government created in 1791, which all the textbooks declare was incomplete, satisfied the just demands of the Loyalists, write the English-speaking authors; it satisfied fugitives who demanded privileges and sowed confusion, declare the French authors. The latter rejoice, however, over the division of the country into two provinces, which they see as further recognition of French Canadian nationality, while the English-speaking authors consider it simply as a reorganization of the country dictated by practical imperatives.

According to the French authors' thesis, Confederation (within which the provinces have predominance over the central government), is a pact, a "*traité entre les races*"

(treaty between the races), and establishes a French state, giving official recognition for the third time to the French Canadian nationality. As opposed to this thesis, the English-speaking authors say: no, Confederation is not a pact, just an Act of the British Parliament that unites a number of provinces under a central government.

Finally, the French-language books declare that the Statute of Westminster was the culmination of a struggle by Canadians for self-government, whereas the English texts state that it was the climax of an evolution. And while the latter closely associate Canadian independence and union with the Commonwealth, the French-language books take great care to distinguish between the two; they deplore the fact that, since a clean break between Canada and England was never made, Canadian independence remains subject to an "insaisissable pression" (intangible pressure), a "subtile séduction" (subtle seduction) on the part of the former mother country.

D. Themes of Particular Interest to the Commission

In the final part of our study, we have considered themes of particular interest to the Commission: nationalism and relations between the two cultures.

What contributes to this nationalism as viewed by the two groups? One and the same physical environment, common obstacles overcome together, the pioneer life that was their common lot, the great economic adventure they have shared. These are things that should help to make them feel that they live in the bosom of a single nation. We might add our struggle for autonomy (political and cultural, vis-à-vis an opposing group or a neighbouring nation), but in the French-language textbooks, autonomy becomes a weapon in the hands of a province to be wielded against Canada as a whole; it tends to "confirmer le principe d'une nationalité canadienne-française" (confirm the principle of a French Canadian nationality). While the English-language books, seconded by one or two French ones, declare themselves for unreserved dedication to the nation as a whole rather than to provinces, there are some French books, and these are the most influential, that give priority to provincial loyalty over national. When they talk about "national" independence it is always "provincial" that they mean; their nationalism, unlike that of the English-language books, is not on the Canadian but the provincial scale; their Canada is still the Canada of the French regime, the St. Lawrence Valley.

This inward-looking nationalism excludes everything originating outside. French Canadians respect France for what she bequeathed them long ago, but since they no longer consider their image to be a reflection of hers, and since, the French books add, even in 1760 the French Canadians were already different from the French of France, they no longer count on anyone but themselves for the accomplishment of their "mission" in North America. As for England, the mother country of English Canadians, who pledge her unconditional loyalty and whose traditional celebrations move them so deeply (as we are given to understand by the English-language textbooks), French Canadians regard her as a foreign country if not their principal foe. And curiously, in the view of the French-speaking authors, the English wherever they may be, in England, the

United States or Canada, constitute a single monolithic mass, everywhere aggressive and domineering. Since they have rejected France, what could be more natural than their rejection of England, the United States and English Canada?

Such conditions are not likely to facilitate relations between the two Canadian cultures. But first of all, what do our textbooks mean by "culture"? The English-speaking authors do not define it, or do so very vaguely, while the French authors define one culture by contrast with the other, which leads them straight to value judgments. But the two cultures do exist, and the textbooks must therefore broach the question of their relations. In the case of new Canadian cultures, the English-speaking authors propose that they be assimilated by the English culture, but in such a way that each may preserve its original characteristics. When they come to the French Canadian culture, however, these same authors recognize that there is no longer any hope of assimilating it, and they propose cooperation on a broad scale. This is also the solution proposed by the French authors, even though they remain on their guard. For both French- and English-speaking authors, cultural duality is still what ensures Canada's identity as a nation in North America, as distinct from her neighbour, the United States.

E. The Lamentable Quality of the French Textbooks

Since it is not within our province to write a critique of the textbooks under study, we have abstained from correcting errors found in them. Nevertheless, before we conclude this work, we cannot refrain from observing that, taken as a whole, the French-language textbooks are very inferior to the English.

True enough, the English authors are not beyond reproach. At times they lack impartiality; their estimation of French institutions is far too much influenced by the modern concept of democratic freedom; on the basis of too legalistic an interpretation, they are very complacent indeed about the rights of French Canadians; they put too much emphasis on the history of England and seem to be obsessed with the cult of allegiance to the Crown; one of them openly espouses the cause of Protestantism against Catholicism; they give disproportionate space to political events; sometimes they neglect French Canadians who have played vital roles in Canada's evolution; a number of them close their eyes to the human conflict dividing Canada, and display an enthusiasm for Confederation that, in some respects, verges on childishness, and that, in any case, smacks heavily of national propaganda. However, such weaknesses are the exception rather than the rule in these books. Given the susceptibility of history textbooks to this kind of thing and the considerable difficulties to be faced, it is in fact surprising that they are not more frequent. Moreover, and this is an excellent corrective, in English-language teaching institutions a history textbook is rarely used in an exclusive way; it is always there, not to be learned word for word, but to provide material for seminar-type discussion.

The situation is very different in the case of the French-language books. At the time of our inquiry, the common practice was to use only a single textbook in class, and particularly in examinations under the jurisdiction of the Quebec Department of

Education, it was to the student's advantage to adhere faithfully to his textbook when answering examination questions.

The French-language textbooks, with the exception of the Charles work (prepared for French-speaking minorities and much less "committed" than the Quebec books), rarely measure up to present-day historical standards. Their most frequent tone is a sermonizing one; a history lesson often sounds like a catechism lesson. History is used for religious propaganda. The fundamental explanation of events is always found in Providence; the vocation of French Canadians is a Catholic vocation; all the Church's doings (the Roman Catholic Church, it goes without saying) are servilely approved; when Protestantism is spoken of one might be attending a lecture on apologetics; liberalism is condemned in all its forms. History is also used for patriotic propaganda. These textbooks overlook economic life, expressing disdain for merchants and admiration only for missionaries or heroes regarded as supermen, and preach the superiority of the French "race" in an ambiguous way that invites the charge of racism; they are motivated by a provincial nationalism that limits their scope of information to the province and ignores the fact that there might be something of value beyond its borders; they deign to consider matters of national consequence only to the extent that they affect the particular interests of French Canadians; they constantly talk of the coexistence of the language groups in terms of battle using a vocabulary borrowed from the military arts. One needs only to glance through the books by Filteau, the most widely distributed and most influential of the French-speaking authors, to realize the excess to which these faults have been carried.

There are several reasons for this woeful situation. While the English-language books are the product of teamwork, the French books have only one author, or sometimes two. But whether an author works as part of a team or alone, the important thing is that he should be trained for it. Looking at the list of English authors, we note that they, or at least the team leaders, have university training in history and are even in some cases seasoned historians. We may search in vain for the equivalent among the French authors. Not one of those whose works we have studied is a professional historian and not one has had a university education in history. They have undertaken the writing of a textbook because they have been told to (which happens frequently in religious communities engaged in the book business) or because they have taken a fancy to the idea; no self-education, either, that might at least have taught them something about shades of opinion, doubt, or calm appraisal. These authors have been exposed only to an atmosphere of superheated provincial nationalism and have been inculcated with the conviction that history should serve what they call "la cause nationale" (the national cause), and so they have made their textbooks vehicles of a French and Catholic apologia. When we consider that today's French-speaking youth has received its historical education from these books, we can hardly wonder at the great vogue for the separatist movement among young people.

F. A Textbook by a Team of French- and English-speaking Historians

How might this situation be rectified? First, professional historians would have to be persuaded to take more interest in school textbooks, and to make up a team to write a

textbook conforming as closely as possible to recognized historical standards. If a French team and an English team work separately, however, we may find ourselves again with the history of two different countries: French Canada, meaning the province of Quebec plus some segments of the French *diaspora*, and English Canada, which is to say the rest of Canada across the continent.

There would therefore need to be a single team of both English- and French-speaking historians to write a single textbook. In this book there would first be an important section on the history of New France; this would be written by a French-speaking historian and would recount French colonization on North American soil, the problems that had to be faced, the way the colonization developed, life in New France, and then, in the culmination of rivalry with the English, its collapse. This first period in the history of our country is of great importance to French Canadians (since it was very largely then that the group originated), but it should be just as important for the young Canadians of Manitoba or British Columbia; all Canadians, French-speaking or English-speaking, should benefit equally from knowing how Europeans adapted to North America in Canada's early centuries, how they evolved and, after 1760, how all, English, French and others, found themselves caught up in the same great adventure.

This foundation having been laid, the text to follow might be divided according to regions; these might be the Atlantic provinces, Quebec, Upper Canada or Ontario, the Prairies, British Columbia; in each case the history of the region would be recounted up to the time of Confederation. This method would make it possible really to do justice to each of the country's great regions, and—since we are conscious of the likelihood of French Canadian opposition to a single textbook of this kind—Quebec in particular would receive full treatment.

A third and final section, from Confederation to the present day, would study overall problems across the continent and the problems particular to each region. This section would also study the contribution of the country's two major cultures, the English and the French, and of the less important cultures too.

The writers of this book should remain aloof from the spirit that has been ridiculed as “*bon-ententisme*” (promotion of brotherly love), since a history textbook should no more serve this kind of nationalism than any other. History is a discipline of the mind; it should accustom the student to scientific objectivity and balanced judgment, and can have educational value without preaching or propagandizing.

It is persistently maintained in certain circles that it is impossible to write a Canadian history of equal validity for our two main language groups. This amounts to saying that history should serve the particular ends of each of them. But history's prime function is to convey an understanding of society as it was in the past, and, more specifically in this case, to acquaint both French and English Canadians with the adventure they have shared on North American soil. In any history textbook we can expect to find both factual information about events and institutions and interpretations placed on them. In the writing of a common textbook for all groups, well-trained historians whose sole aim is to discern and state the truth can certainly succeed in establishing the essential facts. Interpretation is more difficult, and this is the stumbling-block indicated by those who will not admit the possibility of a common textbook. It would of course be a delusion to

look for a single interpretation; such a thing would be impossible even among historians of one language group. But since the purpose of history, as we propose it, is not to impose one interpretation rather than another, it would be perfectly easy—and it has already been done in the *Dictionary of Canadian Biography**, a joint work by English- and French-speaking historians—to set forth not one but the several interpretations arising from particular events or institutions. This practice would not only conform with historical standards and sound pedagogical principles (by teaching the student to appreciate shades of opinion and modesty in assertion), but would also set forth for each group the points of view of the other. In this way French Canadians and English Canadians would be led to a more objective view of the adventure they have shared, and to better mutual understanding. The teaching of history hitherto has been far from this; more often than not it has only tended to set one group against the other. If Canada is more than ever before threatened with schism, we believe we must look for the cause very largely in the manner in which today's citizens have learned the history of their country.

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The English translation of material quoted in French in the body of the text is provided in these Notes.

Part 1, Chapter 1

1. All that remains is to *review the scene*, to reflect on the present situation and to guess at what the future may hold. History rich with the past throws light upon the problems of today and should point the way for action. Ours, brimming with great accomplishments, fills us with pride and optimism (Plante, 351).

2. It is here that our memories of the past are preserved, here where the deeds of our forefathers, their principles, hopes, fears and sorrows are recounted and extolled. Here the present generation will find the inspiration to give purpose to its acts of patriotism (Plante, 409).

3. . . . has no other aim than to give you a magnificent *overall view* of our history so that you will love our country, God who has created it, and the men who transformed it (Laviolette, 3).

4. Stay in the land that gave you birth,
Keep for its struggles your burning passions,
Keep for its needs your utmost strength,
For the blessed beauty of this land, keep all your love!
(quoted by Laviolette, 322).

5. To mould men who shall be both convinced Canadians and convinced Catholics; this is the ultimate aim in teaching the history of our nation (FEC, 5).

6. . . . the story of our past is a continuous succession of examples of patient effort, unyielding courage and passionate determination on the part of incomparable explorers, pioneers, colonists, sailors, soldiers, bishops, missionaries and matriarchs (FEC, 304).

7. MOTIVATION, which is of course of foremost importance, is not always easy to instil. A history book can contribute to it by providing examples of the vigour and tenacity demonstrated by colonists, missionaries and statesmen. These heroes saw noble goals before them and pursued these goals in spite of everything, not fainting nor failing, undeterred by the opinions of others, fearless of suffering and of death itself. Such examples should inspire children to apply themselves dutifully and with similar fortitude to their studies, particularly if their teachers draw as many comparisons as possible from their history textbook (FEC, 4f.).

8. . . . will then become a wonderful adventure that will acquaint you with great men, heroes and saints, many of whom provide examples of courage, patriotism, and the noblest of natural and supernatural virtues at work (Filteau, *Hér.*, 8).

9. We need not reflect for long on the course of our history to be convinced that we have a role to play in the world, even a vocation to pursue (Filteau, *Civ.*, 469).

10. The surest way of meeting the projection of divine will is to be oneself and to develop oneself, with God's help, through one's own inner resources (quoted in Filteau, *Civ.*, 469).

Part 1, Chapter III

1. France had a particular *interest* in the immense Hudson Bay territory It was known that England was carrying on a brisk *trade* there. But France *could not tolerate* this state of affairs in a region which *belonged to her* (Charles, 95).

2. But France claimed the territories of the North as her own and *could not endure indefinitely* what she considered an *encroachment* on her domain. In 1686, the governor instructed the Chevalier de Troyes to drive *the intruders* from their trading posts (FEC, 84).

3. 1759, the year of *doom*. The English *relentlessly pursued their prey* The heroism of the French could not contain the fearsome *onslaught* The enemy *closed his talons* on the St. Lawrence The Isle of Orleans, Côte de Beaupré, Baie St. Paul, and then a 60-mile stretch of the south shore *burned* with flames kindled by the enemy in his *merciless rage* If this perilous assault had failed it would have been called a reckless gamble, but since it succeeded it was considered a masterstroke, and rightly so. Moreover, all the attendant circumstances favoured this *desperate* endeavour (Plante, 163ff.).

4. Thanks to this act of *unprecedented audacity*, the English army had succeeded in gaining the Plains of Abraham *Exhausted* by five years of *nervous strain*, the French officers *lost control of themselves*, and their *headlong flight* turned what might have been *disaster* for the English army into a decisive defeat for France (Filteau, *Civ.*, 137).

5. In the midst of the anxiety that followed the capitulation of Montreal, the French Canadians kept alive a *secret hope* of soon finding themselves again under French rule. *Alas*, the country was one of the victims of the Seven Years' War! News from France, so *eagerly* awaited, arrived with the first ships in the spring of 1763. *Sadly*, all through the St. Lawrence Valley, the message was passed by word of mouth: "Canada is now an English colony." *Gone was all hope* of living again under French rule (FEC, 151).

6. And our old flag, drenched in *bitter tears*,
Folded its white sail and returned across the sea.

Part 2, Chapter I

1. Hatred roused the Iroquois against the French settlements, for the French were allied with the Hurons, their ancestral enemy. There was vengeance, too: the Iroquois had not forgotten the panic spread among them by Champlain's muskets. And then there was greed: the French drew off a considerable proportion of the furs, and the Iroquois might have obtained greater benefit from trading those furs themselves to the Dutch or English posts (Plante, 37).

2. French expansion proved to be Pandora's box, and out of it came war. The project was grandiose, even logical. . . . What was lacking, basically, was greater generosity in men and money on the part of the mother country. Those who were really responsible for the failure lived at Versailles (Plante, 82).

3. In those days France and England were often at war. The two countries differed greatly in language, religion and customs. That there should be war between their colonies too is not in the least surprising (Charles, 88).

4. Canada's participation in this conflict was a corollary of the declaration of war between England and Germany. On September 10, 1939 our country, of its own free choice, took sides with England (Plante, 385).

5. More distressing, more intolerable, were the clauses that did away with French laws . . . In Lower Canada, in particular, the oligarchy, far from applying a policy of association, brutally pursued one of subjection, ostracism and assimilation . . . The French Canadians were completely demoralized. The bloody events of 1837 and the atrocious Durham Report were followed by the iniquitous Act of Union [which] was intended to be the tomb of our nation . . . For the Lieutenant-Governor, R. Shore Milnes, the time had come to put an end to French Catholic schools. The Royal Institution act, cooked up by the bureaucracy, created a kind of Anglo-Protestant-dominated commission . . . In any event, financial tutelage not only meant the loss of legislative and administrative autonomy for Quebec, but furthermore gravely endangered its institutions, its faith, its language and its culture (Plante, 180, 233, 257, 280 and 401).

6. Our people were henceforth faced with domination by another nation, powerful, a long-time enemy and strongly anti-Catholic, whose commercial policies could hardly be expected to encourage a [French] Canadian revival. Their opposing ideas, sentiments and interests were to place our survival in a position of extreme peril . . . Resistance to assimilation has been the toughest struggle in our history; the most exhausting too, since it goes on and on. Even in the calmest periods, the Anglo-Saxon environment surrounding us exerts continual pressure on us, and forces us to be vigilant at every moment (Filteau, *Civ.*, 135 and 227).

7. A new and tragically permanent situation abruptly severed all the arteries through which the lifeblood [of France] had flowed to them. Cut off, isolated, deprived of all communication with the mother country, since in defeat she had been forced to abandon them, they now had only their own strength, or one might better say their pitiful weakness, to sustain them under the yoke of their age-old enemy, completely and irrevocably the conqueror (quoted by Filteau, *Civ.*, 141).

8. Immediately after the conquest, it seemed that our forefathers could choose between assimilating with the conquerors or turning to irredentism or all-out resistance, taking every opportunity to shake free of English domination and return to the bosom of their old mother country (Filteau, *Civ.*, 186).

9. The French Canadians found their response to the challenge before them in their spirit of loyalty to the civil authorities and of allegiance to their religious faith: honest cooperation with the new authorities, adaptation on points of little or no importance, peaceful and lawful struggle, but no concessions over [English] compliance with the terms of capitulation or the [French] attempt to obtain certain liberties, as yet not guaranteed but considered basic and essential (Filteau, *Civ.*, 187).

10. Meanwhile, the [French] Canadians *closed ranks* around their parish priests and their seigneurs, under the watchful but sympathetic eye of the British military authorities (FEC, 151).

11. After 1760, the seigneurs, shorn of all political influence and ruined financially, felt incapable of organizing the struggle. But the *parish* as an institution *remained intact* and, within this *bastion* closed to the new masters, the losers *closed ranks* around their parish priests and *triumphantly resisted* assimilation. The victors, had there been no social structure centred on the parishes, would have created one themselves, designed to serve their own ends (Plante, 89).

12. The family and the parish provided the social framework and backbone of our people, and gave them such impetus and such power that this structure has come to be our *impregnable bastion* . . . the line of church steeples along the shores of our great river, an invulnerable *line of resistance* . . . Each parish became a *fortress* standing ready for *battle* and for *victory*. Each steeple was a *rallying point* for the ample forces of our race; each active and farsighted parish priest became the *commandant* of a citadel. And our parishes together were transformed into *lines of battle*, the *invincible ramparts* of our fundamental liberties throughout the length and breadth of our homeland (Filteau, *Civ.*, 80; the last three sentences are taken from a text by Mgr Camille Roy).

13. *Colonists of mettle*. These colonists, of working-class or peasant stock for the most part, reflected the qualities of their environment [the environment they had come from]. Strong of arm, but above all strong of heart . . . They may have been poor and uneducated, but they could be justly proud of a far superior kind of wealth - their untarnished past and honourable conduct (Plante, 36).

14. Missionary motivation, by its very nobility, was a quality to be found only in the cream of the people . . . This very difficulty necessitated a choice from among the very best . . . [The Normans] also brought with them their customs, their traditions, their songs and language, and their own

particular virtues and failings: strong religious convictions, industriousness, the sense of personal possession which gave rise to a spirit of independence and pronounced individualism (Filteau, *Civ.*, 23, 28).

15. French ancestry had bequeathed a number of characteristics to its Canadian offspring: courage, courtesy, warmheartedness, an enterprising nature, a sense of hospitality, independence. And life in Canada accentuated his love of freedom and the great unknown (FEC, 98).

16. The precautions taken in recruiting colonists did not, however, prevent the arrival in Canada of a number of undesirables. On some of these, the atmosphere in the country had a salutary effect and they settled down to an orderly life. The recalcitrants were either compelled to return to France or else they disappeared from the scene by integrating with the Indians (Filteau, *Civ.*, 27).

17. In the relationship between the elected Assembly and the British crown representative, the reasons for unrest were the same in Upper Canada as in Lower Canada (FEC, 195).

18. Each drop of their blood has sown a seed whose fruit has been maturing throughout our history. The grace earned by the missionaries knows neither time nor space; the historian must bear witness to its existence (Plante, 41).

19. If Canada was able to develop in spite of opposition from the traders, it was no doubt because of the special protection of Providence, and also because of the prayers and sacrifices of the pioneers and the heroic lives they led (FEC, 48).

20. Providence, having already brought together Messieurs de la Dauversière and Olier, now also sent a much-needed leader in the person of Paul de Chomedey, Sieur de Maisonneuve (Laviolette, 33).

21. The recluse, Jeanne le Ber, breathed courage into the hearts of the people, saying, "We should fear nothing: the most holy Virgin will watch over this country, for she is its guardian."

In her most careful hand, Jeanne wrote on the Ville Marie standard to be carried by a soldier ahead of the battalion, "Our enemies put their trust in their arms, but we put ours in the Queen of the Angels, whom we call to our aid. She is as fearsome as an army drawn up in battle array: with her protection we hope to vanquish our enemies."

One night when Walker's fleet was only 500 miles from Quebec, the wind struck it suddenly with such violence that twenty ships crashed with frightful noise onto the rocks off Île aux Oeufs: . . . Walker's fleet was lost with all hands! (Laviolette, 100 ff.).

22. "One great fact stands out conspicuous in Canadian history—the Church of Rome. More even than the royal power, she shaped the character and the destinies of the colony. She was its nurse and almost its mother." This appraisal by the historian Parkman is a valid one, even for the beginnings of the colony (Plante, 38).

23. The modest and indispensable chapel, without which no attempt at colonization could succeed and bear fruit (Filteau, *Civ.*, 79).

24. [Monseigneur de Laval] had from time to time to take a firm stand. Thus it was that he came to grips with the Governor himself when the latter gave permission for the sale of alcohol to the Indians. In carrying out his duty, he hesitated at nothing: the spiritual well-being of his flock was far more important to him than the financial or political interests of merchants and administrators (FEC, 54).

25. During the occupation of the country, from 1629 to 1632, the English merchants had introduced the practice of bartering alcoholic spirits for furs. French traders maintained and even increased this infamous commerce. D'Avaugour, Talon and Frontenac maintained that it was impossible to impose an absolute ban on such trade: that it was essential to the colony's commerce . . . and essential to the progress of colonization . . . To such motives or pretexts, the Bishop replied: Was the salvation of souls to be sacrificed, were natural and divine laws to be violated, for the advantage of material gain, even though it be legitimate? . . . Trading in furs could be done without liquor. Had not the English themselves suggested that the French should ban the sale of intoxicants, and had they not even prohibited such trade themselves? Far from having a beneficial effect on the colony's progress, the alcohol trade decimated the ranks of colonists engaged in clearing the land, diminished the birth-rate and corrupted public morals. But how could reason compete with the lure of gain? (Plante, 86 ff.).

26. When our forefathers affixed a cross to a cabin it became a chapel; thus they took possession of the land. Of course they traded in furs, for they had to earn a little money to provide for their

households. But their greatest ambition was to work side by side with their priests, bearers of the gospel and planters of the cross (Laviolette, 321).

27. The sole instinct of these merchants was greed for gain, their sole purpose commercial exploitation . . . Champlain, on the contrary, dreamed of "giving root to a New France" in America, of "bringing the lilies of France to flower" in Canada. In his eyes, the salvation of a soul was worth more than the conquest of an empire. How could such conflicting attitudes be reconciled in order to achieve unity of action? (Plante, 21).

28. To the task of colonization the coureurs de bois contributed nothing. Their energy was wasted. Too many young men threw themselves into the fur trade instead of clearing more land for cultivation. Spellbound by the call of adventure, they would let go the bird in the hand to chase after the two in the bush, sacrificing the chance of a fruitful life on the land for easy but fleeting riches (Plante, 82).

29. It was Charlemagne who created the political system of the middle ages. This system united the peoples of all nations in one great family working hand in hand with the Church, under the guidance of the Pope, the Vicar of Christ, who exercised authority over peoples and kings alike. Rome was the centre of this society, and the Holy See was the supreme tribunal for the arbitration of disputes . . . Our ancestors brought with them to this country the heritage of the Old World's Christian civilization whose benefits we still enjoy today (Filteau, *Hér.*, 163, 421).

30. Monseigneur de Laval also waged a struggle against the governors to maintain his rank on the Council. All of which amounted only to futile bickering over precedence and protocol . . . In safeguarding his independence vis-à-vis the civil powers, the prelate was also defending the higher rights and interests of the people (Plante, 87).

31. Monseigneur de Laval also skilfully contrived to undo the attempts of the civil authorities to restrict his authority . . . Thus he was able to protect his Church from the machinations of gallicanism [the movement for independence of the French Church from the authority of Rome] (Filteau, *Civ.*, 46).

32. Caesarism, the exercise of royal supremacy in religious matters as stipulated in the Treaty of Paris, was only an extension of gallicanism. . . . From the very beginning of the British regime, the governors sought to interfere in the details of religious administration . . . Monseigneur Briand stood firm . . . Subsequently the attacks were renewed time and again. Our bishops, though they were accommodating enough on other points, categorically resisted such interference (Filteau, *Civ.*, 203 ff.).

33. The Jesuits' prestige in the colony has been called theocratic. Wrongly so, for the Jesuits were never the political masters of New France. Let us say rather that they were influential, and let us take note that their influence was salutary. Three types of men made this period of French settlement in America what it was: the merchant, the gentleman and the missionary. The most selfless, the most far-seeing, was the missionary (Plante, 39).

34. *Control of the mind.* London realized the importance of controlling education in order to achieve its aim of assimilation. In the instructions to Murray we read: To the end that the Church of England may be established . . . we declare that all possible encouragement should be given to the construction of Protestant schools (Plante, 183, 187).

35. In a moment of distraction, the Assembly adopted this bill [of 1801]. Then, at the urging of the clergy, it tried to repair its mistake . . . The beginning of Union was marked by renewed attempts at assimilation through the schools; once again, the danger was dissipated by the vigilance of the clergy (Plante, 280).

36. Also, those students who go on to higher studies at foreign universities often return to this country with strange accents [presumably continental French?] and attitudes of rootless people, perhaps even outright disdain for their own culture (Plante, 399).

37. The [French] Canadian Church, without a bishop from 1760 to 1766, passed through a difficult period: the number of priests diminished suddenly, the men's religious communities had no recognition and were no longer permitted to take in new members, the desertion of two of their number brought consternation to the people, and mixed marriages increased from the autumn of 1759. Finally, religious unity was destroyed and the perniciously erroneous teachings of French philosophers were the vogue in certain circles (Plante, 185).

38. The clergy had not long delayed before embracing the cause of the Patriots. Monseigneur Plessis declared his admiration for Papineau and his moral support . . . Papineau showed subsequently that his patriotism was not pure and untainted, for into it he brought false doctrines and violent passions. The clergy's enthusiasm for him at first cooled gradually and then turned to open hostility, for a number of reasons, but notably because of the Parish Council Bill, which he pushed through the Assembly in 1832 (Plante, 243).

39. There was ill-feeling between the different classes of our society, even between certain citizens and the clergy. The introduction of dangerous or irreligious books undermined the faith of the weak. Many Christians no longer partook of the sacraments. Besides, since the coming of the Loyalists, there was considerable Protestant propaganda (FEC, 211).

40. The elite, festering with advanced liberal ideas, were even sicker than the people . . . The bishops had already censured misdeeds and denounced misconceptions. They had shown firmness towards the Patriots, who were all too easily swayed by these venomous theories. But, insidiously, the evil spread (Plante, 276).

41. Principles, in their turn, suffered an onslaught of a much subtler and more dangerous kind, with the foundation of the library at Quebec, under Haldimand. In this library were assembled the works of the most pernicious French philosophers, all of whom were bent on undermining religious authority. A number of Canadians fell into this trap and drank from these poisonous springs. The evil spread its ravages beneath the surface at first, then broke out into the open about 1830, mounting to a violent crisis of anticlericalism whose effects we have had occasion to observe (Filteau, *Civ.*, 205, 228, 277).

42. May [French] Canadians be true to themselves; may they not yield to the seductive glamour of social and political novelty! They are not strong enough for such indulgence . . . A century later, this watchword is still in tune with the times (*Civ.*, 482).

43. It is not a race of supermen that we must mould, but Roman Catholic Canadians who love their country and their faith. In order to help teachers attain this goal, the authors offer a text designed to awaken A SENSE OF HONOUR, A SENSE OF NATIONAL IDENTITY AND A SENSE OF CHRISTIANITY. They have thought it necessary to give a broad interpretation to these terms, without doubt the fairest interpretation under the circumstances . . . Christianity is worldwide and is composed of charity; it suffers neither disdain for native customs nor narrow bigotry. The relations between our own people and those who are English-speaking offer an ideal vehicle for education along these lines. This textbook does not hide historic examples of conflict, but recounts them without bitterness or ill-feeling, in an atmosphere of realistic and Christian understanding (FEC, 4).

44. [After the great schism] doubt had crept into the minds of many, and in many more had sown the seeds of indifference and rebellion. Sinful tendencies had begun to aggravate this troubled situation, in particular the spirit of indiscipline . . . The Protestant revolutionaries claimed to be reforming the Church and restoring it to its original purity. This reform was simply a revolution in the doctrine, form of worship and discipline of Catholicism . . . It is a dangerous thing to accustom the masses to questioning what ought to be unquestionable, and to casting doubt on the legitimacy of their leaders. The habit of criticism and the spirit of indiscipline persisted even after the unity of the Church was restored (Filteau, *Hér.*, 353 and 380).

45. In 1528 they [the Huguenots] carried their audacity to the point of mutilating and desecrating a statue of the virgin standing in a Paris street, and at the same time they plastered the city with blasphemous posters attacking the [Catholic] mass. The people of Paris turned to fury and demanded an exemplary punishment. To satisfy them, Francis I was obliged to condemn the perpetrators of sacrilegious acts to the usual penalty: the stake . . . Calvin and his disciples, having taken refuge in Geneva and thirsting for vengeance, inundated France with their writings and their preachers . . . Defiance or jealousy led a number of prominent personages to go over to the Protestant party . . . The Queen-Regent showed tolerance toward the Huguenots, and they took advantage of it to propagate their fallacious teachings. Soon their increasing audacity began to exasperate the Catholics (Filteau, *Hér.*, 407).

46. She presided at its birth, she sustained it through its infancy, she provided its education . . . Having brought together the various elements of our race and moulded its soul, the Church has been

its watchful and faithful guardian, checking evil practices as soon as they appeared, and banishing the elements of disorder. The Canadians of yesteryear were wise in gratefully recognizing their debt to the Church. At all times they demonstrated their unfailing loyalty. Nothing, moreover, could shake their confidence in her, nor lessen their devotion (Filteau, *Civ.*, 67).

47. Now that we have come of age, we could not, unless bereft of our reason, allow the bonds that tie us to her to be broken or even weakened. We could not without being untrue to ourselves, be untrue to the Church. What more can I say? (Filteau, *Civ.*, 461).

48. Most essential goods had of necessity to be imported from the mother country, and the colonists had little money to pay for them. Talon set out to free the country forthwith from this ruinous dependence (Filteau, *Civ.*, 43).

49. In encouraging the habitant to supplement his farming with family crafts so that his household might produce the widest possible variety of articles for its own use, Talon contributed greatly to the economic independence of the individual . . . By selling as much as he could and buying as little as possible, the habitant achieved a more comfortable life (Filteau, *Civ.*, 93).

50. This policy had very beneficial consequences; it was at the root of rural prosperity and was one of the principal factors in our survival (Filteau, *Civ.*, 44).

51. France left the 10,000 colonists she had sent to Canada to their own devices, and let them scatter to the far corners of the continent in search of furs (Plante, 166).

52. This policy was to stunt the development of Canadian industry for nearly a century. Consideration was even given at one point to restricting cottage industry and prohibiting weaving, the craft of our grandmothers (Filteau, *Civ.*, 175).

53. Sixteen partners (or merchants), all English or Scottish, supplied the capital. Agents and voyageurs, almost all French Canadians, worked for them, forming a picturesque hierarchy (Plante, 205).

54. Thus, although we need not accuse the conquerors of ill will, by force of circumstance our people found themselves practically excluded from commerce (Filteau, *Civ.*, 160).

55. The principal concern [of the authors of this textbook] has been to prepare a truly formative work. Everyone agrees, in theory, that character is built at home far more than at school, but since the latter offers tangible results that can be shown on report cards, formal education too often takes too much of the limelight from the broader, all-round aspect of learning. It is this temptation that the authors hope to have countered (FEC, 4).

56. This man of noble spirit succumbed to the intoxicating influence of splendour and pageantry. The Prime Minister proclaimed his loyalty [to the crown] and pledged his country to the machinery of common defence for the Empire (Plante, 342, 398).

57. Spellbound by the call of adventure, the *coureurs de bois* would let go the bird in the hand to chase after the two in the bush, sacrificing the chance of a fruitful life on the land for easy but fleeting riches (Plante, 82).

58. As his own master, he thought himself to be the most fortunate of men . . . The *coureur de bois* earned a tidy sum from the sale of his products. He used it to dress like the country's noblemen. He appeared on social occasions decked out in silken hose, velvet breeches, embroidered shirt and plumed hat. He wore a sword and affected the airs of a gentleman. He despised the townfolk, those stay-at-homes who had not roamed the *Pays d'en Haut* (back country) as he had done! . . . With his money squandered, the *coureur de bois* had only one desire: to take off once more in search of high adventure (FEC, 108 ff.).

59. The *coureurs de bois*, professional vagabonds at odds with civilized life . . . The progress of families and even of the nation was hobbled and held back by the lives these men led, homeless and self-destructive lives, particularly from the moral point of view (Filteau, *Civ.*, 97).

60. Of course they traded in furs, for they had to earn a little money to provide for their households (Laviolette, 321).

61. Denied the public offices they had held during the French regime, and having lost their vocation on the land and their appetite for daily work, they lived off the labours of the colonists or curried favour with the conquerors by delivering up their sons and daughters to them. They would never more be the leaders of the nation (Plante, 201).

62. Étienne Parent, himself momentarily overcome with exhaustion, rallied to launch this watchword in *Le Canadien*: "A people must never give up." Despite all appearances, victory was much closer than it seemed (Filteau, *Civ.*, 245).

63. History can contribute [to moral strength] by providing examples of the vigour and tenacity demonstrated by colonists, missionaries and statesmen. These heroes saw before them noble goals which they pursued in spite of everything, not fainting nor failing, undeterred by the opinions of others, fearless of suffering and of death itself. Such examples should inspire the young to apply themselves dutifully and with similar fortitude to their studies, particularly if their teachers draw as many comparisons as possible from their history book (FEC, 4).

64. What is more important than committing a text to memory is an awareness of the essential ingredient of our history: the purity and nobility of our ancestry (Laviolette, 4).

65. . . . volunteers on contract, aging soldiers, poachers, the riff-raff of the salt trade, criminals, young libertines, English deserters and a few blacks . . . (Plante, 127).

66. As early as 1680, the general characteristics of the Canadian people were becoming apparent. The sharp drop in immigration allowed them to consolidate without being seriously affected by newcomers. Henceforth, the Canadian population was to develop far more through its birth-rate than through immigration. It was not until after 1730, moreover, that immigration again became fairly heavy, but not sufficiently so to modify the original basic composition of the population (Filteau, *Civ.*, 34).

67. The races composing the population of Canada were the French and the English. And it is because we of French origin did not wish our race to fuse with the other that we can still call ourselves "French Canadians" (Filteau, *Civ.*, 457).

68. . . . the founders of Canada harboured a generous illusion with regard to the Indians; they believed it possible to assimilate them and even raise them to a condition of complete equality The Indians were not the least interested in availing themselves of these advantages, and stubbornly resisted the civilized life There thus resulted neither fusion nor cross-breeding, but simply friendly relations between the two races (Filteau, *Civ.*, 19).

Part 2, Chapter II

1. What a magnificent work of colonization and evangelism might France accomplish on the shores of the St. Lawrence! He [Cartier] dreamed of peaceful conquest through the cross and the plough, entirely to the honor of his country What marvellous faith there was in this man! His crosses, the Gospel he preached, his masses, his prayers to Mary, left us an immortal memory and paved the way for the propagation of the true religion in our country (FEC, 15).

2. This deployment of energy, however admirable, did not yield immediate fruit of any importance. . . . The importance of Champlain's work lies not in the extent of immediate results, but in the far-reaching effects in later years and in the sum-total of his sacrifices. Unaided by the mother country, undaunted by relentless opposition from the merchants and undeterred by warfare with the English, he pursued to the very end and with minimal results, his lofty and selfless ideal: planting French civilization in America (Plante, 28 ff.).

3. His presence on the Sovereign Council and his active participation in its deliberations established the close alliance between civil and religious authority in our society that has generally prevailed in all matters of common jurisdiction. This collaboration has done much to assure internal peace and has spared our people from disastrous dabbling in certain modern ideologies He also skilfully contrived to undo the attempts of the civil authorities to restrict his own authority (Filteau, *Civ.*, 47).

4. In basing the [French] Canadian Church on parish, school and family life, Mgr de Laval made the survival of French Canadians possible Mgr de Laval laid the foundations of the three pillars that have upheld the whole structure of the French Canadian nation for nearly three centuries. "We owe to this master-builder," writes Abbé Groulx, "the control of Catholicism over our national life, the framework of steel on which our young race is happy to rely" (Plante, 89 ff.).

5. Friction between the Canadians and the French became more and more acute and degenerated sometimes into bitter rivalry The conflict reached its height during the Seven Years' War, with a Canadian governor pitted against a French intendant and a French military command As the representative of the King of France but at the same time a Canadian born and bred, Vaudreuil was faced with making a choice in this difficult situation. In his correspondence with the Court, he tried to make a distinction between the demands on "his zeal for the king's service and his attachment to his homeland."

Homeland! Vaudreuil was probably one of the first Canadians to crystallize Canadian patriotism and to use the word *patrie* when referring to his country (Filteau, *Civ.*, 129 ff.).

6. It seemed as though New France itself disappeared into the grave with the General's remains (Lavolette, 183).

7. He was an upright and far-sighted man who tried to judge the situation soundly and impartially (FEC, 159).

8. Monseigneur Briand was to turn his energies to restoring the Canadian Church from its state of material and moral ruin, for which he deserves the title of second founder. The cathedral and the churches that had been put to the torch had to be rebuilt, and the morals of the people were in urgent need of reform. The Bishop set to work: as soon as he arrived he began the visitation of his diocese and kept it up in the years that followed. Despite the shortage of clergy, he founded new parishes and installed priests. In his pastoral letters he urged the members of his flock to be virtuous, and he preached temperance. Before long his efforts began to bear fruit (Plante, 187).

9. After years of battling for [parliamentary] supervision of the public purse, he still found himself misunderstood—not to say despised—by the English authorities. Eventually he became embittered and turned to violence. Captivating as he was as a leader, he was to find himself hard put to keep his followers within the strict bounds of the law once he had aroused them with his virulent rhetoric (FEC, 188).

10. Nevertheless, Papineau's struggles were not fruitless: they had brought about a reduction in administrative expenses, led [French] Canadians to achieve high office, aroused the political instincts of the population and prepared the way for Hippolyte LaFontaine's triumph (Plante, 252, 253).

11. An entire age was he; for our race long years would pass
With only his voice for a sword and his heart our cuirass!

12. His want of tact and restraint kept him from enjoying a prestige similar to Papineau's (Plante, 247).

13. The fearlessness of the victim who shatters the weapon in his assailant's hand as it is about to strike (Plante, 258).

14. From a legislative union between the individuals of two different nationalities, it became the union of two distinct provinces under a single legislature. This form of union was soon to be reinforced by the principle of double responsibility, by which the Ministry would need the support not only of the elected representatives, but also of the majority in each province (Filteau, *Civ.*, 250).

15. The 1842 session gave LaFontaine an opportunity to distinguish himself by taking a courageous stand; on September 13 he made a speech in French in defiance of the hostile Tories. His pride [in his native tongue] gave renewed courage and confidence to French Canadians, indicating clearly to the oligarchy that they would not allow themselves to be anglicized (Plante, 263).

16. Called upon to explain his attitude, LaFontaine rose. He was taking the floor for the first time in the Parliament of United Canada. The whole House awaited his reply with anxiety. His maiden speech was like a bomb . . . and, with consummate audacity, in a parliament where French was forbidden, he, the representative of an English-speaking county of Upper Canada, made his request in French. . . . He needed only a few minutes to deliver the greatest speech of his career and win an unprecedented victory (Filteau, *Civ.*, 247).

17. . . . the central power would have a tendency to centralize everything, to encroach on the rights of the provinces and disregard their guarantees. . . . These representatives were perhaps not entirely wrong, but Cartier took it upon himself to carry the hesitant along with him at the session of January 1865 (Lavolette, 304).

18. Georges-Étienne Cartier, who had been counted on to defend the Acadians, would not dissociate himself from Macdonald and concurred in this view. Cartier and his followers paid the price for their inertia with defeat in the elections that followed, but the change of government did not improve the lot of the Acadians (Filteau, *Civ.*, 319).

19. Among the latter [the Fathers of Confederation], we should mention Georges-Étienne Cartier, defender of the rights of his compatriots in Lower Canada, and John Alexander Macdonald, the most notable of the representatives of Upper Canada and undoubtedly the most influential politician of his century (FEC, 226).

20. Macdonald was however the most distinguished, so much so that he has remained the prototype of the Canadian prime minister. His successors were to study his career, often copy his attitudes and even borrow his electoral tactics (Plante, 317).

21. But this great body [Canada] was a thing of separate parts; it had to be given muscles and a nervous system. The creation of a stable national party was to be the unifying force. Through his flexibility, Macdonald succeeded in bringing together into a single political party men divided by language, faith and financial interest (Plante, 319).

22. Later there were to be a good many English Canadians grateful for Bourassa's sincere and enlightened patriotism (Plante, 345).

23. A policy of about-turn, of compromise, of restraint of liberty, a mixture of caution and audacity, a series of government measures, all dependent on a combination of modified dictatorship and machiavellian democracy. This policy was not straightforward, perhaps it was even unnecessary, but it was certainly realistic and was successful in keeping the peace internally, muzzling the press, censoring the news and using the radio to spread its propaganda (Plante, 389).

24. In Lawrence's eyes, the expulsion appeared to be a strategic necessity. The Acadians seemed to him to be a bad risk, in view of the increasingly imminent war; it was a precautionary measure, dictated by prudence—a prudence betraying greed and hatred, for the behaviour of the Acadians hitherto in no way justified the Governor's decision (Plante, 155).

25. Lawrence next set about purging the country of its pioneers. . . . But keeping this population in the country at a time when war was expected to break out momentarily seemed to them to be equally dangerous. There was still another solution, a rather distasteful one, true enough: deportation. It was the ideal solution to the Acadian problem . . . according to Lawrence, the more so since it would provide ready-cleared land quickly and cheaply for the English colonists coming to replace the original masters (FEC, 134).

26. Now they could rid themselves of the Acadians without fear of reprisal. . . . Pitilessly, "the great upheaval" divided families. . . . About 7,000 Acadians were dispersed to the American colonies and Louisiana, where a great number died in misery; some 2,000 escaped from their tormentors and took refuge in New France (Plante, 155 ff.).

27. Winslow occupied the church at Grand Pré and turned it into a barracks. . . . Standing on the steps before the altar, Winslow began by reminding them of the kindnesses for which they were indebted to His Majesty; then, unfolding a large sheet of paper, he announced that he had an "unpleasant duty" to perform. . . . We may well imagine the cries, tears and moans that resounded then in the Grand Pré church. Fortunately the priest was there to recall the teachings of the Gospel to his parishioners and to repeat Christ's celebrated words: "Father, forgive them." . . . That evening and the evenings that followed the Angelus remained silent, and the farm animals awaited their masters in vain. Then the drum rolled again as it had done a few days before to call together the men and older boys of Grand Pré, and out through the doors of the church issued the mournful column of prisoners, flanked on each side by a column of soldiers (Laviolette, 153 ff.).

28. Our people were henceforth faced with domination by a nation that was powerful, a long-time enemy, and strongly anti-Catholic (Filteau, *Civ.*, 135).

29. For the French Canadians, the Treaty of Paris was a challenge that they accepted and an ordeal that they overcame. Seventeen sixty-three was the end for New France; in the history of Canada it is only an episode (Plante, 169).

30. Our nationality set out along the perilous path that would lead it eventually to victory (Filteau, *Civ.*, 136).

31. Above all, since that day [French] Canadians have realized how important it is for them to grasp their own destiny if they are to keep the magnificent spiritual heritage that is theirs (FEC, 153).

32. Canadians of different races and tongues fought side by side in a spirit of pure devotion. Having done so, they felt more united, and the idea of Canada as their [common] homeland took root more firmly in their hearts (FEC, 174).

33. During these years, the English Canadians acquired a self-awareness. Having suffered for their country, they discovered a greater love for it, and for many of them this was reason enough for clinging to it. Perhaps the War of 1812 also served to unite the French and English nationalities (Plante, 221).

34. Bands of Patriots prepared for combat in the Richelieu region. But, before even a third of them were armed, the Governor sent out troops to crush them. . . . The Patriots, most of them armed with pitchforks, sickles and sticks, brought the first contingent to a halt at St. Denis on November 23, but were outflanked by the second at St. Charles two days later. The losers fled to the county of Two Mountains to take refuge, but Colborne's two thousand soldiers overtook them and mercilessly put the torch to the villages of St. Eustache and St. Benoît. None of these encounters had the proportions of a real insurrection: they were confined to nine of the 46 counties and claimed the lives of only some hundred soldiers; the most determined of the leaders of the troops were not French Canadians (Plante, 250 ff.).

35. On December 15 the regular soldiers appeared, led by Colborne. They bombarded the church, the convent and the houses where the Patriots had taken refuge. With the fever of desperation, the Patriots fired on an enemy force that outnumbered them 10 to one. Bullets whistled from the spire and windows of the church. Soon the army set fire to the buildings. Chénier leapt down into the cemetery in an attempt to escape. There he was killed, shot twice. In the end his companions surrendered. So exasperated were the troops that a number of people were shot point blank. A number of fugitives were captured and bound hand and foot. After the battle, the troops pillaged the farms and set fire to the houses. Soldiers returned home in wagons loaded with as much furniture, food and farm animals as they could lay their hands on (FEC, 193 ff.).

36. A Whig tainted with radicalism, fiery-tempered, domineering and luxury-loving, he was a man of excess in all things (Plante, 253).

37. After having observed the situation, mostly listening to the administration's representatives, Durham thought he had discovered that the source of discord between the government and the people was the misunderstanding existing between the country's two races (FEC, 199).

38. He [Durham] felt that the colonies should no longer be kept tied to the mother country's apron strings and should consider it to their advantage to remain voluntarily within the Empire. The strongest ties often being the most subtle, he recommended that the influential leaders of the colonies be wooed into collaboration with prospects of wealth and position, the rich and powerful with visions of personal gain and awareness of the necessity of trade, and the Anglo-Saxons in particular with the glorification of their racial identification and pride of empire. . . . He mesmerized his compatriots by prophesying a great and glorious destiny for England as the leader of an immense empire bound to the mother country by commercial advantage and good will (Plante, 254 ff.).

39. In short, the Durham Report was a glorification of English nationality and a disparagement of French nationality; the moral to be learned from it, politically, was that right was on the side of the stronger at the expense of the weaker. . . . Out of the Durham Report came the union of 1840, responsible government in 1848, Confederation in 1867 and the legislative union being attempted today, all of them forms of government favouring the expansion of Anglo-Canadian nationalism to the detriment of the French Canadian nationality (Plante, 254, 256).

40. Moreover, English became the sole official language for all written communications and printed matter emanating from the government, a manifest injustice towards the French Canadians (FEC, 201).

41. Lord Sydenham, the new Governor, proclaimed the Act on February 10, 1841. "The bankers' day," wrote P. J. O. Chauveau on the occasion; Gosford had already pronounced it "the fruit of a mercantile plot." Baring Brothers, the London bank, had invested a great deal of money in Upper Canada, and that province was threatened with bankruptcy by its debt. [Francis T.] Baring, a British

cabinet minister, took care of his interest in the bank by championing the Union Bill for all he was worth. It goes without saying that Upper Canada accepted the Union as "good business." Thus the predicament of the two Canadas was remedied by a grave injustice (Plante, 257).

42. What form was the new constitution to take? Upper Canada and certain delegates of the eastern colonies tended to favour a legislative union, but the majority rallied around the representatives of Lower Canada who opted for the more flexible structure of a federation, which alone might accommodate the regionalism of the Atlantic colonies and the nationalism of the French Canadians. A federation would safeguard the country's common interests and would assure minority groups of the greatest possible degree of autonomy (Plante, 308 ff.).

43. But this was the end of Métis influence in the provinces of the West, an influence replaced by that of the French Canadians, which was itself quickly inundated by the Anglo-Saxon flood (quoted by Filteau, *Civ.*, 318).

44. Aided and abetted by ignorance and fanaticism, the Greenway Liberal government of Manitoba, too, violated the rights of French Catholic groups in 1890 (Plante, 324).

45. Everywhere the problem was the same. . . . The minority, invoking Article 93 of the federal constitution, called for intervention on the part of the central authority. The latter vacillated . . . sought by contrivance or compromise to extricate itself, and the downtrodden minority emerged defeated (Plante, 325).

46. In the province of Quebec, the depression was blamed on big business, the monopoly of English financiers. The French element felt its economic and social inferiority all the more cruelly because of it. Maurice L. Duplessis, a wily politician, took advantage of the resentment and bitterness. While rejecting the idea of separatism, which was favoured by certain extreme nationalists, he made himself the champion of autonomy for his province and claimed for his compatriots a larger part in the development and management of natural resources (Plante, 379).

47. Through the voice of its premiers and with the support of its population, Quebec continues its struggle for autonomy. A high birth-rate, an exceptional geographic position and incalculably rich natural resources provide it with powerful weapons. French Canadians recognize that Confederation needs to be rejuvenated, as do their English-speaking compatriots. Like the latter and together with some of them, French Canadians are working to find a formula for honest conciliation. It has not yet been found. . . .

Our destiny rests on two powerful foundations: a Church and a school system that are fully autonomous. The adoption of the fleur-de-lis flag by the provincial legislature in 1948 stands as a symbol of our will to safeguard our autonomy and, through it, our French civilization (Plante, 401).

48. The system of laws that a people live by is a thing of no small importance. The laws of an orderly nation are the product of centuries of experience and events. They have been worked out and formulated slowly. They are the consecration of long-standing social customs. They are born of the inclinations, moral convictions, characteristics and particular qualities that distinguish a race. They correspond to the customs, attitudes and economic conditions peculiar to it. . . . And for all these reasons they become an integral part of the life of the nation. It seems that one may state without fear of contradiction that "laws are the expression of a nation" (Chapais, *Cours d'histoire*, quoted in Filteau, *Civ.*, 149 ff.).

49. France recognized that its Canadian subjects were adults capable of playing a part in governing themselves . . . local legislation proclaimed by the intendant was not the result of personal decision on his part. In all important matters, custom required that public opinion be sounded out through consultation with the colony's notables, or even through the submission of proposed legislation to assemblies of the habitants (Filteau, *Civ.*, 84 ff.).

50. The seigneurial regime rendered appreciable service to the country. It constituted a social framework; for the colonists, it provided mutual aid, protection and a nucleus of community life. After the defeat of 1760, it stood as a bulwark against infiltration by outsiders, since English immigrants preferred freehold tenure; thanks to it, young French Canadians could find a livelihood despite their exclusion from commerce and industry, for about half the seigneurial lands remained still to be cleared and cultivated. Thanks to the seigneurial regime, these lands escaped the grasp of the conqueror (Plante, 49).

51. The social classes, with their elaborately hierarchical structure, were very close to one another; there was no gulf between the bourgeoisie and the nobility, as there was in France . . . It was a seigneur's accomplishments for his seigneurie rather than his titles that placed him in a privileged class. . . . The "habitants" were quite unlike the peasants of France. They were farm proprietors and not the slaves of a seigneur . . . Through thrift and hard work, a good many of these "habitants" acquired fiefs or sub-fiefs. Thus, about 1700, they were already in possession of a third of the seigneuries (Plante, 144 ff.).

52. No social class could arouse envy as such for its wealth, or be considered as living parasitically on the other classes. In Canada, then, there were no distinguishable social orders, but at the very most only two social classes, the aristocracy and the people, and the differences between them were sometimes so slight that the impression is that of groups in juxtaposition rather than a hierarchy. . . . The Canadian habitant's lot was indeed an enviable one; he was by no means to be pitied, like the French peasant. He was the proprietor of his land and could not help but reflect with satisfaction on the great freedom he enjoyed. . . . With these attributes, he had much more in common with the country gentry of France than with the French peasants. He was a true country gentleman (Filteau, *Civ.*, 86, 89 ff.).

53. The Quebec Act remains the Magna Carta of the French Canadians. French Canadian orators have considered it so, for they have referred to it and drawn authoritative arguments from it in support of their cause; historians have considered it so, for they regard this document as official recognition of the French Canadian nation (Plante, 191).

54. They would not think of adapting to the rule of the majority, believing themselves powerful enough to impose their own views on the authorities (FEC, 160).

55. The American fugitives, being familiar with parliamentary government and wedded to English law, threw the country into constitutional and judicial confusion (Plante, 199).

56. Now that we had been given voting rights, it became easier to demonstrate to all that we were, in the province at least, by far the majority (Lavolette, 226).

57. Lower Canada, for its part, rediscovered its political individuality, regained its pre-1840 control over civil matters, once again became an autonomous province, constituted a sovereign state in its own sphere (Plante, 314).

58. *A French state.* For French Canadians the new constitution had the immense advantage of restoring, in large measure, the mastery of their own destiny (Filteau, *Civ.*, 251).

59. [After] careful deliberation, yielded some of their powers and kept those that they chose to keep (Plante, 311).

60. . . . as an absolutely permanent thing, any more than it commands any particular attachment among them [the French Canadians] (Filteau, *Civ.*, 452).

61. Despite its shortcomings, the Act of 1867 is a constitutional work of monumental proportions, a document bearing the stamp of wisdom: it gave Canada a form of government with both "the strength of a legislative union and the liberty of a federal union" (John A. Macdonald in 1865, quoted by Plante, 313).

62. The constitution worked out by the Fathers of Confederation made it possible for Canada to have a stable government. The latter then bent to the task of assuring the security, happiness and prosperity of Canadians (FEC, 233).

63. . . . the culmination of a long, peaceful but determined struggle [by Canadians] . . . to govern themselves (FEC, 278).

64. . . . gave sanction to liberties acquired . . . since the Treaty of Versailles. . . . Established practice became law (Plante, 363).

65. A political statute would not, indeed, extract Canada overnight from this intangible pressure, this subtle seduction. It is consistent with an age-old tradition that the feelings and loyalty of English Canadians towards Britain are still tied to their attachment to the Crown and imperial solidarity. Time may correct these anomalies (Plante, 367).

66. Also, it is not surprising that our relations with Great Britain should tacitly include a military alliance. Should there be war between England and one or other of the great powers of Europe or Asia, Canada will be in a state of war. It will not automatically be at war, but it will have to be (Plante, 366).

Part 2, Chapter III

1. A nationality may set the moment of its birth as the instant when its members become conscious of being different, and of having, besides a defined habitat, interests, traditions and a common ideal (Filteau, *Civ.*, 128).

2. Most of them were born in Canada and lived a life of struggle there which gave them roots in the country. . . . The Loyalists proved to be courageous when put to the test. They quickly cultivated the land they had obtained. In the end, through their determination, they overcame every obstacle. They became deeply attached to the land that gave them refuge in their exile and on which so much sweat from their toil had fallen (FEC, 98, 166).

3. Out of the Durham Report came the union of 1840, responsible government in 1848, Confederation in 1867, and the legislative union being attempted today, all of them forms of government favouring the expansion of Anglo-Canadian nationalism, to the detriment of the French Canadian nationality (Plante, 254).

4. The "Fathers" had three main problems to resolve: the American threat, economic and political stagnation, and antagonism between the nationalities. The first two were solved, at least in their essentials; the third was only half solved. For the question of nationalities to be settled, Lower Canada would have had to have its independence restored (Plante, 313).

5. The clash of interests was the primary cause of antagonism between the French of France and the colonists who had settled in Canada.

Although very much interwoven at first, the interests of the two groups eventually became sharply divided. Early in the eighteenth century there began to be talk of purely Canadian interests, and soon Canadian history was being cited in their support. . . .

The disagreements of the latter years of the French regime, the obvious state of abandonment in which France had left Canada during the war, and particularly the bankruptcy of the treasury, had done much to cool the attitudes of Canadians towards France, to such a point that a French priest wrote: "It would cost the English little to let them [French Canadians] sample the advantage of having changed masters, for all they [the English] would have to do would be the opposite of what we did" (Filteau, *Civ.*, 128, 186).

6. Since Canada *at the present time* recognizes the Queen of England as its sovereign (FEC, 281).

7. A political statute [that of 1931] would not, indeed, extract Canada overnight from this intangible pressure, this subtle seduction [England's]. It is consistent with an age-old tradition that the feelings and loyalty of English Canadians to Britain are still tied to their attachment to the Crown and imperial solidarity. Time may correct these anomalies (Plante, 367).

8. Four times already the American colonies, now the United States, had invaded Canada. Their sole success, that of 1759-1760, had been to England's benefit. But the dream of the star-spangled banner flying over an America stretching from the North Pole to the Gulf of Mexico had not faded. In 1812 an opportunity arose for the launching of a "glorious war" (Plante, 217).

9. If the war of 1756-1760 had seen Canada fall to English dependency, the war of 1939-1945 brought it to a dangerous degree of American tutelage (Plante, 389).

10. Today we are a great people whose Christian spirit, respect for the law and industriousness command respect throughout the whole world (FEC, 303).

11. Using everything we have said this year, can you show that our history is really an EPIC, a MYSTIC EPIC?

Thy story is an epic tale

Of brilliant deeds unmatched! (Laviolette, 319).

12. Our democratic ideal may seem a little vague, but it is quite devoid of any imperialistic design; this is why Canada's gestures may be accepted without provoking bitterness (Plante, 391).

13. A grave danger threatens the Canadian nationality: Americanism. . . . Besides, the Canadian people have neither the homogeneity nor the culture that would enable them to resist partial absorption successfully. Between English imperialists and French Canadian nationalists there is a whole range of opinions and feelings. A wide and deep gulf separates the different elements: Catholics and Protestants, Ontario English, Quebec French Canadians, and new Canadians in the West.

Confederation is only a cold, legalistic notion for which most show no real attachment (Plante, 398 ff.).

14. In a country like ours there are immigrant races that must inevitably lose their identity, in a sense fade into the impersonal composite that absorbs them; they have consented to this beforehand, because they are no longer rooted in their native soil and cannot expect to survive as before. But in a country like ours there are also constituent races who have rights of survival, rights bequeathed by their history, by priority of territorial occupation, by conquest; races that are masters of their own characteristics in the same way that they are masters of the land they have discovered or conquered. For them there can be no question of fusion; for them there can be nothing other than cooperation (Filteau, *Civ.*, 456).

15. Whatever the case, financial tutelage means for Quebec not only the loss of its legislative and administrative autonomy, but also a danger for its institutions, faith, language and culture. This province, being different from all the others, cannot, without serious detriment, cede its rights to Ottawa. Proof of this is the unjust treatment inflicted on all the minorities from 1867 to the present day. The province of Quebec is the only natural framework within which we can successfully defend, sustain and enrich our spiritual values. Our destiny rests on two powerful foundations: a Church and a school system that are fully autonomous (Plante, 401).

16. The French minorities of the various provinces of Canada have carried on arduous struggles to survive and preserve their culture. The onslaughts they have suffered and perhaps even more their isolation have resulted in quite heavy losses. Of the million French Canadians living outside Quebec, about a third have abandoned their language and perhaps a tenth no longer practise their ancestral religion. Happily, the rest seem to want to pursue the efforts they have undertaken until they obtain full recognition of their rights (Filteau, *Civ.*, 359).

17. In our two cultures we have a twofold wealth that gives Canada its own particular character. Each in its own way contributes to the material, intellectual and artistic progress of the whole country (FEC, 304).

18. Our Anglo-Canadian partners have been slow to admit that the duality of culture might be an enrichment for our country. The struggles waged over schools and language early in the present century forced them to look closely at our problems; they have come to understand us better as a result. The threat of Americanization, to which they were most particularly vulnerable, led them to consider the factors which made it possible for us to raise an effective barrier against this threat. They have come to the conclusion that it is, in part, the French culture that gives Canada a certain originality that stands out in contrast to American materialism. It is thanks to our presence that Canada can partake of one of the great European cultures. It is thanks to our group that French thought can be diffused from sea to sea, bringing to the country a fertile stimulus, a source of originality and personality. The French culture is thus part of the wealth of the Canadian nation. "Our cultural duality," the Hon. Lester B. Pearson has said, "will always be our mark of distinction, even a retaining wall holding back the great American tide" (Filteau, *Civ.*, 477).

Studies of the
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1167

6

Cabinet Formation and Bicultural Relations

Seven Case Studies

Edited by

Frederick W. Gilson



Cabinet Formation and
Bicultural Relations

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Cabinet Formation and Bicultural Relations

Seven Case Studies

Edited by

Frederick W. Gibson

Professor of History and
Vice-Principal, Academic
Queen's University

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John T. Saywell	Professor of History and Dean of Arts and Science at York University
Dale C. Thomson	Professor and Director of the Department of Political Science at the University of Montreal

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The purposes of this study are to discover what opportunities French Canadians have had for participation in national decisions at the highest level of politics, and to find out whether—and, if so, to what extent—there has been a genuine bicultural partnership in the leadership of the two political parties from which successive governments of Canada have been formed.

Since decisions on national policy are normally taken by the federal cabinet, the composition and membership of the cabinet determine, in large degree, the opportunity for participation in such decisions. The process and the results of cabinet formation are, therefore, of crucial importance to any section of the Canadian community which is anxious to exercise a strong and continuous influence over national policy.

It was decided, in consultation with Professor Michael Oliver, the Director of Research for the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, and Professor John Meisel, the Supervisor of Behavioural Studies for the Commission, that several episodes of cabinet formation should be analyzed by scholars known to have special knowledge of one or more of them, and that a series of questions should be directed to each episode so as to produce information which would be germane to the Commission's field of inquiry.

The following list of cabinets and scholars was then decided upon:

The Macdonald cabinet of 1867	W. L. Morton
The Macdonald cabinet of 1878	Donald G. Creighton
The Laurier cabinet of 1896	John T. Saywell
The Borden cabinet of 1911	Roger Graham
The King cabinet of 1921	Frederick W. Gibson
The King cabinet of 1935	H. Blair Neatby
The St. Laurent cabinet of 1948	Dale C. Thomson
The Diefenbaker cabinet of 1957-8	John Meisel

This list of cabinets offered three advantages over any alternative list of comparable dimensions:

It is distributed, at intervals of from nine to 18 years, over 80 years of the life of Canada since Confederation.

It provides extensive and equal representation to the practices of the Conservative and the Liberal parties.

A good deal of evidence is available about each of these cabinets, and studies of the kind outlined above would not require substantial amounts of fresh research, with the delay which that would necessarily involve.

Each of the scholars whose names appear above agreed to write a paper on one cabinet, and the editor undertook, in addition, to write a concluding chapter summarizing the findings of the individual papers. Subsequently, two of the contributors, Professor Meisel and Professor Neatby, were obliged to withdraw because of their other and heavy commitments to the Commission. Since it appeared unlikely that anyone else could be found to do the study of the Diefenbaker cabinet without prolonged delay, this study was reluctantly abandoned. The editor decided, however, in an unexpected burst of optimism, that his knowledge of the 1935 cabinet formation was sufficient, or could quickly be made sufficient, for the purpose, and that a serious gap in the sequence of the papers might thereby be avoided. In acting upon this decision, I have had the benefit of several discussions with Professor Neatby and of a memorandum which he prepared on Ernest Lapointe's position in the 1935 cabinet formation, all of which are acknowledged with gratitude but without committing Professor Neatby to responsibility for anything that is said in this study. The papers on the cabinet formations of 1921 and 1935 as well as the concluding chapter are the sole responsibility of the editor.

The questions which each of the contributors to this study were invited to answer are as follows:

1. If the prime minister was an English Canadian, did he treat the French Canadian leaders of his party solely or mainly as the representatives of a province which, like the other provinces, was entitled to representation in the cabinet? Or did he single out a French Canadian colleague and give him a position of special influence in the process of cabinet-making, perhaps treating him for this purpose as his principal lieutenant or even as co-prime minister? If a French Canadian was singled out in this way, was he given the final say on Quebec representation in the cabinet? Was he given, in addition, a veto power or other special influence on the choice of representatives from other provinces? Did he seek or was he given a particular portfolio so as to recognize his special position in the cabinet? If the prime minister was a French Canadian, did he treat his English Canadian colleagues solely or mainly as representatives of their provinces or did he single out an English Canadian colleague and treat him, for purposes of cabinet-making, in the special manner described above?

2. If the prime minister was an English Canadian, did he consult French Canadian leaders of his party about the representation of Quebec in the cabinet? Did he consult them about English-speaking as well as French-speaking representation of Quebec in the cabinet? Did he consult them about possible representation of French Canadians from provinces other than Quebec? Did he consult them about wider problems of cabinet formation, including the representation of other provinces or groups and the assignment of portfolios among the cabinet as a whole? If he consulted French Canadian colleagues

on the questions, did he take their advice? Did he receive conflicting advice from them on these matters? To put these questions in a slightly different form, did French Canadian leaders endeavour to influence the choice of ministers or the assignment of portfolios for provinces or groups outside Quebec, or did they concentrate their attention on problems of Quebec representation in the cabinet? If the prime minister was a French Canadian, did he consult English Canadian colleagues simply about the representation of their respective provinces in the cabinet, or did he also consult them about wider aspects of cabinet formation, including the representation of Quebec and the assignment of portfolios among the cabinet as a whole? Did English Canadian leaders attempt to influence a French Canadian prime minister's choice of ministers from Quebec or did they concentrate their attention on the representation of provinces other than Quebec?

3. What portfolios did French Canadian leaders seek for French Canadian representatives in the cabinet? Did they get these portfolios? Did they get the most important portfolios, judging importance by (a) the relevance of a particular portfolio to the distinctive ethnic and cultural interests of French Canadians, and (b) by the respect and prestige which the possession of a particular portfolio commanded among French Canadians generally, and (c) by the leverage which a particular portfolio could exert on the administration of the central policies of the government? Was there any understanding among the national party leadership that certain portfolios should be given or should not be given to French Canadians, and, if so, what was the basis of such an understanding? Was there any understanding among the national party leadership that certain portfolios should be given or should not be given to English Canadians, and, if so, what was the basis of such an understanding?

4. Did French Canadian leaders endeavour to extract commitments from the prime minister, or to reach an understanding with him, on issues of policy and legislation during the period of cabinet formation? If so, on what issues and with what success? Did English Canadian leaders endeavour to extract commitments from the prime minister, or to reach an understanding with him, on issues of policy and legislation during the period of cabinet formation? If so, on what issues and with what success?

5. Did any French Canadian leader propose that the cabinet be composed of equal numbers of English Canadians and French Canadians? Did French Canadian leaders press for an increase of French Canadian representation in the cabinet above the number in the previous administration? Did French Canadian leaders ask that any specific proportion of cabinet members be drawn from Quebec or from French Canada as a whole? Did French Canadian leaders endeavour to enlarge or to reduce the representation of the English-speaking minority of Quebec in the cabinet? Did English Canadian leaders endeavour to enlarge or to reduce the number of French Canadian representatives in the cabinet?

6. With respect to those French Canadians who were taken into the cabinet, were the choices influenced by a belief that they would be more co-operative on matters of policy with the English Canadian members of the cabinet than would other French Canadian leaders who were left out? Turning the question around, were some French Canadian leaders excluded from the cabinet because they were believed to be too inflexible on important policies or because they were opposed by other and more powerful French

Canadian leaders, or for other reasons? Did similar considerations apply with equal force to the inclusion or exclusion of English Canadian leaders?

Finally, I would like to record my gratitude to my colleagues, the contributing authors of this study, both for the substance of their contributions and for the promptness with which they submitted them.

In addition, I want to express the deep appreciation of the contributing authors for the assistance which we received from Dr. Eugene Forsey. Dr. Forsey read the study in typescript and prepared a detailed memorandum of criticism and comment in keeping with his customary generosity of mind and concern for accuracy. We are glad to join the legion of scholars who are under a similar obligation to him.

My grateful thanks are also due to the literary executors of the Mackenzie King Estate for allowing me to reproduce the passages from the Mackenzie King Diaries which are contained herein.

Frederick W. Gibson

June 12, 1967

The General Circumstances

The circumstances surrounding the formation and character of the first federal cabinet of Canada were exceptional and in some respects unique, simply because it was the *first* federal cabinet.

First, there was the fact of Confederation itself; second, there was the fact that Confederation by implication and general agreement created a new order of relationships. The federal government replaced the imperial as the co-ordinator and director of the external concerns of the four colonies. They now had to deal with Ottawa, rather than directly with London.

Third, the first federal cabinet was not a party cabinet—even to the extent that such a term may be used of cabinets in the middle third of the nineteenth century, when party ties were loose and party organization slight. Confederation, broadly speaking, had been planned and carried in the three pre-1867 provinces of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Canada, by coalitions.

Finally, the circumstances of cabinet formation in 1867 were highly unusual in that as well as a cabinet, a Senate, two speakers, two new provincial governments, and—by reversion at least—four new lieutenant-governors, and other officers, were to be appointed. The cabinet-makers, therefore, had an unusually wide range of alternative appointments to make.

The Conventions of Cabinet-Making in Canada

The formation of the cabinet went forward under conventions and practices well understood by all those concerned, Maritimers as well as Canadians, French as well as British. It may be well to take note of these, in order to clarify further the conditions of the formation of the cabinet in 1867.

First, the role of all government, and therefore of the executive, was severely limited by convention and practice in the nineteenth century in the United Kingdom, the United States, and in the British North American colonies, especially before 1867. It was, therefore, both acceptable policy and quite practicable to keep government in all its activities, and the cabinet in number of members, quite small. This disposition explains why the leading politicians of Confederation so readily agreed that the cabinet of the Dominion should number no more than 13, and why they refused to solve the problem of appointing a satisfactorily representative cabinet by the simple expedient of adding one or two members to the 13 agreed upon. The leading politicians unanimously and steadfastly held that a larger cabinet would be "unworkable." Surprising as this view is today, it was a datum from which the work of forming the cabinet of 1867 proceeded.¹

From the same concept of limited government a second characteristic of British American cabinet government in the years before 1867 derived. As there was little government, the several departments of government had little work to do. The permanent staffs were small, and the responsible ministers had little administrative work. The extraordinary amount of private political correspondence in the Macdonald Papers bears out this general statement, as does any acquaintance with the lives of the other leading politicians. The minister at that time was primarily a politician, and only to a minor degree an administrator.

To accomplish the work of the cabinet, it was necessary for each member to have influence in some important section of the province and in some important body of interest or opinion. Hence, the cabinet was not only free to be political, it was of necessity highly political—and to be political successfully, it had to be representative.

Any cabinet in a country with a free electoral system was, of course, subject to this need, even that of the United Kingdom. In British North America the need was increased by the size of the country, the dispersion of population, and the marked degree of local feeling in all the provinces. The importance of these factors for the development of Canada's government merits attention, but has never received the study it deserves.

The representative character of British North American cabinets was subtly accentuated by various colonial peculiarities. One was the importance of the official salary to a minister who was normally unable to live by his own resources, but was dependent on his salary. This dependence made his post a job and the salary a piece of patronage, and made him one with the politicians and electors who sought patronage as a natural currency of public life. A beneficiary of patronage himself, he was well disposed towards being a dispenser of patronage. Indeed, it was the power to distribute patronage that in the main gave his office meaning and substance.

The same thing was true also if he were not a public man who had made politics a career as John A. Macdonald had but, rather, a man who used cabinet office as a step to a permanent appointment in the public service. Robert Spence followed this course in Canada West in 1858, and Thomas D'Arcy McGee planned to do so after 1867, because he had no profession and desperately needed an assured income. Such men had an affinity for those who sought one or other of the many rewards of politics.

This, of course, has always been true of political life, and is necessarily true. Those who do the drudgery and run the hazards of political life must be rewarded, or the necessary

work will not be done, or the necessary hazards incurred. The advent of responsible government and the extension of democracy helped widen the circle of those among whom the distribution of patronage was necessary for the winning and exercise of political power.

Explicitly relevant to the subject of this paper is, however, not the above general truth, but the particular event which was the introduction of responsible, or cabinet, government within the British North American colonies. Before 1848 the distribution of patronage was divided between the governor and the assembly; after that date it was concentrated in the cabinet. This concentration was caused by the surrender of more and more subjects of domestic colonial concern to departments of government headed by responsible ministers, and by the introduction of control of the budget by the Department of Finance—begun in Canada by the Act of Union and extended to the other colonies by 1860. Thus the control of patronage became a cabinet matter, and not one for the governor or for members of the legislature, except as they might be able to influence ministers of the Crown. Hence, to distribute patronage both widely and effectively, the members of the cabinet had to be representative of sections and interests, and their power and influence were increased by their position as representative dispensers of patronage.

The efficacy of this role was increased by the nature of the patronage to be distributed. While there were some major prizes, they were mainly in the judiciary or the civil service. These were usually life appointments and consequently seldom available. The greater part of patronage, however, was made up of small items, petty jobs and expenditures, which could be widely diffused, as befitted a democracy with a wide male franchise. The fact that patronage was also frankly partisan and often personal, except for the senior judicial posts, limited its diffusion, but also operated to vary the political, sectarian and personal interests in receipt of patronage. The efficiency of the cabinet member as distributor of so wide a patronage was enhanced because he was the representative political chief, or boss, of a region or a special interest.

The local member was not, of course, excluded from the power to bestow patronage. His place in the system, however, was not that of final decider of who should get what, but that of one with a right and the means of access to the minister. His influence in his riding was much affected by his success in obtaining from the departments what his constituents sought. It was on this relationship of minister with member that party government came to rest, although even a political opponent had normally to be listened to when he came as the representative of his constituency, and the award of "staple" patronage—expenditures on roads and bridges, aid for widows, and so on—did not depend wholly on party loyalty or political support in the legislature. Even in cabinet government something of the general character of government remained, and even a minister of a party cabinet could be non-partisan and humane in minor grants of the public patronage. This, of course, contributed to his position as a popular representative member of a cabinet formed to serve as well as govern the various sections and interests of the country.

The British North American cabinet was a representative body, even in a unitary state such as each province was. It was also a body of confidential sworn counsellors, united to advise the formal head of the government, and to administer the government of the

province as a united body of advisers and administrators. The convention of British cabinet government—that the cabinet was a body of political talent and administrative skill, maintaining a real as well as a formal solidarity among its members—was accepted fully and without question. But it was a solidarity of sectional and communal representatives, and not merely of the ablest politicians a party could produce.

The Preliminary Decisions on Cabinet Formation, 1867

It was with such experience of cabinet government in the circumstances of British-American experience that the leading Fathers of Confederation approached the task of forming the first cabinet of the new federation. What was for the province of Canada a major innovation was made at the outset by the Governor General, Lord Monck, and not by a Canadian politician. This was to establish the convention for the new federation that the office of first minister should be held by one person and not by two, as had been the practice in Canada. Monck's principle was accepted by all the Canadians without demur, as was his choice of John A. Macdonald to be the first prime minister of Canada.² The new cabinet, then, would have a single pre-eminent head, although not a new department of public business.

This decision had two results. First, it made possible the addition of one to the number of the cabinet members at once without too sharply emphasizing the number of members from the prime minister's own province, in this instance Ontario. At the same time it increased the size both of the Ontario representation in the cabinet and of the Conservative representation among the Ontario members.

The second result was not discussed, but in fact underlines one of the decisive aspects of Confederation. In 1815 French Canadians were the majority of the population of all British North America, and in 1840 were still the majority of the population of the province of Canada. By 1851 they had ceased to be so, and in 1861 had decisively become a minority.³ The political duality of the government of the province had been sectional as well as racial, but as the French were a majority in Canada East (Quebec), their racial position was well defended by the convention of duality. A French Canadian politician had always been one head of the two-headed ministries from 1848 to 1864. Cartier's acceptance of Confederation was, therefore, the acceptance of a minority position for French Canadians in the federation. (There was, of course, compensation in gaining a majority position in the province of Quebec.) This minority position was now symbolized both by the principle of representation by population in the House of Commons and by the creation of the personal prime ministership. In consequence, the likelihood of French Canada's holding a large share of political office in Canada—or of being one partner in a dual state—was greatly diminished.

The decision and its consequences were accepted by Cartier, presumably as part of the acceptance of Confederation, and there seems to have been no explicit objection by any French Canadian at the time.

Objection to the treatment of Cartier and French Canadians was to come, not in this matter or in the other political arrangements, but in the distribution of honours. It may

be questioned whether the squabble caused by the manner in which honours were granted is relevant to the subject of this study. But it may reveal that while Cartier accepted the political arrangements as a matter of political necessity and good sense, he by no means accepted any subordination of French to English Canadians except in point of numbers.

The trouble arose because Lord Monck, apparently on his own sole initiative and in order both to honour Macdonald's leading role at the Westminster Conference and to emphasize the pre-eminence of the Prime Minister, recommended that Macdonald be made a Knight Commander of the Bath, with, of course, the title "Sir." On the other hand Monck recommended that Cartier, Galt, Tilley, Tupper, Howland and McDougall be made Companions of the Bath. Cartier peremptorily declined the inferior honour, on the ground that for him to accept it would be to condone a slight on his race. He also asserted that personally he stood as high in Canadian politics as Macdonald and had done as much for Confederation. Galt also felt obliged to decline the honour granted him along with Cartier.⁴ Lord Monck was then in a very awkward situation. After a year's correspondence, the two were allowed to resign the honours, Cartier was made a baronet, Galt a K.C.M.G., and Langevin a C.B.⁵ The French demand for equal honours, if not equal political position, was recognized. The apparent ease with which these political arrangements were made with the French Canadian members is no proof that the episode was actually free of difficulty.

The trouble over honours, however significant it may have been of underlying feeling, does not seem to have affected the process of appointing the cabinet. The delegates to the Westminster Conference, or at least the leaders, agreed among themselves before leaving England in May⁶ on the number to be included in the new cabinet—both the total number and the number from each of the federating provinces.⁷ The total number was to be 13. The maximum number of a "Canadian" cabinet of the former province had been 12 to which was now added the prime minister. It was a decision apparently easily taken, but it proved to be a very firm one. No one, even when difficulties arose in forming the cabinet, ever suggested that the number should be increased to take in all who had a major claim to be included. Yet, to adhere to the number 13 was to attempt to govern the new federation with a cabinet larger by only one than the cabinet of the old province of Canada. This view was firmly held by those who saw the new provincial governments as having very subordinate roles to play and by those who saw them as carrying much of the work of the governments they succeeded. Nothing could be more indicative of the firmness with which the general concept of limited government was held.

The number of positions in the cabinet to be allotted to each province was also easily agreed upon. Nova Scotia was to have two, New Brunswick two, Quebec four, and Ontario five. This allocation was to be as rigidly maintained as the total, for any departure from the number assigned to each province would have necessitated not only a change in the total, but proportionate changes in the representation of each province.

A student of the formation of Confederation as a whole is reminded of the discussions at Charlottetown, Quebec and Westminster and of the debates of the various legislatures as to the composition of the House of Commons and the Senate. The composition of the former rested on the principle of representation by population. This principle had been accepted by the coalition of Canadian parties formed in June 1864, and was fundamental

to the creation of the union. Once accepted, however, it acted automatically under the formula embodied in Section 51 of the British North America Act, by which Quebec continued to have the 65 members it had had as Canada East in the province of Canada. The number of representatives of the other provinces was to be decided by dividing 65 into the population of Quebec at the last decennial census, and then by dividing the number so obtained into the population of each of the other provinces to obtain the number of members each province should have.⁸

The Senate rested firmly on the basis of equality of representation from each of the three regions: the Maritime Provinces, Canada East and Canada West (Quebec and Ontario). Twenty-four senators were allotted to each section—the number of Legislative Councillors from each of Canada East and West under the Act of 1856.

The same thinking as to the desirability—indeed the necessity—of providing representation of both sections and population was demonstrated in the composition of the cabinet. Each section was to have four members, with the most populous providing the prime minister. The members were to represent both territorial sections and population. But the cabinet representatives were to represent regions in their sections, or provinces, and population in its actual varieties—political, sectarian, and economic interest—at least roughly and as far as possible. The Commons, it may be said, represented number, the Senate, section, the cabinet, weight—weight, colour, tone. The representative character of the cabinet was, in short, to be a much subtler thing than the representation provided by the Commons or the Senate.

The Formation of the Cabinet of 1867

This subtlety is revealed by the process of cabinet formation in 1867. Once the total and the allotment of members by provinces had been agreed on, the choice of persons to make up the representation for each province was correctly left to the Prime Minister designate, John A. Macdonald. To this task—as well as that of recommending appointments to the Senate and other positions—Macdonald addressed himself after his return from England and during the remainder of May and early June 1867.⁹ The new cabinet had to be ready to take office on July 1, 1867.¹⁰

The choice of members from Nova Scotia and New Brunswick was easy. Macdonald wisely left it, in effect, to the Maritime leaders themselves, Tupper and Tilley. In Nova Scotia the two elements, Conservative and Liberal, which made up those who supported Nova Scotia's entry in Confederation, had to be represented. The part of the province from which the member came was not of great importance. Tupper, who had led the province into Confederation as Conservative Premier, was an inevitable choice. He named as his colleague Adams G. Archibald, a Liberal and a fervent supporter of Confederation.¹¹ Archibald sat for Colchester, in east central Nova Scotia, but practised law in Halifax, and therefore represented the capital as well as his county. Tupper, as member for Cumberland, represented rural Nova Scotia.

In New Brunswick, Tilley was as inevitable a choice as Tupper in Nova Scotia. At Macdonald's request, he recommended Peter Mitchell, a prominent Liberal supporter of

Confederation. As Mitchell was from a North Shore constituency and Tilley from the St. John Valley, the two main sections of the province were represented.¹²

Trouble arose in the choice of representatives from Ontario and even more so from Quebec. The situation in Ontario illustrates the kind of difficulty Macdonald faced in forming the cabinet. In Canada West the Reformers had elected 44 members in the last provincial election, that of 1863.¹³ It was this body of Reformers who had, with some exceptions, followed Brown into the coalition of 1864. With further exceptions they did not follow him out of the coalition after he left the Government early in 1866. The majority continued to vote with the Government.¹⁴

This general strength and continued support, together with the need to strengthen the coalition Reformers against Brown's endeavour to build a new Reform or Liberal party, enabled the coalition Reformers—with William McDougall as their spokesman—to demand three of the five seats allotted to Ontario in the federal cabinet. McDougall's and Howland's success in frustrating Brown's attempt to win back coalition Reformers to the Reform party at a convention called in Toronto in June 1867, strengthened the coalition Reformers' position.¹⁵ In making their demand, they could point out that the prime ministership had gone to Macdonald, and imply, correctly, that it really counted for more than one. Macdonald could only assent, even though, like a recent biographer, he thought it was hard on the Conservatives that they should not have three representatives.¹⁶ Ontario had 22 Conservative members at the dissolution of the last Parliament of the province of Canada, and Macdonald had no doubt that they would increase their number in the first federal election. They in fact did so to the total of 43 out of 82.

Three Reformers and two Conservatives, all Protestants, made up the representation of Ontario. Four were of recent British ancestry and the fifth, W. P. Howland, was American by birth. There was no French representative. Although the French of Ontario numbered 75,383 in 1871, no French member sat in Parliament for any Ontario riding in 1866 or in 1867,¹⁷ or in the provincial legislature. British by popular representation, Ontario could be presumed to have no need of French representation in the cabinet.

The Ontario representation was a relatively easy decision. But the process revealed how intransigent partisan demands could be, and the history of the Ontario section of the cabinet was not a happy one.

It was in selecting the Quebec cabinet members that Macdonald nearly came to grief, and the attempt to form the first federal cabinet nearly ended in failure. When Tupper and Tilley came to Ottawa early in June to aid Macdonald, they found him in despair and on the point of asking Monck to summon George Brown to form a ministry.¹⁸ This was no doubt a stratagem to counteract the various pressures on him, but the suggestion itself was exceedingly serious. It was almost unthinkable, however, to have the new Confederation governed by those who had helped it only part way to success, or who had opposed it, or had criticized it in some aspect or other, rather than by those who had led in its formation. Nothing could better demonstrate the difficulty of forming the cabinet than the dilemma facing Macdonald, caught as he was between the rigid limitations on the total number agreed on and the related numbers of provincial representation on the one hand, and the necessities of representation in the cabinet for the province of Quebec.

The representation of that province was the last section to be fitted into the general mosaic of the cabinet. As in Ontario, the process of forming the Quebec representation began with a demand for a certain number of seats for reasons that had to be accepted. This was Cartier's demand to have three French Canadians, all of course Roman Catholics, in the cabinet.¹⁹

The demand was, to say the least, moderate. There had always been four French Canadian members in the cabinets of the province of Canada since 1848.²⁰ To ask for three was to give up one representative, a vivid example of Cartier's acceptance of a minority position for the French in Confederation. Having surrendered one, Cartier could well feel that he must insist on three. The serious and sustained resistance (by Dorion and the *Rouges*) to Confederation as a surrender to English Canada made it the more necessary for Cartier to insist. As it was, 929,817 French Canadians would be represented by only three French Roman Catholic cabinet members, while 168,313 English Protestants would have one of their own. Finally, to have had only two French Canadian members would have been both obviously unjust and quite intolerable to French sentiment, and would also have played right into the hands of Dorion. In his critical pamphlet on Confederation Dorion took note of the decrease that would take place in French representation in the cabinet.²¹

In view of that change and the pressure of the *Rouge* opposition to Confederation, it is not surprising that there is, in the scanty records of the struggle over cabinet formation in 1867, some evidence of demands for a fourth French Canadian or at least for some alternative, such as a speakership. In particular, Joseph Cauchon, probably on personal as well as national grounds, sought a position in the cabinet in addition to the three agreed upon. When that was refused, he apparently then became a rival for the speakership of the Commons to John Rose of Montreal when Rose was considered for that position.²² In the end Cauchon was given the speakership of the Senate.

The final decision, however, was in favour of the three Cartier had insisted on: Cartier himself, Hector-Louis Langevin, and Jean-Charles Chapais. These became the representatives of French Canada in Quebec. Here, as elsewhere, the resolution to limit the total number of cabinet members held.

In effect, however, Cartier had accepted a reduced number of French members in the cabinet, and also the fact that the cabinet membership did not take any account of the French population outside Quebec. Cartier had to accept and defend this combined reduction and under-representation on the basis of population, in the face of the articulate, outspoken and not unpopular resistance of the *Rouges* to Confederation. There could scarcely be a clearer illustration of what Confederation involved for French Canada. No wonder the bishops felt obliged to use their authority and influence in support of the accomplished fact of Confederation.²³

To what extent did the *Rouge* resistance to Confederation take note of the formation of the cabinet? *L'Union nationale*, the *Rouge* journal launched to oppose Confederation, was in fact severely critical of the diminution of French influence and members, as Dorion was in his pamphlet attack on Confederation. It does not seem, however, that the cabinet composition was especially criticized. It was attacked as a consequence—the first consequence—of the adverse results, as the *Rouges* saw them, of Confederation as a whole

on the position of French Canadians in British North America. They would have preferred a very loose association with Ontario, and none with the Maritimes. Confederation was to them a concerted effort by an English majority to swamp the French minority. The cabinet as formed in 1867 only pointed up that fact.

To return to the theme of cabinet formation, once it was agreed that there were to be three French members, it followed that the fourth was to be English. For this there could be only one choice—Alexander Galt. The first advocate of Confederation in the practical politics of Canada, he had every claim on general grounds to be a member of the first cabinet of Confederation. The active director of the British American Land Company and of the St. Lawrence and Atlantic Railway, he had all his active life been involved in the development and politics of the Eastern Townships—the English sector of Quebec—and since March 1853, he had been its political representative from Sherbrooke. As a financial man he was an important member of the business community of Montreal; a former Minister of Finance and the financial architect of Confederation, he was the obvious choice for the ministry of Finance. Moreover, he was a Protestant, and the English community of Quebec was predominantly Protestant. There ought to have been no question whatever of his appointment once it was clear that the fourth member from Quebec was to be English.

Yet it was, in fact, the appointment of the English member from Quebec that was the cause of the near failure of the formation of the cabinet in 1867. Indeed, failure was so close that only an unexampled personal sacrifice averted disaster. There were two reasons for the near failure. One was that the English population of Quebec was Roman Catholic as well as Protestant, Irish as well as Scots, English and American. The other reason was the person and the service to Confederation of Thomas D'Arcy McGee, himself Irish and Catholic.

McGee had probably as good a claim on the general grounds of service to Confederation as had Galt, or anybody but Macdonald, Cartier, and Brown. Poet, refugee, immigrant, adventurer, McGee had used his unusual gifts to persuade the Catholic Irish community of Canada, and especially the Irish proletariat of Montreal and Toronto to choose Confederation rather than Fenianism, a British-Canadian rather than an American future. By his own career he had brought the Catholic Irish into Canadian public life, with its excitements, its rewards and its prestige. By his eloquent and sustained advocacy he had persuaded them that Confederation was to be a political union in which all, including the Irish, would enjoy tolerance, justice and equality. It was a great achievement, and it carried with it dangers no other Father of Confederation was to run, as was revealed when McGee was assassinated by a Fenian agent on April 7, 1868. So great was his claim that Macdonald had promised him a place in the cabinet,²⁴ a promise made also, one may be sure, because the Irish Roman Catholics were one of the largest groups in Canada and the Maritimes at that period.

The final trial in the cabinet-making of 1867 was, therefore, to choose between Galt and McGee. A choice was impossible on the face of it, and neither man would, or could because of those he represented, withdraw his claim. The principle of a cabinet limited to 13 with an allotment of four from Quebec, and the principle of sectional and communal representation had thus produced a deadlock, and Macdonald could not break it.

This was the situation when Tilley and Tupper reached Ottawa in late June, 1867. They were dismayed to find that the accomplishment of the general agreement reached in England had proved so difficult and was so near failure. It was by their intervention that the deadlock was broken. By an act of quite unusual self-abnegation, Tupper, apparently on his own initiative, persuaded McGee to give up his claims and the representation of the Irish Roman Catholics of Quebec, if he, Tupper, gave up his claims in favour of an Irish Roman Catholic from Nova Scotia—Edward Kenny, who was also to become a member of the Senate. McGee, with perhaps a greater sacrifice of aspiration and position agreed, and the stalemate was ended. Both were promised compensation; Tupper received his as agent for the Canadian government in England, but McGee was murdered before he received the comparatively obscure but permanent post that would have freed him for writing.²⁵ For both, in any event, the sacrifice was greater than any immediate compensation.

Such was the cabinet sworn in on July 1, 1867. Its composition was as follows:-

<i>Province</i>	<i>Faith</i>	<i>Party</i> ²⁶	<i>Name</i>	<i>Office</i>
Ontario	Protestant	Conservative	Sir John A. Macdonald	Prime Minister and Minister of Justice
Ontario	Protestant	Conservative	Alexander Campbell	Postmaster General
Ontario	Protestant	Liberal	W. P. Howland	Minister of Inland Revenue
Ontario	Protestant	Liberal	W. McDougall	Minister of Public Works
Ontario	Protestant	Liberal	A. J. Fergusson-Blair	President of the Council
Quebec	Roman Catholic	Conservative	George Étienne Cartier	Minister of Militia
Quebec	Roman Catholic	Conservative	Hector-Louis Langevin	Secretary of State for Canada
Quebec	Roman Catholic	Conservative	Jean-Charles Chapais	Minister of Agriculture
Quebec	Protestant	Conservative	Alexander T. Galt	Minister of Finance
New Brunswick	Protestant	Liberal	Peter Mitchell	Minister of Marine and Fisheries
New Brunswick	Protestant	Liberal	Leonard Tilley	Minister of Customs
Nova Scotia	Protestant	Liberal	Adams G. Archibald	Secretary of State for the Provinces
Nova Scotia	Roman Catholic	Conservative	Edward Kenny	Receiver General

The next step in the formation of the new Government was the organization of the legislature and of the new provincial governments and the patronage involved.

The new provincial governments might in the lieutenant-governorships have added much to the available patronage, had not the continuing Fenian menace led to the appointment or retention in office of soldiers: Lieutenant-General William Fenwick Williams, who had governed Nova Scotia since 1866, Major-General Charles Hastings Doyle in New Brunswick, and Major-General Henry William Stisted, appointed Lieutenant-Governor of Ontario in 1867. For Quebec, however, Sir Narcisse-Fortunat Belleau, the stopgap Premier of the Canadian coalition government since 1865, was made Lieutenant-Governor of his native province—the first French Canadian to hold such a position under the Crown. His appointment may reasonably be seen as a symbol of the restoration of the government of Quebec to the Quebeckers and as some compensation to French Canadians for their under-representation in the federation cabinet. So, perhaps, was the appointment of Cartier's protégé P.-J.-O. Chauveau, as Premier.

A simultaneous step was the official appointment of those it had been agreed should be senators. These 72 men were chiefly former Legislative Councillors of the three colonies who had supported the formation of Confederation. None, however, was appointed senator to console him for not being appointed to the cabinet. An unusual feature, by the standard of later practice, was the number of senators who held cabinet posts in the original cabinet.²⁷

The Cabinet 1867-73

Before discussing whether French Canadians suffered from discrimination in having only three representatives in the cabinet of 1867, it is desirable to note to what extent the pattern of representation in the cabinet, as first appointed, continued over the life of that body from 1867 to 1873.

Until Cartier's death on May 20, 1873 there continued to be three French Canadian members. There is no reason to doubt that he would have been replaced by another French Canadian had the cabinet survived the Pacific Scandal. During that period of six years, the number of posts in the cabinet, occupied or to be filled, continued to be 13 until November 16, 1869, when James C. Aikins became minister without portfolio. As he was English, Protestant, and from Ontario, the balance was to some extent tilted against French Canada.²⁸ Aikins' appointment reflected the growth of Conservative strength in Ontario, and was meant to correct the original discrimination against that party in Ontario rather than maintain the balance achieved over all in 1867.

The first change of personnel came in the autumn of 1867 with the resignation of Galt, following the bankruptcy of the Commercial Bank of which he was a director. Thus the English and Protestant post in Quebec was open. This was the occasion for a revival and a revelation of the hope the French Canadian politicians had not wholly abandoned, of continuing to have four members in the cabinet—or at least some equivalent of a fourth such as a speakership. Cauchon was the politician whose name was mentioned for such a post.

Galt's resignation led Macdonald to approach John Rose, an English Protestant financier of Montreal, who had been a member of the Parliament of Canada for some years and a cabinet minister from August 1858 to June 1861. Macdonald had already considered him for the speakership of the Commons. After some discussion the matter was settled by Rose becoming Minister of Finance in succession to Galt, and Cauchon becoming Speaker of the Senate. Thus, the original pattern was maintained, and the French claim recognized to a degree.

The number of the cabinet had already been reduced to 12 by the death of the President of the Council, A. J. Fergusson-Blair, on December 30, 1867. This reduction was increased by the defeat in the general election of 1867 of the English and Protestant representative from Nova Scotia, Adams G. Archibald, the Secretary of State for the Provinces. He remained Secretary after his defeat, as is legally possible, until April 30, 1868. The office was kept vacant until a successor from his own province could be found. This was Joseph Howe who, when "better terms" had been negotiated for Nova Scotia, entered the cabinet as President of the Council on January 30, 1869, and became Secretary of State for the Provinces on November 16 of that year.

The number of the cabinet fell to 10 when W. P. Howland resigned to become Lieutenant-Governor of Ontario, and it was not until Howe's appointment in January 1869 that the post was filled. The number of the cabinet thus stood at 11 from May 1, 1868 to July 14, 1868, and at 10 until January 30, 1869.

In this there was little loss to public business for neither portfolio had many administrative duties, and there was no loss in representation to French Canada. In fact, it gained relatively at this time, although the consideration was almost certainly an academic one. Later, as will be seen, the original 25 per cent of the cabinet, not counting the prime minister, rose to 30 per cent in the last months of 1869, but fell to 17 per cent in 1873.

The retirement of Rose and the appointment of Sir Francis Hincks on October 9, 1869 did not alter the pattern of general representation established in 1867, though the appointment of Hincks was criticized on other grounds. Hincks sat for North Renfrew in Ontario and so filled the vacancy left by Howland's resignation, but the vacancy in Quebec remained until November 15, 1869.

The acquisition of Rupert's Land and the North-Western Territory precipitated, or gave excuse for, the one major cabinet reshuffle before the election of 1872. One of the men most closely associated with the acquisition of the North-West—and one of the least popular members of the cabinet—was William McDougall. The steady strengthening of the provincial Liberal party and of the federal Conservative party in Ontario also made McDougall less and less useful as a coalition Liberal representative of Ontario. It was, therefore, an easy and honourable means of dismissal to appoint him Lieutenant-Governor designate of the North West Territory, in September 1869. It also helped bring to an end the Liberal-Conservative coalition of 1864 in Ontario. Although McDougall remained formally in the cabinet until December 7, the way was now open to reorganize the cabinet while McDougall made his way to Red River.

The first move was the transfer of Howe from the presidency of the Council to the office of Secretary of State for the Provinces. Howe was succeeded in the presidency on November 16, 1869, by Edward Kenny, who vacated the office of Receiver General. J.-C. Chapais, who succeeded him on the same date, left the more important but less honorific portfolio of Agriculture. Christopher Dunkin, a Conservative and critic of Confederation, but who supported it when carried, took his place, thus filling the position of English and Protestant representative left vacant by Rose. The vacancy left by Howland as Minister of Inland Revenue was filled by Alexander Morris, a Conservative, thus replacing a Reformer.

At the same time Macdonald took the unusual step of bringing in as minister without portfolio the Conservative J. C. Aikins of Ontario. This met the growing Conservative demand from Ontario for greater representation. Thus the cabinet came to number 14, the increase in representation going to the Conservatives of Ontario, but only until December 8, 1869, at which time it fell to 13.

These changes were only the first of two phases. The second took place on December 8, 1869. Langevin was transferred from the office of Secretary of State to that of Minister of Public Works, a definite promotion that balanced Chapais' comparative demotion, and gave a French Conservative the control of patronage which the Ontario Liberal McDougall had had. The way was then open to give Aikins the position of Secretary of State Langevin had just vacated.

In the reorganized cabinet Conservative strength had greatly risen and Liberal strength had declined. The number of the cabinet and the pattern of representation remained what they had been in 1867. The representation of French Canada had remained unchanged in number but had increased in weight.

This general situation remained until May 1873, as did the particular situation concerning French Canadian representation. When Kenny resigned on June 20, 1870, to be Administrator of Nova Scotia, Charles Tupper at last entered the cabinet in his place. All the insistence on the need of Irish Roman Catholic representation was apparently ignored until John O'Connor of Ontario succeeded Tupper on July 2, 1872. Tupper succeeded Morris as Minister of Inland Revenue at that date, when Morris became Chief Justice of Manitoba. Tupper followed Tilley as Minister of Customs on February 22, 1873, when Tilley succeeded Hincks as Minister of Finance.

In these, as in other changes, the basic pattern was preserved. When Dunkin went to the bench in October 1871, he was succeeded by John Henry Pope, an English Protestant from Quebec. When Howe resigned on May 1, 1873, to become Lieutenant-Governor of Nova Scotia, T. N. Gibbs, an English Protestant from Ontario, was brought in on June 14, to be Secretary of State for the Provinces, and Hugh McDonald, an English Roman Catholic from Nova Scotia, was brought in as President of the Council on the same date. He succeeded O'Connor, who succeeded Alexander Campbell. Campbell became Minister of the newly created Department of the Interior, which replaced the office of Secretary of State for the Provinces.

One change did occur in the French membership in the cabinet. Chapais resigned from the cabinet on January 30, 1873, and was replaced by Théodore Robitaille of Bonaventure constituency, in the province of Quebec.

The really critical change was caused by the death of Cartier on May 20, 1873. No French successor was in sight and none was found before the ministry was defeated and resigned on November 6, 1873. This departure from the pattern of 1867 was not a violation of principle, and aroused no protest at the time. It was, if significant at all in the summer of the Pacific Scandal, an illustration of the difficulty of forming a cabinet at once representative, reasonably experienced and competent.

Conclusions

What is the significance of this description and analysis of the formation and maintenance of the cabinet of 1867?

It is necessary to keep in mind the background of the 25 years preceding Confederation. In those years French Canadians passed from being a majority in Canada to being a minority. The fundamental cause of the change was the great British immigration.

Confederation, of course, increased the effect of that change, and despite the Acadian French of the Maritimes, the French became even more a minority than before. In consequence, to give French Canadians a just and proper share in the cabinet it was necessary to appoint French cabinet members who in number, importance of office, and personal weight, would be equal to the relative position of French Canadians in Confederation. The problem posed an equation which could have only an approximate solution at best. Good will and some measure of mutual confidence were indispensable to success.

What then was owing to French Canada in the circumstances of French Canada and what did it get in the formation of the federal cabinet?

Again, it is necessary to recapitulate the other features of Confederation. With certain limitations designed to safeguard the English minority, the French Canadians of Quebec received by Confederation control of the province of Quebec.²⁹ With Belleau as Lieutenant-Governor and Chauveau, Cartier's nominee as Premier, the province was governed by French Canadians.

At the same time Quebec and its French Canadians were given a fixed representation in the Commons and in the Senate.³⁰

The relative political position of French Canadians in Quebec was thus assured in Confederation. Quebec, however, received no special benefit like the Intercolonial Railway or the Canadian Pacific Railway, although it participated to some degree in both.

The French Canadians of Quebec were assured by the general agreement of the delegates to the Westminster Conference of three seats in the cabinet of 13. Taking the population of Canada in 1867 at 3,250,000, this meant one minister for each 250,000 of total population. Taking the French population of Quebec at the round figure of 900,000, there was one cabinet minister for each 300,000 of French population.³¹

Thus Confederation meant the loss of one cabinet post to the French Canadians of Quebec. Four had been the usual number in the ministries of the province of Canada, and by the general ratio they were entitled to four rather than three. In the assignment of portfolios Cartier asked for, and got, what was in his opinion "the most difficult of all"

the posts in the cabinet.³² His two colleagues, however, received relatively minor appointments, although the office of Secretary of State was a dignified one, and the portfolio of Agriculture included the important and significant responsibility for immigration.

This situation held until December 1869, when it improved with the promotion of Langevin to the major ministry of Public Works. With the death of Cartier in May 1873, it collapsed and had not been repaired when the Macdonald ministry resigned in November 1873.

Compared with the English of Quebec, both in numbers and importance of office, the French of Quebec were under-represented—one to 310,000 against one to 260,000 by the census figures of 1871.³³ Compared with the Maritimes, the French were greatly under-represented—one to 310,000 against one to 150,000. But only Tupper and Tilley of the Maritime members ever held major cabinet posts, those of Customs and Finance respectively.

In comparison with Ontario, the French did better, as it was one for 310,000 against one for 310,000, using the figures of 1871 and deducting the French of Ontario. But Ontario had the prime ministership and the weighty portfolios of Justice, Public Works, and the Post Office.

The French of the other provinces received no representation.

It is possible to hold, therefore, that the French were in some respects under-represented in the cabinet, both in numbers and weight of portfolios held. An ardent nationalist could well do so, and then point to the collapse of the French position after May 1873, as evidence of bad faith. It must be said that the French might, perhaps, have been given four seats rather than three, as against the English of Quebec and of the Maritimes.

There were, however, offsetting factors. The first was the great personal importance of Cartier, who until his electoral defeat of 1872 was the second man in the Government. The three members were also undoubtedly the spokesmen of French and Roman Catholic Canada in the cabinet. Langevin, who had so much to do with the formation of Section 93 of the B.N.A. Act, may, one may suppose, have spoken for the Acadian French in the New Brunswick School Question.³⁴ The advancement of Langevin also helped offset any underweighting of French representation.

The collapse in 1873 of French representation in the cabinet—caused in part by the growing *nationalisme* that Confederation and the New Brunswick School Question had helped to inflame—was not of significance to the principles of cabinet formation, though it was significant in the search for a man both competent and representative when desired. The *Bleu* tradition was ceasing to attract the fervent young men.

What emerges from these considerations is the inexactness of any assessment. Representation in the cabinet cannot be precisely measured, as can representation by population or by section. Too many intangibles, too many personal factors, are a necessary part of the equation. A cabinet, to be a cabinet—that is, a confidential executive body—must be limited.

Yet the real need in 1867, it would seem, was a cabinet of 15 rather than 13. This would have allowed the French four members and given Ontario one more. Such a total

would have eased the formation of the cabinet, but would not have altered the relative position of the French.

What finally emerges, therefore, is the "over-representation" of the Maritimes. Any student of Confederation will understand how necessary it was, to recognize not only their relatively considerable population and wealth, but also how essential Nova Scotia and New Brunswick were to the existence of Confederation. This necessity prevented, however, bringing the representations of Quebec and Ontario up by decreasing that of the Maritimes. To have taken one each from Nova Scotia and New Brunswick to add to Quebec and Ontario would have given a more mathematically satisfactory overall representation than that actually adopted. But it might well have disrupted Confederation, and no such change was ever suggested by any responsible French or English politician. Adjustments were to be worked out in later cabinets, but in response to other considerations, such as the growth of population in central and western Canada, and the relative decline of the Maritimes.

The cabinet of 1867, with great difficulty, worked out a rough justice in terms of Canadian convention. Those who suffered, suffered only slightly. They were the English Conservatives of Ontario, and the French of Quebec. Those who benefited, if anyone did, were the Maritimers, but this was a necessity of Confederation. Insofar as the French may have suffered it was not from ill will or a desire to repress on the part of the English. It arose from the whole circumstances of Confederation, the deliberate ending of duality in the cabinet and the impossibility of achieving precise equality in cabinet representation.

All cabinet ministers are not in fact equal, but they are persons, and it is impossible to employ persons as vulgar fractions. The French should have had three and one half ministers, but it was necessary to settle on four or three.

The answers, then, to the questions posed with respect to the process of cabinet formation for the cabinet of 1867 are as follows:

1. Because of the decision to have a prime minister of pre-eminent status, it was impossible to recognize a French Canadian as a principal lieutenant, or co-prime minister. Yet in effect Cartier was such, both because of the past relations of Cartier and Macdonald in the cabinets of the province of Canada since 1856, and because of Cartier's general weight and influence. There was thus no question but that Cartier should be acting prime minister during Macdonald's illness from May to September in 1870.

2. There can be no doubt that Macdonald discussed with Cartier all matters relating to cabinet representation from Quebec, and that he accepted Cartier's nominations for his French colleagues. Again, it is impossible to generalize about French-English relations in cabinet-making and functioning in 1867-73. Cartier undoubtedly occupied a special place, both because of the past and because of his own position. I am sure Macdonald discussed the general formation of the cabinet with him. Yet the whole endeavour was to make the prime minister pre-eminent and the final authority over the cabinet and government policy—and this would have been true if he had been French instead of English. Thus, constitutional intent and the still-changing Canadian practice and realities were opposed, and Macdonald had to resolve the conflict as best he could. He consulted freely and reserved few matters to himself alone. He did not accord Cartier a special position because he was French. He did consider him his senior and most trusted colleague because Cartier was Cartier.

3. It is not evident that there was discrimination against French Canadian ministers in the awarding of portfolios in the first instance or in subsequent changes. They received the posts of their preference, or of their weight and experience, or special interest, when these were present. The one evident discrimination is that in the cabinet of 1867, as in all previous cabinets since 1841 and in all since, the ministry of Finance was not entrusted to a French Canadian. The reason is simple. That ministry was always regarded as one to be given to an eminent member of the Canadian business community. There were few such French Canadians and none in political life. The matter seems not to have been remarked on in 1867-1873. This was a discrimination, of course, one arising out of the socio-economic structure of Canadian society. Until that structure was altered, "discrimination" would be practised, and with the assent of French Canadians.

During the life of this cabinet no French Canadian held what is in the present century very much a French Canadian post—the ministry of Justice. Macdonald chose to occupy this himself, because of his past experience and preferences, but in the main because of his great personal interest in the development of the judicial system in the new Dominion and because he hoped the civil law might be consolidated in the Common Law provinces. As such, it was not, of course, any kind of discrimination.

4. There is no evidence of bargaining or agreements on particular policies. In many ways, of course, this had all been done in the formulation of the terms of Confederation itself—for example, in the drawing up of Section 93 with provisions for the protection of minority rights in education.

5. The concept of duality was abandoned with the acceptance of Confederation. The three-to-one ratio for Quebec was agreed on and adhered to by both French and English.

6. All members of the cabinet of 1867, including the French, were supporters of Confederation—all but two were indeed Fathers—and were called to the cabinet as such.

On the whole, the special circumstances of 1867 prevented the questions which prompted this paper from arising. Confederation had been accepted, dual representation had been ended, and a more extensive and complicated plan of cabinet representation had been agreed to by all parties as being fair in the circumstances.

The 1878 Election: Changes in the Conservative High Command

In the general election of September 17, 1878, the Government of Alexander Mackenzie was decisively defeated by a majority even larger than that by which it had been confirmed in power over four years before. In 1874, the Liberals had won approximately 60 seats more than their opponents; in 1878, the Conservative majority was closer to 70. "I resolved to reverse the verdict of 1874," Macdonald wrote proudly to a correspondent, "and have done so to my heart's content."¹ He had triumphed over the humiliation and defeat of the Pacific Scandal in a way that would have seemed utterly impossible less than five years ago. At that time, in the dark autumn and winter of 1873-4, he himself had assumed that his public career had ended for ever. On November 6, 1873, the day after the resignation of his Government, he had met the Conservative members assembled in caucus and had asked to be relieved of the leadership of the party. He had continued in his old post only because the Conservatives had unanimously begged him to do so; but he had publicly declared that he could be only a temporary leader and he had urged the party to find a suitable younger man as his successor.

For nearly two years after the catastrophe of the autumn of 1873, he had been very inactive in party politics; and even later he occasionally repeated his wish for an early retirement from public life. It was not, in fact, until 1876 that all doubts about his real position in the Conservative party were resolved. The beginning of the great debate over Canada's commercial policy, the Conservative adoption of the protective tariff, and the summer's triumphant speaking tour on the picnic grounds of Ontario drove home the conviction, in Macdonald's mind as well as in those of his increasingly ardent followers, that a Conservative victory in the next general election was a real possibility. The recovery of his old role as the dominant and fighting leader of a rejuvenated and purposeful party was completed during the following two years; and on September 18 there could be no doubt whatever that Lord Dufferin, the Governor General, would invite Sir John Macdonald to form the new administration.

Though Macdonald had run in the constituency of Kingston, he was living at that time in Toronto. And so, rather more surprisingly, was his principal Nova Scotian lieutenant, Charles Tupper. For both of them, long residence in Ottawa—it had lasted for Macdonald from the autumn of 1865 to 1874—had served to weaken the connection with their places of origin; and for a good many years before that his relationship with Kingston had grown increasingly interrupted and tenuous. His old law firm, Macdonald and Patton, had already transferred its offices to Toronto. The resignation of his Government and the defeat of the party in the election of 1874 had inevitably driven him back upon his old profession as a means of livelihood. In the autumn of 1875 he moved up to Toronto and soon afterwards established himself and his family in a house on St. George Street, close to University College. Less than a year later, Tupper followed him. Thrown back, like Macdonald, upon his old profession, he had been practising medicine in Ottawa during the winter and spending his summers in St. Andrews, New Brunswick; but the sudden death of his daughter-in-law decided him to move to Toronto in order to be close to his bereaved son. In the early autumn of 1876 he bought a house on Jarvis Street. He had, of course, spent the last weeks of the campaign of 1878 in the Maritime Provinces, but when the election was over he returned, like Macdonald, to Toronto.

Their propinquity, during the two years which preceded the "restoration" of 1878, was significant of much. From the first days of their association at the Charlottetown Conference, Macdonald had been deeply impressed by Tupper's great abilities and enormous force of character; and at the Quebec Conference they had made a "compact" to act together politically in the future. During the first Parliament Tupper's prominence in the party had steadily increased. The humiliation of the Pacific Scandal had left him absolutely untouched. He had been the principal critic of Liberal budgets and Liberal commercial and railway policies during the Mackenzie Government. In 1877, the year after he had moved to Toronto, he accompanied Macdonald on the first phase of the second series of political picnics. It was at the first of these summer meetings, in Kingston on June 6, that Macdonald formally introduced him as the heir apparent to the leadership of the Conservative party of Canada. "I have long been anxious to retire from the position I have held," he told the Kingstonians, "and I am sure you will say, from the acquaintance that you have formed tonight with my friend, the honourable Charles Tupper, that when I do retire, he is a man who will well fill my place."²

Tupper's acknowledged prominence as Macdonald's principal lieutenant and probable successor was the result not only of his own abilities but also of the force of external circumstances. The long years from 1867 to 1878 had seen drastic changes in the upper ranks of the Conservative party leadership. Some of the leading principals of the Confederation years had vanished; the prestige of others had been tarnished or temporarily eclipsed; and although new reputations were in the making, not many were as yet secure and acknowledged. In Ontario and Quebec, perhaps more so than in the Maritime Provinces, the shifting nature of the Conservative high command was clearly exemplified. In Ontario, the Reform wing of the Coalition of 1864, which William McDougall had tried so hard and so successfully to preserve in the composition of the first Dominion cabinet, was now, of course, a thing of the distant past. Fergusson-Blair was dead, William Howland retired, and William McDougall had been seriously discredited by the ruin of his lieutenant-governorship in the Red River Rebellion. Their places in the

Ontario division of Sir John Macdonald's first cabinet had been taken by straight Conservatives—James Cox Aikins, John O'Connor, T. N. Gibbs—but these comparative newcomers had not yet proved themselves to be more than regional leaders, or, as in the case of the Roman Catholic John O'Connor, the advocates of special interests. Alexander Campbell who, with Macdonald himself, had made up the Conservative part of the Ontario contingent in the first Dominion cabinet, was still, and would remain for some years yet, in public life. But, though a high-minded and earnest public servant, critical of Macdonald, yet loyal to him, he would never become a major force in the direction of Conservative party politics.

In the province of Quebec, the changes had, if anything, been still more sweeping. Cartier, H.-L. Langevin and J.-C. Chapais were the three French Canadians who had been given portfolios at the formation of Macdonald's first cabinet in 1867; but by the time of the election of 1874 all three of them had vanished either permanently or temporarily from political life. Sir George Étienne Cartier had died in May 1873, late in the history of the administration, when it was already deep in the troubles of the Pacific Scandal, and no new French Canadian minister was appointed in his place. J.-C. Chapais had resigned earlier, in January 1873, and his portfolio, the office of Receiver General, was given to Théodore Robitaille, the only new French Canadian minister in the cabinet, whose brief tenure lasted for less than a year. In the wide gap left by all these changes it might well have seemed that Langevin could have stepped confidently and with every prospect of permanent high command; but, in fact, the opportunity that might otherwise have been his had already been cancelled as a result of the Pacific Scandal. Since Cartier was dead, Langevin bore most of the ignominy of the Scandal in Quebec and although he led the impoverished and embarrassed provincial Conservatives in the general election of 1874, he himself decided not to run. A year later, when he considered that he might safely venture to re-enter public life, he had the misfortune to run straight into another and only less serious kind of scandal. His election to the Charlevoix constituency, disputed under the provisions of the new elections act, became a celebrated case in the great controversy over "undue clerical influence" in politics, and travelled as high as the Supreme Court of Canada. The Charlevoix election was finally annulled, with costs charged to Langevin; and when the constituency was reopened, his second victory was also protested in the courts.³ This time his election was confirmed; but the protracted legal battle had lasted well over a year, and Langevin emerged from it a somewhat bedraggled and unheroic figure. A late arrival in the third Parliament, he did not take his seat until the session of 1876, and until the court cases were settled his position remained insecure. In the meantime, the real French Canadian members of Macdonald's "old guard" had established themselves independently of his leadership, and L.-F.-R. Masson, the accomplished and able member for Terrebonne, had acquired a definite prominence in the group. When the dissolution came in 1878, Langevin had by no means captured Cartier's place as *chef* in Quebec. In the election of September 17 he suffered another crushing blow: changing his constituency from the unlucky Charlevoix to Rimouski, he was beaten.

Apart, of course, from Macdonald himself, no member of the high command in Ontario and Quebec could seriously rival the continuity and importance of Tupper's services to the party. In his own region, the Maritime Provinces, his pre-eminence could

hardly be disputed either. In Nova Scotia there had been an almost complete disappearance of the leading political figures, both Conservative and Liberal, of the Confederation years. Joseph Howe and Jonathan McCully, those two veteran journalistic rivals, were dead. Archibald was Lieutenant-Governor of Nova Scotia, Henry had been appointed a justice of the Supreme Court of Canada, and Hugh McDonald, an old anti-Confederate who had briefly replaced Howe in the dying months of Macdonald's first administration, had been rewarded with a judgeship in Nova Scotia. One veteran Nova Scotian Conservative, who had joined Tupper's provincial administration as financial secretary in 1864, had made a promising, if brief, appearance in federal politics. Defeated in 1867, James McDonald had been elected for Pictou riding in 1872 and his performance in the second Parliament had won the Chieftain's notice. McDonald was appointed to the famous Select Committee of Five, set up to investigate the Huntington charges in 1873.⁴ The election of 1874 interrupted his career in Parliament, but he was a persistent man and on September 17, 1878 he once more became federal member for Pictou.

Prince Edward Island, which had entered Confederation on July 1, 1873, would probably have to be given a portfolio in the new Conservative ministry; but the Island representative, whoever he was, could hardly be expected to wield any very great influence in the senior councils of the party. The New Brunswick ministers were likely to enjoy a greater authority but, in the political circumstances of 1878, their consequence was also slightly reduced. Tilley, Peter Mitchell, and R. D. Wilmot, the three principals in the great New Brunswick Confederation victory of 1866, were still in public life; and Tilley, who had become Minister of Finance in Macdonald's first administration on the retirement of Sir Francis Hincks, was undoubtedly Tupper's most serious rival for the post of the Chieftain's second-in-command. But Tilley had been appointed Lieutenant-Governor of New Brunswick in 1873 and for five years he had been compelled to stand outside party politics. His term of office had come to an end in the middle of July, 1878, and for the last two months of the election campaign he had vigorously taken over the leadership of the New Brunswick Conservatives.⁵ But in a province where the Liberals were well led and the distrust of protection strong, not even Tilley was able to win a last-minute victory; and New Brunswick, giving the Conservatives only five out of 16 seats, was the only province in the Dominion in which they did not win a majority.

Among the fallen was Peter Mitchell, Minister of Fisheries throughout the first Macdonald administration. Mitchell was a bumptious, jealous North Shore politician, whose truculent policies had made difficulties for Macdonald in the years immediately preceding the Treaty of Washington.⁶ He had, however, given the Conservatives useful if somewhat independent service during the third Parliament and if he had been re-elected in Northumberland, he might possibly have had a fair chance of office despite his party's feeble showing in the province as a whole. But Mitchell had been beaten; and if he were given a portfolio, a seat would have to be found for him, presumably in New Brunswick where reopening a constituency might be a risky business. Mitchell, in short, was a good deal less fortunately placed than his old associate of 1866, R. D. Wilmot. Wilmot was a senator, as Mitchell had been before he resigned to enter the Commons, and Wilmot, though less able and prominent than Mitchell, was available if he should be thought worthy of office.

There could be no doubt about it. In 1878, Charles Tupper occupied a special position in the federal Conservative party. The extent of his authority and responsibility was widest in Nova Scotia and fairly ample in the Maritime Provinces as a whole. But he was no longer exclusively identified, as Tilley still remained, with a particular province or even a particular region. To an appreciable extent he had become a Canadian figure. His role as Macdonald's principal lieutenant was established.

Written Representations from September 17 to October 8

Mackenzie did not hurry with the resignation of his cabinet. Lord Dufferin, whose term as Governor General had come to an end and who was to leave for home that autumn, wanted to preside over the installation of the new Government as one of the last acts of his Canadian career; but also, as he intended to leave by the St. Lawrence route, he hoped that the transfer of power would not be too long delayed. Mackenzie did not make things easy for him. The election had taken place on September 17, and two weeks went by without a sign of the beaten Government's departure. "I am waiting to be summoned," Macdonald wrote to Goldwin Smith on October 1, "Lord Dufferin (*entre nous*) having told me, when here, to keep my carpet-bag ready."⁷ But it was not until Saturday, October 5, that a telegram arrived from Government House in Ottawa, informing him that Mackenzie's resignation was imminent and appointing Wednesday, October 9, for an interview with the Governor General in Montreal.⁸

In the meantime, Macdonald simply waited. Until Mackenzie's intentions were definitely established and his resignation was official, nothing could openly be done. Macdonald did nothing. No potential cabinet ministers were observed arriving in Toronto from out of town. But Tupper had, of course, reached home again and was available for consultation; and if personal appeals to the future prime minister from others were still a little premature, it was always possible to write to his house on St. George Street. Congratulations, suggestions, recommendations began to descend in big batches almost as soon as the results were known. They came from all over Canada, though there were relatively few from the Maritime Provinces. James C. Pope, of Prince Edward Island, whose prospects of office as an Island representative were good, wrote Macdonald dwelling with pardonable pride on the Conservative capture of five of the Island's six seats.⁹ But his letter was exceptional, and most of the communications came from Ontario and Quebec. They usually began with congratulations, but the main interest of the writers was the future Conservative cabinet and their purpose in writing was to make suggestions about its composition.

Some of the suggestions were general in character. One correspondent recalled to Macdonald's attention the considerations which had led in 1867 to the appointment of Edward Kenny, the Nova Scotian Roman Catholic, to the first Dominion cabinet. That appointment, the writer claimed, implied a basic understanding, "that one member of each succeeding ministry should be an English-speaking Catholic."¹⁰ Macdonald hardly needed to be instructed in the political force of this plea; and its exact counter-claim, which probably reached him by the same post—a pointed reminder of the loyal support

which the Orange Order had given the Conservatives during the election— was also, he knew very well, a consideration not to be ignored.¹¹ Alexander Campbell, another probable minister, wrote enclosing a letter from William Miller, a senator like himself, who had played an extremely important part in the change of sentiment about Confederation in the Nova Scotian legislature during the crucial session of 1866. Miller believed that the Conservative group in the Senate should have an adequate representation in the ministry, and Campbell agreed with him. "I think," he wrote, "we should have three in the Senate."¹²

Such recommendations concerned special interests or constitutional conventions. But most of Macdonald's correspondents in the first weeks after the election were more precise. They wrote to support the claims of particular persons for cabinet office. A good many of these letters came from Ontario, a very few from Manitoba. John Schultz suggested that he himself would be a possibility if Macdonald believed that the North West deserved representation in the cabinet;¹³ but most of the letter-writers, sometimes emphasizing their own complete disinterestedness, spoke on behalf of others. The recommendations, for Ontario, were usually far from frivolous. They were made either in favour of previous junior ministers, who had already briefly held office, such as John O'Connor or T. N. Gibbs, or on behalf of promising back-benchers such as Stephenson of Kent, Orton of Centre Wellington, Bowell of North Hastings and Currier of the Ottawa Valley.¹⁴ In almost all cases, the letters came from party workers, or officers in constituency associations. The newly elected members themselves remained discreetly silent.

This was by no means true of Quebec. Macdonald received letters from a good many of the leading French Canadian politicians, including members of the provincial legislature as well as M.P.'s. Langevin, Chapleau, Desjardins, Mousseau, Tarte, Caron, McGreevy and Angers all wrote to him. The great majority of these communications made specific recommendations and only a few correspondents approached the problem of French Canada's representation in the federal cabinet in rather more general terms. Chapleau, with the detachment of a man who had somewhat reluctantly decided to remain in provincial politics a while longer, took the widest view of all. He urged Macdonald not to "forget his Lower Canadian friends," and reminded him that the most popular argument against the *Rouges* had been "their utmost insignificance in the Mackenzie wigwam."¹⁵ He hoped that the French-speaking ministers would be permitted to retain the portfolios they had held in 1873— Militia and Defence, Public Works, with the office of Receiver General, which Chapais and Robitaille had been given, being exchanged for either the secretaryship of State or the ministry of Inland Revenue. There would, he was convinced, be intense and jealous competition for the three portfolios. Masson, if he were well enough, would probably get one of the appointments; but three other members from the Montreal district— Baby, Mousseau, and Ouimet, all of whom were roughly equal in parliamentary service and experience— were rivals for one of the remaining places, and Chapleau feared that a terrible "*guerre de fraction*" might result.¹⁶ He urged Macdonald to make his choices quickly, without seeking too much advice from others. "Our French race," he wrote, "can be very easily ruled, if firmness of action is found in the ruler, when sympathy in the governed pre-exists; but it is the most unmanageable nation if you leave them to decide at which altar they shall worship."¹⁷

Another and quite different factor in French Canadian politics, which Chapleau shared yet tried to modify, was its acquisitive and jealous regionalism. The Montreal members were convinced that their district had done emphatically better in the general election than the Quebec district, and that this gave them a far stronger claim in the distribution of patronage. "That brings forth a question," Alphonse Desjardins wrote, "as to the respective claims of both districts to the favourable attention of the leader. The impression here is that Quebec [district] has had too often the lion's share in the cabinets—as elsewhere—and Montrealers seem as if they were inclined to become jealous of securing their rights. We won't interfere in the choice you will make of the minister from Quebec, but they would be sorry to see an 's' added to that word . . . Pardon me for daring to offer you such information."¹⁸ Chapleau did not venture to be so explicit in writing to Macdonald; but in a letter to Langevin he simply assumed that two of the three French Canadian ministers would be chosen from the Montreal district; "considering the results of the last two elections," he wrote, "we have a right to that."¹⁹ Yet despite this blunt sectional realism, Chapleau never lost sight of the position of French-speaking Quebec as a whole in the federal cabinet. He was aware that a prejudice against Langevin existed among the members from the Montreal district; but he pointed out to them that support for Langevin's claims was the best way of keeping the important portfolio of Public Works in French Canadian hands. "Indeed, everybody understands," he wrote, "that we shall lose the Department of Public Works if we do not all line up on your side."²⁰

Such concern for French Canadian interests in general was unusual. Most of the letters from Quebec that reached Macdonald in the first weeks after the election brought recommendations for particular persons. Langevin, Caron, Blanchet, Robitaille and Chapleau were all suggested for the Chieftain's consideration.²¹ "I suppose by this time," Mousseau wrote amusingly, "that '*chacun offre son ours*'—that is, everybody wants to be Minister."²² He himself disclaimed all personal ambitions, but he reported that he and many of his friends considered that Chapleau ought to be given a place in the cabinet.²³ On his part, Chapleau made no particular recommendations for his own, the Montreal district; but he showed a strong interest in Langevin's claims and a deep regret at his defeat in Rimouski. "His election," Chapleau wrote, "would, I believe, have saved you a good deal of trouble in the selection of your Quebec colleagues. I sincerely hope that it will be in your power to arrange matters satisfactorily to him. It is not my right to offer an advice, but I cannot refrain from giving expression to my sentiments of gratitude toward him."²⁴

There were others besides Chapleau who strongly favoured Langevin. Langevin's claims, in fact, received extremely impressive and perhaps organized support. He and his friends obviously suspected that his failure in the election might have weakened his political influence and reduced his own chances of appointment. Earnestly they set about the work of rehabilitation. More than a dozen people, including Chapleau, Caron, Tarte and McGreevy, wrote to Macdonald strongly emphasizing Langevin's credentials.²⁵ Langevin himself had written, no doubt in some anxiety and trepidation, on September 18, the day after the election. His tone was humble but hopeful. "I need not tell you that I am at your disposal," he wrote, "You know how we have fought together. I am ready to do the same again. If you want me as your colleague in the Commons, I shall have to find a seat

there. If you think that I should go to the Senate to be there your Quebec mouthpiece, well, say so, and I will give up the House of Commons altogether."²⁶

But even this did not exhaust the list of possible French Canadian cabinet ministers. One name, though it was occasionally mentioned in significant connections, was never directly recommended for office. The importance of the personage who bore it was simply taken for granted. This was Louis-François-Rodrigue Masson, an immensely popular man, who had been the member for Terrebonne since 1867, and who had been re-elected in 1878 by a majority larger than any other in the province of Quebec. An established member of Macdonald's "old guard," Masson had played an increasingly important role in the third Parliament. During its first two sessions, when Langevin was away, he had succeeded in consolidating his position. Langevin, after his return, was undoubtedly a more frequent speaker than Masson; but Masson took part in a good many debates, speaking on a fairly wide range of subjects, and more often than any other French Canadian member excepting Langevin. By 1878 he was evidently regarded by the members from the Montreal district as their leader. In 1877, when Macdonald went on a brief speaking tour to the province of Quebec, Masson, along with Chapleau, Langevin, and Thomas White of the Montreal *Gazette*, accompanied him on his travels.²⁷

Yet despite his abilities and his advantages, Masson was not in future to have a particularly active political career. There were other important interests in his life. Chapleau's parents had been poor, but the Massons of Terrebonne were rich, and Louis-François-Rodrigue enjoyed the leisured contentment of country life. His health, moreover, was not particularly good, and his political activities were occasionally interrupted by bouts of illness. Early in June 1878, he had written Macdonald complaining of mysterious aches and pains which the hot weather seemed to aggravate,²⁸ and though the general election was now imminent he had sailed for France for a change of scene and medical advice and treatment. His triumphant election in Terrebonne apparently did not move him either to hurry back home or to communicate with Macdonald, and it was Macdonald who had to get in touch with Masson through Masson's Montreal friends. On the last day of September, Desjardins telegraphed Macdonald that Masson would leave for home by the first boat from Le Havre to New York.²⁹ Both Desjardins and Chapleau apparently assumed that Masson was to be consulted about possible French Canadian appointments to the cabinet—particularly those from the district of Montreal. Chapleau, seeking to excuse himself for suggesting the portfolios to be given French-speaking ministers, informed Macdonald that he had talked these suggestions over with Masson before he left for Europe and that Masson had agreed.³⁰ "But on the whole," Desjardins wrote to Macdonald, "I am satisfied that what you will decide towards Montreal, with Masson's concurrence, will be cheerfully accepted by the party here."³¹

Up until the end of the first week in October, when Macdonald left Toronto for Montreal, French-speaking politicians of real prominence had made very little attempt to exert any important influence on the formation of the new Conservative cabinet. There was no acknowledged *chef* of the party in Quebec; in all probability, Chapleau, Masson, and Langevin would have been accepted as the three principal leaders. Masson had not tried to get in touch with Macdonald; Chapleau and Langevin had both written, but in a modest, deferential fashion, restricting their suggestions within very narrow limits.

Langevin had humbly offered himself in whatever political capacity he might be most useful. Chapleau had supported Langevin's claims and, somewhat apologetically, had ventured to give some general recommendations about the portfolios to be offered French Canadians. No one had felt justified in giving detailed advice, nor had Macdonald invited it. When he left for Montreal, nothing concerning the French Canadian representation in the cabinet had apparently been decided.

Cabinet-Making from October 8 to November 8

On the afternoon of Tuesday, October 8, the Governor General left Ottawa by the North Shore Railway and that evening reached Montreal.³² Macdonald arrived in the city from Toronto the following morning and put up at the Windsor Hotel, where for the next few days the business of cabinet-making was carried forward in a series of confidential talks and interviews.³³ At half-past one o'clock on Wednesday afternoon he met Dufferin according to appointment, and was formally invited to form the new Government. "He was very gushing," Macdonald reported to Tupper, "and said that on personal grounds the warmest wish of his heart was gratified by his having the opportunity of charging me with the formation of a ministry."³⁴ For some time he discussed Conservative policies with the interested and curious Governor General; the talk ranged widely over the proposed new tariff, defence, and the Canadian Pacific Railway, and Macdonald was suitably guarded in his replies.³⁵ He was even more tentative and non-committal about his ministry. "I told him," he informed Tupper, "my cabinet was not cut and dry and would not be till Wednesday when Masson was expected."³⁶ Wednesday was, of course, the following Wednesday, October 16, by which time, Macdonald had learnt in Montreal, it was hoped that Masson would be back.

Macdonald's laconic statement to Dufferin might have seemed to imply that the making of the cabinet as a whole would have to be postponed until Masson's return. But this, of course, was not the fact. A good many appointments had already been decided or nearly decided; and it was chiefly the French-speaking part of the representation from Quebec that still rested in suspense. During that first day at the Windsor Hotel, Macdonald was extremely busy taking soundings of informed opinion in the Montreal district. "I have seen most of the Montreal Conservative M.P.'s, Desjardins, Baby, Ouimet, Mousseau, etc. etc.," he reported later in the day to Tupper.³⁷ Sectional feeling in the district, he discovered, was strong and somewhat vindictive in character. The M.P.'s from the Montreal district were apparently inclined to assume that Langevin's defeat in Rimouski pretty effectively disposed of his chances of a cabinet post. Chapleau, despite his efforts, had not entirely succeeded in mollifying their anti-Langevin prejudices. "They are *against* Langevin," Macdonald informed Tupper.³⁸ Yet, with Masson still absent, even this unanimity was not quite enough. He would have to wait to make up his mind about French Canada.

In the meantime, the cabinet as a whole was rapidly taking shape. On that same busy Wednesday, Macdonald dispatched three important telegrams to the Maritime Provinces.³⁹ Tilley, J. C. Pope of Prince Edward Island, and James McDonald of Pictou, Nova Scotia were all invited to accept portfolios and to join Macdonald in Ottawa

immediately. These three, together with Tupper whose appointment had already been decided upon, would make up the Maritime division of the cabinet, as Macdonald had planned it at that time. As he said later in explanation, New Brunswick's very poor showing in the general election was bound to weigh heavily with him, and, although he did not want to disappoint Tilley or deprive the province of any of its old position and influence, he did not see how he could justify the appointment of two New Brunswick ministers.⁴⁰

Macdonald had predicted accurately when he told Tupper that Tilley, McDonald and J. C. Pope would probably take a couple of days to reach Montreal. By Friday, October 11, they were beginning to arrive and, along with them, other significant personages were observed in town. Senator D. L. Macpherson of Toronto and T. N. Gibbs, the defeated candidate in the South Ontario election, had both appeared; and, what was perhaps more surprising, James Domville, the member for King's County, had made the long journey up from New Brunswick, probably in Tilley's company.⁴¹ Gibbs, though he would have to find another seat, was a cabinet possibility, and Macpherson's presence in Montreal may have suggested a lingering uncertainty in Macdonald's mind about the senatorial representation in the cabinet. To Domville he had offered nothing—or nothing, at any rate, that he had mentioned to his chief confidant, Tupper. In all probability Domville had come, at Tilley's instigation, to lend his aid in the final struggle to win for New Brunswick an adequate place in the national executive. An able man, an active member and fairly frequent speaker in the third Parliament Domville had held his seat in the general election and, in place of the defeated Mitchell, he was probably the best support that Tilley could have brought with him.

The rendezvous for the weekend was Ottawa. Tupper reached the capital from Toronto on Friday morning, October 11. Macdonald came up from Montreal on the same day by the afternoon train, and Tilley and James McDonald were expected that evening.⁴² J. C. Pope, of Prince Edward Island, arrived in Ottawa before the weekend was over; and it is possible that another Pope, J. H. Pope, the member for Compton in Quebec, who had been Minister of Agriculture in the previous Conservative Government, was also called to the capital for the meeting. It was a gathering, as time was soon to show, of ministers designate, at which final decisions may have been provisionally reached about the cabinet as a whole; and it was significant both in respect of those who were there and those who were not. Evidently no French Canadian had been invited to the weekend conclave. Masson was half-way across the Atlantic; Langevin was apparently still in Quebec; Chapleau had remained behind in Montreal.

When the weekend was over, everybody was again on the move. Lord Dufferin left Ottawa on the stately progress which was to take him to Quebec, where his transatlantic journey was to begin on Saturday, October 19.⁴³ His ministers designate returned to Montreal from the capital on Monday afternoon, October 14, and there, in the Windsor Hotel, a formidable gathering of the high command of the Conservative party assembled during the next two days.⁴⁴ There were five Maritimers—Pope of Prince Edward Island, Tupper and McDonald of Nova Scotia, and Tilley and Domville of New Brunswick. From Ontario came D. L. Macpherson, J. C. Aikins, John O'Connor, Mackenzie Bowell, and, of course, Sir John Macdonald himself. Quebec was represented by Chapleau, Robitaille, McGreevy, and J. H. Pope of Compton. It was a significant gathering, which bore a fairly

close resemblance to the cabinet soon to be announced; but while a number of future ministers were present, there were also—if the newspaper correspondents are to be trusted—some important absentees. Langevin had not come, though McGreevy may have been acting as the representative of his interests. Alexander Campbell was not there, but then he had been unwell recently.

By Thursday, October 17, time was running very short. In two days, the Governor General would be sailing from Quebec; and, from every point of view, it was essential that the ministers should be sworn in before his departure. But Masson had not reached New York and there was no certain news of the time of his arrival. Lord Dufferin had planned to leave Montreal for Quebec on Thursday night, and by the afternoon of that day Macdonald evidently felt he could wait no longer. At three o'clock, six ministers took the oath of office; Sir John Macdonald was sworn in as Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior, S. L. Tilley as Minister of Finance, Charles Tupper as Minister of Public Works, J. H. Pope as Minister of Agriculture, John O'Connor as President of the Council, and James McDonald as Minister of Justice.⁴⁵ It was an incomplete list, not more than half the cabinet at the most, and it was vulnerable to the criticisms of opposition newspapers on account both of its deficiencies and of the long delay that had preceded its publication.

It was the work of the Conservative press to answer these criticisms, to explain the delay, and to extol the new ministry. The Montreal newspapers—and particularly *La Minerve* and the *Gazette*—were peculiarly fitted for this task. *La Minerve*, which had been regarded as the mouthpiece of Sir George Étienne Cartier, was a faithful defender of Conservative causes; and Tom White, the proprietor and editor of the *Gazette*, was a confidential and fairly frequent correspondent of Macdonald's. These two newspapers were on the spot; their reporters were not unwelcome at the Windsor Hotel; their editors had occasional access to special information. On Friday, October 18, they both gave extensive news coverage and editorial comment to the new cabinet; and not very surprisingly the resemblance between their respective explanations and observations was remarkably close. The readers of both papers were informed that Macdonald had wished to consult Masson about the Quebec portion of the cabinet ("*la section Canadienne-française de la Province de Québec*" was *La Minerve's* more precise definition) and since Masson could not yet be consulted, only a part of the cabinet had been sworn in.⁴⁶ "The position which Mr. Masson occupies in the party entitles him not only to a seat in the cabinet," the Montreal *Gazette* explained, "but to be consulted in relation to the personnel of the Quebec portion of it; and in consideration of this fact, Sir John Macdonald postponed until the last moment, the final arrangements of his cabinet, even those portions of it belonging to the other Provinces."⁴⁷

The three French Canadian ministers could not be sworn in until Masson arrived. But these were not the only cabinet posts remaining to be filled. Four or five ministers—at least one from the Maritime Provinces and no fewer than three from Ontario—were still to be appointed. Nobody assumed that Masson's concurrence was necessary or desirable for these appointments, and there were other substantial reasons for the delay in making them. Macdonald had evidently not yet decided what senators were to be made ministers, and the problem of New Brunswick's representation in the cabinet was still unsolved. Macpherson and J. C. Aikins, both senators, were present in Montreal. Alexander

Campbell, who had not come to the meeting, was also a senator and had been a member of the first Conservative administration, but Macdonald was aware that there was some opposition to his reappointment.⁴⁸

Moreover, the problem of senatorial representation was complicated by the urgent demands of New Brunswick for a second portfolio. To a newspaperman of the period, the appearance of James Domville in Montreal was eloquent evidence of the strength and persistence with which Tilley was arguing his province's case. The *Globe* of Toronto was, of course, only too ready to invent divisions in the Conservative counsels, and to attribute the delay in the formation of the cabinet to these internal disputes; but it was probably fairly close to the truth when it reported that Tilley had been pressing hard for the appointment of Domville as a second New Brunswick minister.⁴⁹ This, as the event proved, Macdonald was not willing to concede; but by Thursday he had apparently realized that some kind of compromise would have to be made to satisfy the unfortunate New Brunswick. In its issue of October 18, in which the first six ministers were listed, the *Montreal Gazette* announced that it was "understood" that Senator R. D. Wilmot of New Brunswick would be offered the speakership of the Senate and a seat, without portfolio, in the cabinet.⁵⁰ If this concession was made in fact, it would fill one of the three places which were all that even Campbell and Miller had argued should be allotted to the Senate in the ministry; and this would mean that one of the three possible Ontario candidates—Macpherson, Campbell, and Aikins—would have to be dropped.

On Friday, October 18, Masson arrived in New York.⁵¹ He could not possibly reach Quebec before Saturday morning; and this might be too late to permit Dufferin to officiate at the swearing-in of the remaining ministers. The Governor General spent Friday in laying the foundation stones of Dufferin Terrace and the new Kent Gate and in delivering gracious farewells to the citizens of Quebec City.⁵² He was expected to sail for England on Saturday morning; and on Friday Macdonald hurried down to Quebec in order to be present at the Governor General's departure and in the hope that he might be able to swear in the last ministers before he left. Mackenzie Bowell, J. C. Aikins and J. C. Pope of Prince Edward Island also travelled to Quebec in Macdonald's company; and that evening, when the new Prime Minister spoke to the Club Cartier in Quebec City, Langevin and Chapleau were both on the platform.⁵³

By this time, the business of cabinet-making was evidently nearly complete. The names of Macdonald's fellow travellers to Quebec left little doubt about several of the last appointments. It was true that, in addition to Bowell and Aikins, a fifth minister would have to be selected for Ontario; and, most important of all, Macdonald and Masson would have to allot the three French Canadian portfolios. But, in actual fact, only a part of this most formidable problem still remained to be solved. Masson himself had been a certainty from the beginning; and if, as seemed only right, at least one post was to be granted to the Quebec district, Langevin could not be passed over without grave difficulty. Masson was still anxiously awaited, but his coming would probably not result in many surprises.

Masson finally arrived in Quebec in the early afternoon of Saturday. By that time Lord Dufferin had already set out on his journey to England, and Sir Patrick MacDougall, the Commander of the Forces, was about to be sworn in as Administrator of the Dominion, pending the arrival of Lord Lorne, the new Governor General. Sir Patrick's initial act of state was to officiate while the second batch of new ministers took the oath of office.

J. C. Pope was sworn in as Minister of Fisheries, Langevin as Postmaster General, Masson as Minister of Militia and Defence, Mackenzie Bowell as Minister of Customs, and James Cox Aikins as Secretary of State.⁵⁴

When Macdonald and his new associates returned to Montreal on Sunday morning, October 20, only two important decisions remained to be taken. A fifth minister would have to be chosen for Ontario and a fourth for the province of Quebec. For Quebec, Macdonald's and Masson's first choice was Joseph-Adolphe Chapleau, and they evidently considered their preference so important that it was made public on Monday, along with the names of the new ministers. Both the *Montreal Gazette* and *La Minerve* announced that Chapleau had been offered and had been obliged to decline the fourth Quebec portfolio, the *Gazette* adding that it was the ministry of Inland Revenue.⁵⁵ Both papers moreover took care to explain his decision and to praise him for his self-sacrifice. Chapleau, they informed their readers, felt an obligation to retain his post as Leader of the Opposition in the Quebec legislature. Chapleau, *La Minerve* declared, would remain "in order to finish the job begun in Quebec and to bring about the defeat of the Joly Government."⁵⁶

There can be little doubt that this was the true reason for Chapleau's refusal. His entire political career had so far been spent in the Quebec provincial legislature, and there he was engaged in a struggle for the recovery of political power—a struggle which he was convinced was bound to end successfully, but which was not yet over. Early in March 1878, the new Liberal Lieutenant-Governor of Quebec, Luc Letellier de Saint-Just, had abruptly dismissed his Conservative ministry, headed by de Boucherville, on the grounds of its deliberate and contemptuous neglect of his office. Chapleau had been Provincial Secretary in the de Boucherville administration; and when the new Liberal Premier, Henri Joly de Lotbinière, dissolved the legislature and called an election for May 1, Chapleau vigorously led the Conservative attack throughout the province. A virtual draw was the unfortunate result of the election and in the next session of the Legislative Assembly, where the Liberals often survived by only one vote, Chapleau was again in the thick of the fight. In June he repeatedly wrote and telegraphed to Macdonald, excitedly giving him the details of the struggle and requesting his advice.⁵⁷ Yet, despite all his efforts, the Liberals were still clinging to power when the short session ended.

Chapleau felt that it would be impossible for him to leave for Ottawa at this crucial moment. He must stay in Quebec and finish his work. Other French Canadian politicians were only too ready to agree that he should perform this act of self-sacrifice for the good of the party. "Chapleau's leaving us would harm Quebec," wrote Israel Tarte.⁵⁸ and Chapleau himself reported wryly to Langevin that several ambitious Montreal district members had assured him there would be no recriminations if he accepted a federal portfolio but that this would unfortunately cut short the brilliant career he was certain to have in provincial politics.⁵⁹ Yet Chapleau declined Macdonald's invitation somewhat reluctantly and took pains to get as much credit as he could out of his refusal. Two years later, in October 1880, when Macdonald made another of his frequent attempts to persuade him to enter the federal cabinet, Chapleau still declined on the ground that the rehabilitation of the Conservative party in Quebec was not yet complete, though by this time he was back in office as Premier. "This is the third time," he wrote to Macdonald on

that occasion, "I put my individual interests after the good of the party . . ." ⁶⁰ The first time was in October 1878.

Once Chapleau had definitely decided to decline, the remaining posts in the cabinet were quickly filled. On Masson's suggestion Macdonald invited Louis-François-Georges Baby, an M.P. from the Montreal district, to become the third French Canadian minister. He had a brief interview with Baby on Sunday, October 20, and offered him the portfolio of Inland Revenue. ⁶¹ On the same day, or possibly on Monday, he made up his mind about the fifth Ontario post and asked his old friend and partner Alexander Campbell to accept the virtual sinecure of the Receiver General's office, with the promise of the Post Office portfolio in the near future. ⁶² The second appointment from New Brunswick was the last to be settled. Tilley telegraphed in advance to R. D. Wilmot, warning him of the impending invitation; and on Wednesday, October 23, Macdonald wrote offering him the speakership in the Senate and a seat, without portfolio, in the cabinet and, at the same time, asking him if he would be interested in the lieutenant-governorship of New Brunswick when that office was again vacant. ⁶³ He took pains to point out to Wilmot that his offer was a compromise between New Brunswick's previous standing in the cabinet and its very poor showing in the general election.

Baby was sworn in on October 26, Campbell and Wilmot on November 8. The cabinet of 1878 was complete.

Conclusions

It is perfectly clear that in 1878 not one of his French Canadian colleagues had been singled out by Macdonald as his principal lieutenant with a special influence in the making of the cabinet as a whole. The Montreal newspapers complimented Masson as Sir George Cartier's successor; but it was Cartier's "mantle, as leader of the Province of Quebec" which, the *Gazette* claimed, had "fallen upon the member for Terrebonne." ⁶⁴ In fact, as the event was to prove, Masson had neither the ability nor the ambition to achieve Cartier's ascendancy; and even in the autumn of 1878, when everybody waited for him so anxiously, his importance was more apparent than real. The circumstances of September and October, 1878 gave a specious enhancement to the value of his political advice. His absence in France, his hurried recall, the postponement of half the ministerial appointments until his return, and his frantic race against time to Quebec City all helped to put Masson in the news and to lend him a special dramatic interest.

But that was nearly all. Masson's prominence in the newspapers was no real indication of his political importance. His presence and his concurrence were politically important to Macdonald; but he arrived only in time to agree to a set of decisions which was already nearly complete. There were strict limits, moreover, to the matters for which his approval was asked. Nobody, not even Masson's most fervent newspaper admirers, ever imagined that he would have anything to say about the cabinet appointments from Ontario or any of the Maritime Provinces; and it was evidently regarded as proper and unexceptionable that the fourth, the English-speaking portfolio for the province of Quebec, should have been given to J. H. Pope, two days before Masson returned home. Masson's influence, in fact, extended only so far as the three French Canadian appointments; and in the light of

Macdonald's known interest in Chapleau, and Langevin's acknowledged prominence in the Quebec district, that influence was largely confirmatory in character. Baby's appointment was certainly made at Masson's suggestion; but Baby, a junior minister, was only one in a cabinet of 14. Macdonald's principal lieutenant and chief confidant in the making of the cabinet of 1878 was not Louis-François-Rodrigue Masson but Charles Tupper.

In addition to Masson, a number of other French Canadian leaders were asked by Macdonald for their opinions on French Canadian representation in the cabinet. There is almost no evidence that he sent out any written requests for advice; with one possible exception, the numerous letters he received from Quebec were clearly not written in reply to communications of his. He was notoriously wary of the written record on such confidential matters; but discussion was a different matter and once he reached the province of Quebec on October 9, he began to talk freely with federal and some provincial politicians. He told Tupper that he had seen and talked to most of the Conservative M.P.'s from the Montreal district; and when he reached Quebec he doubtless had interviews with Langevin, Caron and others. On their part, the French Canadian leaders were eager to offer advice in person and, long before the new Prime Minister arrived in their province, they had been volunteering suggestions through the post.

Their counsel, in its written form, was concerned exclusively with French Canadian representation in the cabinet; and although proof is, of course, lacking it is very likely that their spoken suggestions were limited in exactly the same way. They had nothing whatever to say about the organization of the cabinet as a whole or the regional distribution of its various portfolios. They showed no concern about the representatives from other provinces, or other groups and interests, whether racial or religious. They did not venture to offer any advice about the fourth Quebec appointment, the representative of the province's English-speaking minority. Their attention was concentrated upon a single subject—French Canadian representation from the province of Quebec. But they were far from speaking with a united voice. There was a marked and somewhat jealous division of opinion between the district of Montreal and the district of Quebec. A number of Macdonald's French Canadian correspondents wrote to support possible representatives from their own districts; most of the letters of recommendation were in favour of a single individual. The sense of regional identity was so strong that few people appeared to be thinking seriously of French Canada's representation as a whole.

Of all Macdonald's French Canadian advisers, Chapleau was the only one who showed much interest in the portfolios which were to be given to French Canadian cabinet ministers. He talked the matter over with Masson, and Masson agreed with his views; but the member for Terrebonne did not apparently take the trouble to write to Macdonald on the subject. All that Chapleau had ventured to ask was that the three portfolios which the French-speaking ministers had held in 1873 should be given to them again, with the possible substitution of the portfolio of Secretary of State or the Inland Revenue for the receiver generalship. Not all Chapleau's wishes were granted. Masson was made Minister of Militia and Defence. The receiver generalship, which was assigned briefly to Alexander Campbell, was soon to be absorbed in the ministry of Finance and in its place Baby was given the ministry of Inland Revenue, as Chapleau had requested. The Department of Public Works, which had been Langevin's before the resignation of 1873, was not

immediately restored to him. Instead he was temporarily made Postmaster General; and Public Works was assigned to Charles Tupper, the caustic critic of Liberal railway policy during the third Parliament. Public Works was a big-spending, important department, and in the light of Macdonald's ambitious plans for western expansion and transcontinental railway building, it was certain to become more important still. Its scope, in fact, was now too large for one department; and Macdonald was probably already planning the creation of the new Department of Railways and Canals and the consequent reorganization of the cabinet, which took place in the spring of 1879. Tupper, as was to be expected, became the first Minister of Railways and Canals; and Public Works, shorn of some of its new consequences, was given back to Langevin.

The idea that the political importance of a particular portfolio, for French Canadians, is to be judged by its relevance "to the distinctive ethnic and cultural interests of French Canadians" is a modern notion which might have puzzled the Fathers of Confederation and their immediate successors, and with which they almost certainly would have disagreed. Cartier, in his speech in the Canadian Legislature in 1865, had emphasized the fact that the powers of the federal Parliament comprehended "these large questions of general interest in which the differences of race or religion had no place."⁶⁵ Defence, tariffs, excise, public works, he declared "absorbed all individual interest"; these matters touched all, concerned all, and could, presumably, be administered by members of all "races"—English, Scottish, Irish and French. Though the three French Canadian ministers formed less than a quarter of the cabinet at any one time, they had, in the 11 years since Confederation, held about two-thirds of the portfolios of government. With the exception of five departments—Finance, Customs, the Interior, Fisheries, and the short-lived office of Secretary of State for the Provinces, which had been abolished in 1873—they had occupied all of the 13 or 14 posts in the federal administration.

The Department of Fisheries had been reserved for Maritimers, and the great prestige of such people as Galt, Hincks and Tilley had so far ensured that Finance had been kept in English-speaking hands. It may have been assumed, through experience or prejudice, that English or Scottish financiers were better than French; but if such an understanding existed, it had never been systematically implemented through the whole range of departments concerned with financial matters and economic developments. The office of Receiver General and the ministries of Inland Revenue and Agriculture had all been occupied by French Canadians. Finally if only a few portfolios had been held exclusively by English-speaking Canadians, none had so far been held exclusively by French-speaking Canadians.

Militia and Defence had undoubtedly been a department of considerable consequence during the period of the American Civil War and the Fenian Raids; but since the Treaty of Washington of 1871 and the withdrawal of the imperial garrisons, its importance had been declining. The scare of war with Russia earlier in 1878 may have slightly revived popular interest in the office and it still carried some prestige, perhaps more in Quebec than in the other provinces. The Montreal newspapers, at any rate, made much of the fact that Masson had succeeded to the portfolio which the great Cartier had held in 1873. The Department of Inland Revenue, the counterpart of Customs, was an improvement on the receiver generalship, which was soon to be eliminated as a separate office; but Langevin's temporary assignment, the Post Office, was a definite comedown from his former

portfolio. None of these departments was particularly concerned with any important political or economic development of the near future, and none earned, or spent, a great deal of money. They were not departments that brought their ministers any very great influence in the cabinet.

The distribution of portfolios, first determined by Sir John Macdonald in 1867, had been altered only as a result of Prince Edward Island's entrance into Confederation, and no further change was made in 1878. Cartier had secured three places for French Canadians out of the four granted to the province of Quebec; this was less than a quarter of the first Macdonald cabinet, and with 14 members in the cabinet of 1878, it was not much more than a fifth of the whole. But there was no apparent dissatisfaction with this share in 1878; and French Canadian leaders in Quebec made no attempt to increase the number of their representatives in the cabinet, or to alter the representation of English-speaking Quebec, or to effect any change whatever in the number and distribution of the cabinet seats, by provinces, throughout Canada as a whole. There was, however, a regional rearrangement of the French Canadian portfolios, with the district of Montreal now contributing two of the three representatives. This shift was claimed and justified on the ground of Montreal's comparatively greater success in the general election. Macdonald used exactly the same argument in reverse when he insisted that New Brunswick's poor electoral results did not merit the second portfolio which Tilley requested. New Brunswick was, in fact, the only province that showed discontent with its share in the new Government; and in the end, after some dispute, it was given two seats in the cabinet but only one portfolio.

Six of the ministers appointed in 1878—Bowell, Masson, Baby, Wilmot, McDonald, and J. C. Pope—had never held cabinet office before. There is little direct evidence to explain why these, rather than others, were chosen. Ability, popularity, political influence and authority were no doubt factors in each case; and in addition each of the new ministers possessed some special and fairly obvious advantage which helped to distinguish him from possible rivals. Bowell represented an important Ontario interest, the Orange Order; J. C. Pope was the obvious choice in a very small Prince Edward Island field; Wilmot was a senator and would therefore not have to run the risk of re-election in New Brunswick; McDonald was a man of whose abilities Macdonald thought highly. Masson, who, like Laurier, spoke English with ease and fluency, was apparently well liked by his English-speaking colleagues, including Macdonald; but the real explanation of the part he played in the formation of the cabinet of 1878 is to be found in his political popularity and prominence in the Montreal district. Why he and Macdonald preferred Baby to Mousseau, Ouimet and Desjardins is a puzzle on which the documents throw no light.

During the formation of the cabinet of 1878, no political leader, whether English-speaking or French-speaking, made any attempt to reach an agreement with Macdonald on any public issue or sought to obtain a commitment from him respecting government policy or future legislation. The Liberal-Conservative party was already committed to an ambitious program of nation-building through immigration, western settlement, and transcontinental transport; and to this there had been added, in 1876, a qualified adoption of protection in commercial policy. In 1878, Conservatives could be suitably vague about the degree of protection which they would impose; but they could not retreat from the principle of tariff adjustment in the interests of Canadian industry.

With good reason, Tilley feared the results of this policy in New Brunswick but though he tried in his speeches to "deal gingerly" with certain of its aspects, he could and did make no attempt to alter it.⁶⁶

In both Quebec and Ontario the Conservative program was generally popular; the only contemporary issue on which French-speaking leaders might have attempted to make bargains with Macdonald before accepting office was, of course, the Letellier affair. Letellier's dismissal of the de Boucherville Government had outraged and infuriated Quebec Conservatives. With fanatical determination they kept insisting that their Lieutenant-Governor had committed an unpardonable constitutional crime and that its only appropriate punishment was his own expulsion from office. During the late autumn and winter of 1878-9, by means of petitions, private letters, and deputations, they urged Letellier's political execution upon Prime Minister Macdonald. Here, obviously, was a burning issue on which prospective French Canadian ministers might conceivably have tried to obtain a commitment from Macdonald during the formation of the cabinet. There is not the slightest evidence that they did so. In the 20-odd letters from French Canadians which Macdonald received in the first weeks after the election, the Letellier affair was not even mentioned. It was not before, but after, the making of the new cabinet that Quebec Conservatives began to exert real pressure for the dismissal of Letellier; and it was months later that a reluctant Macdonald and a still more reluctant Governor General yielded to their entreaties.

The triumph of the Liberal party in 1896 is one of the major events in the evolution of Canadian political parties. The structure of the cabinet formed by Wilfrid Laurier was in many ways tangible proof of the revolution that had occurred in Canadian politics and the Liberal party. The elements in that revolution were the election of a French and Roman Catholic prime minister with solid backing in English and French Canada, the emergence of the Laurier-led Liberals as the moderate party in Quebec, the adoption by the Liberals of a commercial and financial policy similar to that of their opponents, and the support of the party by provincial premiers frankly hostile to centralization. These were the factors that dictated the structure of the cabinet that emerged. Most of the decisions had been made before the election, however, when Laurier was trying to put together a winning combination and when he was in a weaker position than on June 24, 1896.

The Paramountcy of Laurier within the Liberal Party

By 1896 Laurier had emerged as the national Liberal leader. Early in his career he had established a favourable image in English Canada. But his election to the leadership in 1887 was not taken as permanent by many English Canadians who either desired the return of Blake or assumed that some English Canadian, such as David Mills, would gradually emerge as the long-term leader. Many Liberals felt that to enable the party to overcome the decisive Tory majorities in Quebec, however, a French Canadian leader was essential for a short term at least. It is one of the remarkable aspects of Laurier's career that, although racial and religious questions dominated Canadian politics from 1887 to 1896, he was able to consolidate his position and, with the help of a disintegrating Conservative party, gather strength in all parts of the country. By 1896 he was not only the leader of the Quebec wing of the party, he was in most eyes the unquestioned national leader of a national party.

Had there been a leader of the English Canadian or even the Ontario wing of the Liberal party, Laurier's course might have been different. But as Laurier knew, there was no such person in the federal field. The most obvious candidates from Ontario were Sir Richard Cartwright, R. W. Scott, David Mills, John Charlton and James D. Edgar. In time, each of these men received substantial positions within the party, the first three entering the cabinet and Edgar becoming Speaker of the House. But each had very serious shortcomings; none could be a candidate for the position of co-premier or the leading English-speaking Canadian. In the Maritimes the most prominent and influential Liberal was L. H. Davies. Laurier and Davies were close and, in the days before the election, Laurier appears to have relied heavily on his advice. Davies was the negotiator, and was instrumental in securing commitments from A. G. Blair and W. S. Fielding to enter the federal arena. He was also fully aware of Laurier's dealings in Ontario, for he was informed the instant Sir Oliver Mowat had agreed to join Laurier in May. But while Davies was clearly the pre-election Maritime leader, Laurier had been in constant communication with Fielding, particularly since the 1893 convention when the latter had made such an impression, and doubtless looked to him as much as to Davies in 1896 as a Maritime spokesman. Neither man, however, was regarded by the public or the party as a co-premier.

Quite clearly the accession of Sir Oliver Mowat was intended to give the public the impression that he was to Laurier as Cartier had been to Macdonald. Laurier was desperately anxious that Mowat should enter the electoral campaign and join the cabinet. The early negotiations seem to have been carried on in a triangular correspondence between John Ewart, Mowat and Laurier. Laurier had suggested to Ewart in the spring that Mowat should enter federal politics, but the Ontario Premier apparently raised both personal and political objections, the latter being the school question and trade policy. Ewart suggested to Laurier that Mowat be offered the prime ministership and be permitted to bring some of his Ontario colleagues into the cabinet with him. On April 20 Laurier replied:

... that it would be a pleasure for me to make any sacrifice, in order to induce Sir Oliver to enter federal politics. (1) The question of premiership can be easily settled, I would most gladly make way for Sir Oliver. (2) The financial question can also be easily settled, for a syndicate of capitalists, at the head of which are George Cox and S. H. Janes, two of the most wealthy men of Toronto, as you know, is ready to guarantee him an annuity for the rest of his life.¹

Laurier demurred at the inclusion of members of the Ontario cabinet on the understandable grounds that it would cause resentment within the party. Ewart passed on the information to Mowat and suggested direct correspondence between the two, pointing out in a letter to Laurier that the offer of the premiership "will do much to move Sir O. M. to meet your views."² Quite clearly the offer was that and no more; a gesture of esteem rather than a promise that anyone expected would have to be redeemed. Within a few weeks the negotiations were complete, undoubtedly with Laurier giving guarantees on trade policy, and Mowat entered the campaign with a promise of cabinet position. In a letter to Blake on June 25, Mowat reported that he had not consented willingly, but that his first notion had been to refuse: "It was rather as a

matter of courtesy than anything else that I temporised a little, but during the delay I found that our friends thought I wd. render essential service by joining Laurier."³

Naturally much was made of Mowat's decision. After the election the *Globe* led many English Canadian Liberal papers in speaking of the Laurier-Mowat administration and party; and in Quebec *La Presse* and *Le Monde* referred to "*le ministère Laurier-Mowat*."

How much reality there was behind the appearance, however, is uncertain. Most of the decisions about cabinet formation and Liberal policy had been made in advance of Mowat's entry into federal politics. Fielding, Blair, Dobell, Fitzpatrick and Davies had all been guaranteed cabinet positions. Mowat may have helped keep Cartwright out of Finance, but Laurier was sufficiently aware of the views of the industrial, commercial and financial community not to need any prompting on that score.⁴ R. W. Scott had both claims on the party and obvious defects that did not need a Mowat to spell out.⁵ Whether he was influential in securing a position for Paterson and Mulock cannot be determined. Paterson, a manufacturer, was being touted by the manufacturers, while Mulock had as yet few enemies, had good Toronto connections and, since he owned a farm in York country, could pose as a representative of the agrarian interests—the only one who could do so from Ontario or the Maritimes. The organizer of the Paterson lobby appears to have been A. S. Hardy, the new Premier of Ontario. According to John Charlton, it was "a little cabal at Toronto consisting of Jaffray, Cox, Sutherland, Hardy, Mulock and a few others [who] fixed the slate for Ontario."⁶ Surely, Charlton would have known had Mowat been given the power of the veto. Moreover, Mowat's good friend, David Mills, was not invited to enter the cabinet. Although Mills had lost his seat, arrangements could have been made had Mowat been so inclined or been given his preference.

Laurier's Consultations with English Canadians

To the extent that we have any evidence it would appear that Laurier consulted English Canadians only about the non-Quebec wing of the cabinet. There is nothing to suggest that Mowat, Davies, Cartwright *et al* were in any way involved in the background negotiations concerning the entry of Fisher, Dobell and Fitzpatrick into the cabinet. The evidence does suggest, however, that J. Israel Tarte was privy to many of the decisions about English Canadian members and that before and after the election he was the man closest to Laurier. It might be assumed or argued that the selection of Dobell, Joly and, to a lesser extent, Fitzpatrick owed something to known English Canadian views. Dobell was another spokesman for the trade policy demanded in much of English Canada; Joly was widely respected in English Canada and his appointment was hailed as being sufficient to check the political immorality that had disgraced the Mercier regime and much of the old Liberal guard, which many associated with the political tactics of Tarte. Fitzpatrick was to represent, not the province of Quebec or the city of Quebec, so much as the Irish Roman Catholic community in general. The decisions, however, appear to have been Laurier's and all seem to have been made before the election, as will be seen.

Laurier's Choices in Quebec

In selecting the Quebec contingent Laurier must have worked on one assumption: that as a French Canadian prime minister he could personally speak for the entire province of Quebec, and certainly the French-speaking community. Apart from honouring Tarte as party organizer and the instrument through which the fusion of moderate liberalism with moderate conservatism could be achieved, he was not really concerned about representation. His chief concern was not to attract various elements within the community to the party, but rather to exclude the unwanted by the absence of portfolios. As the hostile Quebec press pointed out after the cabinet was announced, Laurier had only given two cabinet positions—and one portfolio—to representative French Canadians: Tarte and Geoffrion. (Because of his Protestantism, many papers preferred not to include Joly as a true member of the French Canadian society.)

There is no evidence to support the charge made by critics that Laurier had bent over backwards to placate English Canada by choosing three English Canadians from Quebec. The three appointments are in themselves explicable. The appointment of Sydney Fisher as Minister of Agriculture was taken for granted by every newspaper, English and French. He administered his department well and handled the patronage of the Eastern Townships without complaint throughout the Laurier administration. The appointments of Fitzpatrick and Dobell appear to have been linked. Laurier wanted Dobell to run as a Liberal and to enter the cabinet, for Dobell had been a Conservative but was prepared to switch to the Liberals. Laurier also wanted him in the party as a representative of the commercial interests of Quebec, as public reassurance that the Liberals would be “all right” on commercial policy, and to assist in forwarding the fast Atlantic line. Late in May Fitzpatrick reported that he was satisfied with a manifesto that Dobell would issue on the question of the tariff. In the manifesto Dobell stated that he was in favour of tariff reform, which would have to be preliminary to imperial preference, that he was opposed to high tariffs and would support freer trade within the Empire, and that he would work towards fair reciprocal trade with the United States. Fitzpatrick told Laurier that “Dobell will be of assistance to us and he is the best available candidate under the circumstances.”⁷ A week after the election Laurier put in writing what he must have planned from the beginning— an invitation to Dobell to join the cabinet as a minister without portfolio. Laurier expressed his pleasure in finding that Dobell was in agreement with him on the trade question: “in my estimation, the one question upon which the future of our country now depends”—and stated that he was determined to make the cabinet “as strong as possible from the commercial point of view . . . [and] the one thing which I would particularly desire would be to have you as an adviser of His Excellency to aid us to frame the new modifications of the tariff, and to prepare new channels for the trade of Canada.”⁸

To enable Dobell to run uncontested in Quebec West it was essential that Fitzpatrick accept nomination in Quebec county, at least so a letter from Fitzpatrick to Laurier on May 27 states. Fitzpatrick, who had earlier declined to be a candidate because it would cost him between four and five thousand dollars and hurt his law practice, declared that his Irish Roman Catholic supporters would be reluctant to see him run in Quebec county. However, as he told Laurier, he would tell them of the offer of the solicitor generalship

for “the prospect of my being in a position to be useful to them will help somewhat I think.”⁹ There were doubtless other reasons for Fitzpatrick’s appointment. Although he ran as a Liberal with independent leanings in the provincial election of 1890, he had been offered a position in the de Boucherville cabinet; moreover, he was a brilliant lawyer who had made a reputation as counsel for Riel and Mercier and in the McGreevy affair. His wife was a French Canadian and he moved easily in the English and French worlds. Furthermore he was a Roman Catholic in good standing among the hierarchy and was selected to visit Rome on the crucial 1897 mission. Finally, he was one of the most outstanding Irish Roman Catholics in the country—with more ability than the Ryans and the Devlins who were clamouring for an Irish Catholic portfolio with their own appointment in mind—and it was understood that he was the Irish Catholic representative in the ministry.¹⁰

Laurier’s determination to attract moderates and to stay as far away as possible from the Liberal machine that had been disgraced by the Mercier scandals, as well as his desire to recognize past services, made the appointment of Sir Henry Joly de Lotbinière virtually inevitable. Although Joly was a Protestant he had been repeatedly re-elected in provincial and federal politics since 1861 in an almost exclusively Roman Catholic constituency. He had retired from provincial politics in 1885 because he disapproved of the extreme Liberal agitation over Riel and remained aloof from the Mercier Liberals. Presumably at Laurier’s urging he had re-entered political life and was vice-chairman at the 1893 convention and agreed to run in 1896. In all probability he was assured of a portfolio—although he was not one to insist on it—for his close friend Lady Aberdeen could state before the election that Joly would be in the cabinet if Laurier was elected.¹¹ In Quebec and throughout Canada, Joly was a hostage to honesty and integrity in the administration, and to English Canada reassurance that the Quebec wing of the cabinet would not slip into the pattern associated with Mercier (and Tarte). At the same time, however, Laurier regarded his tenure as short, and sent him off to British Columbia as Lieutenant-Governor when a vacancy occurred.

To Laurier, if not to everyone, Tarte was an automatic choice for the cabinet. Many English Canadian Liberals had still not accepted him or accustomed themselves to his style of politics or journalism, while many Quebec Liberals still regarded him as a Conservative and a newcomer who somehow had stolen the ear of their leader. Since his unusual defection from the Conservatives, Tarte had become Laurier’s right-hand man, responsible not only for party organization and party battles with all comers—leaving Laurier freer to pursue the paths of sweet reason—but also the confidant of the Liberal chieftain. Some Liberals opposed his selection; Louis Fréchette, for example, wrote to Laurier on June 29 stating that the general opinion was that he should take Geoffrion, Fisher, F. Langelier and Joly—with Langelier to retire soon and give way to Tarte.¹² Others questioned whether Tarte’s services were as great as Laurier imagined. Calixte Lebeuf, two years later, after describing Tarte as a *vilain* and a *vilipendeur* declared that the Liberals won, not because of Tarte but because they had worked for 25 years to convert Quebecers to the principles of Liberalism.¹³ But to Laurier, Tarte was essential both as an organizer and the instrument for absorbing into the Liberal party the school of Cartier and Chapleau. Before and after the election Tarte was in the very centre of Liberal strategy and cabinet formation.

What remained was to placate the *Rouges* or old guard who, while they were not to be admitted to the inner circle of real power, were nonetheless too important to ignore completely. From the Montreal district Laurier selected C.-A. Geoffrion, a member of an old *Rouge* family and an automatic choice. Whether Geoffrion was ever offered a portfolio or whether he turned one down to concentrate on his law practice as some suggested is unknown; at any rate it is highly unlikely he was offered a major portfolio, if any. Laurier also offered a cabinet post to Charles-A.-P. Pelletier, who had sat in the Red Chamber since 1877, but, as he knew, Pelletier was fond of his lucrative position as City Attorney of Quebec and much preferred the less onerous task of Speaker of the Senate and member of the patronage board. Laurier decided to take Joly, then authorized Pelletier to make an "offer-that-was-not-to-be-accepted" to François Langelier. Langelier was foolish enough to indicate he would accept a cabinet position, apparently not realizing until later that his connection with the Mercier regime was too close and that Laurier could not have all four members from Quebec City in the cabinet. However, Langelier was softened with the promise of a position on the bench. Some *Rouges* such as Alfred Thibaudeau and François Béchard went to the Senate, while others received lesser patronage appointments.

French Canadian Press Reaction to the Quebec Representation

There appears to have been a marked difference between the French and English concerns during the period of cabinet formation. While the French press was as interested in the comings and goings in the Windsor Hotel in Montreal (where the behind-the-scenes negotiating went on), and the possible membership in the cabinet, as the English Canadian press, it showed little concern for the distribution of portfolios. Many French papers were content to reprint the educated guesses of the English-language newspapers; nor is there evidence to suggest that French Canadian Liberals were very concerned about the disposition of the portfolios. *Le Temps* reported after the cabinet had been announced that Tarte wanted to be Minister of Railways,¹⁴ but apart from this there is nothing in the public or private documentation to reveal the slightest concern. Why this was so is unknown. The French press may have felt that since there was a French Canadian prime minister, Quebec would be properly represented, and consequently saw no need for other French Canadians to hold major portfolios.

What is striking, however, is that in the period of cabinet formation the French press, like the English, seemed content to pass out all the major portfolios to English Canadians. No English newspaper gave a major portfolio to a French Canadian with the exception of Public Works, which several hopefully gave to Joly. Tarte was variously given Inland Revenue or Secretary of State; Geoffrion was occasionally mentioned as a possible Solicitor General or Secretary of State and the Montreal *Gazette* gave Langelier Public Works. Some newsmen predicted a French Canadian Speaker. The English and French press alike gave Finance, Trade and Commerce, Railways, Interior, Militia, Fisheries, and Justice to English Canadians.

In the end the Laurier ministry was much as had been predicted by the press, particularly after it became known that Cartwright would not get Finance. The ministry was:

Laurier	President of the Council
Mowat	Minister of Justice
Fielding	Minister of Finance
Cartwright	Minister of Trade and Commerce
Borden	Minister of Militia
Blair	Minister of Railways
Fisher	Minister of Agriculture
Davies	Minister of Fisheries
Mulock	Post Office
Scott	Secretary of State
Dobell	Without Portfolio
Tarte	Public Works
Geoffrion	Without Portfolio
Sifton	Interior Designate
Paterson	Customs
Joly	Inland Revenue
Fitzpatrick	Solicitor General

The Treasury Board was also unbalanced, with Tarte sitting among Cartwright, Davies, Borden, Scott and Fielding.

During the same period there was nothing to suggest that French Canadians either demanded equal representation or even relative representation with English Canada in the cabinet. Nor is there evidence that commitments were demanded concerning policy or legislation from Laurier as a condition of entering the cabinet, though commitments were demanded by English Canadians on the trade question.

The reaction to the announcement of the membership of the Laurier cabinet may give more insight into the feeling of French Canada than the official correspondence. It was natural, of course, that the Liberal press would hesitate to criticize the Laurier Government in its first few hours. *La Patrie*, for example, thought the cabinet was the best since Confederation¹⁵ (although Laurier's more modest view was that he thought he had done pretty well). The English Canadian Liberal press both in Quebec and outside, although disapproving of some members and the disposition of some portfolios, was generally laudatory. The Conservative or independent press in Quebec, however, was fairly unanimous in its condemnation.

Le Temps declared that "Mr. Laurier will rule but not govern," and described the first act of the Government as "the deepest national humiliation which could have been inflicted on the French race."¹⁶ The editorial went on to say that of the five important cabinet posts—Justice, Finance, Railways, Interior, Trade and Commerce—none was given to a French Canadian and that indeed there were only three French Canadian names in the whole cabinet. A few days later *Le Temps* lamented: "In this country we are a minority whose characteristics are so little known that we cannot afford to sacrifice the

slightest amount of our influence. . . . We are honoured to have a French prime minister, but it is an empty honour which will cost us dearly."¹⁷

La Minerve (Tory) found it difficult to imagine a worse cabinet:

Running through this list, we immediately and regretfully observe that Mr. Laurier has begun his term by sacrificing Quebec as his expiation for being Catholic and French Canadian.

The province of Quebec has received only two important departments—Agriculture, entrusted to Mr. Fisher who is English and Protestant, and Public Works, assigned to Mr. Tarte—a sorry representative of our race. Mr. Laurier has assumed only the presidency of the Council. Mr. Joly, a Protestant, and Mr. Fitzpatrick an Irish Catholic, have been assigned only secondary posts subordinate to their colleagues. Mr. Joly is under Sir Richard Cartwright and Mr. Fitzpatrick under Sir Oliver Mowat. They are what the Liberals call, with a great deal of irony, apprentice ministers.

In the whole cabinet there are only four [*sic*: five] Roman Catholics. Never have our fellow Catholics been so poorly represented in the federal government.

La Minerve also reported that Tarte desperately wanted the Department of Railways and wondered why, despite his great efforts for the party, he had not received it. The only conclusion that *La Minerve* could come to was: "In spite of that, he failed miserably. Why? Because of the old notion that a French Canadian cannot be a good Minister of Railways, just as it was believed in Quebec City that only an English Canadian could be Treasurer and that, on city council. French Canadians had no right to aspire to the chairmanship of the finance committee."¹⁸ On the following day, July 15, *La Minerve* headlined its editorial "French Canadians Thrown out! "

Everyone is talking about it, Conservatives and Liberals alike. On the streets, in the offices, in the clubs, nobody makes a mystery of the deep humiliation inflicted on us. . . .

He has sacrificed his compatriots; he has completely ignored the district of Montreal.

He has granted only two of 14 departments to French Canadians—one to himself whom he could not reasonably exclude and the other to the Honourable Mr. Tarte. . . . Is it weakness, cowardice or treason? We do not know; but the province of Quebec has been deeply humiliated and slighted.

This is Mr. Laurier's first act as prime minister and this beginning is a shameful capitulation, almost a national dishonour.¹⁹

Two days later *La Minerve* was still railing and talking of treason: "Was it treason? We do not believe that Mr. Laurier is a Machiavelli. Was it anti-national, that is anti-French Canadian, feeling? Even if he is not overly enamoured of his race, Mr. Laurier would not do anything deliberately, his friends assure us, for the sole purpose of humiliating and ignoring it."²⁰

The Quebec *Morning Chronicle*, an independent Conservative paper, joined the chorus of abuse, telling Laurier that he had disappointed everyone by his liberality towards the English. With his Quebec majority Laurier had the right to five colleagues of his nationality and faith, but had remained content with Tarte and Geoffrion. It was, said the *Chronicle*, the first time since Confederation that only two portfolios had been given to French Canada.²¹ The Toronto *Globe* also seemed to realize that with the victory gained

in the province of Quebec French Canada might have expected the lion's share of the cabinet, and the *Globe* congratulated Quebec on its moderation. The *Globe's* comments prompted *La Presse* to remark: "Alas, this is probably not the last capitulation that will be recorded: fear of the cry of 'French domination,' and the need to set an example of impartiality in order to maintain cabinet solidarity will demand many more sacrifices."²² *Le Monde* recalled Laurier's famous speech on March 3, 1896 when he declared that as the leader of a national party he spoke neither as a French Canadian nor as a Roman Catholic. There was no need for English Canada to worry about a French Canadian prime minister, commented *Le Monde* bitterly: "Mr. Laurier has kept his promise: he has forgotten that he is a French Canadian and Roman Catholic This is exactly what we had predicted. Only four Catholics in the whole cabinet and the French Canadians relegated to the background—this is all we have gained by voting in a burst of chauvinistic enthusiasm for one of our own."²³

On September 21, 1911, the day of the Dominion general election, the Montreal newspaper *La Patrie* informed its readers, and through advertisements in the other local papers the residents of Montreal generally, of an electrifying method of revealing the election result. It had, the notice explained, been arranged with the Montreal Light, Heat and Power Company, "whose courtesy is so well known," that that night between the hours of nine and eleven the lights of the city would be turned off once for a fraction of a minute if Sir Wilfrid Laurier and the Liberals were triumphant, twice if R. L. Borden and his Conservatives were the winners. In the evening, at the close of one of the bitterest political campaigns since Confederation, the citizens of the metropolis waited restlessly for the signal. Suddenly the lights went out, came on and then, after a long, agonizing moment filled with mingled hope and fear, went out again. Thus, in Montreal on that equinoctial night, the end of an era in Canadian politics was announced.

The Conservative-Nationalist Alliance and the 1911 Election

A change of government invariably excites great interest in the process of cabinet-making and the interest is even more intense if, as was the case in 1911, the victorious party has been long in opposition. There will be no dearth of eager aspirants, most of them backed by a body of supporters to belabour the prime minister designate with exhortations and advice, but there may be few men still on the scene who are obviously qualified by former experience to assume portfolios and who are acceptable on other grounds as well. As Sir William Van Horne put it to Borden a few days after the election, the "Conservatives of Canada have been long enough out of power to have lost the office-holding habit and there are very few 'left overs' to claim anything." On the basis of that fact Van Horne, not a practising politician, proceeded to attribute to Borden a freedom of choice that was more illusory than real. "You can therefore commence with new and sound materials," he wrote, "and build an enduring structure and one that will

stand as a model for future governments A good many people think they have claims upon you and will be disgruntled if you pass them by and some of the undesirables are prominent and influential; but if they are in the least degree tainted or under suspicion I earnestly hope you will have nothing of them—that you will not take one such into your Cabinet Above all I hope you will be THE LEADER. . . .”¹

Well, Borden *was* the leader, as he was to demonstrate conclusively in the coming years, but like all men in his position he was surrounded by restrictions and restraints when it came to choosing his colleagues. It was not merely a matter of weighing the claims and talents of individuals, of taking the best or most deserving men. A host of prudential considerations had to be kept in mind if the cabinet was to be as broadly representative of the country as Canadian cabinets are expected to be. Various sectional, occupational, ethnic and religious interests had to be represented, and these might take precedence over the strong claims to preferment of certain individuals. But it is always so in Canada and in that respect Borden’s problem of selection was no different from that of any other prime minister. There was, though, one feature of the situation in 1911 that was unusual and this made the problem even more complicated than it would otherwise have been.

The fact was that the victory of the Conservatives—a victory both decisive and sensational—had been materially assisted, as far as one could judge, by two groups which had not hitherto been supporters of the Conservative party, groups which would demand membership or at least influence in the new administration. One was the assortment of Liberal Toronto businessmen who had issued a manifesto against Laurier’s proposed reciprocity agreement with the United States and had worked tirelessly to bring about his defeat. The other was the Nationalist faction in Quebec whose leading figure was Henri Bourassa and who reacted violently against Laurier’s Naval Bill of 1910. The claims of the first group were satisfied by the appointment of one of their number, W. T. White, as Minister of Finance. The case of the Quebec Nationalists was more complex and requires some explanation.

The complexity was caused in part by the difficulty of deciding just who was a Nationalist in 1911 and who a Conservative. The views of the Nationalists and of most French-speaking Conservatives on the issue uppermost in the province—naval policy—were virtually indistinguishable. Both groups were strongly against Laurier’s decision to establish a Canadian navy which might be placed under the control of the British Admiralty in time of emergency anywhere in the world. French Conservatives as much as Nationalists were opposed to Borden’s proposal that a cash contribution be made to pay for new ships to strengthen the British navy, in order to help meet the immediate menace of expanding German power on the seas. Although the Nationalists were described by one prominent Quebec Conservative who was allied with them in 1911 as “nothing else but dissatisfied Liberals,”² on the burning issue in Quebec they were at one with the majority of the Conservatives, and their candidates in the election ran under the label of Conservative-Nationalist.

The closeness of the alliance between the two elements and the extent to which so many French Conservatives had divorced themselves from the rest of the party on the naval question were demonstrated by, among other things, the stance adopted by the leading French-speaking Conservative, F. D. Monk, and by his relationship with Bourassa.

Although he was remotely of Swiss and English ancestry, Monk had for years occupied a pre-eminent place among the French Canadian Conservatives and in 1901 had been chosen federal Conservative leader in Quebec. (It may be noted in passing that this did not make him in any sense co-leader of the Opposition, nor was there any suggestion when the Borden Government was formed that Monk as one of its members was or should be regarded as co-prime minister.) Monk resigned as Quebec leader in 1904 without apparently suffering any marked loss of influence among his compatriots; six years later he fell out with the main body of the party over naval policy and ceased to attend the caucus. Shortly after the new Government took office in 1911, during a speech in the House of Commons, he tried to minimize his quarrel with Borden the previous year. Of all the Prime Minister's qualifications, said Monk, "there was none which I thought so outstanding . . . as his extreme delicacy in all relations. I cannot conceive how it is possible for any man to have any serious difference with the hon. gentleman who sits at my right."³ But their disagreement had been serious enough for Monk, when a challenge to Borden's leadership was being made from another quarter, to refrain from signing a round robin beseeching him to stay on.⁴ It had been serious enough to cause Monk to state at a public meeting at Drummondville in October 1910, as reported in *Le Devoir*: "We are against the navy because we have something better to do with our money than to spend it on buying ships to serve the conflicts and entanglements of Great Britain. . . . I have separated myself from Mr. Borden on that important question and I will continue to fight the battle with my friends the Nationalists as long as the battle is not won. We are not going to abdicate our rights and our principles for the sake of Mr. Borden."⁵

Monk's first pronouncement on the naval issue, expressing views shared by a large number of other Quebec Conservatives, was made at a banquet at Lachine in November 1909, and it was this that paved the way for the alliance with Bourassa.⁶ The two men had not been strangers to one another, of course. Indeed Monk's wife was the grand-daughter of a first cousin of Louis-Joseph Papineau, Bourassa's grandfather⁷ and this, while not a very intimate family relationship, offered a tie of sentiment and kinship. Monk was an admirer of Bourassa despite the fact that they did not see eye to eye on every public issue. After the Lachine speech Bourassa, in his own speeches and his newly-founded paper *Le Devoir*, increasingly gave encouragement and support to Monk. The alliance between them was fully revealed during a stormy federal by-election campaign in Drummond-Arthabaska in November 1910, when "Monkite" Conservatives, with Monk himself playing a prominent part, helped elect a Nationalist candidate in a seat which had been held continuously by the Liberal party since 1887. Thus by the time of the general election of 1911 the political union of Bourassa and Monk was complete and together they led the highly successful effort against Laurier in a province which since 1896 had furnished the solid base of the Liberal ascendancy.

Outside of the predominantly English-speaking ridings, Borden apparently left the campaign in Quebec in the hands of Monk. Bourassa's biographer tells of a meeting called by Charles Beaubien, who had worked as Conservative organizer on behalf of the Nationalist nominee in the Drummond-Arthabaska by-election. Beaubien brought together "at his home four leaders: Herbert B. Ames, very much an imperialist; C. J. Doherty, less an imperialist; F.-D. Monk, a bit of a nationalist; and Bourassa, an

out-and-out nationalist. Thus a tacit understanding was concluded by which Borden would virtually leave the province of Quebec in Monk's hands; and Monk himself was under Bourassa's influence."⁸ Thus Monk, despite his relinquishment of the position in 1904 and his complete disagreement with Borden on naval policy, was implicitly recognized in 1911 as *le chef conservateur* in Quebec. By the same token he and his Nationalist friends were assured of great influence in deciding who would represent the province in the cabinet if the Conservatives won the election. That influence would be all the greater if Quebec made a substantial contribution to the hoped-for victory.

Quebec's contribution was substantial—27 seats—even though it would have been possible for Borden to form a government had the party not won more than the 11 seats captured there in 1908. The extent to which Nationalist support accounted for this marked improvement is impossible to determine exactly. It may be, as one authority has written that "the Nationalists . . . provided the popular platform and personnel, and the Conservatives . . . contributed the less obvious but helpful 'sinews' of campaign funds."⁹ However, there is some reason to believe that it was less a matter of the Monk Conservatives deliberately and cynically appropriating the Nationalist platform, than of the two groups finding a natural basis of union in an attitude on the naval question and the general subject of *impérialisme* which expressed some of the fundamental fears and antipathies of the French Canadians. They were so close together on these matters that they could all fight the battle with a good conscience as autonomists, opposed equally to the Liberal plan of a Canadian naval force and the Conservative proposal of an emergency cash payment. As for personnel, there is no doubt that Bourassa and some of his lieutenants such as Armand Lavergne and Olivar Asselin put forth a herculean and effective effort. At the same time, though one cannot estimate with entire confidence, probably no more than 25 of the 65 opposition candidates in Quebec were actually Nationalists, of whom perhaps 10 or 11 were elected. The fact is sometimes overlooked that in the four preceding general elections the Conservative party in Quebec, while never winning more than 16 seats and on one occasion as few as eight, had always received more than 40 per cent of the popular vote. It is conceivable that even without the Nationalists' support Monk could have exploited the naval issue to add substantially to this large, traditionally Conservative strength and have captured a considerable number of additional seats.

But that is mere conjecture. The Nationalists' support was real and it is only reasonable to assume that that fact was largely responsible for the Conservative candidates (including those who were actually Nationalists) receiving only about 5,000 fewer votes in all than the total given to their Liberal opponents. They got more than 49 per cent of the ballots, a gain of about 8½ per cent over the Conservative showing in 1908. This shift caused the Liberals to lose a number of ridings in which the Conservatives had hitherto done reasonably well but not well enough. It was a striking success which guaranteed Monk and his Nationalist allies a strong voice in the intricate negotiations about to take place regarding the composition of the cabinet.

Monk and his supporters, however, were not the only French-speaking element in Quebec whom Borden had to consider, for the French Conservatives were not wholly united behind Monk's leadership. There were some of the old fashioned *Bleu* variety who distrusted his association with Bourassa and Co., were less dogmatically "autonomist" in

outlook, and were not on very friendly terms with him personally. The three men among these "loyal," "orthodox" and "pre-Nationalist" Conservatives most often mentioned as possible ministers were T. Chase Casgrain, Rodolphe Forget and L.-T. Maréchal. Casgrain was handicapped in his own province by the fact that he had been one of the prosecuting counsel at the trial of Louis Riel, as well as a leading accuser of Honoré Mercier at the latter's trial on charges of corruption in 1892, and he was, in Nationalist circles at least, "considered the most imperialistic of French Canadians."¹⁰ There was a good deal of scepticism about Forget's ability to discriminate between the temptations of private gain and the requirements of public service ("a speculator, first, last and always" one of Borden's correspondents called him)¹¹ and it was argued that it would be unfitting to take a stockbroker into the Government in any capacity. As far as one can judge there was less objection to Maréchal on personal grounds, aside from the fact that he was not identified with the Nationalist viewpoint. Like Casgrain he had not contested a seat in the election and, not being among the elect, was possibly in a less strong position than he might otherwise have been; nonetheless, both he and Casgrain had support. So had Forget, who had run and won in two ridings as the law then allowed. Would it be possible to get at least one of them in to balance Nationalist influence? There promised to be quite a tug-of-war between the Monk and the non-Monk Conservatives, with Borden in the uncomfortable position of being almost certain to antagonize one group or the other no matter what was decided upon.

Letters to Borden about Cabinet Appointments from Quebec

In all the speculation about the composition of the new cabinet one of the few things that seemed to be almost universally taken for granted was that Monk was assured of a place. There were daily reports in the press about what politicians had been closeted with Borden who "remained at home, where he met his carefully selected visitors."¹² The journalists kept their readers posted as to which dignitaries had come to the capital and which others were said to be on their way. There were, of course, rumours galore concerning which portfolio would go to this or that individual, and which individuals would go without. A lot of this gossip was fanciful guesswork to say the least. One story, for example, had it that Sam Hughes might be appointed aide-de-camp to the newly chosen Governor General, the Duke of Connaught, a bit of whimsy which gravely underestimated both Hughes and the well organized letter-writing campaign on his behalf to which Borden was subjected. There were suggestions that Sir William Van Horne be made Minister of Railways and Canals, though apparently no firm predictions that he would be, and what a bonny thought it is to picture *him* at a cabinet meeting or in the House of Commons! As far as Quebec was concerned there was much conjecture over whether Herbert Ames, George Perley or Rufus Pope (a dark horse definitely) would represent the Protestant English-speaking minority; whether C. J. Doherty (almost a sure bet, most agreed) or someone from another province would be the Irish Roman Catholic member; which one or two in addition to Monk from among Bourassa, Lavergne, W. B. Nantel, L.-P. Pelletier, Casgrain, Maréchal, Forget and various other worthies would make up the French Canadian cabinet contingent. But about the future of Monk himself there was little if any doubt except as to which portfolio would be his.

While this guessing game was being played in the newspapers, Borden was bombarded with advice, much of it, of course, conveyed orally by those he consulted, some transmitted in writing. In view of the seemingly irreconcilable disagreement regarding naval affairs between the Nationalists and Monk Conservatives on the one hand, and the balance of the Conservative party on the other, and keeping in mind the rather extreme anti-imperial sentiments expressed by some Nationalists and Monkites during the campaign, one would expect to find unusual interest displayed in English-speaking Canada in the choice of the French ministers. In fact, this does not seem to have been a burning issue outside Quebec. Fear that the Monk-Bourassa axis might obtain an undesirable measure of power predominated in the opinions that were offered. The *Hamilton Spectator*, as staunchly Conservative a paper as there was in the country, doubtless spoke the minds of many people when it sternly warned the new Prime Minister not to knuckle under to Monk and his like.

Mr. Borden has been returned to power with a majority sufficient to permit him to be independent of Quebec, or rather that portion of it which is hostile to Canada's participation in Imperial naval warfare. He is in an ideal position and he should take full advantage of it. . . . there is need for a real naval policy for Canada, and the *Spectator* looks to Mr. Borden and his government to produce such a policy at the earliest possible moment. Mr. Monk may not like it and his Nationalist friends may object, but they are, after all, only a meagre minority, and, like all minorities, must yield to the will of the majority or move elsewhere. Meanwhile Mr. Borden doesn't have to promise Mr. Monk anything in respect to the naval question.¹³

Quebec, wrote Sam Sharpe of Ontario, who was being touted in some quarters as a prospective Minister of Militia, "should not have more than *four* seats at the very outside. I understand strong exertions are being made to have *five* portfolios for Quebec. This should not be allowed on the showing of the Province."¹⁴ J. S. Willison, the Toronto journalist and panjandrum, said he thought that while "we should deal generously with Quebec, surely it is in the West that the Conservative party must chiefly build for the future."¹⁵ Willison evidently did not believe, even in the wake of the great Conservative triumph, that the future had already arrived.

From an even more eminent source came a note of concern that Monk might extract some concession regarding naval matters. Early in October the retiring Governor General, Earl Grey, wrote to Borden:

I do not wish to thrust my advice upon you but I think it may perhaps be useful to you to be able to consult me when you are in any doubt as to which direction your duty to the Crown requires you to steer the ship of which you are now the pilot.

I have, as you are aware, only one desire, and that is to assist you in making such arrangements as will enable the King's government to be carried on in a way that will conduce to the strength and glory of Canada and the Crown. . . . I recognize the great difficulties of your position, and would like to help you if I can; as I know it is sometimes a help to a man to be able to explain his difficulties to some one who is sympathetic, anxious to help, and absolutely disinterested. I beg you will not hesitate to come to me, if you should wish to discuss any point on which you may very naturally be doubtful as to what the permanent interests of the country require. So long as I am in Canada my *whole* time and services shall be at your disposal.

Our short talk yesterday has I confess left me a little uneasy and apprehensive as to the difficulties that you are likely to encounter on the meeting of Parliament, unless you are able to satisfy the House of Commons that the presence of Mr. Monk among your colleagues on the Treasury Bench does not mean a weak or retrogressive Naval Policy.¹⁶

Similar considerations possibly were in the mind of J. K. Flemming, Provincial Secretary of New Brunswick, when he suggested that an Acadian from the Maritimes be included in the cabinet.¹⁷ No doubt he was thinking of the interests of the Conservative party in his province, as well as of justice to the Acadians; but he may also have judged that an Acadian would have a moderating influence on the other French-speaking ministers. It was an attractive proposal but not a very practicable one just then. The only elected French-speaking Conservative from the Maritime Provinces was F.-J. Robidoux of New Brunswick, whose mother was an Acadian, but he was only 36 years of age and his sole previous experience in public office was as a municipal secretary.

Of course not everyone who wrote to Borden from outside Quebec about the general composition of the cabinet shared the widely felt misgivings over the influence of Monk and Bourassa. The knowledgeable, important and interested Clifford Sifton seems not to have cared much who represented the French Canadians in the Government. He sent Borden a list which, he said, "looks to me to be about the strongest slate you can make." For each province Sifton had jotted down the names of certain men but for Quebec his slate read: "Doherty—Perley—2 French."¹⁸

The views received by Borden from prominent English-speaking people in Quebec itself were, in certain cases at least, more carefully considered and better informed than most of those from outside. These people for the most part were more concerned than Sifton about which French Canadians were chosen, and less fearful of the Nationalist virus than many outsiders. Above all they wanted the Conservative party to take advantage of the tie with the Nationalists to entrench itself strongly in Quebec once more. C. H. Cahan of Montreal, whose role not only in 1911 but over a long period of Canadian politics has yet to be adequately described and assessed, set forth his thoughts at some length in a letter to the Prime Minister. It made little difference to the political situation in Quebec, he wrote, whether Doherty was chosen to represent the Irish Roman Catholics and whether Perley or Ames was appointed spokesman for the English-speaking Protestant element. "The selection of at least two French Canadian colleagues for Mr. Monk, who is as much English as French, is the matter of supreme concern in Quebec." Who should they be? "Of the two named in the press, Pelletier was a colleague of Mercier, is alleged to have been a grafter, and is now without political influence even in his own constituency; and Casgrain is entirely out of sympathy with the French Canadians, owing to his connection with the Riel and Mercier prosecutions . . . which have caused him to be execrated to this day throughout Quebec."

There were various men, Cahan continued, who would be acceptable to both French and English, men such as W. B. Nantel and J.-M. Tellier, the provincial Conservative leader, but there was need for something more if the party were to enlarge and consolidate its beachhead in the province. Cahan explained:

Now I have been throughout Quebec night and day for six weeks, and from long experience I know the Latin temperament pretty well. There are thousands of

young French Canadians who have been precluded from all consideration and advancement under Laurier, Lemieux, *et al.* All the old leaders of the old *Bleu* party are either dead and buried, or out of the game, and these young men have had no name and no standard around which to rally except recently around the name and standard of Bourassa.

Bourassa's objective point is the Premiership of Quebec province. You need not worry about him. But to hold Quebec and to make Quebec the very citadel, as it naturally should be of the Conservative party, the spirit and influence of the young men of Quebec must find expression in your Cabinet.

Tellier, Nantel and others will, in a sense, suit both English and French; but give the young Nationalist sentiment one representative such as Lavergne, for instance, and you can make up in Quebec, even against Laurier's personal leadership in the province, all the losses which you must be prepared to suffer in Ontario, at the next election, when Reciprocity is no longer an issue, and when many Liberals in Ontario will naturally fall back into the old party ranks.

As to Forget, he is worthy of all consideration; he has made a splendid fight; but you cannot very well have a stock broker in your Cabinet even without portfolio; and the gambling game engrosses Forget soul and spirit. What Forget really wants is a title; and that you can promise him and, perhaps, fulfil your promise at an early day.¹⁹

Somewhat similar advice came from William Price, defeated in the riding of Quebec West which he had held since 1908. In a memorandum to Borden, who may have been amused upon receiving it to recall that its author had been a leader of the intra-party intrigues against him,²⁰ Price presented his assessment. There must be three French Canadian ministers and, following custom, two should be from the Montreal district, one from the Quebec district. Monk, of course, would be one of the two Montrealers. Who should the other be and who be taken from Quebec? Of the members elected, said Price, three—Nantel, Forget and Pelletier—might be possibilities. Nantel was a "straight level headed man of good ability but lacking in experience in the larger sense." Forget was "very able and if it were not for his large business interests would be a good man for the ministry." As for Pelletier, he too was "able, an excellent debater and of good executive ability, but he is not trusted and is generally unpopular. He is however a powerful man." Price thought that Forget would satisfy either Montreal or Quebec and if he accepted a portfolio it would then be possible to take either Pelletier from the latter district or Nantel from the former. If Forget refused, "as is very probable," both Pelletier and Nantel could be brought in. Casgrain, "a splendid man," had been mentioned but it would be very difficult to elect him anywhere in the province.

Then Price came to the thought he seemed to be most anxious to convey. A further possibility was "to put Armand Lavergne as the minister for the Quebec District. He is very popular and a future leader." Lavergne, who as a member of the provincial Assembly had not contested a federal riding, would be able to "get a county without trouble. He would take with him the younger element and help to consolidate the party in the province." Price conceded that including so fiery a Nationalist in the Government might not sit very well in Ontario and elsewhere but was certain that it would "take" in Quebec. Lavergne, he assured Borden, "is not anti-British, nor is he small. He is capable of great development, and has the qualifications for a future leader of the province." In the ministry, Price concluded, he "would be tied to us and would be a future asset." In a

short note accompanying this memorandum Price remarked: "I may say Monk is very favorable to Lavergne. I have endeavoured to put the situation impartially."²¹

Like Cahan and Price, a third member of the English-speaking establishment in Quebec—Van Horne—did not appear to be overly alarmed about Nationalist power and influence. Without venturing to recommend specifically which Quebeckers should become ministers of the Crown he urged Borden to make a friendly overture to Bourassa.

...I have some reason to believe [Van Horne wrote] that without taking him into your arms or becoming in any way responsible for him you can make him a power for good instead of evil in Quebec. If you were to take advantage of an opportunity to send for him before long for a chat or, better, to ask his advice on some unimportant matter you will I am sure secure his good will and be able later on to steer him in the direction you wish. He feels that you have treated him with contempt and his vanity is hurt. Why not try the experiment? He knows well enough that you can't for political reasons make any concessions to his present political ideas.²²

Implicit in the observations of Price and Van Horne was the assumption that, now that the election was over and they had served their purpose, the Nationalists could be controlled and perhaps even converted into regular law-abiding Conservatives. Lavergne could be tied to the party and made into an "asset" with a seat in the cabinet; Bourassa could be disarmed and transformed into "a power for good" by being consulted on "some unimportant matter." It was not untypical of the Anglo-Saxon patricians of Quebec to believe that the leaders of the French could be managed and manipulated, but neither Bourassa nor Lavergne was the most manageable of men.

Also implicit in these submissions, as in that of Cahan, was a further assumption: that Borden was free to make his own choice of French-speaking colleagues. However, it is not entirely clear that he was, or that he did much more than put his stamp of approval on the choices Monk made after prolonged and sometimes acrimonious discussions with other interested gentlemen from Quebec. Shortly after the election the defeated candidate in Laval constituency, J.-E.-E. Léonard, a Montreal lawyer, wrote to Borden: "The opinion of the great majority of our friends in Quebec is that Monk and Bourassa have made the result in our Province and I am sure that you can take the heart of the Quebec voters in choosing Mr. Monk as your lieutenant in Quebec and and [*sic*] give him a free hand in the choice of your Quebec colleagues."²³ Did Borden follow this advice? It was a question often asked but the true answer is not easy to find.

The Selection of the Quebec Ministers

Of one thing, though, there is no doubt: Monk was one of the first men, and first of all from Quebec, to be summoned by Borden, who wired his invitation the day after returning in triumph to Ottawa from Halifax. Monk was in the capital the following morning.²⁴ Before that call came, however, he had talked over the situation with Bourassa. As the latter recounted it nearly two years later, Monk "began by assuring me that he had no intention whatever of renouncing the opinions he had expressed during the campaign" and then went on to say "that he would not enter the cabinet without

me." Bourassa who was neither suited by temperament nor inclined by choice to exchange his cherished independence for the restraints and responsibilities of public office, gave this idea short shrift. "... Mr. Borden, said I, cannot decently offer me a portfolio; and I cannot, for any consideration, enter a Conservative cabinet." It was different, though, for Monk, an old Conservative, and Bourassa advised him to take a portfolio on terms which would require no sacrifice of principle, and to demand colleagues from Quebec who were acceptable to him. After this interview, Bourassa wrote, "I left for the country in order not to be a witness of the fight over the spoils—a thing for which I have very little taste, I admit,—as well as to be disinfected from a political campaign of two months' duration."²⁵

Monk travelled to Ottawa but what was agreed upon between Borden and him as to the selection of the other French-speaking ministers is not precisely known. Bourassa's biographer states flatly: "Borden summoned Monk who would choose the ministers representing the province of Quebec."²⁶ Bourassa's version, however, is a little more equivocal. He states that Borden, having offered Monk a portfolio, "virtually left to him the choice of his Quebec colleagues; or at least he gave him to understand that no representative from that province would be called to the cabinet without his knowledge and consent."²⁷ Monk himself was alleged to have stated at a political meeting late in October that he had been allowed to choose the other Quebec ministers. This led to questions in the House of Commons, first of all by Charles Murphy.

Mr. Murphy:

1. Is the government aware that . . . Hon. F. D. Monk stated that the Prime Minister had allowed him to select his cabinet colleagues from the province of Quebec?
2. Was any Ontario minister accorded a similar privilege by the Prime Minister? If not, why was an exception made in the case of Hon. F. D. Monk?

Mr. Borden:

1. No.
2. Answered by the answer to No. 1.²⁸

Later in the same question period Frank Carvell asked:

1. Is the Prime Minister aware that the Minister of Public Works declared a few days ago that he had been entrusted with the choice of his colleagues in the Province of Quebec?
2. Who made the choice of the Quebec Ministers, the Prime Minister or the Minister of Public Works?

Mr. Borden:

1. No.
2. The members of the cabinet were selected by the Prime Minister and their names submitted by him for approval in the usual constitutional manner.²⁹

Of course in a formal sense the ministers must be chosen and recommended for appointment by the prime minister, but Borden's answer does not remove the possibility that he acted according to Monk's wishes. One hesitates to reach a conclusion too confidently since matters of this kind were so often decided in private conversations of which there is no record. All that can be done is to try to reconstruct from the available documents what happened as the politicians came flocking to Ottawa to jockey for position and intrigue in smoke-filled rooms.

According to Bourassa he “had explained the situation to a few of our most devoted friends.” After he left Montreal to “disinfect” himself they undertook to exert pressure in order to get the kind of Quebec representation they wanted.

Urged by a few conservatives who, I think, were sincere in their support of the nationalist ideas, they decided to take part in the fight and demand the appointment of ministers favourable to those ideas, or at least bound through their public pledges to defend them.

The “orthodox” conservatives, who had been conspicuous by their absence from the strifes of the last two years . . . and even during the general elections, had risen in all their might and power on the evening of the 21st of September.

Rested by a long sleep, they talked in stentorian tones; starved by a long fast, they had an immense appetite. Forced to accept Mr. Monk, whom they had been cursing for a long time, they demanded that his colleagues be real Tories, free from any nationalist alloy. They were supported by the imperialists, headed by Sir Hugh Graham, who was waving aloft his receipts for election funds and his “promissory notes”.³⁰

Graham, the egocentric and Machiavellian proprietor of the Montreal *Star*, was strongly urging that either Maréchal or Forget be included.³¹

Bourassa explains that between the two clearly opposed factions there was a third force, “the autonomists of the moment, mere pretenders or new-born to the creed,” and they “had but one thought: patronage.” Their real interest was in two “good” departments being assigned to Quebec ministers “to give them a liberal share of the spoils. . . .” They sought an understanding between the two hostile groups and suggested: “Mr. Monk and Mr. Casgrain, with two ‘good’ portfolios; Mr. Lavergne or Mr. Nantel as Attorney General [*sic*]³² and perhaps Mr. Forget, minister without portfolio as a ‘moral force’ (?)”. Several other combinations were suggested as well. After several days of consideration and argument Casgrain and Maréchal were counted out, and Nantel and Pelletier, both acceptable to the Nationalists, were chosen. “Pelletier was the hardest to shove through,” wrote Bourassa, “not so much for his nationalism as for his propensity for complicated affairs. Lavergne had a fight to secure his appointment. He could do no less for the most devoted of his ‘disciples.’”³³ Presumably this rather puzzling description of Pelletier was intended to be ironic.

The word must have gone out from Ottawa that there was determined resistance to Pelletier because Borden was suddenly showered with communications from Quebec City. On October 3 and 5, telegrams signed by large numbers of men, both French and English, and supporting Pelletier as the minister for that district were dispatched.³⁴ On October 4, one prominent Anglo-Saxon resident of the city wired Borden: “There is evidently an impression being created that L. P. Pelletier is not acceptable to English element in this district. That is quite unfair to him and most incorrect. The Chronicle has strongly advocated his representation in your government and Mr. Wm. Price is also most pronounced in this respect.”³⁵ Price seems to have got wind of the fact that his name was being used in this way and he sent off a message of his own: “Please remember that I stand by memo sent you the other day. Don’t take notice of any telegrams purporting that I support any particular man. As long as you choose a man from our district as given in memo, I am satisfied. I have no particular preference.”³⁶ But Price’s memorandum

gave the distinct impression of a preference for Lavergne and if Pelletier was to represent the Quebec district Lavergne would be excluded.

That, of course, was the way things turned out but the question remains, did Pelletier win the place by default after Lavergne turned it down? Bourassa, who interrupted the disinfecting process to be in Ottawa during the weekend of September 30 for a consultation with Monk, and who must have been in touch throughout with what was going on in the capital, stated definitely later on: "It is true that Lavergne refused the appointment of Attorney General [*sic*] and even a portfolio. . . ." ³⁷ On this point and the subject of the selection of the Quebec ministers generally Lavergne himself was reported in the Montreal *Star* as having given the following account at a meeting in November 1912:

The first names proposed . . . were those of Messrs. Monk, Tellier, and myself. I declined this offer of a portfolio in the Cabinet, and at Mr. Pelletier's request, I did my best to make Mr. Monk accept him in my place. He objected at first. Mr. Forget at the same time was working in favour of Mr. T. Chase Casgrain, but I refused to agree to that choice.

It seemed understood then with the Premier and Mr. Monk that Mr. Pelletier would be the Quebec [district] representative in the Cabinet. Later I learned that Mr. Borden's intentions were to have only two French-Canadian ministers in his Government, and it was at this juncture that I went to Montreal on a special train, paid for by Mr. Cahan, to impress Mr. Borden with the necessity of following the tradition, giving three French-Canadian representatives in the federal Cabinet, which point we finally gained. ³⁸

Asked in Parliament whether all this was true, Borden replied stiffly: "The statement which relates to alleged confidential communications is not accurate, so far as the Prime Minister is concerned." ³⁹ There may have been a certain amount of deliberate mischief-making in Lavergne's remarks, which he made shortly after Monk left the Government as a result of continuing disagreement over naval policy; certainly the Nationalists were now bent on embarrassing and harassing the regime they had helped to elect. However, it is not unreasonable to assume that when the Government was being formed, Monk, having hoped in vain to get Bourassa into the cabinet, would aspire to bring in one of Bourassa's chief lieutenants in order to have strong backing at the council table for his stand on the naval issue. He may therefore have proposed such a step to Lavergne. If the latter refused immediately, the matter never reached the stage where Borden would be called upon to make a formal offer.

With Casgrain and Maréchal eliminated, Lavergne (let us assume) having declined an informal invitation from Monk, and Pelletier and Nantel chosen, there remained Rodolphe Forget who, according to Lavergne, had been working on Casgrain's behalf. Balked in that effort, Forget became, if he had not been throughout, an aspirant for office himself. According to one report he was offered a portfolio, refused it and "left Ottawa in great anger." ⁴⁰ A story dispatched from Ottawa on Sunday, October 8 to the Montreal *Gazette* included the news that Forget, "it is now certain, will be minister without portfolio." ⁴¹ When the membership of the cabinet was published the Montreal *Star* explained that Forget had declined a place in it for the time being, "as the granting of a certificate to La Banque Internationale, in which he has a large interest, will come under consideration by the Cabinet." ⁴²

Quite clearly it was no part of Monk's desire to have Forget included. On Saturday, October 7 he scribbled a note to Borden from the Rideau Club: "It seems that two members *Mondou* and *Lesperante* [*sic*]⁴³ want Forget to go in without portfolio. It is for you to decide but it is, as you know, a serious proposition. A message from a nationalist in Montreal informs me that your slate for Quebec was published and gave great satisfaction."⁴⁴ It may be noted that inasmuch as a matter of this importance to Monk was one for Borden to decide, Monk had evidently not been given *carte blanche* in choosing his colleagues.

If Lavergne can be believed, the attempt to get Forget into the Government came to a peak after the Quebec slate had already been agreed upon. That agreement had been reached the day before Monk wrote the note just quoted. Monk was to be Minister of Public Works, Pelletier Secretary of State, and Nantel Minister of Inland Revenue. That, said Lavergne in a letter to Borden which he drafted but, it may be, did not send, was the understanding when he and the other members of "the Quebec delegation" who had been in Ottawa left the capital on Friday. But then the Forget complication arose.

When we got to Montreal at the Place Viger hotel . . . Mr. Forget slipped in and held a private caucus, under closed doors, at which I was not present nor invited. I left for Quebec [City] but all the Quebec members present remained.

The following changes were then suggested: Mr. Monk, public works, Mr. Pelletier, postmaster-general, Mr. Nantel, solicitor-general, & Mr. Forget, without portfolio.

I learned these changes only this morning [Sunday]. I cannot say that I can approve of them. First I think it is a diminution [?] from Quebec, by losing one portfolio, taken away from a French Canadian.⁴⁵ This opinion seems to receive support here [Quebec City] from the nationalists and prominent conservatives. Secondly, I cannot, & my friends either, approve of the entering [?] in a cabinet of a member of the stock-exchange, president of different companies & trusts. This seems immoral, if that word is not too strong.

Lavergne ended his letter by begging leave "to insist, if not impertinent, on the popularity of the first combination, as agreeable to all," and by suggesting "that the situation could be improved if the solicitor-general was elevated to a seat in the cabinet."⁴⁶

What happened after the meeting at the Place Viger Hotel is very difficult to decide from the scanty available evidence. One gathers from Lavergne's version of the incident that Forget would have been satisfied to enter without portfolio. It may perhaps be inferred from Monk's worried message about the two members who favoured that appointment that it was the most that Forget could hope for, that there was no chance of his being put in charge of a department. The only evidence that he was offered a portfolio seems to be the story in the *Star*—that he had declined it because of his interest in the pending bank certificate application—and conceivably that was invented as a face-saver for Forget and for Hugh Graham, his backer, when the makeup of the Government was announced. If Forget left Ottawa "in great anger" it may have been because Monk, Pelletier and Nantel were to be the only French Canadian ministers. Perhaps, still angry, he turned up at the Place Viger Hotel to hold his "private caucus" and managed, either on the Friday night or on Saturday morning, to have the changes of which Lavergne complained accepted by a number of those present as a basis of further discussion. Perhaps, too, the harried Borden was then during Saturday bombarded either in person,

by messenger or over the telephone from Montreal with objections to those changes, including Monk's few lines from the Rideau Club. This might explain what the latter meant when he wrote to Borden from Montreal on Sunday: "I hope you have been able to enjoy a good night's rest, after all the trouble we gave you yesterday. Our friends were really very grateful for your kindly reception of their requests."⁴⁷

The best that can be said for all this is that it is an imaginative but not wholly uninformed reconstruction of events. It may be much worse than that, a tissue of conjecture for which there is no foundation in fact. Borden's comment on the matter is conclusive without being very revealing: "There was a movement in favour of Rodolphe Forget but for certain reasons I thought it undesirable that he should enter the Government."⁴⁸ For whatever reasons and by whatever means, Forget was left out and Monk, Pelletier and Nantel were all given portfolios. None of them, as Bourassa explained to Cahan, who had been under a misapprehension on this score, "are, or ever have been, leaders of the Nationalist group. All that can be said is that . . . they have espoused the Nationalists' program and, in consequence, received the support of the Nationalist group."⁴⁹ This distinction, however, was too fine for many people to grasp. The three men were widely thought of as Nationalists, outside Quebec anyway, and their appointments, coupled with the exclusion of their *Bleu* rivals, amounted to a signal victory for the forces of sentiment and power ranged behind Bourassa and Monk.

The Result

Altogether, counting the two English-speaking choices, Doherty and Perley, Quebec had five ministers (one more than in the last years of the Laurier administration) and four of them held portfolios. No doubt the question of which departments they should be given loomed large in the discussions that went on in Ottawa in late September and early October. Bourassa mentioned the desire of some of the politicians that Quebec receive two "good"—that is, large patronage-dispensing—departments and the desire was fulfilled. In this respect, things turned out better than they would have under the allotments described by Lavergne as having first been decided upon, for Pelletier, instead of becoming Secretary of State, became Postmaster General and the Post Office, like Monk's Department of Public Works, dispensed patronage on an extensive scale. These two portfolios along with Justice which was given to Doherty and Inland Revenue which went to Nantel, were ones which very frequently, though not invariably, had been assigned to Quebec ministers in the past. Although with the exception of Justice none of them was considered to be among the more prestigious posts, there appeared to be no dissatisfaction with them on the part of their recipients.

There is not much evidence of interest on the part of the Quebeckers in what portfolios were allotted to ministers from other provinces, or in who those ministers should be. Here again it must be kept in mind that Monk and the others may have expressed opinions about this to Borden in conversation but there is no reference to it in the available written communications between them. True enough, the French Canadians, it seems, objected to Sam Hughes, which would not be very surprising. One of his friends, J. H. Burnham of Peterborough, reported to Borden that Hughes had heard of these

objections and had said, as Burnham put it, that "if that was the way the F. were going to act then the row might as well come now as any other time."⁵⁰ This could hardly have diminished Borden's misgivings about including Hughes on his roster. Also, though this had nothing to do with French Canadian attitudes, Cahan told Borden after the Government took office that the Bank of Montreal and C.P.R. people thought that Toronto's commercial interests were better represented in the cabinet by G. E. Foster, W. T. White and A. E. Kemp than were those of Montreal by Perley who was not "closely identified with the commercial life of this City." He had been talking to some of them just that day Cahan went on and "they all assure me that you will have their loyal support; yet in reality they hope that as you make changes in Quebec's representation in the Cabinet, you will give the large commercial interests of Montreal a little better show."⁵¹

One important question that arose almost inevitably from the disagreement over naval matters between the Monk Conservatives and the rest of the party was whether Monk, upon entering the Government and assuming a large degree of responsibility for the choice of the others from Quebec, had received any undertakings from Borden as to future naval policy. In his campaign speeches Monk had repeatedly advocated the repeal of Laurier's Naval Act, as well as a plebiscite before any new measures were embarked upon, and specifically before Parliament was asked to approve a cash contribution to the British navy. Bourassa wrote that Monk "had intimated that his acceptance of a portfolio was subject to the abrogation of the naval act and to popular consultation, by means of a plebiscite, on all new naval policy."⁵² Several weeks after the election Pelletier and Lavergne were quoted as telling the audience at a political meeting that the Prime Minister had promised a referendum. Asked in the House whether this was true, Borden answered: "The Prime Minister has made no promise on the navy question, except those which are to be found in his public utterances."⁵³ Assuredly no such promises would be found there and that, as far as the record goes, was that.

Similarly with regard to educational policy in that portion of the District of Keewatin which was shortly to be annexed to Manitoba there were claims and denials that an understanding had been reached between Borden and Monk. The Quebec Nationalists wanted to be sure that the Roman Catholic population of the area would be exempt from the Manitoba law prohibiting publicly supported separate schools, and even apparently hoped that the whole Manitoba School Question might be reopened and resettled in a manner favourable to the Roman Catholic minority. On this subject Bourassa wrote: "He [Monk] did not demand that the Manitoba School question be taken up again through the direct and immediate intervention of the federal power; but it was well understood that the rights of the minorities would be safeguarded in any territory that might be annexed to Manitoba."⁵⁴ And once again Lavergne alleged, as Rodolphe Lemieux phrased it in a question in Parliament, that Borden had promised Monk "that the Government would do something . . . for the Catholics of Manitoba and Keewatin." Was this true? Lemieux wanted to know. Borden's denial was unequivocal: "No promises of the character alluded to were made by the Prime Minister."⁵⁵

Of the two questions, naval policy and schools policy in Keewatin, the former loomed very much larger. It was the issue that had brought Monk and Bourassa together for their onslaught on the citadel of Sir Wilfrid Laurier; it was the issue that led in turn to

the resignation of Monk from the Government he had helped to bring to power. In 1912, when his demand for a plebiscite was refused and a contribution of money to enlarge the British navy was decided upon as official policy, Monk stepped down. Nantel and Pelletier both remained for a time, until late in 1914 when the former was appointed to the Board of Railway Commissioners and the latter was made a judge. But with Monk's departure no strong Nationalist influence remained in the cabinet, and there is little reason to believe that any of those he left behind around the Council table greatly mourned his going.

In the general election of December 6, 1921, the Government of Arthur Meighen was heavily overthrown. The electorate returned 117 Liberals, 64 Progressives, 50 Conservatives, 3 Labour, and one Independent member. Since the new House of Commons contained 235 members, it thus became the first federal election in which no political party won a majority of parliamentary seats. Nevertheless, the Liberals, lacking but one, were plainly in the best position to form a government, and, there being no possible doubt about the verdict upon the Conservative ministry—they had failed to elect a member in six of the nine provinces, and 10 cabinet ministers had suffered personal defeat—Prime Minister Meighen deemed it his immediate duty to offer his resignation.¹

The Fall and Rise of Mackenzie King

For Mackenzie King the election and the prospective summons to office were the fulfilment of a long and concentrated ambition. It was just over 10 years since that equinoctial day in the autumn of 1911 when King, then a junior minister of the Crown, found his career abruptly checked by the smashing defeat which finally overwhelmed the administration of Sir Wilfrid Laurier. In King's case, it had been a double misfortune. Not only did he forfeit his portfolio, the minor Department of Labour, but he was unable to salvage his parliamentary seat, and in the bleak aftermath of the general defeat—when there were few safe Liberal seats, at least in Ontario—King's claims had not been considered sufficiently important for the Liberal chieftains to find one for him. He was thus turned out of Parliament at a time when his political reputation was still far from established (he was 37 in 1911 and he had served for only two years in the House of Commons) and when possession of a seat on the then greatly attenuated Opposition front bench would have given abundant opportunity to develop his powers and advance rapidly up the ranks of the Liberal leadership. It was a bitter disappointment and its edge was in no way blunted when arrangements were deliberately made—and at the highest level of

the Liberal hierarchy—to afford precisely this opportunity to another and only slightly less junior ex-minister from Ontario, George P. Graham.

For a time, Mackenzie King struggled to keep a foothold on the Liberal ladder. He continued to live in the national capital; he took on a succession of publicity and organization chores for his party; and he endeavoured in these and other ways to keep his name before the attention of Sir Wilfrid Laurier and the Liberal party. But nothing came of these various expedients and, at length, in August 1914, King abandoned them in favour of less casual employment. The post he chose, head of the Industrial Relations department of the Rockefeller Foundation, undoubtedly offered responsible work in the main field of his professional training and experience, but it had the distinct disadvantage of taking him away from Ottawa for months at a time and of carrying him even farther out of the mainstream of Canadian public life. It was thus seen as a distraction and Mackenzie King refused to be permanently diverted.

From the beginning, the goal of Mackenzie King had been, quite simply and plainly, the prime ministership of Canada. He had never lost sight of it nor long doubted that one day the prize would be his. In the spring of 1913, 15 months before he began work with the Rockefeller Foundation, he obtained the Liberal nomination in North York and before World War I was over it became clear that in this, as in everything else he had done since September 21, 1911, King had been essentially biding his time. In 1917 his time came. In that year, a military and political crisis burst upon Canada. The Conservative Government of Sir Robert Borden proposed a measure of conscription and invited Sir Wilfrid Laurier and his colleagues to join them in a coalition for the implementation of conscription and, in general, the more vigorous prosecution of the war. Laurier refused, and with his refusal the Liberal party broke apart. One large and important section supported conscription and joined the Conservatives in Union Government; the remainder stayed with Laurier in Opposition. A general election was called for December 1917 and in that election Mackenzie King ran in North York as a Laurier Liberal. He was beaten, but the defeat in North York was the decisive turning-point in his political career. For it was the decision to make the fight for Laurier and to make it in the province of Ontario—where only one other of Laurier's surviving cabinet colleagues, Charles Murphy, did the same—that established Mackenzie King, once and for all in the front rank of the Liberal party. By this single act, he won for himself what he had never had before—a large and powerful following within his party, including, above all, the Quebec Liberals who then represented the overwhelming opinion of French Canada. It was this body of support, represented in great strength at the national Liberal convention called a year and a half later to choose a successor to the "martyred Laurier," which turned aside the aspirations of two prominent conscriptionist Liberals, W. S. Fielding and George Graham, and chose, instead, Mackenzie King. The Liberal tide which King had seized at its absolute ebb in the autumn of 1917 he rode on to fortune in the autumn of 1921. By that time, the Union Government had disintegrated and its unfortunate legatee, the Meighen administration, had run its short and melancholy course into the worst electoral defeat that the Conservative party had experienced. The fall and rise of Mackenzie King was at last completed.

The Liberal Cabinet Potential in 1921

In 1921, 10 years had elapsed since a Liberal government had held office in Ottawa. And in that momentous decade—the most turbulent in Canadian political history since the 1860's—sweeping changes had occurred in the Liberal high command from which a cabinet could be drawn. Sir Wilfrid Laurier was dead and so were many, though not all, of the leading figures of the Laurier era. Others had moved off the political stage, either into retirement or to the bench or to other posts of a non-political character. In addition to these normal causes of attrition, there were others peculiar to the World War I period. The conscription crisis made a great upheaval in the Liberal party. Some of the most respected of the Liberal elder statesmen and many of the most promising of the younger generation had broken with Laurier and linked their fortunes, in varying degrees, with Union Government. After the war some Liberal Unionists returned to their old allegiance but others did not. Of the latter, a few found a permanent home within the reorganized Conservative party; some retired from public life; others, these principally in the Prairie Provinces and rural Ontario, went off on a new political orientation altogether; and there were still others who found themselves temporarily stranded in a kind of political no man's land. For the split of 1917 had been everywhere attended by great bitterness on both sides, and, although, in the postwar years, first Laurier and then Mackenzie King placed “a light in the window” to welcome back the departed brethren, feelings still ran high and division persisted. In many quarters, notably in Nova Scotia, Ontario and Manitoba, there were not a few Unionist Liberals who continued to despise the “Laurier rump,” and there were at least as many Laurier Liberals who cherished a deep hatred for the “betrayers of Laurier” and who were determined that they should receive no further preferment or recognition from the Liberal party. Inevitably it would take time—it took a further 10 years—to effect a general reconciliation, and meanwhile the lingering acrimony was bound to aggravate the problems of Liberal leadership, including the problem of forming a Liberal government at Ottawa. In every province except Quebec the composition of the federal Liberal leadership corps had been greatly altered, and in each of these eight provinces it had been seriously weakened in the process.

In the Maritime Provinces one veteran still towered over the field. Fifteen years as Minister of Finance in the Laurier administration had elevated William Stevens Fielding to an eminence within the Liberal party second only to Laurier and, while the war decade had dimmed the lustre of his reputation, it was by no means extinguished. Fielding and his reciprocity agreement had been blamed for the 1911 defeat and he had made additional enemies by supporting conscription and Union Government. Yet so great was his prestige as a national figure that he came within an ace of winning the Liberal leadership in 1919. In that contest his age (he was 71) and his wartime record told against him, but these considerations could not possibly exclude him from cabinet office in 1921. For the preceding year and a half he had easily borne a large share of the Liberal leadership in the House of Commons and the 1921 election placed him at the head of a solid phalanx of Liberal members from Nova Scotia. Fielding's appointment to the cabinet was a foregone conclusion; his return to his old portfolio only slightly less certain.

Aside from Fielding, however, there was no one else of remotely comparable stature—there had not been in Nova Scotia since the death of Sir Frederick Borden in 1914. Yet Nova Scotia, in every Dominion cabinet but one since 1867, had been represented by two ministers, and December 1921, on the morrow of an election in which the Liberal party captured for the first time every seat in the province, was a singularly awkward moment to repeat the exception. If the tradition were to be preserved, there were, among the “solid sixteen,” three possibilities. A. K. Maclean was acceptable on grounds of ability and experience, but he had been a minister without portfolio in the Union Government and, though he returned to the Liberal fold after the war, it would be very difficult in 1921 to take into the cabinet two Unionist Liberals from Nova Scotia. This was not a bar to the aspirations of D. D. McKenzie: in 15 years in the House of Commons he had never wavered in fidelity to his leader and, for a few months in 1919 following Laurier’s death, he had enjoyed solitary eminence as temporary leader; the real objection to McKenzie was that he was a narrow-minded, cantankerous man who could not be expected to bring strength to a national government. Of E. M. Macdonald, the final possibility, all that could be said was that no businessman need tremble from his presence in the Council chamber and that he had served faithfully in the House of Commons for 13 unbroken years.

The New Brunswick crop of potential ministers was even scantier. After the resignation of Andrew Blair from the Laurier cabinet in 1903 the direction of federal Liberal affairs in the province had passed from one minister to another, and the last of these, William Pugsley, was now Lieutenant-Governor. Frank B. Carvell, the solitary Liberal of genuine promise to come out of the Maritimes during the war, was equally out of the running. Carvell had made a reputation as a fierce critic of the Borden Government, but his powerful convictions on conscription had swept him into Union Government and then, when the tide receded, had left him high and dry in the chairmanship of the Board of Railway Commissioners. With the removal of Carvell’s hand, New Brunswick Liberals fell to quarrelling among themselves, and, as a result, they only succeeded in electing five candidates out of a possible 11 in 1921. None of the five was an obvious cabinet choice. Two were French Canadians whose pleasing manners, modest abilities, and records of long service in the House of Commons almost exactly cancelled out each other’s claims, leaving as the only alternative A. B. Copp, a Sackville lawyer. Copp was a dignified and co-operative politician who had made no influential enemies in the course of a varied legislative career; his hopes for preferment rested on this and on the further fact that his province had not hitherto been denied representation in any Dominion cabinet.

No politician—Liberal or Conservative—had ever arisen in Prince Edward Island to fill the gap left by the appointment of Sir Louis Davies to the Supreme Court of Canada in 1901, and since that date the province had gone unrepresented in the federal cabinet. Although the 1921 election made no striking improvement in the situation, it was a fact that the Island had, for the first time since 1887, elected only Liberal candidates to the House of Commons, and Mackenzie King felt an additional obligation to the Island Liberals for their generosity in finding him a seat in 1919. John E. Sinclair, one of the members-elect, was a prosperous young farmer in good standing whose modest political experience and talent might be made into a suitable instrument of recognition if he were taken into the cabinet but given nothing very complicated to do.

The federal Liberal party in the Maritime Provinces thus presented the appearance of a great many Indians with but one chief, and he a man of 73. In the central provinces the Liberal position was decidedly mixed: weak in Ontario for over a decade, it was supremely strong in Quebec.

In the province of Quebec, the long Liberal ascendancy—accomplished by Laurier and temporarily dislodged by Henri Bourassa and the Nationalist upsurge in 1911—was now fully restored. The battle over conscription had rallied the entire French Canadian community to the standard of Laurier and his stricken party as the only possible instrument of constitutional protest, and, so long as the memory of that struggle remained fresh, the heirs of Laurier were to occupy an impregnable position in their province. In the 1921 election the Quebec Liberals, even more decisively than their associates in Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island, drove all before them and, for the first time since Confederation, gained every seat in the province. The Quebec contingent, a solid bloc of 65 members reinforced by a dozen senators, contained proven and potential cabinet ministers aplenty.

Laurier, of course, was gone, and with him Tarte and Geoffrion and Sydney Fisher and most of their generation. Of the survivors, L.-P. Brodeur was on the Supreme Court of Canada and Sir Charles Fitzpatrick was Lieutenant-Governor of the province. Senator Raoul Dandurand, however, was still available, and his 23 years in the Senate—four of them as its Speaker—combined with his general ability and continuing vigour, made him at 60 an obvious candidate for the leadership of the government forces in the Upper Chamber, a post which had always carried with it cabinet rank.

In the House of Commons there were three seasoned French Canadian leaders who had been promoted, early in life but late in the history of the Laurier Government, to ministerial office and who now belonged to the old guard of Laurier liberalism; they had all remained prominent, in varying degrees, in Opposition and each was still in the prime of life. Rodolphe Lemieux, first in parliamentary ability and in the length and variety of his cabinet experience, had entered Parliament in 1896 and, after Henri Bourassa stepped aside, he had been brought forward rapidly and given in succession the posts of Solicitor General, Postmaster General, and Minister of Marine and Fisheries. Henri-S. Bédard, a less conspicuous figure in every way, had succeeded Lemieux as Postmaster General for a few weeks in 1911; he too had given effective service in Opposition, though his parliamentary career had been broken by three years internment as a prisoner of war in Germany. The oldest and by far the most attractive of the three was the member for Trois-Rivières, Jacques Bureau. A blithe and buoyant sprite of a man, Bureau had been for over 20 years one of the most popular members of the Commons, and although there had been nothing remarkable about his tenure as Laurier's Solicitor General in succession to Lemieux, he had repeatedly, out of his inexhaustible wit and optimism, entertained the Liberals in office and lifted them in Opposition. Standing slightly outside this circle of the old guard there was George H. Boivin, an able and attractive new man who had risen to the deputy speakership within a year of his election to Parliament in 1917; but Boivin's prospects of promotion to a Liberal cabinet were dimmed by the fact that he was known to have been negotiating with Arthur Meighen in the spring of 1921, in response to the latter's offer of a cabinet post.²

None of these men, however, had stepped into the spacious vacancy in the politics of Quebec left by the death of Sir Wilfrid Laurier and, in fact, the question of who was to be his successor as the principal Liberal spokesman of French Canada was still unsettled. Among the federal parliamentary group the one who came the closest was Ernest Lapointe. Lapointe had come into Parliament in 1904, a young lawyer from Kamouraska county with a farming background and no influential connections. Lacking them and lacking, too, the vivacity and the cultivated eloquence of Bourassa and Lemieux, his progress was slower and he did not attain cabinet rank during the Laurier regime. Lapointe possessed, however, more durable qualities: he was loyal, dependable and, above all, teachable, and it was one of Jacques Bureau's principal services to his party that he took the young Lapointe under his wing, and in a thousand kindly ways guided him through the intricacies of parliamentary procedure, Quebec politics and the English language. Under this tutelage and with encouragement from Laurier, Lapointe's political education advanced, and, as the Liberals moved through the prolonged and turbulent period of opposition, his steadiness and tenacity shone more brightly. In 1916, he stepped briefly into national prominence in the debate over the Ontario bilingual schools question; and in the 1919 Liberal convention, where his influence over the Quebec caucus was a vital factor in focusing French Canadian preferences on the choice of Mackenzie King, it was evident that Lapointe had attained a definite prominence among the Quebec Liberal leaders, a prominence which made it appear quite suitable when he switched constituencies and took over Quebec East, Sir Wilfrid Laurier's old seat. And yet in 1921 it was still true that Lapointe had not fully established his position as the chief of Quebec Liberals and in that year he was confronted with a new and exceedingly formidable rival on the flank.

Sir Lomer Gouin was by all odds the most impressive parliamentary recruit whom the 1921 election brought forth. His whole life hitherto had been spent in the law and politics of Quebec, and in both spheres he had gone about as far as anyone could go. He was a former *bâtonnier général* of the provincial bar; his law firm was closely connected with several of the largest business enterprises in Montreal; and for 15 years he had been an exceedingly forceful and successful premier of the province. In 1920, at the age of 59, he resigned from the provincial government and in 1921 he was elected to Parliament for the Montreal division of Laurier-Outremont, an accomplishment which he undoubtedly considered as no more than a stepping-stone to another summit. For Gouin, in addition to his other qualifications, was a masterful and domineering personality, used to command and fairly breathing authority, and it is unthinkable that he should have left the provincial premiership for a seat on the back benches of the House of Commons or for any political office other than one of acknowledged pre-eminence among French Canadian Liberals in federal politics. Gouin and Lapointe had clashed briefly in the behind-the-scenes manoeuvring at the Liberal convention in 1919; the cabinet formation of 1921 was to be their second and major encounter.

There were, in addition to this array of French Canadian cabinet prospects, three aspirants for the cabinet appointment which custom had assigned (sometimes it had been two) to the English-speaking population of Quebec. One of them, Walter Mitchell, was a recent transfer from the provincial field and in this respect, as well as in his background and outlook on public issues, he bore a striking resemblance to Sir Lomer Gouin. A

Montreal lawyer, Mitchell had made his way rapidly up the professional and business world of that city into the government of the province: he had been for six years Provincial Treasurer in the Gouin administration, a post which he filled to the entire satisfaction of the business community and which he left in November 1921 to become, a fortnight later, the member of Parliament for Saint-Antoine, the first Liberal ever to represent that riding. Although neither his career nor his presumptions soared quite so high as did those of his senior colleague, Mitchell was an unusually able and ambitious man whose sights, like Gouin's, were naturally set on the cabinet. One distinct alternative to Mitchell was Andrew McMaster, also a Montreal lawyer but in other ways a quite different public man. McMaster was a Cobdenite Liberal of very independent views, and in the course of four years as the member for Brome he had made a strong impression by force of character and by his unremitting assault upon the system of protective tariffs. Standing almost at midpoint between these two on issues of economic policy was a third possibility, James A. Robb, a flour miller and moderate protectionist from Huntingdon. Robb thus appeared in the advantageous role of a compromise candidate for cabinet appointment, and his claims were further enhanced by a record of four years of sagacious and persuasive service as chief Liberal whip in the House of Commons.

The Liberal party in Quebec was unique in the strength of its cabinet potential. There was a plenitude of candidates—more in fact than there were posts to go round, if the province was to receive anything like its customary share. Competition was bound to be keen, pressure on the Prime Minister intense, and he would have his work cut out to eliminate in such a way as to do the least damage to party unity in the province and to the Government's position in the country as a whole.

In Ontario and even more in the provinces of the West, this was not the problem. Nowhere in that great expanse from the Ottawa River to the Pacific was there a goodly harvest awaiting a federal Liberal cabinet-maker. The Liberal party in Ontario had fallen upon lean times. Cartwright, Paterson and Scott—venerable even in the prewar era of Liberal ascendancy—were all dead. Three others, Sir William Mulock, Sir Allen Aylesworth, and C. S. Hyman, were still living, but Mulock was on the High Court of Ontario, and Aylesworth and Hyman had been contentedly in retirement since 1911. Of the surviving Ontario members of the Laurier cabinet this left, besides Mackenzie King, only two—George Graham and Charles Murphy—actively in public life. Murphy, in addition to experience, possessed honesty and energy—he could be relied on to be a very energetic spokesman for the Irish Roman Catholic vote—but he was also an unforgiving and contumelious individual, a prey to ferocious animosities, and likely to prove an exceedingly difficult cabinet colleague. Graham, with an even longer and more varied experience—he had served in the government of Ontario before becoming federal Minister of Railways and Canals—was, in other respects, very different from Murphy. A shrewd and genial man of surpassing good humour, Graham had laughed and joked his way into the affections of countless men. His wartime record was ambiguous—he voted for conscription but declined to join Union Government and then stood aside from the wartime election—but it did not prevent him from making a quite respectable run for the leadership in 1919. His weaknesses were a timidity in the face of great issues and a tendency to think of politics solely in terms of rewarding friends and organizing followers; his misfortune, in 1921, was that for several years before 1917 he and his

friends had stood in Mackenzie King's light in the province of Ontario. Both Graham and Murphy were, in fact, senior to King in age and in cabinet experience; both had been prominent in the Liberal Opposition at Ottawa after 1911; both were re-elected in 1921; and Mackenzie King disliked the pair of them. Still, their claims could not lightly be set aside if only because there were so few available alternatives and because Ontario had never had fewer than four ministers in the federal cabinet. To be sure, there were, among the score of Ontario Liberal members, one or two promising newcomers like Euler of North Waterloo and Malcolm of North Bruce, but they would require a period of apprenticeship before they could be considered for cabinet posts. And, finally, there was T. A. Low, a small businessman and promoter from Renfrew, who had been in Parliament before the war and in whom King saw, or thought he saw, the makings of a political organizer.

There were, in fact, only two Ontario Liberals of high ability whom the war years had brought into federal politics. One of them, Newton W. Rowell, a man of outstanding intellect, had left the provincial leadership to become President of the Privy Council in the Union Government; but Rowell had become, more than any other Unionist Liberal, anathema to Laurier Liberals and he was, for that reason, unavailable. The other was W. C. Kennedy, an Irish Catholic. Kennedy, the president of a private utility company and a popular ex-mayor of Windsor, was scarcely a national figure but he was the nearest thing to a prominent businessman in politics whom the Liberals, outside of Quebec, could produce in 1921. He had come into the House of Commons as a Laurier Liberal in 1917 and had made his mark on the Opposition benches; Mackenzie King had been so favourably impressed that, three months before the 1921 election, he had offered Kennedy a portfolio so as to make sure that he ran. Aside from Kennedy, there were no new men with strong claims, and this meant—especially if Graham or Murphy were to be jettisoned—that someone would have to be found outside the ranks of official Liberalism in Ontario. The most likely recruit was James Murdock of Toronto, a prominent and widely respected trade union officer whom Mackenzie King had drawn into the election campaign with the promise of a portfolio; but Murdock, unfortunately, was now a defeated candidate.

It was in the provinces west of the Great Lakes, however, that the war and postwar years had caused the most sweeping changes in the Liberal leadership, leaving it, in fact, almost entirely dismantled. William Templeman was gone from British Columbia and since his death the federal interests of the party had been in the care of Hewitt Bostock, Liberal leader in the Senate. None of the three British Columbian Liberals elected in 1921 was of cabinet calibre. On the Prairies there had never been a Liberal with the ability or the energy or the commanding authority of Clifford Sifton, but after his resignation from the federal cabinet in 1905 a new generation of leaders had emerged through farmer organizations and provincial politics. The members of this group which included J. A. Calder, T. A. Crerar, Arthur Sifton and W. M. Martin, were almost all Liberals, but such was the power of the conscription issue that they were, with few exceptions, swept up into the campaign for Union Government, and in the postwar years the one who remained most active in federal politics, T. A. Crerar, left the federal Department of Agriculture to take up the leadership of a new political movement. The wave of Unionism was followed by a wave of Progressivism and under the force of these successive

disturbances the Liberal party on the Prairies was torn from its moorings and, both in federal and provincial politics, all but completely overwhelmed. In the federal election of 1921 not a single Liberal was elected in Alberta and Frank Oliver, the only survivor of the Laurier era, went down with the rest. The sole Liberal elected in Saskatchewan was W. R. Motherwell, a veteran homesteader and provincial Minister of Agriculture. He was undoubtedly of cabinet stature, but, like Oliver in Alberta, he had just concluded a bitter campaign against the new farmers' movement and his appointment to the federal cabinet would bring little, if any, farm support to the Government. In Manitoba two Liberals were elected, both in Winnipeg ridings, but by far the more promising of the two, A. B. Hudson, a former attorney general of the province, had run as an Independent-Liberal, choosing this way of signifying his sympathy with the cause of Progressivism and his desire to keep free of embarrassing entanglements with official Liberalism. In the conditions of postwar Canada, the Liberal party on the Prairies, no less than the Conservative, had virtually ceased to exist.

Mackenzie King's Plans and Principles of Cabinet-Making

The general election of 1921 took place on December 6, a Tuesday. Mackenzie King took the next day off and on Thursday he turned to the problem of forming a government. From that moment until the afternoon of December 29, just three weeks later, when his administration took office, King's energies were fully engaged in this single task.

The first three days were spent in taking stock and laying plans. The salient feature of Liberal cabinet potential, as it presented itself to Mackenzie King, was the exceedingly lopsided character of its distribution throughout the country; and this feature underscored, in a peculiarly forceful and urgent manner, the regional strengths and weaknesses of the Liberal party in the aftermath of World War I. Supremely powerful in Quebec, very strong in the Maritime Provinces in electoral support, if not in leadership, the Liberals were very much weaker everywhere west of the Ottawa River. They had won only a quarter of the seats in Ontario and British Columbia (21 out of 82 in Ontario and 3 out of 13 in British Columbia). Out on the Prairies, traditionally an area of pronounced Liberal strength, the Liberal party, as an organized force in federal politics, was in almost total eclipse. The essence of the predicament was that political recovery from wartime and postwar damage was by no means complete, and that, in the meantime, the Liberal party was not a genuinely representative national party, certainly not in the sense that it had been before the war or that the Conservative party was in the post-Confederation era.

One cause of the difficulty was, of course, the bitter cleavage which the conscription issue had made in Liberal ranks in all the English-speaking provinces. And yet, ever since the federal convention of 1919, the task of reconciliation had been in hand, and the 1921 election returns were proof that, at least in the Maritimes and in scattered parts of Ontario, definite progress had been made. Nothing of the kind had occurred, however, in most of rural Ontario or in the Prairies, and in this failure resided the second and more compelling reason for the continuing weakness of the Liberal party. In these two areas

the farmers of Canada, in revolt against the business interests of the country and against the Conservative and Liberal parties which they considered to be tools of business, had cut adrift from old allegiances and launched upon a political venture of their own. The United Farmers' movement, organized on a local and provincial basis and animated by all the fervent indignation of an evangelical crusade, was an immediate and smashing success at the polls. Six months after the armistice the farmers turned out a Conservative Government in Ontario and installed E. C. Drury, a former Liberal, in the premiership at the head of a Farmer-Labour administration; in 1921 the farmers accomplished a similar feat in Alberta; and subsequently, in Saskatchewan and Manitoba, Liberal Governments were only narrowly to avert the same fate, the former by a severance of all ties with the federal party, the latter by the device of a Progressive-Liberal coalition. Fired by their provincial conquests and by victory in seven federal by-elections, the farmers' movement drove on into federal politics, and in the 1921 election the Progressive Party, led by T. A. Crerar, became the most successful third party in federal political history, sweeping the Prairie Provinces virtually clean with 38 out of a possible 43 seats, capturing 24 in Ontario, and adding one from British Columbia and one from New Brunswick to make a total coup of 64 seats, exactly 14 more than the Conservative total for the whole of Canada.

The effect on the Conservative party was to complete the ruin of the Meighen Government; the effect on the Liberal party was only less unfortunate. It was not simply that the Liberals were denied a mathematical majority—and even more emphatically, a clear working majority—in the House of Commons. This was an embarrassing, but not necessarily a paralyzing, consequence, since a Liberal Government could expect support from the Independent member, and there was already reason to believe that two Ontario Progressives would also be helpful.³ Much more serious was the fact that the Progressive sweep on the Prairies denied the Liberal leader the opportunity to construct out of his following in Parliament a fully representative cabinet and barred the door to the restoration of the Liberal party as an effective national party.

To Mackenzie King it was a distinctly disappointing, though not a surprising, feature of the election.⁴ He had, in fact, foreseen the danger and for more than a year he had been trying to forestall it, to head off the farmers' revolt, and to bring its leaders into some kind of working combination with the Liberals. From the beginning King viewed the farmer and labour movements as ephemeral manifestations of liberalism which should be absorbed into the Liberal party. He had therefore endeavoured, while in opposition, to prevent Liberals and farmers from being drawn into open conflict with each other, both in the House of Commons and in federal by-elections. On three separate occasions between November 1920 and February 1921, he had proposed, first to Crerar and then to Drury, an open coalition of Liberals and Progressives to be worked out before a general election so that the two groups could present a united front against the Government and avoid the perils of three-cornered contests in the constituencies.

The response of the farmer leaders had been very cool. They distrusted King's sincerity, they feared that such an arrangement would be unacceptable to their following—that it would indeed, split the farmers' movement and dissipate its strength at a time when it was very definitely on the rise—and they preferred to wait until after the election, when they fully expected to be in a very powerful bargaining position. In

consequence, all King's approaches had failed, and the Liberals were drawn into a fight against Progressive as well as Conservative candidates. The campaign proved to be a heated one and unavoidably feelings were aroused which further clouded the prospects of a Liberal-Progressive alliance. King himself not only reversed his earlier decision in favour of a coalition but actually committed himself publicly against the idea on at least two occasions during the campaign and in his first post-election statement to the press. This did not mean, however, that he had given up all thought of reconciliation. Despite a mounting irritation with the Progressive leaders, King was still in sympathy with the farmers' movement and, besides, the plain and stubborn fact remained that, until the Progressives or the body of opinion which they represented could be won over, the position of the Liberal party in Parliament and in the country would be precarious and, so long as this was true, King's own future as a party leader was bound to be uncertain.

For Mackenzie King, therefore, it was not a question of whether to effect a reconciliation with the organized farmers of Canada but only of when and how, and in the aftermath of the election he thought he saw answers to these questions. Able for the first time to offer the Progressive leaders office and power, and with these the opportunity to participate in decisions of the federal government on all those issues of economic policy which were of such urgent concern to the farmers' movement, King decided to invite them into his Government. It was a vitally important decision and it shaped the entire course of cabinet formation in December 1921.

The invitation, if it were to succeed, would not only have to be made attractive to the Progressives but would have to carry the support of the Liberal party in the House of Commons. The Liberal parliamentary group, aside from the handful from the four western provinces, was made up of three elements: 25 members from the Maritime Provinces, 21 from Ontario, and the full complement of 65 Quebec members. Mackenzie King did not expect much objection from the Maritimes—and certainly not if Fielding was prepared to endorse the move—but he could not be as confident about the two other components. Within the short space of two years the Liberal party in Ontario had been beaten by the farmers' movement in two general elections—one provincial, the other federal—and in 1921 there were many Ontario Liberals, especially in the western part of the province, who were in no mood for generous treatment of an antagonist who had prevented them, as they felt, from capitalizing fully on the prevalent anti-Conservative feeling. On the other hand, Ontario Liberals had cut such a consistently poor figure in every election for more than a decade that they were in no position to dominate the national councils of their party. Much more to be feared was any serious opposition from Quebec. For in 1921 the province of Quebec, breaking every precedent, had voted solidly Liberal, and its 65 members now constituted—also for the first time since Confederation—a majority of the parliamentary party out of which the Government of Canada would be formed. The Quebec Liberals were thus in a position of very great strength; their support of any major piece of Liberal policy or strategy affecting their interests was indispensable; and on the point of taking the Progressive leaders into the Government that support could not simply be taken for granted.

Yet if the danger of opposition from Quebec had to be taken seriously, it was not likely to come equally from all quarters of the province. For the traditional regionalism of Quebec politics persisted well into the twentieth century, and in 1921 the Liberal

party in the province, superficially a monolithic bloc, was in fact divided into two quite definite groups and the division—corresponding broadly to the distinction between the districts of Quebec and Montreal—was reflected not only in the presence of two groups of federal leaders but in differences of attitude and temper on a wide variety of public questions, including those economic issues which were relevant to any rapprochement between the federal Liberal party and the organized farmers of Ontario and western Canada.

The Quebec district group, led by Ernest Lapointe and his associates Bureau and Béland, was firmly based on the traditional farming and professional interests of French Canada, and its views on the tariff and other economic questions were moderate and sufficiently flexible to allow of considerable accommodation with the farmers. The Montreal Liberals, by contrast, were intimately associated with the great financial, transportation and industrial enterprises of that city, and in the circumstances of postwar Canada the leaders of the Montreal business community were in an apprehensive and unaccommodating mood. Their fears, aroused by the uncertainties of the transition from a war to a peace economy, were aggravated by contemporary eruptions of social discontent and political protest, and not least by the farmers' revolt, a phenomenon which was viewed in Montreal as a dangerous assault on the protective tariff and the whole associated system of national economic policies with which the prosperity of the metropolis was inseparably connected.

In this unwelcome atmosphere of economic change and political instability the leaders of Montreal business were by no means certain of where to turn for the protection of their interests in federal politics. The Conservative party, though safe as always on the tariff, had forfeited their confidence as a result of the railway policy of the Borden and Meighen administrations. The federal Liberals, though much less heavily committed to dangerous experiments in public ownership of transport, had never been entirely reliable on trade policy, and their new leader was an unknown quantity as prime minister. On both counts Montreal business found the combination of the new Liberal platform, with its promise of specific and sweeping tariff reductions, and Mackenzie King's pre-election gestures to the farmers less than reassuring. The two politicians who, above all others, commanded the confidence of Montreal business leaders were the Premier of Quebec, Sir Lomer Gouin, and his Provincial Treasurer, Walter Mitchell, and it was upon this pair and their advancement at Ottawa that they placed their main reliance.

Mackenzie King, faced with these two rival factions, had leaned toward the Quebec group and particularly toward Ernest Lapointe whom he brought forward into a position of special prominence. Within two months of his election to the party leadership King told Lapointe that he would want him in any Liberal administration at Ottawa, and in the succeeding two years he selected Lapointe more frequently than any other politician, English or French, to accompany him on a series of speaking tours throughout the country. In September 1921, within a week of the announcement of the election, King offered Lapointe his choice of any portfolio in a Liberal Government, and said that he would look first to him in any negotiations for the formation of a cabinet. At the same time, however, King did not fail to give encouragement to the Montreal group. Once the Progressive leaders had turned down his pre-election overtures for a coalition, it was plain that the Liberals would need all the election help they could get, including the financial

support of the city of Montreal. To obtain it, King, at the urging of Rodolphe Lemieux and Raoul Dandurand, had invited Sir Lomer Gouin to move into the federal field, and offered him the Liberal leadership in the Senate and a place in the Government without portfolio. With the same objective in view, King deliberately played down, during the campaign, the tariff and railway issues which divided Montreal so sharply from the farmers' movement.

Yet Mackenzie King's pre-election encouragement of the Montreal Liberals was based on immediate political necessities rather than genuine sympathy. King distrusted the political influence of business and, in the case of the Montrealers, he sensed that what they wanted was not simply a share of political power but full control of a federal Liberal administration. This he was determined to prevent both because a government controlled from Montreal would frustrate the reconstruction of the Liberal party in the agrarian sections of the country and because, as a general principle, he did not want any single interest to dominate a government of his making. Moreover, King saw in the postwar manoeuvres of Montreal business and its political allies a serious threat to his own position as party leader. His suspicions had been excited during the months preceding the election by a series of rumours and reports to the effect that an alliance of protectionist Liberals and Conservatives was being spawned in Montreal. In March 1921 the chief Liberal whip told King that George Boivin, the Deputy Speaker, had been pressed to join the Meighen Government and that two other French Canadian Liberal members were also to be approached. Then, late in September, while he was campaigning in the Maritimes, King heard from another source that a meeting had taken place in Montreal between leading men of both parties, including Prime Minister Meighen, Sir Lomer Gouin and Lord Atholstan of the Montreal *Star*, at which the terms of an alliance had been worked out. Whether, in fact, these rumours were true, it is certain that Mackenzie King took them seriously. He considered for a time the idea of withdrawing from North York in favour of a safe seat in Prince Edward Island; he made it plain that he did not want either Gouin or Rodolphe Lemieux (whom he also suspected of being party to the conspiracy) to campaign in Ontario; and he took the even more unusual step of asking both these men for public expressions of loyalty to his leadership.⁵

The election eased this "danger" by returning Mackenzie King in North York at the head of the largest party in the House of Commons and with the prime ministership within his grasp, but it did not wholly remove his apprehensions. The Liberals plainly lacked a secure parliamentary footing, and King feared that, if his Government should stumble from one narrow escape to another in the House and thence, perhaps, to humiliating defeat, intrigues against his leadership would revive and would overthrow him. It was a most disturbing possibility and, as he reflected on the problems of cabinet formation, King saw in it an additional argument for a new approach to the farmers' movement. If the Progressive leaders could be brought into his Government, and if their parliamentary supporters could steadily be melded with the Liberals, the danger of a Government defeat would be greatly diminished, his own position correspondingly strengthened, and a large step taken toward the complete restoration of the Liberal party. Yet, somehow, this would have to be done in such a way as not to excite serious opposition within his own party, and especially among the high protectionist Montreal wing of the Quebec Liberals. It was the imperative need to avoid this consequence that

enhanced the importance of Ernest Lapointe both as a counterweight to the influence and aspirations of Gouin and as the one man who might be able to keep the main body of French Canadian Liberals in line. To gather in the Progressives with one hand and to elevate Lapointe to paramountcy in Quebec with the other—these became the two central and related elements in Mackenzie King's ambitious strategy for the formation of a Government in 1921.

On the afternoon of Thursday, December 8, two days after the election, Mackenzie King called in Andrew Haydon, the national organizer of the Liberal party, and outlined his plans. His principal aim was a "united Canada," and he proposed to form a cabinet which represented farmers, labour, soldiers, businessmen and the professions and which struck a balance between Protestants and Roman Catholics. An alliance with the farming community he regarded as an essential foundation for the future, and he was determined not to leave the West in isolation from his Government. He had also decided to reduce the cabinet from 21 (the size of the Meighen cabinet before the election) to 16, and to make the provinces the basis of representation according to the number of parliamentary seats to which each province was entitled, without denying recognition to any province—a method of representation which led him to assign Ontario four ministers in addition to himself, Quebec four as well as the solicitor general (not of the cabinet), and each of the other provinces a single minister. Finally, he wanted to keep all portfolios out of the Senate.

With these general principles in mind, King and Haydon drew up a preliminary and incomplete slate, as follows: from the Maritimes, Fielding and Sinclair; from Quebec, Lapointe, Gouin, Béland, Dandurand and McMaster; from Ontario, Drury, Kennedy, Murphy and Murdock; from the Prairies, Crerar, Hudson, Motherwell and/or Marshall; and from British Columbia, Bostock or General Sir Arthur Currie.⁶ The composition of this first slate is a good indication of King's initial intentions. His list, leaning heavily toward the agrarian interests, not only included three militantly low-tariff Liberals—Motherwell, Marshall and McMaster—together with two leaders of the more flexible group of Quebec Liberals—Lapointe and Béland—but it contained also the names of two leaders of the farmers' movement—Crerar and Drury—and that of Crerar's close friend and political ally, the Independent Liberal A. B. Hudson. Admittedly, a countervailing force was provided in the presence of four strong protectionists—Gouin, Dandurand, Kennedy and Fielding—but other claimants of a similar bent were conspicuously missing, and among the latter were Graham, Lemieux, Robb, D. D. McKenzie and Walter Mitchell. Taken as a whole, the slate was designed to reassure the farmers' spokesmen that the new Government would not be weighted against them, and that, if they accepted membership, they would be able to make substantial progress in implementing the economic policies to which they were committed. It was hopefully framed, in other words, to attract the Progressive leaders into a Liberal Government, and on that basis King was ready to negotiate, provided, of course, that he could be reasonably sure of general support from the main elements of his own following, and especially from the Quebec Liberals. Immediately after his conversation with Haydon on Thursday afternoon, Mackenzie King telegraphed Ernest Lapointe to come to Ottawa on Saturday—his first summons to a member of the Liberal parliamentary group.

While waiting for Lapointe, Mackenzie King went over his slate again, and on Friday he had another talk with Andrew Haydon. King was now beginning to allocate portfolios among prospective ministers. In several instances he was already quite clear: thus he assigned Fielding, Finance; Drury, Railways; Kennedy, Public Works; Crerar, Interior (with Immigration and Colonization); Sinclair, Customs and Inland Revenue; Béland, Secretary of State; Murdock, Labour; and McMaster, Solicitor General. From the beginning King reserved for himself the offices of Prime Minister, President of the Privy Council and Secretary of State for External Affairs (the External Affairs portfolio, since 1912, had been vested by statute in the prime minister). There were other individuals, however, on whose assignments he was less definite: he thought of Hudson or Lapointe for Justice; Lapointe or Lemieux for Marine and Fisheries (including Naval Affairs); Motherwell or Marshall for Agriculture; Gouin or Dandurand for leader in the Senate without portfolio. During the second talk with Haydon, two other names appeared—Lemieux and Bureau—and, although King's plans for them are not entirely clear from the evidence available, he seems to have been thinking of Lemieux for a judicial appointment or, failing that, for Marine and Fisheries, and of Bureau for the Senate, possibly with the portfolio of Public Works.

By the evening of Friday, December 9, an outline of the cabinet was beginning to take shape in King's mind, and it was at this point that he made his first post-election overture to the Progressives. Andrew Haydon, at King's direction, invited T. A. Crerar, by telegram, to meet him in Toronto on the following Wednesday. The telegram emphasized the importance of the meeting and the need for secrecy. Before Crerar's reply was received, the interview with Lapointe took place.

King's First Interview with Ernest Lapointe

Ernest Lapointe arrived in Ottawa on Saturday, December 10, and spent most of the morning with Mackenzie King. It was then slightly more than three months since King had offered Lapointe his choice of any portfolio and had promised him a role of special influence in cabinet-making, and on this, their first meeting after the election, King began by repeating these assurances in unqualified terms:

I told him I regarded him as nearest to me and would give him my confidence in full now and always. We would work out matters together. I regarded him as the real leader in Quebec, had sent for him first of all as promised. Asked which portfolio he would like and said he could have it—he said Justice—that he was not good at business administration that Justice would give him the prestige he needed in his province. He is *worthy* of Justice, is just and honourable at heart—a beautiful Christian character—he shall have it.⁷

With the question of Lapointe's portfolio and role apparently settled, the conversation moved freely over all the problems of cabinet formation. Lapointe agreed that national unity should be the central objective and that this prescribed a broad attitude toward the farmers; he volunteered the suggestion that Crerar and Drury be offered cabinet posts. He also produced a slate of his own and, both in cabinet membership and portfolio

assignments, it corresponded closely with the one drawn up by King and Haydon. The principal differences were that Lapointe's list included D. D. McKenzie as a second minister from Nova Scotia, Copp or C.W. Robinson from New Brunswick, and F. T. Congdon from the Yukon, if elected, for Militia and Defence.⁸

Lapointe had no objection to reducing the cabinet but he felt that Quebec ought to have four ministers plus the solicitor general.⁹ With this King agreed and he was also pleased to discover that Lapointe's ideas about the composition of the Quebec representation accorded, on the whole, with his own. Lapointe suggested Gouin for Senate leader without portfolio and Béland for the office of Secretary of State. Bureau was no problem, for he simply wanted a senatorship. Lemieux, on the other hand, would have to be included, in Lapointe's judgment, unless he was willing to accept appointment to the bench. As to the English-speaking representation, Lapointe's preference was for Robb, but he agreed that McMaster would make an excellent solicitor general.

Ernest Lapointe's recommendations, from a Quebec standpoint, had positive merit. They resisted any reduction in Quebec representation; they preserved an even numerical balance between the districts of Quebec and Montreal; and they gave moderate recognition to the English-speaking minority. On the other hand, in claiming the senior portfolio for himself and relegating Gouin to the Senate leadership, and in leaving Lemieux's interests undefined and exposed, Lapointe, with King's encouragement, was clearly tilting the balance in favour of his own group and thus inviting opposition. It was a jarring prospect and King noticed that throughout their conversation Lapointe was distinctly nervous on the subject of his Montreal colleagues. Lapointe predicted that Lemieux would be offended at not receiving the first summons to Ottawa, and he urged King to send for him without delay. As for Gouin, Lapointe thought he might want Justice and fully expected him to be hostile to the idea of bringing in the Progressives. He feared, therefore, that, if Gouin were asked not only to swallow King's plans for the farmers but also to accept a minor portfolio for himself, there would be an uproar in Montreal. To avoid this without relaxing his own hold on the Justice portfolio was Lapointe's immediate and puzzling concern, and on the day following his first interview with King he thought he had found a solution. In a letter, addressed to "My dear Leader," Lapointe wrote: "Re Quebec representation, I really believe that you should offer Gouin a Department, as well as leadership in the Senate. . . . If he prefers to be without portfolio, then you must still give Quebec four Departments. Otherwise, we would likely meet trouble, specially if *your plan* re Western representation, which I approve, is to succeed, for a strong element in our province will not like it. . . ."¹⁰

Mackenzie King was thus warned at the outset—and by the man whom he had chosen for his principal associate in cabinet-making—that his plan to rebuild the Liberal party by bringing in the leaders of the farmers' movement might run into trouble and that, if he went on with it, he would have to proceed cautiously and flexibly in his dealings with the Montreal Liberals. Still, Lapointe had unquestionably given his blessing to the plan, as well as to most of the other features of King's original slate and, in view of the great importance of this personal commitment, the main effect of their conversation on King was to crystallize his resolve to press ahead. King was persuaded that, if negotiations with Crerar and Drury could be brought to a successful conclusion before opposition within the Liberal party was fully aroused, the advantages of such a stroke, to the party and to

himself personally, would greatly outweigh the hazards. Compensation, it had begun to appear, would have to be given Gouin and Lemieux, perhaps in the form of more generous treatment in the matter of portfolios than he had initially intended, but just how strong their opposition might be and precisely what price they would exact for co-operation were questions which could only be answered in personal interviews. King decided to send for them at once and also to push on with the full range of negotiations which his plans required.

Immediately after his interview with Lapointe, King telegraphed Lemieux to come to Ottawa and, with Lapointe's approval, he sent similar messages to Fielding, Murphy, B  land, Bureau and Kennedy. King also arranged to meet Drury in Toronto on the following Wednesday, and when a message arrived from Crerar, in reply to Haydon's telegram, expressing a strong preference for Winnipeg over Toronto as a meeting-place, he agreed at once and sent Haydon to Winnipeg on the evening train. Finally, with these engagements definitely scheduled, King felt sufficiently confident of early success to inform Prime Minister Meighen, in reply to a query as to when he would be ready to form a Government, that he would give him a definite answer by Thursday, December 15, and that he hoped to be ready by Saturday, December 17.

Negotiations with the Progressives: Haydon's Mission to Winnipeg

Andrew Haydon arrived in Winnipeg on Monday morning, December 12, and that evening he had his first interview with T. A. Crerar and A. B. Hudson. Between that time and Friday, December 16, there were to be four such meetings, all of them held in the privacy of Hudson's law office and each promptly relayed by Haydon to Mackenzie King in coded telegrams addressed to F. A. McGregor, King's secretary.¹¹

Haydon opened by stating, as Hudson recorded it, "that Mr. K. was anxious to form a Government which would be representative of all parts of the Dominion and would be free from the domination by the Montreal interests and any reactionary influences in his own party." He then produced a list of men whom King had in mind inviting into his Government.¹² With two exceptions it was the same slate, including Crerar and Drury, that King and Haydon had drawn up on the preceding Thursday and Friday. The exceptions were the addition of A. B. Copp and the deletion of A. B. Hudson; on the latter point Haydon explained that King intended to restrict every province except Ontario and Quebec to one minister, and that, if Hudson's name were added to Crerar's, Manitoba would be over-represented.

Mackenzie King's cabinet list made an excellent immediate impression on Crerar and Hudson: they told Haydon that it "would be regarded in the west as an evidence of King's desire to create a really forward-looking Gov't."¹³ Satisfactory though it was, however, the slate was not enough. The Winnipeggers stipulated at once that there would have to be a clear understanding on the policy of the Government in several important particulars. At this point the discussion turned to questions of policy and cabinet membership, and for the remainder of the week the negotiations in Winnipeg were wholly taken up with these two aspects of the issue. Specifically, Crerar and Hudson put forward five conditions: first, a tariff according to the terms of the Liberal platform of 1919;

second, the immediate transfer of natural resources to the Prairie Provinces, with a subsequent financial adjustment, if necessary; third, the reduction of railway freight rates to the levels prescribed by the Crow's Nest Pass and Manitoba Agreements; fourth, a willingness to reconsider reciprocity; and fifth, a full and fair trial for public ownership of railways. To these policy requirements Crerar added one other, relating to cabinet membership: the Prairie Provinces, in his judgment, were entitled to four places in the Government, and he claimed three of them for Hudson, himself and some Progressive from Alberta.¹⁴ Finally and, from the standpoint of the time required, most ominously, Crerar made it clear that he would have to consult his followers about the whole proposition. For this purpose a meeting of the western Progressive members-elect was called for Tuesday, December 20, in Saskatoon.

Haydon reported the first conference to Mackenzie King and awaited instructions.¹⁵ King had not expected such a bill of conditions and a day went by before a full reply¹⁶ was received from Ottawa. In that interval Haydon had a second conference with Crerar and Hudson. This time the only subject was Prairie representation in the cabinet. Crerar was more than ever convinced that the Prairie Provinces should have four ministers, and he and Hudson succeeded in persuading Haydon not only that this was a reasonable request but that the Justice portfolio should go to Hudson. For Saskatchewan, they ruled out Motherwell on account of his intense hostility to the farmers' movement, and suggested instead C. W. Hamilton, Minister of Agriculture in the provincial government. For Alberta, they conceded that Charles Stewart, the former Premier, would be acceptable. The second conference left Haydon decidedly optimistic. He relayed a summary to King and added: "Your proposed slate very acceptable and gives here guarantee good faith your part which prairies have disbelieved. You can put this through but perhaps not this week. Much depends on Drury also."¹⁷

On Wednesday, December 14, the awaited reply to Haydon's first telegram arrived. "I am ready to consider following," Mackenzie King's telegram began, "as basis of understanding to ensure coalescence of Liberal and Progressive groups." There followed his response to each of the five policy conditions which Crerar and Hudson had stipulated: first, a tariff according to the Liberal amendment to the 1921 budget, repudiating the protective principle and calling for changes which would reduce the cost of living and the cost of implements of production; second, transfer of natural resources to the western provinces at the first session of Parliament, coupled with discontinuance of the special annual subsidy which the Dominion had paid those provinces in lieu of resources; third, no commitment on freight rates; fourth and fifth, full acceptance of the conditions relating to reciprocity and the publicly-owned railways. King was thus willing to give ground before Progressive demands on economic policy, but on the quota of Prairie ministers he was unyielding. The cabinet had to be cut down, he explained, the Maritime Provinces were being limited, and, therefore, he could not possibly consider more than one minister from each of the western provinces. Motherwell he regarded as entitled to represent Saskatchewan, but, he asked, could not the Alberta Progressives be induced to provide a seat for Hudson or Crerar?¹⁸

Haydon, on the same day that he received these instructions, laid them before Crerar and Hudson at a third conference.¹⁹ The westerners were far from satisfied. They took King's modest concessions in their stride and pressed for full acceptance of the pith and

substance of all their original terms. His tariff formula they rejected as altogether too indefinite and, thrusting him back on the uncomfortable ground of the 1919 Liberal platform, they demanded immediate and substantial general reductions, together with a generous enlargement of the free list. Freight rates, they insisted, were a burning question in the West and nothing less than full restoration of the Crow's Nest Pass Agreement would suffice. On the resources question, they held out for an act which would hand over the resources to the provinces forthwith and provide for settlement of all the financial details by arbitration. Similarly, with respect to western representation in the cabinet, Crerar stood on his original position: redistribution, he contended, would soon give the Prairies an additional 15 seats and, in the meantime, that section should have one more minister. He still balked at Motherwell; for Alberta his first choice was Stewart, his second Herbert Greenfield, the U.F.A. Premier.

Once again, the results of this latest conference in Winnipeg were promptly transmitted to Mackenzie King,²⁰ but, if the Progressive spokesmen hoped for further concessions, they were disappointed. King would go no farther, and the bargaining, at least on a long-distance basis, was at an end. This was made plain within 24 hours in two final telegrams from Ottawa, one from King, the other from Ernest Lapointe. "Can only consider," King's telegram ran, "taking representation from Progressive party into cabinet on same basis as representation from ranks of Liberals, namely on policy as announced and faith in personnel of administration to do justly by all concerned. Unless our friends prepared to discuss possibility on this understanding which is common to all please let me know at once. Pressure is very great as to other alternatives and I must come to quick decision. Each day's delay likely to prove prejudicial to what we have been considering." In the same message King claimed Drury's support for the view that "men not terms" should be the main consideration, and stated that Drury was willing to enter the cabinet if he could arrange for a successor in Ontario. It was "advisable," King concluded, for Haydon, Crerar and Hudson all to come to Ottawa immediately.²¹

Ernest Lapointe's telegram, sent at King's request, called upon Crerar, in urgent and dramatic fashion, to put his trust in men not terms and to act at once:

Sorry so many conditions required by friend Crerar. Country on verge of collapse. Honest and well-meaning men must come together to save it and trust one another. Only way to find moderate and best solution of all big problems. Now is opportunity for building a reunited Canada which may not present itself again. Speedy decision necessary otherwise shall have to yield to pressure from other quarters whose views as to incoming cabinet differ from his [King's] and mine. Ask Crerar not consult many but follow his own judgment and conscience.²²

Eastern Pressures in Ottawa

Why did Mackenzie King cut short the Winnipeg negotiations, and why did he and Lapointe appeal so urgently to the western Progressives to accept cabinet invitations without further delay? The telegrams from King and Lapointe referred to very great pressure in Ottawa: what was the object of this pressure and from what quarters was it exerted?

There was pressure, undoubtedly, and Mackenzie King was beginning to find it heavy, but, for the most part, it did not take the simple and direct form of flat opposition to inviting leaders of the farmers' movement into the Government. King was now the focus of all the pressures which interested individuals and groups invariably bring to bear, by telegram, letter and personal interview, upon a prime minister-elect for the purpose of obtaining ministerial posts and other appointments for themselves and their friends. During the four days of Haydon's mission to Winnipeg, King had been in almost uninterrupted consultation with leading Liberals from the Maritimes and the central provinces—principally those whom he had summoned after his first talk with Lapointe—about various aspects of the task at hand, including his plan of bringing in the Progressives. Of those who offered advice, King found only one man, W. C. Kennedy of Ontario, to be strongly opposed to the plan. Other Ontario spokesmen, notably Charles Murphy and the editors of the Toronto *Star* and the Toronto *Globe*, were definitely in favour of it, and so were two elder statesmen, Sir Allen Aylesworth and Sir William Mulock. Nor was there opposition from the Maritimes. W. S. Fielding, to whom King offered the Finance portfolio, strongly endorsed an alignment with the farmers' movement and approved of the terms of King's reply to the initial conditions advanced by the Progressives in Winnipeg. Even more encouraging, from King's standpoint, was the discovery that three French Canadian leaders—Béland, Lemieux and Gouin—were prepared to give the plan qualified support. To be sure, the views of these three differed in detail. They all favoured Drury; none of them was enthusiastic about Crerar. Béland was very hesitant about taking in any western Progressive; Lemieux did not think well of Hudson because of his stand on the Manitoba schools issue, though he was not disposed to rule Hudson out; Gouin, on the other hand, preferred Hudson to Crerar and suggested that Crerar should come in later and that, for immediate purposes, it would be sufficient to bring in some Alberta Progressive with Hudson and Drury.

These early soundings, though generally reassuring, were no guarantee of a safe passage for Mackenzie King's plans for the farmer leaders. The highest card which he had to play, in his negotiations with the Progressives, was the manifestly low-tariff complexion of the Government he was seeking to form. His original slate had been favourably viewed by Crerar and Hudson and, though it had not proved sufficiently alluring by itself to draw them in at once, it was still essential that nothing be done to diminish whatever confidence it had created. The difficulty was that, while Haydon in Winnipeg was negotiating on the basis of this slate, King in Ottawa was being subjected to mounting pressure to alter it in ways which would jeopardize the western negotiations and, as well, the associated negotiations with Drury. Already there were unmistakable signs, in the advice tendered by Kennedy and Murphy, of a campaign in support of George Graham, and King was beginning to worry about the hazards of leaving him out. Similarly, King's intention to restrict Nova Scotia to a single minister encountered formidable resistance, immediately from Fielding, almost as promptly from Quebec and Ontario spokesmen, and finally, when the word got back to Nova Scotia, from a medley of local politicians and groups who kept up a perfect clamour of protest until the day the cabinet was sworn in. The names which were most assiduously advanced, D. D. McKenzie and E. M. Macdonald, had been missing from King's slate and they were both, like George Graham, "reactionaries" in the view of those associated with the farmers' movement.

Even more disquieting, however, were the pressures that were beginning to come from Montreal. The Montreal Liberals, needing no instruction in the importance of "men not terms" to the cumulative decisions of a government, set to work to make certain that the cabinet contained a reassuring proportion of "sound" men acceptable to the business community. Though they were by no means indifferent to the representation of other provinces, the main interest of the Montrealers lay with their own province and their own district, and they concentrated, therefore, on pushing forward the members of their own group and on sidetracking or downgrading their Quebec rivals. Thus Rodolphe Lemieux, in his first interview with Mackenzie King on December 12, spoke out strongly for Gouin and Mitchell, passed lightly over the Lapointe group, and jettisoned McMaster. When King remarked that he did not see how he could give portfolios to both Lemieux and Gouin and that the former should have the first say, Lemieux replied that he was tired of politics and was thinking of the speakership of the House of Commons for himself. Gouin, he urged, should be kept in the Commons (thus leaving the Senate leadership for Dandurand) and given either Railways or Justice (thus challenging Lapointe). As to English-speaking representation, Lemieux supported Robb and pressed for Mitchell, a combination which would give Montreal four or six Quebec ministers and eliminate McMaster whom Lemieux recommended for a senior judicial appointment.

Sir Lomer Gouin, whom King saw on the day after his interview with Lemieux, took the same line. The province of Quebec, he contended, should have six ministers, four French and two English, with Robb and Mitchell filling the latter roles, and with Lemieux included as the fourth minister from Montreal. On the subject of his own appointment, Gouin extricated himself from the minor role of Senate leader by saying that for the present he would prefer not to replace Dandurand. What he wanted instead was Justice, or the presidency of the Privy Council, or appointment without portfolio. When King replied that, subject to his promise to Lapointe, he could let Gouin have one of these or some other portfolio, Gouin quickly narrowed the range of acceptable departments by stating that he did not want one with much administration, like Marine and Fisheries, and he suggested that King persuade Lapointe to take that department or Railways. The representations of Gouin and Lemieux were soon reinforced by two other Montrealers, Senators Raoul Dandurand and Frederick B  ique, who obtained an interview with King on Thursday, December 15, two days after his talk with Gouin. The two senators took the ground that Montreal, by reason of its generous assistance to the Liberal party in the election, was entitled to four cabinet ministers: Gouin and Robb, of course, would have to be included, but, in addition, they pressed very hard for Mitchell as a minister without portfolio, and they, like Gouin, were most reluctant to see Lemieux's platform ability muffled by the Commons speakership.

Mackenzie King was thus exposed, in the first full week of cabinet negotiations, to multiple pressures to reshape the original design of his cabinet. This he was very loath to do and his initial response to the importunate easterners was to hold them off and avoid, as far as possible, specific undertakings. But he could stall for only a few days at most and by the middle of that week it was clear that, if the pressures grew more insistent, he would have to yield and find places in the cabinet for some of the "reactionaries" whose claims were being so energetically touted. There was, therefore, in MacGregor Dawson's words, "a very real danger that the original 'purity' of this body which had seemed so

attractive to Western eyes, would become gravely compromised and the Progressive leaders would then find it increasingly difficult to enter the Cabinet themselves or to justify their entrance to their followers."²³ King's enemy, in other words, was time, and, in the time that would be consumed by further bargaining with the Progressives followed by consultations with their followers, he saw the prospect of his whole position being overrun. It was to avert this consequence that he broke off negotiations in Winnipeg and, in conjunction with Lapointe, dispatched the telegrams urging the westerners to come in and to come quickly. "Will you walk a little faster?" said a whiting to a snail, / "There's a porpoise close behind us, and he's treading on my tail."

There was, quite possibly, an additional reason for King's peremptory action. On the previous day, Wednesday, December 14, he had seen Premier Drury in Toronto and had invited him to join the Government. Drury showed a strong interest and said he would like to accept if he could arrange for a successor, a problem he would have to take up with his colleagues and supporters. He raised the idea of a Liberal-Progressive coalition at Ottawa but King turned it down emphatically, saying it would have to be a straight Liberal Government. When Drury indicated that Crerar had kept in touch with him about the discussions in Winnipeg, King said he thought Crerar was making a mistake in exacting so many conditions on economic policy, and that he should pin his faith on the men whom King was proposing as colleagues. On this point Drury, according to King, agreed with him, and said he would so inform Crerar. From this conversation, King may have concluded that he had already gone as far as he needed to go in concessions to the Progressives and that he could press them for an immediate decision. This, at any rate, is what he proceeded to do on the following day.

T. A. Crerar's Predicament: The Hudson Mission to Ottawa

The attempt to stampede the westerners failed. On Friday, December 16, Haydon took the latest telegrams from King and Lapointe to a fourth and final conference with Crerar and Hudson. Crerar was now in a very difficult position. "He is anxious efforts should succeed," Haydon reported to King, "but must act in way to carry support West."²⁴ It was the imperative need of western support which had caused Crerar to bargain so closely in the Winnipeg negotiations, and he was still far from confident that Mackenzie King's invitation, even with the modest concessions which had been extracted from him, would be sufficient to overcome the intense distrust of the old political parties and of political leadership generally which pervaded the farmers' movement. And it was the same necessity which had prompted Crerar, after his first conference with Haydon, to call a meeting of the western Progressive members in Saskatoon, a step which, in his judgment, remained, perhaps more than ever, an elementary and indispensable precaution. It was decided, accordingly, that Crerar would go ahead with the Saskatoon meeting on the following Tuesday, and that, immediately afterwards, he would go east for a final consultation with King, arriving in the capital on Saturday, December 24. The decision meant further delay and, when it was relayed to King, he protested at once that he could not possibly wait for a full week.²⁵ It was arranged, therefore, that Hudson should go to Ottawa so as to be there to receive from Crerar, on Tuesday or Wednesday, a telegraphic

report of the Saskatoon meeting, and that Drury should be brought to Ottawa on Wednesday to confer with Hudson and King. From King's standpoint, even this delay was perilous and before Crerar left for Saskatoon another obstacle arose which further diminished the prospects of success.

On Saturday evening, December 17, Crerar reviewed the week's developments at a small gathering in Winnipeg of his closest friends and advisers, including J. W. Dafoe, the editor of the *Manitoba Free Press*. During the election campaign the *Free Press* had given strong independent support to the Progressive party and, though Dafoe was not present at any of the post-election conferences with Haydon, Crerar had kept in touch with him throughout and he was "a very interested observer" of the negotiations.²⁶

Since the end of the war Dafoe, who had broken with the Liberal party over conscription, had been hoping and working for a realignment of Canadian politics on a clear-cut division between a Conservative party, representing the forces of business, and a genuinely liberal and progressive party "which would unite all those people who opposed government by the 'interests.'"²⁷ He had supported the farmers' movement because he saw in it the nucleus of a political party of the second type, a nucleus which might be enlarged to take in all the low-tariff groups in the nation, including the low-tariff wing of the Liberal party. If the Progressives were to be the core of a new and purified liberalism, then, in Dafoe's judgment, they must be kept together and, equally, they must be kept free of contamination by either of the two old and reactionary political parties, and on the latter score he was highly suspicious of Mackenzie King's post-election overtures to the Progressive leaders. Dafoe's suspicions, undoubtedly passed on to Crerar, coincided precisely with those held by Sir Clifford Sifton, the publisher of the *Manitoba Free Press*.

Sifton, who had resigned from the Laurier Government on the separate schools question and had broken completely with his party over reciprocity and, subsequently, over conscription, wanted, above all, to see a postwar Liberal party in which French and Roman Catholic and Montreal influences were reduced to a subordinate place. In the circumstances of the 1921 election and cabinet formation, Sifton thought he saw a possibility for the realization of this objective through a Liberal-Progressive coalition in which the identity and influence of the Progressives were carefully buttressed beforehand. Holding these views, he had been disturbed by Mackenzie King's pre-election statements against a coalition; in November he had remonstrated with King privately on the subject, only to find him stubbornly opposed. Sifton, like Dafoe, correctly diagnosed King's post-election intentions to be not coalition with, but absorption of, the Progressives into a Government composed, in Sifton's phrase, of "the leftovers of the Laurier aggregation," and offering nothing more to the farmers' movement than a few cabinet posts and some general assurances on policy. An arrangement of this kind was no more to Sifton's taste than it was to Dafoe's, and he promptly set to work to warn the Progressive leaders, through Dafoe, of its dangers. "Once they are in without anything more definite than that," Sifton wrote to Dafoe, "the Progressive party as a political force comes to an end. The policy of the Government will be dominated by Quebec and anybody that does not like it can have the privilege of getting out but in the meantime he will have fatally compromised his political position."²⁸ The only real protection for the Progressives, Sifton insisted, was a formal, open coalition supported by a 50-50 division of cabinet posts and by "a written agreement in regard to some matters of policy."²⁹ "Otherwise,"

he predicted, "the Progressives will share the fate of the Liberals who went into the Union Government, with the absolute certainty that if the Progressive movement stays alive the followers will turn upon the leaders who have gone into the Government and regard them as having betrayed their principles."³⁰ Sifton also communicated directly with Crerar in a letter written on the day the negotiations began in Winnipeg; he urged that "an absolutely straight front should be presented against any attempt to secure the adhesion to the Government of individual members of the Progressive party."³¹

Notwithstanding all of Sifton's warnings (reinforced, in all probability, by similar advice from Dafoe), neither Crerar nor Hudson raised the coalition issue in any of their discussions with Andrew Haydon, even though it was evident that a coalition was not part of Mackenzie King's offer.³² The only Progressive to do so during that week, E. C. Drury, in his conversation with King in Toronto, met with a flat refusal. By the end of the week, however, Crerar, having failed to exact the specific pledges on policy and on the number of portfolios that he desired, faced the prospect of confronting the Saskatoon meeting with precisely the kind of vague proposition which Sifton had predicted would lead to disaster for the Progressive party. In these chilling circumstances the case for a coalition took on a new force and urgency, and at the Saturday evening gathering in Winnipeg the Dafoe-Sifton counsels prevailed. The clinching argument was supplied by the intimation that Drury had reached the same conclusion. Crerar read out a telegram he had received from the Ontario Premier as follows:

Am of opinion that for sake of future progressives should guard against absorption by liberals. If alliance or coalition formed should be conditional on King professedly accepting fundamental parts of progressive platform and leaving Gouin bloc out of Cabinet. This I think he is prepared to do—political continuity of progressives should also be assured. Fear I cannot accept invitation. Think you should come east as soon as possible.³³

"This statement of views by Drury," Dafoe reported to Sifton, "exactly corresponded with the opinion which the meeting had reached itself. There was practically unanimity in the view that co-operation could only be possible on the basis of a formal coalition with public guarantees which would be a protection for Mr. Crerar against his own people."³⁴ Accordingly, the matter was decided and A. B. Hudson, who was present at the gathering and who was to leave for Ottawa on the following morning, was charged with the task of conveying these terms to Mackenzie King.

The Winnipeg negotiations ended on Friday, December 16, with nothing settled between the Progressives and the Liberals. Nothing could be settled until after Crerar's meeting with his supporters in Saskatoon and Hudson's arrival in Ottawa, both of which were scheduled for the following Tuesday. On Friday Mackenzie King told the Governor General that he would need more time to complete his slate, and over the weekend he enjoyed a breathing-space of relative tranquillity in Ottawa. In that interval King was able to solve a few of his easier problems. He decided to offer a cabinet post to Dr. J. H. King of British Columbia, assigning a portfolio temporarily to Senator Bostock until a seat could be found for Dr. King. He settled upon John E. Sinclair for Prince Edward Island in accordance with virtually unanimous advice from that province and elsewhere. For New Brunswick, he moved to the conclusion that for want of a better "available" alternative,

there was nothing to do but take in A. B. Copp.³⁵ Nova Scotia continued to present difficulty (the flow of communications from the province in support of a second minister gave no sign of abatement), but D. D. McKenzie, one of the most determined claimants, eased matters by offering to resign at any time that a judgeship became available. King made no commitment but he began to give greater weight to McKenzie's claims on the score of his temporary leadership of the party in 1919, and it occurred to him as well that a portfolio for McKenzie might be a useful device for turning aside more objectionable aspirants.

Progress on these details still left open, of course, all the dangerous and interwoven issues of representation for the central provinces and the Prairies. But on this weekend, at least, the pressures from Quebec fell off sharply and on Monday morning, King received from Andrew Haydon a cheerful account of his mission to Winnipeg. Haydon had concluded that the Prairies would have to be given four ministers, though he thought Motherwell could be included in this number, and he was confident that, even if Crerar should finally decline King's invitation, Hudson's acceptance was practically certain. Haydon said not a word about a coalition: the question had not come up in his talks with Crerar and Hudson, and neither he nor King had any inkling of the revised terms which Hudson was then bearing from Winnipeg; nor had Drury yet informed King of his decision to stay out. Ominously enough, however, from the standpoint of the reception that Hudson was likely to get in Ottawa, the weekend had brought forth fresh evidence of hostility to the Progressives in Ontario.

George Graham, in a long and painful interview with King which exposed the edges of their mutual dislike, succeeded in leaving the clear impression that many Liberals in the western part of the province would take offence at the appointment of Drury to the cabinet. The same impression was conveyed by Sydney Little, a prominent London supporter, and by Hartley Dewart, Liberal leader in the Ontario legislature; and Arthur Hardy, a confidant of King, took care to remind him that the feelings of W. C. Kennedy were still "very strong in the matter."³⁶ None of these intimations of opposition caused King even to consider rescinding his invitation to Drury, but neither did they incline him to be more flexible on the form of the alliance. He was quite ready, indeed eager, to accept and defend Crerar and Drury as colleagues in a Liberal government, but not as leaders, co-ordinate with himself, of a coalition in which both partners would retain their separate identities and work together on an equal footing. Faced with this additional evidence that his approach to the Progressives was unpopular in the central provinces, King simply braced himself as best he could against the expectation that the second full week of cabinet-making would see a renewal of vigorous lobbying in Ottawa.

King's expectation was amply fulfilled. On Tuesday morning, December 20, A. B. Hudson arrived in Ottawa and the coalition question was immediately thrust into the forefront of the negotiations. At an interview with King and Haydon, Hudson read a telegram from Crerar whose preliminary soundings in Saskatoon had led him to believe that co-operation would be acceptable to the western Progressives provided that it was arranged along the lines of the telegram from Drury which had been discussed at the Winnipeg gathering on the preceding Saturday.³⁷ Hudson then read out the Drury telegram with its emphasis on guarding "against absorption by the Liberals" and on preserving the "political continuity" of the Progressives. King, who had understood Drury

to accept his objections to a coalition, was surprised and disconcerted. He replied that his own followers would not accept a coalition and that, regardless of how his refusal might be interpreted, he simply could not consider the proposal.³⁸ He told Hudson to inform Crerar at once, and, when Drury telephoned in the midst of the conversation, King also requested him to wire Crerar not to insist on a coalition.³⁹ Ernest Lapointe, with whom King conferred immediately after the interview with Hudson, took precisely the same position. "I also feel," Lapointe wrote that day to a Montreal friend, "that the request of a formal coalition cannot be accepted. Our friends won't object to our dealing with individuals, not with a party which desires to perpetuate itself as independent from and sometimes opposed to the Liberal party. Liberalism should be good enough for all."⁴⁰ Two leading Albertans whom King saw later on the same day were emphatically opposed. Frank Oliver was bitterly hostile to any form of association with the Progressives; and Charles Stewart, though he approved of taking in Crerar, Hudson and Drury, did not favour a coalition.

The coalition proposal and King's rejection of it threatened the Liberal-Progressive negotiations with immediate collapse. Within 24 hours of the interview with Hudson, King's plans were dealt a second blow. On Wednesday morning E. C. Drury came down from Toronto to tell King that his followers had refused to release him from his provincial responsibilities until after the next election. On the coalition question, Drury appeared ambiguous: he confirmed, in the presence of Hudson and Haydon, the statements in his telegram to Crerar advising a coalition as expressing his real judgment; but he acknowledged, in conversation with King, the latter's objections to a coalition and he advanced the opinion that Crerar and Hudson should go into the Government. When King remonstrated with him, Drury countered with the suggestion that King would have to give some "visible evidence" of meeting progressive ideas. To this King replied in terms which unwittingly confirmed all the apprehensions that Sir Clifford Sifton had conveyed to Dafoe and Crerar: "I said taking in Crerar, himself and Hudson was pretty good visible evidence, they could leave the Ministry if not in sympathy as we worked out our policies."⁴¹

Thus, by noon on Wednesday, December 21, Mackenzie King's strategy of cabinet formation stood on the edge of ruin. Drury had finally withdrawn and it was clear that, if Crerar and Hudson held out for a coalition, there would be no Progressives in the new Government. Then, quite suddenly, the pendulum of expectation swung back towards success. On Wednesday afternoon a telegram arrived from Crerar giving his version of the Saskatoon meeting. The western Progressive members had decided unanimously to retain their identity and organization as a party and to give independent support to progressive legislation. At the same time, however, the meeting had also given "tacit approval," in Crerar's phrase, to any Progressive member, "including myself, entering Government as individuals providing policy and personnel satisfactory to us." Crerar plainly believed that the Saskatoon meeting had not closed the door to the Council chamber: "May be able to do something on this," his telegram continued, "providing policy will be such carry support."⁴² Crerar was already on his way to Ottawa, bringing with him a "small committee" of Progressive members, and his hopeful interpretation of the attitude of his western supporters immediately raised expectations in the capital. Hudson, when he showed the telegram to Mackenzie King, commented that it looked favourable; and King,

letting hope outrun all caution, leaped to the conclusion that "the Rubicon has been crossed and that the gulf between East and West has been bridged."⁴³ The conclusion was premature but on the strength of it King decided to postpone final disposition of the cabinet until he could confer with Crerar in person.

Quebec Pressure Reaches a Climax

Crerar was not due in Ottawa until Saturday, December 24, and this left a gap of two days, Thursday and Friday, during which time it was vital that nothing be done which would cause the "policy and personnel" of the Government to appear unsatisfactory in Crerar's eyes. In that interval, however, Mackenzie King came under renewed and very heavy pressure to alter his cabinet slate.

Most of the pressure was from the province of Quebec, and, as in the previous week, it was principally directed to strengthening the representation of the Montreal group. During the first week of negotiations the Montreal Liberals had made a strong bid to obtain six places for the province of Quebec, two of them to go to English-speaking representatives, Robb and Mitchell, and the remaining four to go to French Canadians and to be divided equally between the Gouin and Lapointe groups, a scheme of representation which, taken as a whole, would have assigned four ministers to the district of Montreal and two to the district of Quebec. King had had no difficulty in agreeing to four French Canadians—this was the number that he and Lapointe had settled upon at the beginning—but he had held out for a total Quebec representation of five and he had given no encouragement to the supporters of Walter Mitchell. He had also yielded to Gouin's request for a portfolio, but he had been much dismayed to learn that, in effect, the only portfolios in which Gouin was interested were Justice and the presidency of the Privy Council. Justice had already been promised to Lapointe and, with respect to Gouin's alternative preference, there were special and, to King, compelling objections. The presidency of the Privy Council, traditionally a minor post, had taken on a greatly enlarged importance during the period of Union Government when it was given, first to N. W. Rowell and then to J. A. Calder, to signify the position of each in succession as titular leader of the Unionist Liberal wing of the wartime and postwar coalition. Under these auspices the portfolio had recently acquired a prestige second only to that of the prime minister, and in 1921 Mackenzie King, who was bent on assembling in his own hands all the symbols of ultimate political power, had deliberately reserved it for himself. Most assuredly, he had not the slightest intention of giving it to Gouin, whose loyalty he viewed with the most profound suspicion, even if, to avoid doing so, it became necessary to back down on his promise of Justice to Lapointe.

In the early stages of cabinet formation Mackenzie King had been much more worried about Gouin—and even about Mitchell—than he had about the third controversial Montrealer, Rodolphe Lemieux, whom he believed he had succeeded in sidetracking, right at the beginning, into the speakership of the House of Commons. In this belief King was wholly mistaken, for Lemieux's pride was bruised by the primacy which had been given to Lapointe in all the consultations and by the speed with which King had grasped at his expressed interest in the speakership, and in the week that followed their first interview

Lemieux spread the word in sympathetic circles that he was being ignored. In this way he succeeded in stirring up a lobby in his behalf, and by the beginning of the second week of cabinet-making its activities were giving Ernest Lapointe serious concern. On Tuesday, December 20, Lapointe confided his worries to Mackenzie King and two days later he took Béland with him to King's office for a discussion of the problems of Quebec representation.

At this meeting, on Thursday afternoon, the two Quebecers urged King to raise their province's quota of ministers to six and to restrict the English-speaking share of it to one. The proposal had two implications: it would deprive Montreal of more than one English-speaking representative; and, by providing for five French Canadians, it would make room not only for the troublesome Lemieux but also for Lapointe's old friend and mentor, Jacques Bureau, thereby achieving an even balance between the district of Quebec (Lapointe, Béland and Bureau) and the district of Montreal (Gouin, Lemieux and an English representative). Mackenzie King had no reason to want more than one English minister from Quebec (this was what he had been thinking of all along and, besides, it was the easiest way to avoid taking in Mitchell), but he balked at the proposed enlargement of the Quebec quota. King's original design contemplated five for Ontario (four plus himself), five for Quebec (four plus the solicitor general) and one for each of the other provinces, and he was reluctant to depart from these figures. He therefore resisted Lapointe and Béland on this point, as he had the Montrealers in the previous week, and countered their proposal with a little pressure of his own. He began, in fact, to urge Lapointe to take the portfolio of Marine and Fisheries, arguing the Justice would bury him in legal work and isolate him from the main currents of political life in French Canada. King's real purpose, of course, was to recover Justice for Gouin, and Lapointe was naturally reluctant to release the more important portfolio to his rival. He gave King no undertaking at this interview but within a few hours King's insistence mounted as a result of a message from Montreal. That evening Senator Dandurand telephoned to urge him to take in Lemieux as the man most capable of maintaining a close liaison between the Government and the district of Montreal; and in the same conversation Dandurand made it plain that Gouin was still anxious to be appointed President of the Privy Council. Dandurand and Gouin were coming to Ottawa the next day, Friday, and it was arranged that they should see King that evening.

Mackenzie King made careful preparation for this encounter. On Friday morning he saw Lapointe again, repeated his request of the previous day, and succeeded at length in persuading him to give up Justice to Gouin. Lapointe was not happy at making the sacrifice and he intimated that Bureau would be upset, but he said finally that they would do anything to help the party and get a government formed. King now had something substantial with which to turn aside any further pressure from Montreal on other aspects of cabinet formation and, thus fortified, he turned to the question of Quebec's English-speaking representation in which the Gouin and Lapointe groups were both keenly interested.

On Friday afternoon King had interviews with Walter Mitchell and Andrew McMaster. The two men presented an interesting contrast. Mitchell was all for two English and three French from Quebec and he left no doubt that he expected to be one of the former. McMaster accepted readily the restriction of English representation to one, urged King

to be as generous as he could to French Canada, and showed a willingness to stand aside for the present. Mitchell strove at length to disabuse King of any idea that Gouin had been a party to a conspiracy against him, and he also managed to convey a message from Premier Taschereau and his colleagues in the Quebec Government to the effect that they were decidedly unsympathetic to the current negotiations with the Progressives. McMaster was emphatically in favour of these negotiations. The only point at which the views of Mitchell and McMaster coincided was the acknowledgement by each in turn, at King's prompting, that his claims to a cabinet post were inferior to those of James A. Robb. The admission was all that King needed; the appointment of Robb as the sole English minister from Quebec would enable him to meet the wishes of Lapointe and Béland and, at the same time, withstand any additional exertions on behalf of Walter Mitchell.

A few hours later Mackenzie King dined with Sir Lomer Gouin and Senator Dandurand and spent the evening in their company. It was a long and strenuous session, the climax of all the efforts of the Montrealers to influence the composition of the ministry. The entire discussion was taken up with the representation of the province of Quebec. King took the initiative by stating that, thanks to Lapointe's generosity, he was now able to offer Gouin the Department of Justice. The presidency of the Privy Council, constituted as a portfolio separate from the prime ministership, he regarded as a wartime device and a symbol of the betrayal of Laurier by the Unionist Liberals, and he proposed to reunite the two posts in his own prime ministership. And besides, King went on, he wanted to preside at cabinet himself and he did not see how government business could be properly conducted under two heads. Faced with this opening rebuff, Gouin quickly produced a counter-proposal. If this was the case, he would prefer to go in as a minister without portfolio, but in that event Rodolphe Lemieux would have to be taken in as Minister of Marine and Fisheries (Béland could be made Commons Speaker) and Walter Mitchell also appointed as a minister without portfolio. Mitchell, he emphasized, was essential. The insertion of Lemieux and Mitchell, together with himself in a minor post—this was to be Gouin's price for leaving the Privy Council portfolio to King and Justice to Lapointe. It was a skilful and, in some ways, a tempting manoeuvre, but Mackenzie King, with the remains of his Liberal-Progressive negotiations hanging in the balance and with T. A. Crerar scheduled to arrive the following morning, was not to be drawn. It was impossible, King said, to take in all three; everyone would say that the Government was being run by Montreal. To this argument, which spelled certain exclusion for one of his associates, Gouin objected vigorously—what could King possibly have against them? King insisted, however, that the full trio was out of the question and that, for the province as a whole, four French and one English were all that he could manage. Senator Dandurand, seeing that the flanking movement in favour of the Montreal combination had failed, came back to the subject of Gouin's portfolio and began to press King to make him President of the Privy Council; he kept this up until King had to say flatly that he would not do it. Whereupon Dandurand, turning to Gouin, asked what he would do if Lemieux did not come in. Gouin replied that in that case he, too, would remain out. King's double negative was thus matched by Gouin, and the bargaining had produced stalemate. In the end it was King who gave way, and on the point of Lemieux. He had prevailed upon Lapointe to make the sacrifice for Gouin and he was not going to

shift again on the Justice portfolio, but he promised to see Lemieux in the morning and to do what they had asked for him.

There the discussion ended. King had yielded up Justice to Gouin and had agreed to take in Lemieux, but Gouin might not accept if Lemieux refused to come in, and Lemieux's response could not be predicted. Still, from Mackenzie King's standpoint, it had not been a complete surrender. The Montrealers had been stopped short of their full objective. They had failed to make any headway for Mitchell or to obtain for Gouin the portfolio he most desired; and, aside from Lemieux, whose final position was by no means settled, King had escaped without having to make any alterations in the Quebec representation which might frighten the Progressives. King, putting the best face on it that he could, promptly reported to Lapointe that he had stood his ground "against handing over Canada's future to the financial magnates of Montreal."⁴⁴

After Gouin and Dandurand had departed, King saw Lapointe who was now to be called upon, so it appeared, for a second sacrifice, this time in favour of Lemieux, and gave him an account of the day's activities.⁴⁵ Shortly before midnight Andrew Haydon and A. B. Hudson were brought in for a final conference preparatory to the crucial meeting with Crerar on the following day. King urged Hudson to do all he could to persuade Crerar not to renew the bargaining on terms but to come in on the basis of the cabinet personnel as proposed. Hudson's terse summary captures the mood of that day in Ottawa: "Conference King, Lapointe Haydon & Hudson. Montreal pressure great. Situation tense."⁴⁶

Crerar's Decision: Failure of the Negotiations with the Progressives

Saturday, December 24, was a day of dénouement in the formation of the 1921 cabinet. The two leaders of the Liberal and Progressive parties were to meet for the first time since the election and on the outcome of that interview hung the fate of Mackenzie King's first plans for the formation of his Government and the rebuilding of his party. King rose early, still hopeful that before Christmas Day the new Government would be sworn in and that it would include representatives of the farmers' movement.

For Mackenzie King the business of the day began awkwardly but usefully. After breakfast he called in Rodolphe Lemieux and offered him his old portfolio of Marine and Fisheries, adding that Sir Lomer Gouin had made his own entrance into the Government conditional upon Lemieux's acceptance. It was a grudging and long-delayed gesture, so tactlessly proffered as to invite the inference that King was hoping for a refusal. If such was his purpose, it was quickly achieved. Lemieux dismissed the offer—all he wanted was the Commons speakership and that was final—and went on to give full vent to his disappointment and humiliation. He had been loyal to King—a better friend than King knew—but the conscriptionist Liberals had been out to destroy him, and King had passed him over etc., etc. What rankled most, it appeared, was the fact that he had not been summoned to Ottawa first of all, before Lapointe or anyone else, and that it was to be, at least in Lemieux's eyes, a King-Lapointe ministry. Before he was through, Rodolphe Lemieux had given Mackenzie King a difficult hour, but the embarrassment, King felt, was a small price to be rid of a man whose judgment he thought appalling and whom he

regarded as the prime instigator of the "Gouin conspiracy" of the previous summer. And, besides, the absence of Lemieux's name from the final slate would make it that much easier to deal with Crerar.

Crerar arrived shortly before 10:30. King talked with him alone for a few minutes and then they were joined by Ernest Lapointe and A. B. Hudson who remained until the discussion broke off at noon. King began by dwelling on the opportunity that was before them to strengthen the unity of Canada and to lay the foundation for the advancement of liberal policies for a long time to come. To achieve these ends and, in particular, to prevent the isolation of western Canada from the Government, he was willing to take into the cabinet Crerar and other representatives of the Progressive party. He was willing, that is, if they were prepared to come in on the same footing as other ministers; he would not entertain a coalition, nor would he discuss terms beyond a general understanding on policy. This, then, was the invitation: an offer of cabinet posts in a Liberal party Government so constituted, if the Winnipeg negotiations were an accurate forecast, as to be broadly sympathetic to the farming community.

The invitation was declined. Crerar replied that he would like to accept, that when he left the West he had felt free to do so if he were satisfied with the general policy of the Government, but that a stopover in Toronto, on the preceding evening, had changed his mind.⁴⁷ In Toronto he had met with the Progressive members from Ontario and had found them to be opposed, emphatically and unanimously, to the entrance of any Progressive into the Government. He had concluded, therefore, that he could not go in, at least not for the present. He did not intend, however, and neither did his associates, to become the official Opposition in the House of Commons; they would maintain their identity as a party, in keeping with the Saskatoon resolution, but they would give the Government independent support so long as its legislation was progressive. This concession fell far short of King's hopes, and he remonstrated with Crerar on the main issue, emphasizing that western Canada stood to lose by not having as strong a representation in the cabinet as it would if Crerar and other Progressives came in. Crerar conceded the point but came back to the attitude of the Progressive members. He repeated that he "did not think it was possible at the present time to carry their support—that after a time when new members had been working together, became [*sic*] better acquainted and gained confidence in sincerity of government it might be possible to do something."⁴⁸

Mackenzie King, seeing his whole project in imminent danger of foundering on the suspicions of the Progressive rank and file, tried a different tack and brought up the pro-agrarian complexion of the ministry, the line which he had believed all along to be his safest approach to the Progressive leaders. Would it help, he asked, if they went over the names of the ministers? Crerar hesitated, but then agreed, and King read aloud his slate, prefacing it with the remark that even at this date, it was still tentative. It was not, of course, the identical list that Haydon had shown to Crerar and Hudson in Winnipeg two weeks before; much had happened at Ottawa in the interval.⁴⁹ Of the original 17, 12 remained, including Mackenzie King and Crerar. Five had been dropped: Sir Arthur Currie and Duncan Marshall; Drury at his own request; McMaster, now replaced by Robb; and Bostock, replaced by J. H. King. Crerar made no criticism of these changes. He did object, however, to three new names, McKenzie, Graham and Lemieux, and to one old

one, Gouin, and he did not like to see two places assigned to Nova Scotia. McKenzie and Graham had been added as a result of insistent demands from Nova Scotia and Ontario. King explained that McKenzie's tenure would not be long, and he said that Graham was willing to come in or stay out. As for Lemieux, he was to be Commons Speaker, not a minister; it was necessary to include either Gouin or Lemieux, but, King said, he would not take both and, most decidedly, he would not take Mitchell, for whom the other two were pressing.

Neither King's slate nor his explanations made any difference. Crerar's mind was made up and he was no longer interested in bargaining over policy or about the number of Progressives who should be given cabinet posts. He only wanted to know whether King would alter the policy of his Government if there were no Progressives in it. King said that he would not, but that in their absence it might be more difficult to go as far to meet them as he would like; if the Progressives turned down his invitation, the Government would have to be constructed out of the materials at hand. Once the discussion reached this stage there was really nothing left to be said. Crerar asked for a little time to confer with the three Progressive members whom he had brought down from the West, but, when he returned in mid-afternoon, it was only to confirm the answer he had given in the morning. Crerar, like Drury, had definitely decided to remain out. After Crerar had finally departed, King, to save something from the wreckage, made a last effort to draw in A. B. Hudson, but Hudson put him off, saying that he would have to consult friends in Winnipeg. This slender hope aside, it was plain enough by Christmas Eve that Mackenzie King's cabinet negotiations with the farmer leaders had ended in complete failure.

In retrospect, King and Crerar were each privately inclined to blame the other. King thought that Crerar should have inspired and dominated his following, and Crerar was critical of King for changing his slate.⁵⁰ These criticisms, though understandable, are not very useful as an explanation of what went wrong. Neither man, in fact, fully understood the position or the problems of the other; each did things which embarrassed the other and hampered the negotiations; and, most damaging of all, both of them operated from positions of fundamental weakness.

Mackenzie King, by his refusal to concede specific terms and written guarantees and by his rejection of a coalition, made it evident that his real purpose was absorption of the farmers' movement. This inevitably intensified the suspicions of the Progressive leaders and their allies, and made it more difficult and more dangerous for them to accept King's invitation. But King, had he agreed to their terms, could not have carried the support of Quebec and Ontario Liberals who comprised almost three-quarters of the new Government's supporters in the House of Commons and thus formed the overwhelmingly dominant element of the fragmented Liberal party.

T. A. Crerar naturally was anxious to make very sure of substantial backing from his own people before joining a Government formed by men whom they had been fighting against; but the prolonged bargaining and consultation to which this necessity gave rise exposed King to pressures which he was too weak to resist and to which he yielded in a manner which made his original offer one of diminishing attractiveness. When it was finally brought home to Crerar that he could not get the needed backing, he chose isolation from the Government as the only alternative to isolation from the farmers' movement. Shortly after the final collapse of the negotiations, J. W. Dafoe wrote: "There

is no doubt in my mind that under no circumstances could Crerar have taken the whole strength of the Progressive movement with him if he had gone into the Government, even though he had his due proportion of colleagues and there had been provision made for preserving the identity of the Progressives. Correspondence which I am in receipt of from farmers out in the country makes it clear to me that they regarded the whole movement as one of those old-fashioned manoeuvres by which they were to be buncoed in the interest of the big corporations.”⁵¹ By the time that he reached Ottawa there was not much doubt in Crerar’s mind either. The Toronto meeting, in particular, had demonstrated to him that it was too much to expect the Progressive rank and file, after a bitterly contended election campaign, and at their moment of greatest triumph as an independent political movement, to accept any new arrangements which implied, even remotely, absorption by one of the old-line political parties.

The timing of Mackenzie King’s strategy was thus fundamentally wrong. A Liberal-Progressive alignment within a federal administration could only have been brought off by sophisticated, accomplished leadership on the part of men who were effectively in command of their respective followings. In 1921 neither Mackenzie King nor T. A. Crerar possessed anything like the necessary experience or authority.

Mackenzie King, though disappointed, quickly convinced himself that he had been wise to make the approach. It was a move in the right direction, he had shown that he was willing to give the Progressives a share of power within a national party, and he felt that a basis had been laid for a rapprochement which, given time, might produce a willingness to accept power on his terms, especially if, as he expected, the organized farmers failed to sustain their passion or preserve their unity in the years ahead. In that case there would be other and better opportunities, and for these King was prepared to wait.

The Final Phase: Completion of the Slate

After Crerar’s final refusal there was nothing for Mackenzie King to do but fill his cabinet with expectant Liberals. In the end it took a further, and wholly anti-climactic, period of five days before the Government was sworn in. The representation of three large areas remained unsettled: the Prairies, Quebec and Ontario.

The West was now only too easy. Leaving Manitoba open for Hudson (after Hudson’s subsequent refusal it stood open for another two years), King turned to W. R. Motherwell of Saskatchewan and secured his enthusiastic acceptance of the Department of Agriculture. For Alberta he selected Charles Stewart, gave him Interior, and found a seat for him in the province of Quebec. To Dr. J. H. King he assigned the moderately important portfolio of Public Works, partly as a device to soothe the Premier of British Columbia for the loss of one of his few competent ministers, and partly as a means of keeping it out of the hands of Charles Murphy.

The province of Quebec continued, right up to the end, to present difficulty. Mackenzie King had long since decided upon Lapointe and Béland, and, in the revised list which he had shown to Crerar, he had included Bureau and Robb. There was, however, the vexing problem of Montreal representation, unresolved by the choice of Robb, and magnified by Gouin’s failure to get the portfolio he wanted and by his threat to remain

outside unless Lemieux went in. With Lemieux's final refusal there was no longer any assurance of holding Gouin. It all came back to Sir Lomer Gouin and the Montreal group, and in the final week of cabinet formation their aspirations produced one last spasm of pressure.

Early in the afternoon of Saturday, December 24, while Mackenzie King sat waiting for Crerar to bring back his final answer, he called in Gouin, told him of his conclusive interview with Lemieux earlier in the day, and pressed him to accept the Justice portfolio. The news of Lemieux's decision—if news it was—did not prompt Gouin to carry out his threat, but neither was he ready, as yet, to accept King's offer. For that he still had a price, and he was determined that King should pay it. The price was the appointment of Walter Mitchell.

Mackenzie King, in his interview with Gouin and Dandurand on the preceding day, had refused to take into the cabinet the combination of Gouin, Lemieux and Mitchell. He had been driven, however, to accept Lemieux, along with Gouin, and now, with Lemieux definitely out, Gouin endeavoured to insert Mitchell as a substitute. If he were to take Justice, Gouin told King, he would need the help of some lawyer from one of the common-law provinces in the House of Commons (presumably as solicitor general) and, in addition, it would be necessary to include Mitchell as one of the ministers from Montreal. What was he to say, after all, to Mitchell's friends who had been counting on his appointment? King's answer was blunt enough: he would simply have to tell them that Mitchell's claims ranked below Robb's, that the cabinet membership was limited, and that nothing could be done for him, at least not for the present. Gouin was not satisfied. He would have to talk matters over again with friends in Montreal. He undertook to let King know the result on the following evening. Gouin telephoned from Montreal, as promised, on Sunday night, but only to apply more pressure, and afterwards he kept King waiting for yet another day before finally committing himself.

The stubbornness of Sir Lomer Gouin was not, in this instance, solely a personal matter. Walter Mitchell was, in truth, no ordinary office-seeker, either in ability or in the range of his connections, and included among the latter were the Bank of Montreal and the Royal Bank of Canada. The Bank of Montreal had been striving very hard to promote him for a cabinet appointment, acting through the fitting instrumentality of one of their directors, Sir Lomer Gouin. When word reached Montreal on Christmas weekend that, despite Gouin's efforts, J. A. Robb was likely to be the solitary English-speaking minister from the province, the financial community took alarm. It was decided that a last-minute effort should be made to repair the omission, and for this purpose an approach was made to P. C. Larkin of Toronto, a prominent merchant and philanthropist who was also a close personal and political friend of Mackenzie King (King's meeting with Drury on December 14 had taken place in Larkin's home). On Sunday morning the managing director of the Royal Bank telephoned Larkin from Montreal, put to him the case for two English-speaking Quebec ministers, including Mitchell, and requested him to communicate with King immediately. Larkin passed on the message forthwith, but it had no greater success than any of the previous representations on Mitchell's behalf.⁵²

When Gouin telephoned from Montreal on Sunday evening to suggest E. M. Macdonald of Nova Scotia for Solicitor General and to raise Mitchell's name once again, he found Mackenzie King's attitude quite unchanged. King consented to review the respective

claims of Macdonald and D. D. McKenzie for the solicitor generalship, but on the point of Mitchell he refused to reconsider. (The sole and quite unintended effect of this latest intervention from Montreal, so it appears, was to cause King to decide not only to make McKenzie Solicitor General but to raise this position to cabinet rank, and on Monday he secured the reluctant assent of W. S. Fielding to this arrangement as fulfilment of the greatly desired allotment of two portfolios to Nova Scotia).⁵³ With that the political force of Montreal business was spent and, although Gouin held off his own decision for another 24 hours, he informed King on Monday night, December 26, that he would accept appointment as Minister of Justice. King, greatly relieved, proceeded to complete the arrangements for Quebec.

Lapointe and his two colleagues, Béland and Bureau, made up the representation for the Quebec district. For Montreal there were Gouin and Robb, and, to maintain an even balance between the two districts, Senator Dandurand was added as Government leader in the Senate. With respect to numbers and racial composition, the Quebec roster came out, as Ernest Lapointe had lately urged, at five French and one English, for a total of six, making one more than Mackenzie King had initially contemplated. In the matter of portfolios the balance inclined in favour of Montreal. Gouin had gained the senior department among those allotted the province, and Lapointe had accepted one of distinctly lesser importance in Marine and Fisheries. Bureau received Customs and Excise, and King persuaded Béland to take Soldiers' Civil Re-establishment, a department for which he felt that Dr. Béland's professional background and experience as a prisoner of war would make him an appropriate minister. Montreal was afforded compensation for its disappointment in the English-speaking representation of the province by the assignment of Trade and Commerce, a department of importance to the business community, to J. A. Robb. No portfolio was bestowed on Senator Dandurand, the third Montrealer.

No last-minute obstacles—or opportunities—appeared in Ontario. Mackenzie King, having failed to secure Drury, at length persuaded W. C. Kennedy to take on the controversial Department of Railways and Canals. He wanted to keep this portfolio in Ontario, and Kennedy was the only Ontario Liberal to whom he was prepared to entrust it. James Murdock, whom King was bent on having as a representative of labour, was given the Labour Department, and arrangements were set in motion to provide him with a seat in the House of Commons. The two veteran war-horses, George Graham and Charles Murphy, were grudgingly admitted, *faute de mieux*, and because King was brought to the conclusion that there were more enemies to be made by leaving them outside, but his treatment of their portfolios suggests the measure of his reluctance. Murphy, who had asked expressly for Railways or Public Works, was denied both and offered, instead, his choice of two or three lesser departments; of these he selected the Post Office. This left Militia and Defence alone unprovided for and, there being no one more suitable among the Liberals in the Commons, King eventually offered it, with the Naval Service appended, to Graham. It was not what Graham wanted—he would have preferred his old portfolio of Railways, or Soldiers' Civil Re-establishment—but he took what he was given. Finally, as the sixth minister for Ontario, and only because of King's feeling that Ontario should not have fewer places than Quebec, T. A. Low was added as a minister without portfolio.

The roster then being as complete as it could be made, "having regard to all the circumstances," as the new Prime Minister was accustomed to say, the Mackenzie King administration was sworn in by the Governor General on the afternoon of Thursday, December 29. The members were as follows:

W. L. Mackenzie King	Prime Minister, Secretary of State for External Affairs, President of the Privy Council
W. S. Fielding	Finance and Receiver General
George P. Graham	Militia and Defence, and Naval Service
Charles Murphy	Post Office
Raoul Dandurand	Minister without Portfolio
H.-S. Béland	Soldiers' Civil Re-establishment and Health
Sir Lomer Gouin	Justice and Attorney General
Jacques Bureau	Customs and Excise
Ernest Lapointe	Marine and Fisheries
D. D. McKenzie	Solicitor General
J. A. Robb	Trade and Commerce
T. A. Low	Minister without Portfolio
A. B. Copp	Secretary of State
W. C. Kennedy	Railways and Canals
Charles Stewart	Interior, Indian Affairs, and Mines
W. R. Motherwell	Agriculture
James Murdock	Labour
J. E. Sinclair	Minister without Portfolio
James H. King	Public Works ⁵⁴

Conclusions

1. Well before the period of cabinet formation in December 1921, Ernest Lapointe was singled out by Mackenzie King to be his principal lieutenant in the leadership of the Liberal party with a special influence over the making of the cabinet as a whole. Between the Liberal convention of 1919 and the general election two and a half years later, King took Lapointe with him on every important speaking tour that he made. He offered Lapointe, three months before the election, any portfolio that he wanted in the next Government, and promised to work out all the cabinet arrangements with him. Once the election was over he called Lapointe to Ottawa, summoning him before any other member of the parliamentary group, and in their first discussion reaffirmed his earlier assurances. He told Lapointe that he regarded him as the real leader in the province of Quebec and as his closest colleague, invited him to choose his own portfolio, and said that he would give him his full confidence and that they would work out everything together. In the three weeks of cabinet-making that followed, King saw Lapointe more frequently than any other prospective minister, and made greater use of his advice and assistance in

the two most difficult problems that confronted him, the composition of the Quebec representation and the negotiations with the Progressives.

Yet the role to which Ernest Lapointe was called and the position which he was able to make for himself was not, in 1921 or subsequently, that of a co-prime minister. The Liberal convention of 1919 had elected a single national leader for the Liberal party, and Canadian constitutional practice, since 1867, recognized only one prime minister. Mackenzie King, though he was not yet by any means securely established in either of these posts of ultimate power, was fully determined to be the single pre-eminent head of his party and his Government, and the patent weaknesses of his position in 1921 only made him the more sensitive about any suggestions that final authority be shared with anyone else. His earlier proposals of a coalition with the Progressives were quickly discarded, even before the election, when it began to appear that there would be many more Liberals than Progressives in the new Parliament, and it is perfectly evident that King had not the least intention of raising any Liberal colleague to a position in the cabinet co-ordinate with himself.

In the making of the 1921 cabinet Mackenzie King took several important decisions in advance of his discussions with Lapointe and other prospective ministers. Three months before the election he had invited Kennedy and Murdock into the Government. Immediately after the election, in his preliminary conversations with Andrew Haydon, he decided that the cabinet should be smaller than the Meighen cabinet. And on the ambitious plan to bring the Progressive leaders into the Government, the decision to open negotiations was taken by King before Lapointe arrived in Ottawa. Lapointe subsequently endorsed these decisions.

Lapointe was consulted on the full range of cabinet appointments for all the provinces, and he produced a comprehensive slate of his own. His recommendations were given great weight, for example, in the cases of Copp, Murphy and McKenzie, but he did not have a veto over the choice of ministers from any province. Though no one was appointed from Quebec of whom Lapointe did not approve, it can scarcely be maintained that he had the final say about the representation of the district of Montreal.

With respect to the portfolio assignments Lapointe's influence was not decisive. He was consulted, as were others, but the final decisions were King's. King negotiated directly with each minister, and, of all the interviews that King had, Lapointe was present only at those with Crerar and Hudson. Lapointe, indeed, did not finally receive the portfolio of his choice. He asked for, and was promised, Justice, but at a later stage in the negotiations the offer was rescinded, Justice was given to his principal French Canadian rival, and Lapointe was left with a portfolio of distinctly lesser prestige.

The truth is that Ernest Lapointe was not, in 1921, the sole or paramount leader of the Liberal party in Quebec, much less the undisputed *chef* of French Canada. Sir Wilfrid Laurier's death had removed the one figure who was able to command the loyalties of the French Canadian community as a whole. In his absence the old regional tensions revived, and the Quebec Liberals divided into two contending factions, each with its own leader and both equally successful in the first postwar general election. Ernest Lapointe was the acknowledged leader in the district of Quebec, but his authority in the district of Montreal was negligible. The Montreal Liberals, French and English, had brought forward a new federal leader in the person of Sir Lomer Gouin, and during the cabinet formation

of 1921 their energies—and his—were devoted to elevating him to the position of senior minister for the province and to furnishing him with as many cabinet colleagues from Montreal as they possibly could.

In the ensuing struggle between the two Quebec factions, Lapointe was only partially successful. He was able, in the end, to obtain the appointment of three ministers, himself included, from the district of Quebec, and to hold Montreal to three, one of the latter being an English Canadian. But in the contest for the senior Quebec portfolio Lapointe lost out to Gouin, and the district of Montreal also received, in the Department of Trade and Commerce, a second important portfolio. Gouin's victory was signalized at the first meeting of the new cabinet when he was assigned the chair immediately to the left of the Prime Minister. W. S. Fielding, the Minister of Finance and the senior Privy Councillor, was seated on Mackenzie King's right, and Ernest Lapointe to the right of Fielding.

Yet the setback to Ernest Lapointe was only temporary, and his subordination to Sir Lomer Gouin more formal than real. The insistent, crowding pressure to which Mackenzie King was subjected by the Montrealers in the making of his cabinet did nothing at all to allay his distrust of Gouin, and in the councils of the new Government it was Lapointe, above all, to whom King turned for advice on all matters affecting Quebec. The Prime Minister's evident preference, coupled with Gouin's progressive alienation of the Quebec Liberal members by his arrogance, effectively prevented Gouin from consolidating his position, and, when he retired two years later, a somewhat frustrated and diminished figure, Lapointe was promoted to the Justice portfolio and quickly came into his own. He held the post in every Liberal administration until his death in 1941, and throughout that period he was the pre-eminent French Canadian Liberal, the second man in the hierarchy of his party.

2. To return to cabinet-making in 1921, Lapointe was not the only French Canadian whose advice Mackenzie King sought or received. King consulted most of the other leading Quebec Liberals in federal politics, including Gouin and Lemieux, B  land and Dandurand. They were consulted not only about Quebec representation, English-speaking as well as French-speaking, and about the representation of French ministers outside Quebec, but also on the wider problems of cabinet formation, including the representation of the other provinces and the entrance of the Progressive leaders into the Government.

Without exception they showed no interest in the representation of French-speaking people outside Quebec. Otherwise, however, they were far from indifferent to the representation of the English-speaking provinces. They were opposed to a Liberal-Progressive coalition but not to the idea of inviting individual Progressive leaders and adherents into the Government, though they differed, in detail, as to who should be brought in. Nevertheless, though they clearly endeavoured to influence Mackenzie King's choice of ministers from the other provinces, their principal and overriding concern lay with the representation which the province of Quebec was to receive. And on every aspect of this problem—the number of French and the number of English, the regional distribution of cabinet places, the assignment of the senior portfolio—there was a sharp clash of opinion between the district of Montreal and the district of Quebec.

3. Partly because of this pervasive regional rivalry, French Canadian leaders in 1921 showed a greater than usual concern over the portfolio assignments for French Canadian

ministers. On this subject five of the French Canadians who offered advice to Mackenzie King had specific recommendations to make. Lapointe thought that French Canadians should get Justice, Secretary of State and Public Works; Gouin claimed for them the presidency of the Privy Council, Justice, and Marine and Fisheries; Lemieux proposed that Justice or Railways should go to Gouin; Dandurand proposed Gouin's name for Justice or the Privy Council post; and Béland suggested himself as Postmaster General. Two of these portfolios, Marine and Fisheries, and the Post Office, together with the solicitor generalship, were offices in which French Canadians had appeared prominently during the Laurier administration. They had been intermittently represented in two others, the office of Secretary of State and the presidency of the Privy Council, most recently in the Meighen Government. The only two departures from recent practice were the request for the Justice portfolio, which had not been held by a French Canadian since the Mackenzie administration, and Lemieux's suggestion of Railways for Gouin. No French Canadian had ever occupied Railways, and Lemieux was the only man, in 1921, to propose a French Canadian for this or any other major economic department.

Not all of these proposals were accepted, and three of the four French Canadian ministers who were assigned portfolios were disappointed, in varying degrees, with what they received. Gouin was made Minister of Justice because he had to be given an important portfolio and because Mackenzie King was afraid to let him have the presidency of the Privy Council. Lapointe was then relegated to Marine and Fisheries. Béland's first preference was for the Post Office, his old department in the last days of the Laurier Government, but, when Charles Murphy selected it from the several lesser portfolios which he was offered, Béland accepted Soldiers' Civil Re-establishment and Health. Bureau, so far as can be determined, had no particular preference, and he was given Customs and Excise.

Four portfolios were thus distributed among the five French Canadian ministers: Justice, Marine and Fisheries, Customs and Excise, and Soldiers' Civil Re-establishment and Health. Justice was a senior and important portfolio, highly esteemed in the legal profession and in all the interlocking professional and commercial circles which formed the traditional political élite of French Canada. Lapointe told King quite frankly that it would give him the prestige he needed in the province of Quebec, and Gouin was evidently of the opinion that either Justice or the Privy Council would be an appropriate recognition of the prestige which he already possessed. Marine and Fisheries was a moderately important department, and its Marine Division, invested with responsibility for the protection and improvement of navigation in the St. Lawrence, was of special interest to Quebec. Customs and Excise, charged with the enforcement of the tariff laws and the collection of internal revenue, was the principal revenue-producing department of the federal government. Soldiers' Civil Re-establishment and Health was a combination of two new and small departments: the former was of immediate concern to a large group of war veterans; and the Health Department afforded a nucleus for the development of programs of social welfare of the kind which were embodied in the 1919 Liberal platform. Customs and Excise was connected, though not so closely as Finance or Trade and Commerce, with the economic policies of the new Government; and the administration of this department became, four years later, a storm-centre of political controversy, though this, of course, was not foreseen in 1921. Justice was the only

department of the four which conferred upon its minister substantial influence in the Government or high prestige in the country.

There were no hard and fast rules which automatically opened or shut the door of any department to an English-speaking minister or a French-speaking minister. Nevertheless, Mackenzie King and the other Liberal leaders were undoubtedly influenced by the relevance of certain portfolios to particular regional and other group interests and by the practices which had developed in the past with respect to the allocation of these portfolios. The Department of the Interior, since 1888, had been held consistently by western ministers, and the spectacular growth of the Prairie Provinces in the twentieth century led easily to the assumption that Agriculture, as well, should go to the West. Fielding's long tenure of the Finance Department and his continuing strength in the Liberal party made it virtually unthinkable that it should be given to anyone else so long as he was capable of supporting the weight of its departmental duties. Besides, Mackenzie King was not in sufficient command of his party to demote Fielding, even if he had desired to do so. As it was, he considered no one else for the post, and no other name was suggested to him. It might have been suspected that Sir Lomer Gouin, given his particular business connections and his strong concern with tariff and railway policy, would have aspired to Finance or Railways and Canals. There is not the slightest evidence that he did so, and, in fact he ruled himself out for both these portfolios by his overriding determination to be President of the Privy Council or Minister of Justice and by his refusal to take any department with a substantial administrative load. Railways and Canals, like Finance, had always been held by English Canadians. In 1921 public ownership of railways was an exceedingly divisive issue in the Liberal party. Mackenzie King wanted, therefore, to keep the Railways portfolio out of the hands of anyone who was strongly committed to one or other side of the question. This ruled out all the leading westerners and Quebeckers, and, since the Maritime Provinces offered no suitable candidate, it had to go to Ontario. Trade and Commerce had almost invariably been assigned to an English Canadian from Ontario or Quebec; in 1921 Kennedy was the only acceptable possibility from Ontario, but King had greater need of Kennedy in Railways, and he therefore appointed Robb, the only available businessman, apart from Gouin, among the Quebec candidates. On the other hand, the Post Office, Public Works and the office of the Secretary of State were three departments in which French Canadians had been frequently represented in the past, and in 1921 Mackenzie King assigned them all to English Canadians.

4. Of all the political leaders who made representations to Mackenzie King during the cabinet formation of 1921, only two, T. A. Crerar and A. B. Hudson, endeavoured to attach policy conditions to their entrance into the Government. The Liberal party stood committed to the program of extensive economic and social reform which had been drawn up by the national Liberal convention in 1919. The program proposed sweeping and specific tariff reductions, a revival of reciprocity, improved labour practices in the terms of the Labour Conventions of the Treaty of Versailles, and measures of social welfare which included old age pensions, unemployment insurance and maternity benefits. The platform was not universally popular among Liberals: the tariff proposals, for one thing, were disliked in the central provinces, they had been publicly repudiated by Fielding, and during the 1921 election campaign, they were deliberately played down

by Mackenzie King. It is scarcely surprising, therefore, that the Progressive leaders who were invited to enter the Liberal cabinet were highly sceptical of the sincerity of the Liberal leadership. Accordingly, Crerar and Hudson tried hard to obtain from Mackenzie King specific commitments on economic policies which were of prime importance to the farmers. King was prevailed upon to offer concessions, but they were so modest and so general in their nature as to be unsatisfactory to the westerners, and, of course, even these commitments fell to the ground once the Liberal-Progressive negotiations collapsed. No other politician, whether English-speaking or French-speaking, attempted to reach an understanding with Mackenzie King or to secure commitments from him on government policy or legislation.

5. What proportion of the 1921 cabinet was French Canadian? Were French Canadians under-represented in relation to their numerical position in the population of Canada?

The French share of the 1921 cabinet slightly exceeded one quarter: five of the 19 members were French-speaking. The French share of the population of Canada amounted to 28 per cent.⁵⁵

The total population of Canada in 1921 was 8,800,000, and with a cabinet of 19 members this meant one cabinet minister for every 463,000 of population. The French share was slightly under this national ratio. There were nearly 2,500,000 French-speaking Canadians in the whole of Canada, and, with five French Canadian cabinet ministers, this meant one minister for each 500,000 of French population in Canada.

When these population figures are reduced to regional and provincial elements, the French-Canadian position in the cabinet appears to better advantage in some respects and worse in others. All five French ministers were from the province of Quebec. With the French-speaking population of Quebec standing almost at 1,900,000, this gave one minister to every 380,000 French Canadians in Quebec. The Quebec French, moreover, did distinctly better than the Quebec English: one to 380,000 as compared with one to 472,000. On the other hand, the French-speaking minorities outside Quebec, amounting to 563,000 in all—248,000 in Ontario, 125,000 in the four western provinces, and 190,000 in the Maritimes—were given no separate representation. By comparison with the population of the Maritime Provinces, the French population of Canada was very much under-represented in the cabinet: one minister to every 500,000 French as opposed to one for every 333,000 Maritimers. As against the population of Ontario, however, the French of Canada stood on a precisely equal footing of representation, one minister to 500,000 in each case; and as against the four western provinces the French of Canada were substantially over-represented, one to 500,000 French by comparison with one to 833,000 westerners.

There is no indication that French Canadians were dissatisfied with the number of places which they received in the 1921 cabinet. Their representation was, in fact, larger in absolute numbers and nearly as large in percentages as it had been in any cabinet since Confederation.⁵⁶

Ernest Lapointe, at the beginning of the cabinet-making in 1921, advised Mackenzie King to follow the Laurier example in this respect, and he urged that, at the very least, French Canadian representation must be kept as high as it had been in the Meighen Government prior to the election—namely, three cabinet ministers and the solicitor

general in a ministry of 23. Later in the cabinet-making proceedings, when the two districts in the province of Quebec were jockeying furiously for position, Lapointe and his colleagues from the Quebec district pressed for a total French Canadian representation of five, thus holding the English-speaking representation of the province to one, whereas Gouin and the Montrealers contended for a French Canadian representation of four, so as to include two representatives of the Quebec English. No English Canadian leader outside Quebec endeavoured to influence the number of French Canadians in the cabinet. Two English-speaking Quebecers, however, attempted to do so: Mitchell recommended that French Canadian representation be limited to three, and McMaster suggested that it be four. None of the Quebec French showed any interest in cabinet representation for the French ministers outside Quebec. Pius Michaud and Onésiphore Turgeon were the only men to propose that the New Brunswick minister be a French Canadian; each suggested himself, and neither received any support from the Quebecers, who had only English names to recommend for the post.

6. Was any eligible candidate excluded from the cabinet because he looked to be too inflexible on public questions or dangerously unorthodox on matters of party policy? Most decidedly this consideration did not apply to any of the French Canadians who were left out. Boivin was omitted because he was known to have been negotiating with Meighen about a post in the previous Government and because his loyalty to the Liberal party was, on that account, suspect. Lemieux deliberately chose to remain out, it would appear, rather than go in and play second fiddle to Lapointe. Turgeon and Michaud were left out because of the impossibility of deciding between them and because neither attracted strong support from the New Brunswick English or the Quebec French.

The possession of very strong, not to say inflexible, opinions on trade and transportation issues did not keep Gouin or Dandurand out of the cabinet, nor did the fact that the Progressive leaders were committed to quite opposite views cause their appointment to appear less desirable in the eyes of Mackenzie King. Inflexibility on economic policy was a barrier, however, to Mitchell and McMaster. The appointment of Mitchell, King felt, would tip the balance far too heavily on the side of the protectionists. Yet Mitchell had powerful backing and, to make his exclusion less unpalatable in Montreal, King also jettisoned McMaster, his polar opposite on economic questions, in favour of the middle-of-the-roader, J. A. Robb.

Among the other English Canadian rejects, A. K. Maclean was left out because Mackenzie King feared that the appointment of a second conscriptionist Liberal from Nova Scotia would cause trouble in the province. E. M. Macdonald, a fellow Nova Scotian, was passed over because his claims, on the score of party service, were judged to be inferior to those of D. D. McKenzie.

Comparisons with 1921

The most striking feature of the cabinet formation of 1935, by contrast with Mackenzie King's first experience of cabinet-making in 1921, is that it was in every way a smoother, faster and more successful operation. The explanation is to be found in the improved circumstances of the Liberal party and in the greater authority and confidence of Mackenzie King as leader.

The Liberal party of 1921 had not been a genuinely national political party. It was, in fact, little more than a sectional party, made up of distrustful eastern factions and dominated by a French Canadian bloc which was itself divided into two jealous regional groups. In the first postwar election the Liberals failed to obtain a stable or a national majority in Parliament. They swept Quebec and most of the Maritime constituencies, but the ancient Liberal bastions in rural Ontario fell before the Progressive crusade, and Liberal candidates in the Prairie Provinces were all but completely annihilated by the same exuberant antagonist. Recapture of support from those who had voted Progressive became at once an essential condition of successful federal Liberal leadership.

In hasty pursuit of this objective Mackenzie King had seized upon the cabinet formation which followed the 1921 election as an opportunity for the absorption of the farmers' movement into the Liberal party. The manoeuvre, as the preceding paper shows, was a failure. What was more, the complicated negotiations and consultations which it required drew out the whole business of cabinet-making into a full three weeks, and the delay gave free rein to all the competing ambitions and jealous rivalries which racked the Liberal party in the postwar period. A scramble for office quickly developed and, in his efforts to cope with it, it was a fundamental weakness of Mackenzie King that he was young, inexperienced and still unproven as a party leader. He was 47 in December 1921, he had been Liberal leader for a little over two years, and the results of the first election under his leadership were inconclusive. Though sure of his own judgment, he lacked the prestige and authority to impose it on his following and especially on the elders of his party, some of them stubborn survivors from the Laurier era, and few of them disposed

to subordinate their long suspended desires for office to the delicate requirements of a complex exercise in interparty courtship conducted by a political novice in the person of their erstwhile junior colleague. Faced with a surge of conflicting pressures, Mackenzie King fell back instinctively on those methods of conciliation which were the principal endowment of his professional experience, and this posture inevitably produced, in the composition of his ministry, compromise and concession. In the end not only did the Progressive leaders elude his grasp, but he was compelled to take into the Government several venerable and unbending personages whom he knew to be ill-suited to the difficult task of party reconstruction that lay ahead. The first Mackenzie King administration which took office on December 29, 1921 was a decidedly imperfect realization of the original plans and preferences of the new Prime Minister.

The circumstances which governed the cabinet formation of 1935 were quite different. The Liberal party now dominated the political life of Canada. Fully restored to national dimensions in the twenties, it had become a good example of the omnibus Canadian party drawing support from every major area and interest in the country. And, though the second administration of Mackenzie King had been overturned in 1930 by the aggressive leadership of R. B. Bennett, the party which King continued to lead had nowhere been uprooted by defeat, and its tenacious and widespread regional strength, coupled with deepening public disillusionment with Bennett in power, enabled it to make an impressive comeback in the second depression election. The general election of 1935 returned 171 Liberals to a House of Commons with 245 members, thus giving the Liberal party a majority of 74 over all others combined. Alone among the parties, the Liberals elected candidates from every province, and Liberal members formed a majority of those elected from all but two provinces. The Conservatives were reduced to 39, and this total—the smallest Conservative representation since Confederation—slightly exceeded that of all the splinter parties and groups. For the new minority parties, from which much had been hoped and feared, failed to make any impression on the nation as a whole, and the remaining 35 seats were filled by an assortment of 17 Social Crediters, 7 CCF'ers, 5 Independent-Liberals, 2 Liberal-Progressives, 1 Independent-Conservative, 1 Reconstructionist, 1 Independent, and 1 UFO-Labour. The Liberal revival, moreover, was by no means confined to national politics. There was a Liberal government installed in every provincial capital except Edmonton, and the recent electoral successes of the provincial Liberals, notably in Saskatchewan, Ontario and Nova Scotia, had undoubtedly lent powerful support to the federal party in its final ascent to office. In 1935 the Liberal party of Canada stood on the threshold of a long and unparalleled ascendancy.

And so it was with Mackenzie King. No longer the political novice of the early 1920's, King had long since become an experienced, accomplished and confident leader. Of the 17 years that had elapsed since World War I, he had been Leader of the Opposition for seven and Prime Minister for nine. The election of 1926, in which he snatched solid victory from ignominious defeat, had put an end to earlier misgivings about his leadership and given rise to the myth of his political infallibility. His defeat in 1930 had been neither dishonourable nor, indeed, long regretted by his party as they watched the Bennett Government being dashed to pieces in the hurricane of depression. Far more devastating to King had been the Beauharnois scandal, erupting a year after defeat and threatening personal disgrace and political ruin. He had managed, however, to clear his name and the

name of his Government and, after public repentance and pledges of reform on behalf of his party, he had been permitted to emerge from the valley of humiliation. Since then he had shown masterly skill in keeping his Opposition following united on a program of moderate reform and economic orthodoxy against all the divisive forces and radical ideas of the mid-thirties until at last he had brought them triumphantly into power once again. In 1935, Mackenzie King, his sagacity proven, his paramountcy established, was in full command of his party, quite able to win its acceptance of his political judgment whenever he chose to assert it. In the formation of his third and, as he expected, final administration he chose to do precisely that.

Cabinet Potential of the Liberal Party in 1935

There was no crippling shortage of Liberal cabinet material in 1935. In every region, though not in every province, the supply was adequate and, in some areas, better than that. It was, of course, only five years since a Liberal Government had held office in Ottawa, and most of Mackenzie King's former colleagues were still in public life. Of the 19 members of the second King administration, at the time of its resignation in 1930, 11, including the Prime Minister, were elected to the House of Commons in 1935. One other, Raoul Dandurand, was still available, if needed, to lead the Government forces in the Senate; and two others, Charles A. Dunning and James Layton Ralston, the ablest ministers in that earlier Government, though no longer in Parliament were still in the prime of life and, perhaps, still willing to take up ministerial responsibilities. Not all the carryovers were suitable for reappointment—some had been weak ministers even in the less exacting conditions of the late 1920's and others had since declined in prestige or physical powers—but among the number there was a reassuring core of proven executive ability and continuing political strength, and it would not be impossible, in the political circumstances of 1935, to find replacements for the weaker brethren.

Within the Liberal parliamentary group there were several younger men who had appeared in 1930 or earlier and whose performance in Opposition now gave them substantial claims to promotion. And there were others, a small but very promising handful, who were elected to Parliament for the first time in 1935, and whose unusual abilities entitled them to immediate consideration, if only because the state of the nation put an exceedingly high premium on the knowledge and vitality which they possessed. Finally, outside Parliament, amplifying the cabinet potential of the party, ranged the members of the eight Liberal provincial governments, and Mackenzie King had not hitherto been reluctant to recruit federal ministers from the provincial level. The total cabinet potential which these various resources represented was not, of course, distributed with perfect geographic felicity—it was thin to the point of vanishing in Alberta and Prince Edward Island—but it could be said, at least, that there was no great region devoid of established Liberal spokesmen who could be expected to bring strength of one sort or another to a federal administration.

The condition of the Liberal leadership in the Maritime Provinces illustrates the point. Fielding was gone from Nova Scotia, but Mackenzie King had found a suitable successor in J. L. Ralston whom he brought into the Government in 1926. Ralston, a soldier-lawyer

of outstanding ability and with a high sense of public duty, had imparted fresh purpose to the Liberal cause in the Maritimes, and he continued to give effective service in Opposition as his party's financial critic. Shortly after the 1930 election, however, financial necessity had caused Ralston to join a Montreal law firm, and the demands of these two sets of obligations proved so heavy that he did not stand for re-election in 1935. His withdrawal from Nova Scotia had left the field clear for two promising younger men. J. L. Ilsley had been the federal member for Hants-Kings since 1926, and during the period of Opposition he forged steadily ahead, by earnestness and hard work, into a position of quite definite prominence, declining in the course of it the provincial leadership of his party. This role had been taken up, after an unsuccessful run for Parliament in 1930, by Angus L. Macdonald, and the eloquent and high-spirited Macdonald had led the provincial Liberals to a handsome victory at the polls in 1933. Two years later, in the federal election of 1935, Nova Scotia went solidly Liberal and either Ilsley or Premier Macdonald was now a virtual certainty for a federal cabinet post.

New Brunswick was adequately, though less impressively, endowed. There was one venerable survivor, P.-J. Veniot, a former premier who had been taken into the King Government in 1926—the second French-speaking Canadian outside Quebec to hold office as a federal minister of the Crown¹—and who had held on to his seat in 1930 and again in 1935. But Veniot was now 72, age and illness had dragged him down in Opposition, and his place had been taken by J.-E. Michaud, also a French Canadian. Michaud was a proven organizer and vote-getter in local politics, and in 1933 he had transferred to Parliament in a spectacular by-election victory which did not go unnoticed by Mackenzie King. Michaud's prospects were good, provided that his promotion, in succession to another French Canadian, did not excite serious opposition from the English and Protestant element of the party in New Brunswick.

Prince Edward Island, like Nova Scotia, had gone solidly Liberal for the first time since 1921, but the four Island members counted for much less among the Liberal hosts of 1935, and, since none of the four was an obvious, or even a reasonable, cabinet choice, it was likely that the province would be passed over, as it frequently had been in the past, for a federal cabinet post.

The more populous central provinces offered, as might be expected, a larger supply of cabinet possibilities, but the two groups of leaders presented an interesting contrast in point of age and political experience. In Quebec the balance inclined heavily on the side of the old guard; in Ontario the new faces greatly outnumbered the old.

In Quebec the sizable beachhead which the Conservative party had made five years before was almost totally erased, and the province, electing 56 Liberal regulars and five Independent-Liberals, was once again, as it had been throughout the postwar decade, overwhelmingly Liberal. Not only that, but the entire French Canadian complement of the 1930 King cabinet now reappeared intact and, it soon was clear, expectant of reappointment. Yet the actual membership of the Quebec leadership group was very uneven in quality, and the claims of its weaker brethren were due for re-examination.

First among the French Canadians stood Ernest Lapointe. Now 59, Lapointe had been Mackenzie King's right bower in office and in Opposition, and there was not the slightest doubt either of his recall to the cabinet or of his appointment to a portfolio of unquestioned seniority. Slightly junior to Lapointe was P.-J.-A. Cardin of Sorel, the

senior member from the district of Montreal. Cardin had been a strong minister in the previous decade—he took over Marine and Fisheries in 1924 when Lapointe went to Justice—and he remained prominent in Opposition. He was, in addition, a superlative platform orator and an excellent political organizer, and it would have been most surprising if he had not expected that this combination of abilities, which had once again produced results in the recent election, would be fully recognized in the arrangements for the new cabinet. Senior in age and precedence to both Lapointe and Cardin was Raoul Dandurand, the sixth-ranking Privy Councillor for Canada and the eldest Liberal statesman of Quebec. Dandurand had been a member of the Senate since 1899, he had been Liberal leader there since 1921, and even now at the age of 74 he could be considered sufficiently hale and energetic to support the burdens of that office.

The claims of the two remaining French Canadian carryovers were much less solidly established. Fernand Rinfret was an accomplished public speaker, but in four years as Secretary of State he had developed no other political talents. He had been blamed for the heavy Liberal losses on Montreal Island in 1930 and his subsequent experience as mayor of Montreal from 1932 to 1934 had failed to augment his political strength in that quarter. Lucien Cannon of Quebec City was a bright lawyer and a convivial individual, but he was also erratic to a degree, and his earlier performance as solicitor general had left the unfortunate impression that he lacked the steadiness and the sobriety appropriate to high office. His absence from Parliament while the Liberals were in Opposition had not been keenly missed, and he had compounded his obscurity during that period by neglecting to mend his political fences in the district of Quebec.

Cannon and Rinfret were distinctly vulnerable, and one or both of them might be dispensed with, provided, of course, that suitable replacements were available. Of such there were, however, very few. It is true that the 1935 election had brought into Parliament numerous recruits, including Ernest Bertrand and Joseph Jean, two Montrealers who would in time be deemed suitable for cabinet appointment, but both these men were inexperienced and neither commanded immediate attention. Pierre Casgrain of Montreal was undoubtedly an experienced parliamentarian—he had served in the House of Commons since 1917 and for eight of those years as Quebec whip—but Casgrain had not greatly impressed his seniors as a potential cabinet minister, and it was more likely that recognition of his legislative knowledge would take a different form.

The only Quebec Liberal to emerge from the early depression years with an appreciably enhanced stature was Charles G. Power of Quebec City. Power had entered Parliament in 1917, a young lawyer with an excellent military record, but his progress up the Liberal ranks was slow until his party fell from office in 1930. Then it was that his superb organizing abilities, his skill and dash in parliamentary combat, and his cheerful delight in puncturing pomposity had all found new opportunities. In the freer and more relaxed atmosphere of Opposition, "Chubby" Power had come forward at a rush into the front rank, and he was now, by all odds, the most popular member of the House of Commons, at least among the members of his own party. But Power, though bilingual, was not a French Canadian; he was an Irish Catholic and his promotion, however appropriate on various grounds, could not easily be presented as a reinforcement of the French Canadian section of the cabinet. There was thus a very real possibility that the

French Canadian old guard from Quebec would be reappointed *en bloc* and *faute de mieux*.

Nor was there any obvious choice for the role of cabinet representative of the English-speaking population of Quebec. Either Ralston or Dunning would probably be quite acceptable to the Montreal business community, but both were transplants from other provinces and neither could any longer be assumed to be interested in public office. The only "indigenous" possibility was Charles B. Howard, an ambitious and locally prominent businessman from the Eastern Townships, who had been a member of the House of Commons for 10 years and who had been passed over for promotion in 1929.

Ontario, by contrast, was not afflicted with a superfluity of old guard Liberals. Of the long succession of undistinguished Ontario politicians who had found their way into the King cabinets of the 1920's, most had long since moved on, either into private life or into the Senate where their continuing presence did nothing to modify Mackenzie King's well-known prejudice against assigning portfolios to the Upper Chamber. Aside from the Prime Minister, who now represented a Saskatchewan constituency, there were only two carryovers. One of them, W. D. Euler of Kitchener, was a politician of undoubted administrative and parliamentary ability, with a numerous and faithful following in his section of the province. These assets, coupled with his stubborn independence—he was an unwavering protectionist—and dour rectitude, had previously made Euler a very satisfactory Minister of National Revenue and they now equipped him adequately for an economic portfolio. The other, J. C. Elliott of London, was a much more amiable but weaker man. Elliott had performed indifferently in several portfolios in the 1920's, and he had never been able to rally much support for the Liberal party in his province. More recently, a long and serious illness had caused him to fall back still further, leaving him in 1935, at 62, a somewhat tired and isolated figure.

But the gaps left in Ontario by the attrition of the old guard appeared, on the face of it, easy to fill. For the depression decade saw, for the first time in a generation, a resurgence of the Liberal party in Ontario, and its revival, associated with the rise of Mitchell F. Hepburn to the premiership in 1934, was evident in federal, no less than provincial politics. In the federal election of 1935 the Liberal party succeeded in electing 56 members from Ontario, and this contingent—the largest since the election of 1874—contained no fewer than 32 who were making their first appearance in Parliament, plus five others who had been first elected at by-elections in the previous year. Among the recruits there were seven who were eventually to be elevated to the cabinet.²

Three of the seven stood out for immediate recognition. Norman McLeod Rogers was a university professor whom Mackenzie King had brought into the public service in 1927 as one of his secretaries. In 1930 Rogers returned to academic life, but he continued to assist King informally, and in 1935 he was elected to Parliament for Kingston at the age of 41. King admired Rogers' idealism, valued his assistance, and respected his knowledge of constitutional and economic problems. Now that Rogers had acquired a political footing, King foresaw for his protégé a bright political future, and was anxious to promote him to larger responsibilities. Clarence Decatur Howe, the new member for Port Arthur, had even less experience of public life than Norman Rogers. Howe had made, however, a conspicuously successful career in the profession and practice of civil engineering—his firm was the leading builder of grain elevators in Canada—and he was, in

summary truth, a business executive of quite exceptional abilities who had the good fortune to appear in politics at a time and place which assured their prompt and full employment. The third conspicuous newcomer was Arthur Slaght, the member for Parry Sound, a successful Toronto lawyer who was believed to have the confidence and the enthusiastic backing of Premier Hepburn. In addition to these new faces there were, among the Ontario members, two other young men, Ross Gray of Lambton West and F. G. Sanderson of Perth, who had come into Parliament in the preceding decade and who had succeeded in making a favourable mark as Opposition members. The Ontario possibilities for the cabinet in 1935 were thus distinctly bright, far better, in fact, than they had been at any earlier time in Mackenzie King's leadership.

West of the Great Lakes, too, the older generation of Liberal leaders was fading away, and in every province but Manitoba it had been pushed aside. In Manitoba the success of Mackenzie King's patient courtship of the farmers' movement was now an accomplished fact of several years standing. The moderate Progressives had become Liberals and, although some of them continued to use the hyphen, the union had long since been sealed by the appointment of Robert Forke, T. A. Crerar's successor as leader of the Progressive members of Parliament, to the King cabinet in 1926. Forke, however, proved to be an incompetent minister, and Mackenzie King had been glad to replace him, six months before the 1930 election, with Crerar whom he had been trying for eight years, off and on, to bring into the Government. Crerar had lost his seat as well as his portfolio in 1930, but he was now re-elected, a fully reconciled Liberal, and no cabinet-maker could ignore his extensive experience in politics and business or the support which he still commanded from a substantial element on the prairies, including the *Winnipeg Free Press*.

Yet Crerar, in the 17 years that had passed since the Great War, had held cabinet office for only 14 months. He was unsympathetic to many of the new ideas that were current among Prairie farmers and, during his absence from Parliament in the early 1930's, three younger Manitoba members had come forward into positions of some prominence. Two of them, J. T. Thorson and J. A. Glen, were ambitious lawyers, and Thorson was, in addition, an outspoken member of the reform wing of the Liberal party. The third, W. G. Weir, was a farmer and a hard-working young member whose wide experience as a director of farm organizations in the twenties and thirties had brought him into close touch with recent developments in farm opinion on the subject of wheat marketing. Crerar undoubtedly had the edge over all three, but in 1935 he was faced, for the first time in his political career, with a little competition.

In Saskatchewan there was one lone veteran but his day was past. W. R. Motherwell had been federal Minister of Agriculture throughout the twenties and he was re-elected in 1935. Motherwell had been in politics for more than 40 years, he was now 75 and even in the preceding decade he had been overshadowed by two younger men. Between Charles A. Dunning and James G. Gardiner there lay a long and intense rivalry for the role of the leading Prairie spokesman at Ottawa. In the 1920's the prize had gone to Dunning, the successful Premier of a government in which Gardiner was a successful minister. He had been brought by Mackenzie King into the federal cabinet in 1925, the keystone of King's plans for winning over Progressive opinion in the West. Dunning had lived up to expectations. He was a conspicuously clear-thinking, constructive and energetic politician, and Mackenzie King, who had been warned that he was also very ambitious, found him to

be "head and shoulders over the other ministers"³ and promoted him to the Finance Department in 1929. After his personal defeat in 1930 Dunning went into business and swiftly made an impressive new reputation as a trustee and reorganizer of bankrupt companies. In 1935 there was no Liberal who stood higher in the respect of the business community and, though he did not run in the election, he was still, in every important sense, available for reappointment to his old portfolio. By this time, however, Dunning was an eastern businessman and he could no longer be viewed as an authoritative spokesman for the Prairies at Ottawa. This position was now clearly indicated for James G. Gardiner and, if it was true that Dunning would bring strength to the new Government from one quarter, there was no denying that Gardiner would be a valuable asset as well.

Gardiner's sights had been set on Ottawa for at least a decade. Undoubtedly less genial than Dunning, but scarcely less able or ambitious, Gardiner had wanted to make the move in 1925, when Dunning had, and Mackenzie King, who prized Gardiner's organizing abilities, would have been glad to take the two of them. But the double move had been effectively discouraged by Dunning, and Gardiner had been left to take over the provincial premiership and to consolidate his position in the West. In 1929 his position had been suddenly overrun by an upsurge of Saskatchewan Conservatives, but Gardiner was a born fighter as well as a born organizer, and in 1934 he had made a smashing comeback at the polls. Premier once again, he was now the strongest Liberal politician in western Canada, and Mackenzie King, who viewed him as the key to Liberal prospects in Alberta as well as Saskatchewan, had already offered him, before the 1935 election, a place in the next federal administration. Gardiner was still very interested, but he was now in a better position to come in on his own terms, and it was most unlikely that these would include acceptance of a place second to Charles A. Dunning. The question of Saskatchewan's representation in the new cabinet was thus complicated by the Dunning-Gardiner relationship, and it was bound to be affected by whatever plans King had for the Finance portfolio.

There were no such complications in Alberta: the Liberal position was, in fact, distressingly simple. In Alberta the old Mackenzie King strategy of cultivating the organized farmers had never worked. The radical Progressives had clung to their independence, and, when Albertans finally became disillusioned with the UFA, they did not turn back to the Liberal party. During the federal election of 1935 Mackenzie King, fearing a second Social Credit sweep, threatened to deny Alberta a seat in his cabinet. The threat was ignored. Social Credit candidates swept all but two seats, and Charles Stewart, King's Minister of the Interior in the twenties, was among the fallen. Unless a seat were found for Stewart outside the province, as had been done in 1921, Alberta's chances of representation in the federal cabinet were negligible.

In British Columbia, however, there appeared to be no reason for discouragement. J. H. King, the province's federal minister in the twenties, had finally been replaced, a few weeks before the 1930 election, by Ian Mackenzie, a young ex-minister in the provincial government. There had been no time for Mackenzie to demonstrate his talents for federal office, but in the atmosphere of Opposition he, like Chubby Power, had quickly blossomed into a "bonnie fechter." A man of striking good looks and pronounced Gaelic affinities, Mackenzie proved to be a resourceful parliamentarian, eloquent and aggressive in debate, lighthearted in everything but his intense loyalty to his chief, and these

qualities—perhaps even more than his easy receptivity to radical ideas—had won him golden opinions from Mackenzie King. Among the half dozen Liberals who were elected in British Columbia in 1935, Ian Mackenzie stood out as the most eligible cabinet prospect.

Alberta and Prince Edward Island, then, were the only provinces with no evident candidates for appointment to a federal Liberal cabinet. Elsewhere there were enough, and in most provinces more than enough, for the posts that were available. It was, of course, the responsibility of Mackenzie King to sort out the various claims and to decide.

This was a much easier task than it had been in 1921. In October 1935 Mackenzie King was just two months short of his sixty-second birthday. He was older than most of his associates and he had been longer in public life. The advantages of age and experience, strongly reinforced by King's new prestige and authority over his party, not only assured that his decisions, once taken, would be more readily and widely accepted, but they also gave him greater confidence in his own judgment. Moreover, he knew his men better than he ever had before. The older generation, the carryovers from his previous governments, he had worked with in cabinet. He was well acquainted, too, with many of the younger men, especially those like Power and Ilsley and Mackenzie whom he had watched in the House of Commons and in caucus. He was less familiar with the numerous recruits who were about to make their first appearance in Parliament, but even among the men in this category there were several, like Howe and Slaght, whom he had met and whom he knew by reputation, and there was one, Norman Rogers, whom he knew extremely well. And, although many members of the provincial governments were probably strangers to him, there was no Liberal premier whom he had not observed in action at official or party gatherings.

In the course of these varied associations Mackenzie King had reached clear judgments about the usefulness of most of the leading men of his party as actual or potential ministers of the Crown. Prior to the election, however, he had been very sparing of commitments. Ernest Lapointe, of course, knew that he would be a leading member of a Mackenzie King administration and the two men had discussed Lapointe's portfolio. But, aside from Lapointe, King had only approached two men: during the campaign he sounded out Angus Macdonald, and some months before that he extended a definite invitation to James Gardiner. In no case had there been any assurance about a particular portfolio. After the election there was no longer any need for reserve. Mackenzie King was now the Prime Minister designate and it was his duty to form a government with all convenient speed.

Mackenzie King's First Discussion with Ernest Lapointe

The general election of 1935 was held on October 14, a Monday. Next morning Prime Minister Bennett informed Mackenzie King that he was prepared to resign whenever King desired and suggested a meeting to discuss arrangements. That afternoon the two men talked for over an hour in King's office in the House of Commons.

Bennett outlined the problems which he thought would require immediate attention by the new Government, and inquired when King would be ready to take over. King

thought a week or 10 days would be sufficient and said he hoped to be ready by the middle of the following week. The undertaking, so easily given, was a good indication of his self-confidence; Ernest Lapointe, when King told him of it two days later, shook his head in disbelief. It was prompted also, the evidence suggests, by King's determination to avoid a repetition of the prolonged and embarrassing scramble which had developed in 1921. His own views, with respect to most of his colleagues, were clear, he was sure that any doubts or tangles could be ironed out quickly, and he felt that the sooner the thing was done the better. His proposed timing of the transfer of power was perfectly acceptable to Bennett, and it was also agreed, at Bennett's suggestion, that Lord Tweedsmuir, the newly appointed Governor General, who was scheduled to sail for Canada on October 18, should be requested to postpone his arrival for a week, apparently so that he might be greeted by the new Prime Minister and his cabinet. Since the Earl of Bessborough, the outgoing Governor General, had already departed, the new Government would have to be sworn in by the Administrator, Sir Lyman Duff, the Chief Justice of Canada.

Though these arrangements suggested that no time should be lost in getting his Government formed, Mackenzie King's subsequent movements were unhurried. He summoned Ernest Lapointe from Quebec City, but he sent out no other invitations, and, in the day and a half that elapsed before Lapointe arrived, he did nothing in particular. The meeting with Bennett was King's only engagement for Tuesday. On Wednesday morning he looked through some of the congratulatory messages and dictated his diary. The afternoon was divided between a visit to Kingsmere and a wedding. He passed the evening quietly with a few friends. On Thursday morning he was back on the congratulations and the diary. Not until Thursday afternoon, October 17, three days after the election, did the real business of cabinet-making begin.

On Thursday, at one o'clock, Ernest Lapointe arrived at Laurier House for lunch. He spent most of the afternoon with Mackenzie King and returned in the evening. In the following week Lapointe saw King every day except Sunday and he was present at many of the interviews with prospective ministers. Nobody else was so closely associated with the negotiations, a fact which says a good deal about Lapointe's position in the Liberal party and about his relationship with Mackenzie King.

More than any other federal politician, Ernest Lapointe symbolized the postwar ascendancy of the Liberal party in Quebec. Though he had never attained—not even after the retirement of Sir Lomer Gouin in 1924—the towering pre-eminence of Laurier as the *chef* of French Canada, Lapointe had long since become the most powerful French Canadian in federal politics, a national figure second only to Mackenzie King in the structure of Liberal leadership. King and Lapointe were not close personal friends—King had none among his political associates—but 15 years of shared experience in the direction of party and government business had made them political intimates. Major disagreements between them over public policy or party strategy had been rare, and through the years each had come to value the judgment, trust the loyalty, and respect the position of the other. From the beginning they had never been, in any sense, rivals or competitors, and now, in 1935, there was no succession issue to trouble their relations. Each was disposed to think of the new ministry as the last in which he would serve before retirement. They had, in fact, settled long ago into a complementary and exceedingly

comfortable relationship of mutual dependence in which each knew the other's mind on most issues and in which a great deal could be taken for granted.

In this political partnership Mackenzie King was the dominant member. It was King and not Lapointe who had been elected Liberal leader in 1919; it was King and not Lapointe who had been, and was now to be again, the Prime Minister; and Mackenzie King, no less than his predecessors, jealously guarded the ultimate primacy which each of these roles conferred. In the present instance he had already taken several important decisions about the formation of the Government without consulting Lapointe. Specifically, King had decided to leave Alberta outside (on election day he commented that "Alberta will have to go unrepresented for a while and work out her own salvation"⁴); to have the Government sworn in within a week or 10 days; to cut down the size of the cabinet; to keep the portfolio of External Affairs for himself; and to bring in Norman Rogers as Minister of Labour. In addition, Mackenzie King, several months before, had offered Gardiner a place in the Government, and had told him to make plans accordingly.

During their conversation on October 17 Mackenzie King informed Lapointe of all these decisions, but, since he was then seeking Lapointe's views and approval of these and all other aspects of cabinet formation, it is very difficult to draw a clear line between "informing" and "consulting" with respect to what took place in an extended discussion of important matters between political intimates.⁵ This conversation, the first and most important of all that King had during the period of cabinet formation, lasted for more than three hours, and covered the full range of cabinet posts and other senior appointments.

Mackenzie King began with a brief statement of purpose which introduced one unusual and very personal criterion. "I opened the conversation with Lapointe by saying that I felt the people of Canada had given us a great trust and expected us to make the most of it; that we must seek to get the most effective Cabinet we could. I said at once that I was determined not to have men in the Cabinet who drank—that character must be the first essential. To this Lapointe said: 'You will have a pretty difficult time.' I said I knew that, but I was quite prepared to face the issue. We then began to go over the names of a few who would be expected [*sic*] to be taken in."⁶

They began with Quebec and King promptly applied his standard to "Chubby" Power and Lucien Cannon. He conceded the strength of Power's claims on the grounds of ability, friendship and loyalty, but he questioned Power's temperance. Could Lapointe suggest some other form of recognition? King went on immediately to say that he would not even consider Cannon for the cabinet: "not only were his habits bad, but he had not been loyal or friendly nor [*sic*] helpful."⁷ Lapointe agreed that Cannon had been anything but helpful and made no attempt to protect him. He simply asked King if he was quite determined on the point and, when King said he was, Lapointe replied that he was glad of it and that Cannon should not be recognized, even though he could be expected to cause trouble if he were not. On the subject of Power, however, Lapointe's response was altogether different: "he really did not see how, in the province of Quebec, we could ignore Power without all kinds of trouble."⁸ Power, he argued, was the only possible Irish Catholic representative (Lapointe assured King that the Bishop of London, Ontario, would regard him as a suitable cabinet representative); he had a large following

in the House and outside (Lapointe read King a letter from the young Liberals of Quebec requesting Power's appointment); and he could do a great deal for the war veterans. Power's drinking was, admittedly, a problem, but Lapointe felt, nevertheless, that Power could be relied upon, and offered to have a frank talk with him. King readily acknowledged the force of these arguments and, although they did not remove his apprehensions, he had no alternative Irish Catholic to propose. He told Lapointe that he "would not definitely close the door against Power, but would think it over."⁹

Turning to Montreal, King expressed other misgivings. "I then spoke of Cardin and Rinfret, and not feeling too favourable to either of them."¹⁰ King said an impression existed that Cardin had used his influence on behalf of business associates. Lapointe said that nothing of the kind had been suggested in the campaign, and that Cardin had done his part excellently. Cardin was, in fact, closely connected with the Simard shipbuilding interests, the largest business enterprise in his riding, and the Simards were large stockholders in the Beauharnois Power Company. It was this association which gave rise to King's apprehensions about Cardin, both in 1935 and subsequently. Rinfret, so King and Lapointe agreed, was excellent on the platform but lacking in judgment and growing deaf. King relayed a story that Bennett had told him, in their interview on the day after the election, to the effect that Rinfret had taken money for admitting immigrants to Canada. Lapointe thought the story false, and, though he also considered that Cardin might be willing to go on the bench, he added pointedly that, "if the members of the Montreal district were brought together, he thought they would say that these two men were the only two they wanted as their members [ministers]."¹¹ This argument was all the more telling because King, once again, had no alternatives in mind. All he could do, for the moment, was postpone a final decision on Cardin and Rinfret: "I said we may have to take them, but we shall wait and see."¹²

While they were discussing Quebec, King said he thought he should take on External Affairs, "for a time at least, and because of the war situation." Lapointe was disappointed—he had spoken frankly to King several months before about his own interest in this department—and King, seeing his present reaction, said at once that he planned to reduce the size of the cabinet, and asked if Lapointe would like to take on some other portfolio, along with Justice, suggesting, as a possibility, Secretary of State. Lapointe said he would be glad to take that one.

Of the leading French Canadians from Quebec, this left only the venerable Senator Dandurand, and King asked if it might not be a suitable ending to his career to become Speaker of the Senate. "Who then," Lapointe replied, "would you have as Leader of the Government in the Senate?" After discussion King came to the view that there was no one better. "I believe Lapointe is right," he commented, "in putting him, at the moment, as the only one who can lead the Senate . . . Also, I would rather have him in the Cabinet, without portfolio, than any other member of that House."¹³

The discussion of Dandurand raised the subject of the speakers. Lapointe at once put forward Casgrain's name for the Commons. King asked if Casgrain was equal to the task and Lapointe said he had no doubts. King was sure, at least, that Madame Casgrain would help with the social side of the speaker's office, to which he attached importance, and that with the large Liberal majority there would be no serious problems anyway. Lapointe suggested that the deputy speaker of the Commons be selected from the

younger men in Ontario, and he and King both seemed favourable to Ross Gray. The Senate speakership was more difficult. King asked Lapointe whom he thought would be the best man, but Lapointe had no one in mind. They canvassed various names without much enthusiasm until King finally suggested Senator Walter Foster of New Brunswick. Lapointe agreed instantly, but King was not altogether sure in his own mind, and the matter was left open for further consultations.

The problems of Quebec representation took up more time in this discussion than those of any other province. The reason is that King had misgivings about several of the men whom he assumed Lapointe wanted, and Lapointe's defence, in three instances, left him not fully persuaded. By the end of their conversation the pros and cons had been thoroughly aired but the issue only partially settled. Dandurand and, of course, Lapointe were to be included, and Cannon was eliminated; but the fate of Power, Cardin and Rinfret was left in abeyance. "It seems curious," King commented, "that, with regard to Quebec, there are real limitations with respect [to] all, excepting Lapointe himself." ¹⁴

King and Lapointe made more rapid progress in their discussion of the other provinces. For Nova Scotia they settled at once upon Ilsley. Lapointe reported Ralston as saying that the province would favour Ilsley above all others, and King intimated that Premier Macdonald, who had ruled himself out, was of the same opinion. Prince Edward Island, King said, wanted a minister and was putting forward A. E. Maclean, the perennial member for Prince County. He asked Lapointe if he would like to sit in cabinet with Maclean. "He replied that he would not, and I said I would not. We both thought P.E.I. would have to do without a Minister, reducing the size of the cabinet."¹⁵ New Brunswick, surprisingly, appears to have been passed over in this discussion; the diary record makes no mention of it except the reference to Foster as a possible Speaker of the Senate.

From the Maritimes the two men shifted to Ontario. King said he intended to appoint Rogers Minister of Labour, and Lapointe endorsed the choice enthusiastically. On Euler's reappointment they were also in full agreement, but, though they spoke of Public Works as a possible niche for him, the question of his portfolio was left over. Public Works had been Elliott's portfolio in 1930, but King said he had decided, with great reluctance, to leave Elliott out because of his age, physical debility, and political weakness in Ontario. Lapointe demurred, emphasizing Elliott's loyalty and character, but King, readily conceding these qualities, still felt that "he would absorb our time, rather than assist us, were he there."¹⁶

With Rogers and Euler in and Elliott apparently out, this left at least two other cabinet places to be filled from Ontario. King was in no hurry to decide who should fill them. "I mentioned Slaght and Howe as two names to be considered in Ontario as new men, but where to place them was another matter, and we would have to leave this open for further discussion."¹⁷ Behind this bland evasion lay Mackenzie King's intense suspicion of Premier Mitchell Hepburn. He already suspected Hepburn of trying to build a political machine which would be all-powerful in party affairs, federal and provincial, in Ontario, and he had no intention of taking into the privacy of his cabinet anyone who would be a pipeline to Queen's Park.¹⁸ Howe was no friend of Hepburn but Slaght was, and King suspected that others among the new men from Ontario might be similarly tied or

inclined. He preferred, therefore, to take further soundings before completing the Ontario slate.

The discussion of Ontario possibilities raised Dunning's name, and this in turn brought up the Finance portfolio and the problem of Dunning's relations with Gardiner. King thought they should try first to get Ralston for Finance and Lapointe agreed. King then told Lapointe that he had invited Gardiner into the Government, and referred to the difficulty that Gardiner's antagonism to Dunning might present. It was a complication which, as Lapointe agreed, would have to be considered, but King was hopeful that it might be overcome if a seat were found for Dunning somewhere in the East, thereby making it quite clear, if he were brought in, that he was not to be a western minister.

This turn in the discussion brought King and Lapointe to the western provinces. Saskatchewan was clear enough: Gardiner was assured of a place if he wanted to come in. The far west was quickly disposed of. Lapointe acquiesced in the decision to omit Alberta ("It is the only way," King commented, "to teach that province a lesson"); and Ian Mackenzie looked like a perfectly acceptable minister for British Columbia.

Manitoba alone produced uncertainty. They hesitated about Crerar. King thought that from one point of view Crerar was "the only one we could get who is suitable for Minister of Agriculture," but they both seemed to feel that he was losing touch with farm opinion and that his hold on Manitoba was slipping. They reviewed other names and had no difficulty in striking out Thorson ("impossible," King thought, "because of his tenacious way") and Glen ("too much of a little Englishman with set views"). Lapointe considered that Weir was the best man. King thought highly of Weir's ability and industry, but pointed out that he had run as a Liberal-Progressive against an official Liberal candidate. One solution, it seemed, might be to take in Crerar for a time and then make Weir his successor. The idea was discussed but not decided, and it was agreed that the Manitoba representative was one of the problems that would have to be held over.

By the end of his first post-election talk with Ernest Lapointe on October 17, Mackenzie King had made substantial progress over the whole range of cabinet possibilities. The cabinet representation of five provinces—Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, Saskatchewan, Alberta and British Columbia—was now definitely settled. Two of the ministers from Quebec and two from Ontario were agreed upon. One speakership, at least, was filled. Alternative portfolios had been debated for some of the prospective ministers and in four cases—King, Lapointe, Ralston and Rogers—the assignments had apparently been decided.

Yet much remained to be done. The Manitoba minister was still to be decided, the New Brunswick minister had yet to be considered; and, although neither problem was likely to be unduly perplexing, the former, at least, offered potential embarrassment. Far more difficult, however, were the unsettled elements in the representation of the two central provinces. The main obstacle in Quebec was a disagreement between King and Lapointe over three of the leading candidates; in Ontario the governing factor was simply King's distrust of Hepburn. Cutting across some of these provincial problems ran the personal animosity between Gardiner and Dunning. And, finally, almost all the portfolio assignments had to be worked out.

Progress of Cabinet Negotiations, October 17 to October 19

Mackenzie King's next step—taken while his Thursday afternoon discussion with Lapointe was still in progress—was to approach Ralston with the offer of Finance. The appointment of Ralston or, failing him, Dunning would place the central economic portfolio in competent hands. It would also resolve, if a seat were found for either of them in Quebec, the problem of a suitable cabinet representative for the English-speaking population of the province. King had decided, with Lapointe's concurrence, that Ralston should have the first refusal, and, while they were talking, he telephoned Ralston in Montreal and requested him to come to Ottawa immediately. Ralston arrived a few hours later and at nine-thirty that evening Lapointe brought him to Laurier House. "We did our utmost," King recorded, "to persuade Ralston to come into the government, but he said it was absolutely impossible, with his office in the shape it is" ¹⁹ Dunning then became the choice of all three for Finance. Ralston thought he would accept it, King asked about finding a constituency for him near Montreal, and Lapointe thought that Black of Huntingdon would be willing to give up his seat. This brought up the probable expectations of C. B. Howard to be taken in as a representative of the Eastern Townships, but King, who had a poor opinion of Howard's ability and political strength, said he could not be considered for the cabinet because of his association, as a director, with the Manufacturers Finance Corporation, a company which had recently come under fire from an Ontario Royal Commission. The proposed arrangement for Dunning could thus be used to bar the door against Howard. Lapointe predicted that Howard "would raise a terrible fuss," but he agreed with King and Ralston that he carried no weight politically.

The tripartite discussion with Ralston clarified other portfolio assignments as well. Ralston approved strongly of Rogers' appointment, but thought that he might be better in Trade and Commerce than in Labour, and suggested the latter department for Euler. King had been considering Ian Mackenzie for Trade and Commerce, but Ralston did not think much of that idea. After other portfolios for Mackenzie were mentioned, King asked about National Defence and they both agreed without hesitation that he would be excellent in that department. Ralston and Lapointe also stood together in favouring Power as the best man for Pensions and National Health. Mackenzie's portfolio and Power's (if he were brought in) were now, in effect, decided, but King was less sure of the merits of Ralston's suggestions for Rogers and Euler. He decided to send for Rogers at once, before seeing anyone else from Ontario, to confer about his portfolio and to learn what he thought about the general situation in the province.

There was now, however, one problem of far greater urgency than Rogers' portfolio, and that was Premier Gardiner of Saskatchewan. The discussions with Lapointe and Ralston had virtually settled the Finance portfolio on Dunning, and this raised at once the question of Gardiner's attitude to his old rival. Mackenzie King was not prepared to lose Gardiner as the price for getting Dunning; he wanted them both. He decided, therefore, that before approaching Dunning he would see Gardiner and find out exactly where he stood.

Gardiner was already in Ottawa, and at one o'clock on the following afternoon, Friday October 18, he came to Laurier House, accompanied by Ernest Lapointe. King came straight to the point and asked how he would feel about Dunning coming into the

ministry. "Gardiner's countenance," King recorded, "at once took on a very strong and defiant look."²⁰ He launched into a long and unflattering review of Dunning's career, alleging selfishness, timidity and disloyalty, and ending with the flat comment that he would have to consider carefully whether he could go into a Government with Dunning. King defended Dunning's record, and tried to ease Gardiner's mind by stating that, if Dunning were to come in, it would be on the understanding that he found a seat in the East and that Gardiner was given a clear field in the West. Lapointe had to leave early and on the way downstairs from the library he and King agreed that Gardiner had some justification for his suspicion of Dunning and that, if he proved intractable on the subject, they might have to give up all thought of Dunning.

Returning to Gardiner, King began to sound him out on what he had in mind for himself. Gardiner said he was more interested in financial matters than agriculture. King suggested National Revenue or, as another possibility, a new department, Immigration and Resources, which would bring together most of the federal agencies that were of primary interest to western Canada. Of the two, Gardiner preferred National Revenue on the ground that it was more closely related to finance. He thought that, as far as financial administration was concerned, he was just as well equipped, by native ability, training and experience, as Dunning, and, when King asked whether he enjoyed the confidence of eastern businessmen, Gardiner said he believed he did, even more than Dunning. As they talked, King concluded that what Gardiner really wanted was the Finance Department or, failing that, some portfolio which he could use as a stepping-stone to Finance. Before he left, Gardiner candidly stated his preferences to be: Finance, National Revenue, Immigration and Resources. By the end of the interview it was clear that Gardiner was going to be a problem. Not only was he anxious to keep Dunning out of the cabinet, but he wanted for himself the very portfolio which he knew that Dunning was most likely to get. Charles Dunning, it seemed, was not the only man who could be charged with personal ambition, and King thought that Gardiner was overreaching himself. Yet Gardiner would be a very useful minister, and there was no doubt in King's mind that he would have to be handled with care and given the strongest assurances about his position in the Government in relation to Dunning.

The interview with Gardiner was the most important, as well as the most difficult, business which engaged Mackenzie King on Friday, October 18. On the same day, however, he had two other conversations which carried him directly to decisions on cabinet appointments pertaining to Manitoba and Ontario. The first was a telephone conversation with J. W. Dafoe of the *Winnipeg Free Press*; the other was an interview with Norman Rogers.

The call to Dafoe arose directly out of King's discussion with Gardiner and Lapointe. During that discussion Gardiner had expressed a preference for Crerar over Weir as the minister for Manitoba, and had spoken warmly of the role of the *Winnipeg Free Press* in the election; and Lapointe had suggested Dafoe as Canada's minister to Washington with special responsibility for reciprocity negotiations. King seized upon the latter idea. "I said Dafoe would be the very man," he recorded, "and that I would not hesitate for a moment to ask him, but I was doubtful if he would accept. I said I was ready to take him into the government."²¹ The decision was no sooner taken than King tried to get Dafoe to come to Ottawa for immediate consultation, and, when this proved impossible, he telephoned

him in Winnipeg after Gardiner and Lapointe had departed. He asked Dafoe if he were ready to join the Government; Dafoe declined with appropriate expressions of appreciation. "I then asked him who he thought should be the Minister from Manitoba, and he replied Crerar. I said: 'What portfolio do you think he should get?' He replied: 'I do not think he would be at all exacting, and I think you could trust him to do well in anything you might lay his hand to.'"²² King then broached the Washington post, pressed Dafoe to take it, and obtained his promise to give it careful consideration. Dafoe subsequently declined this offer, as well, but his long-distance talk with King on the afternoon of October 18, definitely settled the Manitoba cabinet post except with respect to Crerar's portfolio.

The same afternoon, shortly before the telephone call to Dafoe was put through, Norman Rogers arrived at Laurier House. King invited him into the Government and, after a brief discussion of alternative portfolios, including Trade and Commerce, offered him Labour; Rogers accepted gladly. With the portfolio question out of the way, King steered the conversation on the ground of the Liberal party in Ontario. Whereupon Rogers, as King recorded it the next day, "told me that he felt quite sure, as I have frequently said, that the Hepburn wing of the party was seeking to build up a political machine to serve its own ends; that he had evidence they were not too friendly to himself, fearing, evidently, his own preferment." Slaght's name was introduced, and, although it was acknowledged that his ability would make him a useful minister, Rogers and King "felt there was a danger of taking him in, owing to his being obviously a Hepburn man. . . ."²³

The Friday talks with Gardiner and Rogers thrust into the forefront of Mackenzie King's mind two important and quite distinct problems: the Finance portfolio and the remaining appointments in Ontario. Admittedly, each was difficult to decide, but it was also clear to King that delay, and the additional pressures which delay would inevitably produce, could only make them both more complicated. And besides, the time allotted for cabinet-making was passing rapidly; three days had already gone by since King had told Bennett that he would be ready in a week.

The interview with Norman Rogers was Mackenzie King's final engagement that Friday, and after Rogers left, early in the evening, King was too tired to bring his thoughts to bear. Next morning he awakened at four o'clock and, lying in bed, began to go over the whole situation. He reconsidered the two immediate problems against a larger background, and the more he thought about them in this light the more certain he became that Dunning was the right man for Finance. With the depression a continuing certainty and with war now a distinct possibility, he would need as many of the ablest men as he could get. Dunning, for one, was essential. Gardiner, too, would be needed, and he would simply have to prevail upon Gardiner to set aside his personal feelings. It was time, King sensed, for him to assert his own judgment and his own authority. Ability, then, was one essential; political reliability—loyalty—was another. This meant that Slaght, because of his link with Hepburn, would have to be left out. Howe, King concluded, would be a far safer man, and it suddenly occurred to him that Howe would fit admirably into a new Department of Transport that would bring together Railways and Canals and the Marine.

These decisions, though they still left him short one minister for Ontario, gave Mackenzie King profound relief, and at once the whole structure of the cabinet took

clearer shape in his mind. Shortly after eight o'clock he drafted an outline of the main features as he saw them at this stage:

I have decided to reduce the portfolios from 18 to 14, and to have one minister without portfolio, instead of two. That means Prince Edward Island and Alberta will have to go without a minister. Representing Prince Albert I will give two ministers to Saskatchewan, which, with British Columbia and Manitoba, will be four for the West. With four for Ontario, and four for Quebec, and two for the Maritimes, I believe the distribution will be a fair proportion in relation to the population of these areas. Quebec, in addition, will get a minister without portfolio; the Leader of the Senate, and a Speaker. Ontario, a Deputy Speaker, and perhaps the more influential departments. I think, too, that I shall not have anyone in the ministry over 60, excepting possibly Dandurand. My idea is to bring in half of the former colleagues, and half of the Cabinet of new men.

I will abolish Secretary of State, Solicitor General; consolidate Immigration, Colonization, Mines, Forests, Indian Affairs, Parks, etc., into one; Railways and Marine as Transport, to include national highways, and I might also include Civil Aviation. My idea also would be to announce my intention to appoint Parliamentary Under-Secretaries . . . which would give an opportunity to younger men to receive recognition and prepare for the ministry.²⁴

Mackenzie King lost no time in implementing the decision about Finance. Later on the Saturday morning he sent for Gardiner and Lapointe, and at one o'clock they came to Laurier House. King opened by stating at length the case for Dunning: his exceptional ability, his wide knowledge and experience of government and business, his proven success as a federal minister, the confidence in which he was held throughout Canada and abroad; and, beyond these considerations, the magnitude of the problems facing the government, and the imperative necessity of having a man with Dunning's qualifications in charge of the most important economic department. It was a long statement—it took King half an hour—and it was conclusive. When he had finished, Gardiner said that, since King felt as he did, he would not raise further objection to Dunning's appointment. His chief worry about Dunning, he added, was that Dunning had his own friends in western Canada and was likely to seek preferment for them at the expense of Gardiner's friends. King, having gained his main point, was quick to reassure Gardiner on this one. "I said there would be none of that; that, if Gardiner was in, he would be the western minister, and Dunning would only be permitted to come in by an eastern door; that he would practically be the English-speaking minister from Montreal. . . Both Lapointe and I assured Gardiner that he would have to have the say, and we would back his wishes on western matters; that we would both let Dunning fully understand this."²⁵

King then turned to the question of Gardiner's portfolio and, with Lapointe's support, urged him to take on the new Resources Department, rather than National Revenue. Of the two, King argued, Resources was much more important: it would have great patronage; it would touch all the western questions; it would, in fact, keep Gardiner "in the west and master of an empire there, while Dunning would be in the east." These advantages seemed to appeal to Gardiner, but he was reluctant to see the Agriculture portfolio go to Crerar. He did not want to commit himself without consulting W.R. Motherwell, whom King had agreed to appoint lieutenant-governor so as to make his seat available to Gardiner. Motherwell was in Regina and Gardiner decided to go west immediately to talk with him and to arrange for a change in the provincial leadership. He

left Ottawa on the evening train and just before his departure he telephoned King to reaffirm his interest in Agriculture and to bring up, as well, the possibility of taking Railways. King said he thought that Railways should be combined with Marine and "ought to go to a centre that connects with a water system," but he did not eliminate it as a possibility for Gardiner. "He left me with the understanding," King recorded, "that I would not finally decide on Agriculture for Crerar until he had seen Motherwell, nor on Railways."²⁶

The discussions with Gardiner cleared the path for the entrance of Dunning without the loss of Gardiner. A seat for Dunning had to be found, and the portfolios for Gardiner and Crerar sorted out, but, these details aside, it is nevertheless clear that by the afternoon of Saturday, October 19, Mackenzie King was making headway in the formation of his cabinet. The representation of six provinces was now finally decided; a seventh, Ontario, lacked only one minister to complete its quota; and Quebec, if Dunning could secure a seat there, was half completed. There were, in fact, only three major issues still in doubt: the fourth minister for Ontario; the minister for New Brunswick; and the second and controversial half of the representation of the province of Quebec. The last of these was now by far the most important problem.

Had it not been for Mackenzie King's reservations, the Quebec representation in its entirety could have been settled in his first conference with Lapointe on October 17. King had, of course, taken for granted Lapointe's entry into the ministry, and he had agreed promptly to the reappointment of Dandurand, but he had taken strong exception to four of Ernest Lapointe's leading Quebec colleagues, and one of these, Cannon, he had flatly rejected. Lapointe had accepted the verdict on Cannon, apparently without demur, but he had defended the other three—Power, Cardin and Rinfret—and it was clear that he favoured their appointment. King had no alternatives with which to reinforce his objections, and Lapointe had not made it easier by suggesting any. All they had been able to agree on, in their Thursday conversation, was to wait and see.

By the weekend Mackenzie King had no new ideas on the subject, and Lapointe's position was unchanged. At this point King made his first important concession: he decided to yield on the subject of Power, the one for whom Lapointe had spoken most strongly. On Saturday afternoon he told Lapointe to see Power in Montreal the next day and to let him know that he was wanted in the Government provided that he could give the necessary assurances on the subject of temperance. Lapointe was greatly relieved.

At the same time, however, King gave no sign of relenting on Cardin or Rinfret. These two men worried King. They worried him because their various associations, and particularly Cardin's, conjured up in his mind the danger of another Beauharnois. Yet the fact remained that, for all his apprehensions, he could think of no one to put in their places, and it was only too evident that, unless substitutes were quickly supplied, final capitulation to Lapointe could only be a matter of days. On the question of French Canadian representation for the district of Montreal, Mackenzie King was, in effect, being boxed in, and his exasperation is reflected in a quite unusually severe comment on Lapointe:

Lapointe is very weak when it comes to resisting the forces that are likely to create trouble. With him it is "who the boys want"; for example, regarding Montreal, he would have Cardin and Rinfret, just because, if the Montreal members were polled,

they would name these men, though he knows there is a feeling that Cardin is co-operating with Simard and other [*sic*] Tories in working out contracts, and admits that Rinfret is not of much help in the government nor of the best judgment in Parliament or in the country; also he is much weaker since he has been Mayor of Montreal. Personally, I feel much concerned about both of them, but less inclined to have Rinfret come in than Cardin. As I pointed out to Lapointe, Rinfret never did keep in touch with Montreal. We will have to get some newer, younger, and more active men there.²⁷

The last sentence touched the heart of the problem: it would take time to bring forward new men in Montreal, and, meanwhile, there was a government to be formed. And, though Ernest Lapointe may have been weak in his lack of ruthlessness with respect to Cardin and Rinfret, he had no better men to suggest and, besides, Lapointe was far too powerful a figure to be overridden, at least on the matter of Quebec's cabinet representation, by any frontal assault, in the manner, that is, in which King had overridden Gardiner. Yet King, at this juncture, was not ready for a complete surrender. He decided that, if one was to be averted, he would need allies, and for this role he selected Senator Dandurand of Montreal. On Saturday evening he telephoned Dandurand and asked him to come to Laurier House on Monday morning. Subsequently he arranged to have Lapointe and Dunning come at noon on Monday so that the four of them could lunch together and have a full discussion of the Quebec situation.

The Final Stage of Cabinet-Making, October 21 to October 23

There the matter rested over the weekend—Mackenzie King gave no attention to cabinet formation on Sunday—and on Monday morning Dandurand came to Laurier House at the appointed time. King offered him his old post of Senate leader without portfolio and Dandurand accepted. King then came to the real business of the day: he confided to Dandurand his fears about the Quebec representation and sought his help in dealing with Lapointe. "I then told him," King recorded, "that I looked upon character as the most important of all considerations in the forming of the Cabinet; that, while Lapointe was of the highest character himself, it was very difficult to get him to take a stand against anyone who was a personal or political friend, that he was easily moved on personal matters, though firm otherwise. I said that he, Dandurand, would have to stand with me in having Lapointe join with us in seeing that the right thing was done."²⁸

Dandurand was more sympathetic than helpful. He agreed that Cannon was not "desirable"; but Power, he argued, was different. Power had character, he was honest, and his appointment to the cabinet would be very popular in Quebec. King said he had decided "on Lapointe's account," to take in Power, and turned the discussion to the district of Montreal. Dandurand's views were clear but mixed. He hoped that King would not appoint Cardin ("... he had the reputation now of having made a lot of money out of dredging contracts, and was not trusted") but he felt differently about Rinfret. He conceded Rinfret's limitations, but "the trouble was that there was no one else in Montreal. . . ." Dandurand raised, but only to dismiss it, the name of Thomas Vien, the member for Outremont, and he had no one else to suggest. The conversation moved harmoniously over other matters—Dandurand agreed that Foster would be the best

Senate Speaker and that Howard should be left out of the cabinet, and he offered to help Dunning find a seat in the Eastern Townships—but on the main issue, the problem of finding alternatives to Cardin or Rinfret, Dandurand looked like a frail ally for Mackenzie King. And so, indeed, he quickly proved to be.

Ernest Lapointe and Charles Dunning arrived at noon. Greetings were exchanged in an atmosphere of general congratulation, and Mackenzie King came to the first item of business. He made a graceful little speech about the nation's problems and Dunning's signal qualifications for high office, and invited him to join the Government as Minister of Finance. He had discussed Dunning's appointment with Gardiner, he added, and Gardiner was "quite satisfied," but it would have to be understood from the beginning that Dunning must "keep in his own back yard" as the representative of a Quebec constituency and that Gardiner's advice would be taken on western matters. Dunning accepted with alacrity both the portfolio and the understanding, merely remarking about the latter that it was "perfectly right." With that they adjourned to lunch and an interlude of partisan pleasantries on the subject of the recent election.

In the afternoon discussion Mackenzie King, after trying to win a second ally against Lapointe, came to the problem which was uppermost in his mind only to have his little stratagem completely misfire:

After luncheon we came upstairs, and I began taking up the Quebec situation. On the way, I told Dunning that he must support me against Lapointe, where Lapointe would be yielding. It was, however, all as I expected. Before we had gone very far, both Dandurand and Dunning were finding it would be impossible to do what I wanted to do with respect to both Cardin and Rinfret. In the case of Cardin, because of his great power as a speaker with the mass of the people; and Rinfret, as the only one who could serve as the central figure for the ministry in Montreal. Also, both Lapointe and Dandurand stressed the necessity of having more than two French ministers for the province of Quebec, pointing out that there were many French in Ontario and other parts of Canada, and that the Quebec representation really stood for the French representation of Canada. Lapointe said that much as Bennett disliked giving Quebec the representation demanded, he found he had to do it. They regarded Power's appointment as representing the Irish Catholics, rather than as a Quebec appointment.²⁹

On the main question at issue, Ernest Lapointe, now reinforced by Dandurand and Dunning, had his way. Cardin and Rinfret, it was decided, were to be taken into the cabinet, and the only point on which Lapointe yielded was the question of what their portfolios should be. He said he "would be quite willing to have the Secretary of State post go to either Rinfret or Cardin." Whereupon it was agreed among the four that Cardin was not to be given a spending department and that he should be offered Secretary of State instead; and that Rinfret, provided he could clear himself of the rumoured immigration scandals, might be invited to be Postmaster General. King records that he "did not say the final word with regard to either Rinfret or Cardin, but arranged to have them come to see me tomorrow, so that we could discuss the situation with them personally."³⁰ Nevertheless, the only aspect of the "situation" that was left open after the Monday afternoon conference was the matter of their portfolios, and, as matters turned out, when the final word was said on this subject, it was pronounced not by King nor by Lapointe but by P.-J.-A. Cardin.

By the afternoon of Monday, October 21, the Quebec slate was apparently complete, and the only problems of cabinet representation still requiring decision were the fourth minister for Ontario and the minister for New Brunswick. Time, however, was now running short. Thursday, October 24, would be Thanksgiving Day, and on Monday Mackenzie King told Lapointe and Dunning that the Government would have to be sworn in not later than that date. This left a little over two days for final decisions on cabinet representation and for the allotment of the remaining portfolios. To bring these matters to a swift conclusion King began, on Monday evening, to schedule a series of interviews with prospective ministers for Tuesday and Wednesday. In the midst of these arrangements he finally found a little time for New Brunswick.

Nothing, at this stage, had been decided for New Brunswick except the appointment of Senator Foster to the speakership. King had discussed this with Lapointe and others, and he had been thinking of leaving Veniot out of the cabinet and bringing in Michaud. On Monday, however, a letter from J. L. Ralston caused him to hesitate. Ralston suggested that English and Protestant opinion in New Brunswick might be upset by the appointment of one French Roman Catholic minister in succession to another from the previous Liberal administration. On Monday evening King telephoned Foster, offered him the speakership, and put to him the question raised by Ralston. Foster admitted that there might be a problem, but on reflection he was inclined to think that his own appointment to the speakership would make Michaud's appointment acceptable by balancing, to a degree, the New Brunswick ticket. King accepted Foster's judgment and asked him, and subsequently Michaud, to come to Ottawa immediately.

Beginning on Monday, then, the pace of cabinet-making accelerated sharply. Late that afternoon, towards the end of his conference with Lapointe, Dunning and Dandurand, Mackenzie King called in T. A. Crerar. In the presence of the others, he welcomed Crerar back into the Government and said he had sent for him so that they might discuss portfolios. Crerar said at once that he would like to have his old portfolio, Railways and Canals. This, of course, was not at all what King had in mind, and he said abruptly that it would not be possible. He did not want his old colleagues—Lapointe and Dunning excepted—to return to their old portfolios, and, besides, he did not know where to find a Minister of Agriculture and another minister to take charge of western affairs. Crerar said he thought he was entitled to a major portfolio and Agriculture was a minor one. The atmosphere became strained. King took exception to Crerar's assessment of Agriculture, and made a few chilling observations of his own about Crerar's advancing years, the claims of other Manitobans, and the objections that would be raised to Crerar's appointment. He brought up Gardiner's name, pointed out that there was no one for Agriculture but Gardiner or Crerar, and broached the new Resources Department. Crerar appeared to be more favourable to Resources than he had to Agriculture, but his first choice was still Railways, and before the conversation ended he brought it up again, along with Trade and Commerce. King indicated that he had Howe and Euler in mind for these posts, and asked whether Crerar had any way of persuading Gardiner to take Agriculture, so as to leave Resources for himself. Crerar thought the only way was for King to prevail upon Motherwell to lend his good offices.

On this inconclusive note the interview with Crerar concluded, but that evening King did what Crerar had suggested. He telephoned Motherwell in Regina, offered him the

lieutenant-governorship, and pressed him to urge Gardiner to take Agriculture. Later in the same evening King also succeeded in reaching Gardiner directly by telephone, only to find that Gardiner had changed his mind. He was no longer interested in the Resources Department ("a sort of glorified Parks Commission," he termed it), and he did not regard Agriculture as sufficiently important ("if they only wanted him for Agriculture in the east, they could not think much of him . . ."). What he now wanted was Trade and Commerce, because of its importance to the marketing of grain, or failing that, the transfer of the Board of Grain Commissioners from Trade and Commerce to Agriculture. King thought privately that Gardiner, in "angling for one of the more important portfolios," was "running the danger of getting out of his depth"; but he agreed to consider the idea, and he decided to discuss it with Dunning.

Next morning, Tuesday October 22, Mackenzie King turned first to Gardiner's portfolio. Calling in Dunning and Lapointe, he asked their opinions of the proposed transfer of the Grain Commissioners to Agriculture. Dunning thought it would be a mistake. The Agriculture Department, he argued, had to do with production; Trade and Commerce should be left to deal with distribution and sales. King accepted Dunning's judgment, but suggested as a compromise that the newly established Wheat Board, set up by the Bennett administration at the previous session of Parliament, might be placed under the supervision of a cabinet committee, with the Minister of Agriculture as chairman. The suggestion was approved by the others, and King promptly drafted a statement of policy to this effect.

While they were talking, Gardiner telephoned from Regina. King explained that the Grain Commissioners would have to remain with Agriculture, but he assured Gardiner, in response to a specific question, that, if he came into the Government "he could fight as hard as he wished" for the transfer. Gardiner asked about the Trade and Commerce portfolio and King replied that he would have to keep it for Ontario. He said that he had told Crerar he would have to take the Resources portfolio, and this now meant that Gardiner must accept Agriculture, since these two portfolios should go to the West. Gardiner still would not give a final answer, and King ended by saying that he would tell the press, in the statement to be issued when the Government was sworn in, that he was leaving the Agriculture portfolio open for Gardiner.³¹

This conversation virtually settled the question of Gardiner's portfolio and, with it, the portfolios for Crerar and Euler. After luncheon Mackenzie King called in Euler, offered him Trade and Commerce, and emphasized that "it was a much more important department than National Revenue," his old portfolio ("that, if we could not save the country by reviving trade, it could not be saved at all, and that all our other policies depended on that").³² Euler appeared "genuinely pleased" at the promotion. That evening, shortly before eleven, King saw Crerar again and told him it would have to be the Resources Department. Crerar accepted "fairly philosophically."

The interview with Euler was the first of a series which occupied Mackenzie King through that Tuesday afternoon and evening. At two-thirty he saw Elliott and broke the news to him that he would probably not be reappointed, trying, however, to soften the blow by offering him a senior judgeship. At three-thirty he saw Howard and told him that he could not be considered for the time being.

Shortly before five o'clock Cardin arrived and saw King alone. King led up to the point slowly. He thought it desirable that the cabinet be reduced in size and that former ministers should not take their old portfolios. He had heard that Cardin would like to go on the bench: was this true? No, Cardin replied, he was not interested in the bench, and, what was more, he did not care whether he remained in public life or not. King offered him Secretary of State, prefacing the offer with a remark about that department needing a lawyer. "He did not seem to be very enthusiastic," King noted, "but said not to consider him at all; that he would wish to do whatever I liked."³³ Cardin inquired about his old Department of Marine, and King told him he intended to incorporate it into a new department which would be assigned to an Ontario minister. King said not to regard the matter as settled, and suggested a further talk, but he felt, by the end of the interview, that Cardin would accept.

After dinner King sent for Rinfret who came to Laurier House at eight o'clock. King asked whether there was any truth in Bennett's story that he was implicated in immigration scandals, and Rinfret made a prompt and convincing denial. King then said that he was thinking of inviting him to be Postmaster General and of making Cardin Secretary of State, on the score that the latter department required a lawyer. Rinfret seemed pleased at the prospect, but King said there would have to be another talk with Cardin. Toward the end of the interview Lapointe and Dunning arrived, and Rinfret was able to satisfy Lapointe, as he had King, that there was nothing to the immigration rumour. With that the Quebec representation, subject only to Cardin's final acceptance, seemed at last to be complete. It only remained to select a fourth minister for Ontario.

On Tuesday afternoon, in the interval between his interviews with Cardin and Rinfret, Mackenzie King saw Prime Minister Bennett by appointment at five-thirty in the latter's office in the Parliament Buildings. King said that, although his slate was not entirely prepared, he thought he could be ready to take over on the following afternoon. "I said I thought it was desirable to get the government sworn in before Thursday; that I had forgotten about it being Thanksgiving Day, which would make it a holiday for the Service as well as the country." Bennett thought that Thursday would be acceptable to the Administrator all the same, if it were more convenient for King, but King insisted on the earlier date, and it was arranged that shortly before five o'clock on the following afternoon, Wednesday, Bennett would tender his resignation, and that a few minutes later an official would go to Laurier House to inform King that the Administrator wished to see him. The swearing-in of the new Government would follow.

These arrangements, made at Mackenzie King's request, advanced by one day the date on which he proposed to take office. On the preceding Monday, October 21, he had told Lapointe and Dunning that he had decided on Thursday, Thanksgiving Day, at the latest: "It is my intention to attend Thanksgiving service in the morning, and have the Cabinet sworn in in the afternoon."³⁴ On Tuesday, however, he told Lapointe and Dunning that it would have to be done by Wednesday night. Why the change of time? To his two senior colleagues King explained, on Tuesday morning, that he now felt, on reflection, "that many people would regard Thanksgiving Day as a religious holiday, and it would be better if the change of government were not to take place that day," and on Tuesday afternoon he gave Bennett a secularized version of the same explanation.³⁵ But if not Thursday, then why not Friday or Saturday? King did not even suggest either of these dates to

Bennett who would probably have accepted them without hesitation; but to Lapointe and Dunning he disclosed another reason. "I did not want to run over until Friday," he told them on Tuesday, "with all the contention there would be meanwhile . . . I was anxious to avoid all kinds of pressure, lobbying etc."³⁶

The evidence suggests that a fear of "pressure, lobbying etc." was much on Mackenzie King's mind on Tuesday. Early on Tuesday morning, while he was having breakfast, King was handed a letter from Premier Hepburn, the first and only communication from Hepburn during the period of cabinet formation. It was, as King expected, a recommendation of Slaght's appointment to the cabinet, though it contained an express disavowal of any intention to interfere in federal cabinet arrangements.³⁷ King replied tactfully that there must be no hint of interference, and later that morning he read the draft of his reply to Lapointe and Dunning.³⁸ It is altogether likely that King saw in Hepburn's letter an augury of more intense pressure from Queen's Park, and that it was his desire to avoid it which caused him, a few hours later, to commit himself to Bennett to take office on the following day. And it is equally probable that it was the same consideration which brought about, on Tuesday evening, a change of mind with respect to J. C. Elliott as a minister for Ontario.

Mackenzie King regarded Elliott as a spent force, and he had been opposed all along to the idea of reappointing him. On Tuesday afternoon he had told Elliott that his chances, though not absolutely hopeless, were very slight. By six o'clock that evening, however, King stood committed to taking office with his colleagues within 24 hours, and at that moment he still lacked a fourth minister for Ontario. If further "pressure, lobbying etc." from Hepburn were to be forestalled, King could not leave the final Ontario slot open, as he had left Agriculture open for Gardiner. Someone had to be found and immediately. It was this predicament which now gave special point to a suggestion made by Dunning on the previous day. Dunning, King recalled, had "suggested, with regard to the difficulty of settling an Ontario fourth representative, that it might be wise to have Elliott come into the Cabinet, pending his appointment to the Bench, which would give me time to look for the best man for the post."³⁹ By Tuesday evening Dunning's suggestion seemed to present the only way out. Late in the evening King called in Lapointe and Dunning and went over the Ontario problem once again. "I said that I had been thinking the matter over further, and still was undecided as to which of the younger men I should take into the Cabinet; that there was a jealousy as between Ross Gray and Fraser, and there were others in Ontario who would like recognition—Sanderson for example. I thought it might be best for one or other of these men to come in later on, when we would also be dealing with the under secretaries. In the meantime, I could take Elliott into his old portfolio. . . ."⁴⁰ Lapointe and Dunning approved immediately. Thereupon King sent for Elliott, told him what he had been saying to Lapointe and Dunning, and offered him Public Works on the understanding that he be prepared to give it up at any time, either for the bench or for some other appointment. Elliott accepted and the Ontario slate was complete.

Thus by midnight on Tuesday, October 22, eight days after the election, and less than 24 hours before the Government was due to take office, Mackenzie King's cabinet plans stood fully matured and ready for formal execution. All the decisions on representation had been made, and the most difficult problems in the assignment of portfolios appeared

to be overcome. King had not yet interviewed all the prospective ministers—he was to see the remaining five on Wednesday—but none of them was expected to decline appointment or object to the portfolio which he would be offered. Of those with whom King had talked, only Gardiner and Cardin had not finally committed themselves. Gardiner, it seemed clear, was now virtually certain within a day or two, and Cardin, King felt, had been brought around to take what he was offered. Wednesday was bound to be a crowded day, but there seemed to be no reason to anticipate real trouble, except possibly from Toronto, and, with Elliott's appointment plugging the last loophole, not even Queen's Park could upset arrangements in the few hours that remained.

Wednesday, the day of climax, turned out to be distinctly more trying than Mackenzie King had anticipated, and, before the day was out, it was borne in upon him that he had seriously underrated P.-J.-A. Cardin.

For Mackenzie King the day began in an orderly fashion. He gave some thought to the symbolism of the occasion, and arranged to have flowers placed on the graves of the members of his family and on those of Sir Wilfrid and Lady Laurier, Mr. and Mrs. P. C. Larkin and Mrs. J. E. Atkinson. At ten-thirty Ian Mackenzie came to Laurier House by appointment. King offered him National Defence, stressed its immediate importance, "with war threatening Europe, which brought with it the possibility of the Empire being involved," and added that he was taking in Power as Minister of Pensions and National Health. Mackenzie was delighted with Power's appointment and accepted his own with pleasure. King then sent for Power who arrived some time after eleven in the company of Lapointe. King talked frankly with Power for a few minutes: he offered him Pensions and delivered a short lecture on the importance of temperance in ministers of the Crown. Power accepted the portfolio and gave the appropriate undertaking, whereupon King invited him up to the library for a brief exchange with Lapointe and Mackenzie.

After Power's departure, at some time between eleven o'clock and noon, the even progress of business was abruptly checked, and affairs took a turn for the worse. "I then got," King recorded, "the biggest surprise of all, which was that Cardin had left the hotel and gone to Montreal; that he was greatly annoyed at not getting back the Department of Marine, and was likely to stir up a great deal of trouble."⁴¹ It was then less than six hours before the scheduled time for the swearing-in ceremony.

King got on the telephone at once and tried to find Cardin in Montreal. He succeeded, and the report of Cardin's displeasure was swiftly and fully confirmed. Cardin, as King recalled it, "spoke at considerable length about being humiliated; of having an important department taken from him, and being offered one which had nothing to it and constituted [*sic*] mostly of rummaging among old books which were filled with worms; that he did not care about himself, but that the people he represented would resent it; that he was quite glad to quit politics altogether; that he would not take that post."⁴²

King's response was a mixture of surprise and conciliation. He denied any intention to humiliate. There was nothing final, he protested, about his offer of the previous day; he had expected to have a further talk; and he was sure that Rinfret would not mind giving up the Post Office if Cardin desired it. At length, "after much difficulty," King persuaded him to return to Ottawa that afternoon to talk it over. Afterwards P. R. Du Tremblay of *La Presse* telephoned King to say Cardin was with him and that he was doing his best to convince him to go to Ottawa at once: could not Cardin have his old Department of

Marine? King replied that this was out of the question, but that "there might be other adjustments which could be made." He persuaded Du Tremblay to accompany Cardin back to Ottawa, and it was understood that the two men would arrive about five-thirty.

While he waited for Cardin, Mackenzie King obtained Rinfret's consent to take back his old portfolio of Secretary of State and release the Post Office for Cardin. Otherwise, however, King simply went ahead with the scheduled engagements of the day. Shortly after noon Senator Dandurand came to Laurier House with Donald Black, the member for Huntingdon, who had intimated a willingness to give up his seat for Dunning. King thanked him for his co-operation, and Black said that, before he finally resigned, he would have to go over the county and make sure that Dunning could carry it.⁴³ Afterwards, King received W. G. Jaffray Jr., the son of the publisher of the *Toronto Globe* and Harry Anderson, the editor; he described the main features of the new cabinet and invited the *Globe's* support. This was followed by a second talk with C. B. Howard, in which King repeated what he had said the day before about not taking Howard into the cabinet, but agreed to state publicly that he was leaving the Eastern Townships open for the present—this on the chance that the plan to seat Dunning there failed to come off. At two o'clock Norman Rogers and J. E. Atkinson lunched with King at Laurier House. From three to four King rested. At four-thirty C. D. Howe arrived. It took only a few moments for King to offer him the two portfolios of Railways and Canals, and Marine and to state his intention to combine them into a single department. Howe accepted readily and, as soon as he left, Pierre Casgrain was ushered in. King told Casgrain that Lapointe and he thought that he should be made Speaker of the Commons, adding that, when Parliament assembled, his name would be proposed for election. Casgrain was "very pleased."

A few minutes after five o'clock a messenger arrived at Laurier House to summon Mackenzie King to the meeting with the Administrator. Sir Lyman Duff received him in the Governor General's office in the East Block. He asked King whether he was prepared to take over the Government. King replied that he was, but that he might have to ask for another hour or two before he could bring the ministers to be sworn in, "as some of them had not yet arrived in the city. . . ." They went over Mackenzie King's slate. King drew attention to the Agriculture portfolio, saying it would not be filled until he had a reply from Gardiner, but no mention was made of Cardin. Mackenzie King took the Oath of Allegiance, and then the Oath of Office as Secretary of State for External Affairs and President of the Privy Council. He signed the oath book, and signed the order-in-council appointing himself Prime Minister, Secretary of State for External Affairs and President of the Privy Council. His request for a few hours delay was granted, and it was ten o'clock that evening before the other ministers were sworn in. "The intervening hours," King recorded, "were pretty strenuous, and presented problems which required quick and decisive action."⁴⁴

As soon as the afternoon ceremony was over, Mackenzie King drove back to Laurier House. It was time to prepare for Cardin. King called in Lapointe and Dandurand, and told them about the call from Du Tremblay earlier in the afternoon. While they were talking, word came that Cardin and Du Tremblay had arrived at the Chateau Laurier. King sent for them at once, and when they arrived, he went downstairs, leaving Lapointe

and Dandurand up in the library, and received Cardin and Du Tremblay in the morning room.

"I rebuked Cardin for having gone away, and told him I knew nothing of it until Lapointe had told me he was in Montreal."⁴⁵ Cardin replied that he had left a letter at Laurier House on the previous evening. King acknowledged this, but said it had not been delivered to him because he had asked to be kept free from communications. He took the letter from his pocket, showed Cardin that it was still unopened, and suggested that he take it back. Cardin declined to take it back, saying "it was clear that there were those who did not have confidence in him, and that he was quite content to go back into private life."⁴⁶ King dismissed the idea as nonsense, said he had been quite willing to discuss the portfolio question again, and added that since their telephone conversation he had persuaded Rinfret to release the Post Office so that it might be offered to Cardin. Cardin turned down the Post Office: he was entitled, he thought, to one of the largest spending departments. That would be true, King agreed, if it were not necessary to compensate Ontario for the fact that he was giving that province fewer portfolios than Quebec. At this point Du Tremblay urged Cardin to take the Post Office, but Cardin "was quite firm in declining, evidently feeling considerably hurt." Whereupon, Du Tremblay, turning to King, suggested that the Marine Department be restored to Cardin. Once again King refused: Marine would have to be integrated into Transport and kept for Ontario.

It thus became a contest between King's suspicion and Cardin's pride, and in the end it was Mackenzie King who gave way. The remainder of the interview is best told in King's words:

They then pointed out that Marine and Railways together were two important departments, and that Public Works was a very important department; that what Quebec was getting carried with it no patronage, for example: Justice, Pensions; Post Office an exception, but mostly dealing with Postmasters and clerks; Secretary of State, and Minister without portfolio; and, so far as Finance was concerned, it was not even certain to go to Quebec; that Dunning would be looked upon as going to the Dominion rather than to the province; also, that Finance had no patronage. I confess I felt there was truth in this representation. I finally said: "Well, excuse me for a moment. I want to have a word with Elliott, to whom I have offered Public Works." Cardin then said: "No, not to think of Public Works." I said: "Never mind, let me get in touch with Elliott." I came upstairs and talked with Dandurand and Lapointe, and, at the same time sent for Elliott. When Elliott arrived, I told him of the *emphase* [*sic*] which had been reached, so far as Cardin was concerned, and asked him if he would be agreeable to give up Public Works and take Post Office as a means of settling the matter. He said at once: "anything you wish, Mr. King, I am willing to do. You have been more than considerate of me." I thanked him, and Lapointe spoke of how different his attitude was to that of Cardin. I immediately returned downstairs, and said to Du Tremblay and Cardin that I had just spoken with Elliott and he was quite prepared to surrender the portfolio of Public Works and take the Post Office. Cardin then said that he did not want to do anything that would hurt Elliott or offend him. I said Elliott was only too glad to do what we all wished, and that it was only the public interest we were seeking to serve, and to be happy in so doing. . . .⁴⁷

The matter was finally settled. P.-J.-A. Cardin had got what he insisted on having, and what Mackenzie King had been anxious to deny him, a large spending department. The

last obstacle to the formation of the 1935 cabinet had been surmounted, and the new Government, lacking only Gardiner, could now be sworn in before the end of the evening.

There were still, however, two items of unfinished business. Mackenzie King had to see J. L. Ilsley whose train was due in Ottawa that evening. And three leading representatives of New Brunswick, a province which had received minimal attention in the preceding week, had now arrived in town to learn their fate. After the interview with Cardin, King sent for P.-J. Veniot, J.-E. Michaud and Senator Walter Foster.

Veniot and Michaud came together, and King received them in the morning room. A few minutes later Foster arrived in the company of Ilsley, who had come straight from the station, and they were shown up to the library. King told Veniot that, because of his age and recent serious illness, he could not be reappointed to the cabinet. Veniot was very upset. He said that, if he could not get into the Government he would be ruined, and he urgently requested a portfolio, if only for a year or two. King replied that personal need could not be considered in connection with cabinet appointments, and remarked that he was under strong pressure to have New Brunswick represented by an English-speaking minister. "Having made this statement," King recorded—and having noticed that Veniot and Michaud were disconcerted by it—"I followed it up by saying that it was all very well for them to coming [*sic*] along and make this demand now, but that my mind went back to one or two years ago, when I could not get anyone to fight the by-election that was needed to help win this general election, until Michaud, at my request, without any undertaking whatever, gave up his position in the Legislature and ran, and captured the seat by a majority of six thousand. I felt that, but for that by-election, we would not have won all the others."⁴⁸ It was this circumstance, King went on, which, in addition to his fitness for a cabinet post, entitled Michaud to prior recognition, and he proceeded to offer him the Fisheries portfolio. Michaud accepted, and King asked to be excused because of the imminence of the swearing-in ceremony. He escorted Veniot and Michaud to the door, and then joined Foster and Ilsley in the library. He told them of the conversation he had just had downstairs and confirmed his offer of the Senate speakership to Foster. Finally, he invited Ilsley to be Minister of National Revenue, and Ilsley accepted. It was then eight o'clock.

At nine-thirty, after he had revised his statement for the press and had something to eat, Mackenzie King drove to the East Block where his ministers were already assembled in the Prime Minister's office. The Administrator arrived at ten o'clock. Mackenzie King was summoned to the Governor General's office, and, a few minutes later, he had his colleagues brought in, in order of precedence, for the swearing-in.

After the ceremony, the members of the Government returned to the Prime Minister's office. Newspapermen were admitted, and copies of the Prime Minister's statement were distributed. "I then asked the members," Mackenzie King recorded, "to come with me to the Council Chamber, and we had our first meeting of Council." Ernest Lapointe, at Mackenzie King's request, took the chair to the right of the Prime Minister, and Charles Dunning the one to the left.

The members of the third Mackenzie King administration, in order of precedence, were as follows:

W. L. Mackenzie King	Prime Minister, President of the Privy Council, and Secretary of State for External Affairs
T. A. Crerar	Mines, Immigration and Colonization, Interior and Indian Affairs
Ernest Lapointe	Justice and Attorney General
P.-J.-A. Cardin	Public Works
Charles A. Dunning	Finance and Receiver General
J. C. Elliott	Postmaster General
W. D. Euler	Trade and Commerce
Fernand Rinfret	Secretary of State
Ian Mackenzie	National Defence
Charles G. Power	Pensions and National Health
J. L. Ilsley	National Revenue
J.-E. Michaud	Fisheries
Norman Rogers	Labour
C. D. Howe	Railways and Canals, and Marine
Raoul Dandurand	Minister without Portfolio
J. G. Gardiner	Agriculture ⁴⁹

Conclusions

1. It is clear that by 1935 Ernest Lapointe was fully established as Mackenzie King's principal lieutenant with a special influence over the making of the cabinet as a whole.

Lapointe's position, however, was not that of co-prime minister. The final authority and the ultimate responsibility belonged to King, and in 1935 he took several important decisions about the cabinet without consulting Lapointe in advance: the decisions about the size of the cabinet, the representation of Alberta, the length of time it would take to form the Government, the reorganization of departments, and the appointment of Rogers and Gardiner. Lapointe took no exception to these decisions, and he made no attempt to veto King's choice of ministers from provinces other than Quebec.

Lapointe, moreover, had even less to do with the allocation of portfolios. This was, quite evidently, a special prerogative of the Prime Minister. King consulted Lapointe, as he did others, about particular portfolio assignments, but the final decisions were King's. The separate negotiations were conducted directly by him with the ministers concerned, though sometimes with Lapointe present, and any shifts that were made, as in the cases of Rinfret, Elliott and Cardin, were made by King. The Liberal party and the new Liberal Government, like every national party and every Government since 1867, had a single pre-eminent head, and in 1935 it was Mackenzie King. Ernest Lapointe, to signify his special position in the cabinet was made Minister of Justice, but it was not the portfolio of his first choice.

If not co-prime minister, was Lapointe the *chef* of French Canada? He was not so in the sense of being concerned to see that French Canadian minorities in provinces other than Quebec were given special recognition in the representation of those

provinces in the cabinet. He showed no particular interest and he had no special influence over the choice of the New Brunswick representative; he was not even present at King's interview with Michaud and Veniot. And, although Lapointe was in receipt of numerous representations from Franco-Ontarians bespeaking a cabinet post for E.-R.-E. Chevrier, the member for Ottawa East, there is no evidence that he brought these communications to King's notice or did anything else to forward Chevrier's appointment. Lapointe took the position that the French Canadian ministers from Quebec represented the whole French Canadian citizenry throughout the country, and he argued that there must be at least three of them, regardless of how many other ministers were appointed from Quebec.

Was Lapointe the *chef* of Quebec? This comes closer to an accurate definition of the base of Lapointe's power, but even this description requires qualification. He did not produce a Quebec slate for King's approval. It was King who took the initiative by criticizing the men whom he assumed Lapointe would want, and by proposing specific solutions to the problem of the English-speaking representation from the province. When King records that Lapointe seemed relieved that Power would be offered a post, it means that King, at least, believed that both Lapointe and he accepted King's decisions as final.

Quebec's English-speaking representation was bound up with the Finance portfolio and the necessity of finding someone who was acceptable to the business community. Lapointe had never had any close connections with Montreal business, and it is scarcely surprising that he should have produced no proposals of his own for the representation of this interest in the cabinet. What is, perhaps, surprising is his apparent indifference to the representation of the Eastern Townships.

Nevertheless, it is true that no one was appointed to the cabinet from Quebec of whom Ernest Lapointe did not approve. He was consulted, right at the outset, about the English-speaking representative, and he approved of the decisions about Ralston, Dunning and Howard. He was present subsequently at King's interviews with Ralston and Dunning, though not at the interview with Howard. In the other elements of Quebec's representation the authority and influence of Lapointe were decisive. A word from him was sufficient to overcome King's hesitation about the appointment of Dandurand. And with respect to the other three—Power, Cardin and Rinfret—all of Mackenzie King's lively objections were eventually overborne by the tenacity of Ernest Lapointe.

Was Lapointe, then, the *chef* of Quebec French Canadians? Certainly he was recognized as such by Mackenzie King, and there is no doubt that he had more influence on the selection of the other Quebec French Canadians than any other minister had on the choice of colleagues from his province or region. Mackenzie King was Prime Minister, he was confident of his own judgment, he had opinions about all the French Canadian aspirants, but he did not simply inform Lapointe of what he intended to do about the French Canadian representation of Quebec. He discussed the situation with Lapointe, tried to persuade him, brought pressure to bear on him, and, when Lapointe proved inflexible, finally yielded to him. And even if King had had ready alternatives to those French Canadians to whom he objected, it is exceedingly doubtful that he would have appointed them over Lapointe's opposition.

But if, as is true, two of the French Canadian ministers, Cardin and Rinfret, and the Irish Catholic from Quebec City, Power, all owed to Ernest Lapointe their appointment to the cabinet, none of them was under a similar obligation with respect to his portfolio. It was Mackenzie King who determined their original portfolio assignments, and, when at the last moment Cardin's attitude made certain adjustments necessary, it was King, barely pausing to secure Lapointe's concurrence, who made them. P.-J.-A. Cardin did not look upon Ernest Lapointe as the *chef* of Quebec, the final spokesman of French Canada. There is no evidence that Cardin tried to get Lapointe to defend his interests in the vital matter of his portfolio. He defended his own interests directly with King, and in the end he got Public Works not through Lapointe's intervention but by his own stubborn insistence. Lapointe was not present at either of King's interviews with Cardin, nor at the interview with Rinfret.

In Cardin's independent self-reliance there can be seen not only personal jealousy but also a lingering residue of the old rivalry between the districts of Montreal and Quebec. This regional tension, long an important force in Quebec politics, had intruded heavily upon the cabinet formation of 1921, and Ernest Lapointe, who then possessed little authority outside the district of Quebec, had had to fight to establish an even numerical balance of ministers between the two districts. In 1935, he felt no such necessity, and the regional tension between the two districts was much more muted. He saw no need to protect Cannon, a former colleague from Quebec City: and he made every effort to include Cardin or Rinfret, two leading Montrealers. The final slate for the province of Quebec contained three French Canadian ministers from the district of Montreal, and only two ministers from the district of Quebec, one of the latter being an Irish Roman Catholic. All these dispositions were perfectly satisfactory to Lapointe (he would have been happy if Dunning had been added as a fourth minister from Montreal), and the reason is that by 1935 Lapointe's position was fully established on a much higher plane of authority and influence. No longer simply the most powerful politician in the eastern district of Quebec, he was now, and he knew himself to be, the leading spokesman of his province and of French Canadians as a whole in the national politics of Canada. And this explains why Mackenzie King, who understood Lapointe's strength and who never underestimated the importance of French Canadian support to the success of the Liberal party, believed that a satisfied Lapointe was an indispensable condition to a satisfactory cabinet representation from Quebec.

It is not sufficient, however, to discuss the precise refinements of Lapointe's role as leader of French Canada, or of Quebec, or of French Canadians in Quebec. His role, even in 1935, appears to have been less dominant than has sometimes been supposed. But the influence of Ernest Lapointe was not confined to these areas or to these aspects of cabinet-making. He was informed of Mackenzie King's views and decisions on all cabinet appointments, and King, in informing him, was clearly seeking his approval, or taking it for granted because he knew, from their long and close association, how Lapointe would react. It bears repeating that, in conversations on important public matters between two men who were as intimately connected as King and Lapointe, no clear distinction can be made between informing and consulting, and that it is impossible to allocate precisely the initiative or the veto power. King and

Lapointe were not competing; they were jointly endeavouring to form the strongest possible Government. Lapointe had opinions about many of the English Canadian candidates for cabinet office, but in most instances his opinions were in harmony with King's. He disagreed with King over Power, and Power at length was appointed, but this was an exceptional case because Power came from Quebec City and Lapointe relied heavily upon him. He also demurred at the initial decision to drop Elliott, and Elliott was eventually included—though not, it should be added, solely because of Lapointe's attitude to him.

Finally, it should be noted that Ernest Lapointe played a unique rôle in assisting Mackenzie King to form the Government. He was the first person whom King sent for after the election, and the first with whom he discussed the problem in detail. From his first discussion with King on October 17 until the Government was sworn in on October 23, Lapointe saw King every day except Sunday, more frequently than any other minister. He was present at the most important interviews: with Ralston on October 17, with Gardiner on October 18 and 19, and with Dunning on October 21; and he was present with Dunning when King saw Crerar on October 21 and Euler on October 22. King records that he had planned to have Lapointe at the interview with Rogers: and, when Elliott came for his first interview with King, Lapointe left beforehand only because it seemed tactful to do so. Not only was Lapointe present on these occasions, but King looked upon him as someone whose participation in the discussions would lend additional weight to what he had to say. King recorded that on October 19, when Lapointe and Gardiner arrived at Laurier House together, he had hoped to see Lapointe first so as to get his help in persuading Gardiner to accept Dunning's entry into the Government.

Ernest Lapointe was, in fact, much more than a colleague, even in matters that lay outside Quebec and French Canada. He was Mackenzie King's principal lieutenant, his senior and most trusted colleague, the first among all the others, the second man in the Government. It was altogether fitting, therefore, that Lapointe should have been assigned the seat on King's right hand from the first meeting of the new cabinet and that, a fortnight later, he was made acting Prime Minister on the occasion of Prime Minister King's first absence from Canada after the 1935 election.

2. Aside from Lapointe, Senator Dandurand was the only French Canadian whom Mackenzie King consulted about the problems of cabinet formation in 1935. Dandurand, however, was consulted only on two problems: the representation of Quebec (and this mainly in the hope of giving King a counterweight to Lapointe's advice) and the speakership of the Senate. On the subject of Quebec's representation, Dandurand quickly fell in behind Lapointe, so that Mackenzie King received essentially the same advice from both of them. King had interviews with four other French Canadians—Cardin and Rinfret, Michaud and Veniot—but none of these men was brought in to discuss anything other than his own entrance into the Government or his own portfolio. Ernest Lapointe was the only French Canadian who had anything to say about the cabinet as a whole or about the regional distribution of portfolios.

3. Lapointe and P.-J.-A. Cardin were the only French Canadians who showed much interest in the portfolios which were to be given to French Canadian ministers, and their interest was concentrated almost exclusively on their own portfolios. Lapointe

would have liked to take External Affairs, but King wanted to keep it for himself, as he always had before, and Lapointe accepted his old portfolio of Justice. Cardin wanted to recover the Marine Department or, failing that, to obtain some large spending department with ample patronage opportunities. He was effectively shut out of Marine, but by his flat refusal to take either of the two minor departments which King offered him, he succeeded in prying loose the Department of Public Works, and that, from Cardin's point of view, was probably at least as useful as Marine would have been. There is no evidence that Rinfret was concerned to secure any particular portfolio; he was clearly pleased by King's conditional offer of the Post Office, but when this was withdrawn he accepted his old portfolio, Secretary of State, apparently without objection. Michaud was gratified both by his promotion to the cabinet and by his assignment to the Department of Fisheries, a portfolio which had usually gone to the Maritime Provinces and, most frequently, to New Brunswick. Lapointe and Cardin, then, did not get the portfolios of their first choice, but in both cases they received others of comparable importance, and it is exceedingly doubtful that their disappointment with the outcome was acute, or as severe as it undoubtedly was on the part of Crerar and Gardiner, the two English-speaking ministers whose preferences were also denied.

Four portfolios were assigned to the five French Canadian members of the 1935 cabinet: Justice, Public Works, Fisheries and Secretary of State. Justice was undoubtedly a senior portfolio carrying a great deal of prestige. It had been held by a long succession of distinguished lawyers whose professional reputations and political careers had elevated it to a position of special prominence, amounting to titular leadership of the Canadian Bar. Its political prestige was, perhaps, particularly high in French Canada and this partly because of its association, in the nineteen twenties, with the careers of Sir Lomer Gouin and Ernest Lapointe. The Minister of Justice, moreover, was vested with the responsibility of advising the Governor General in Council on the exercise of the federal power of disallowance over provincial legislation, and the possession of this responsibility at a time when dominion-provincial tensions were running high was almost bound to make the minister an important focus of power as well as controversy. Public Works was a major spending and patronage department, and its operations might well have brought it additional consequence in the mid-thirties if the new government had been committed to a large expansion of public works projects for the purpose of creating employment. Fisheries was a department of traditional and definite importance to the Maritime Provinces. The office of Secretary of State was little more than a dignified sinecure. None of these departments was intimately concerned with the principal economic policies of the new Government. Public Works was the only one which earned or spent large sums of money. Justice by virtue of its connection with the disallowance power, was the only one which was closely connected with important political developments in the near future; and it was also the only one which brought its minister any great influence in the Government.

Neither King nor Lapointe regarded any portfolio as earmarked by necessity or right for English Canadians as such, or for French Canadians as such. They did accept, however, a number of practices which had developed over the years with respect to the regional allocation of portfolios, and these conventions tended to narrow the range of

departments for which any prospective minister was eligible. King and Lapointe assumed that Agriculture and the new Department of Mines and Resources (the heir to the old Department of the Interior) should both go to the western provinces and that Fisheries ought to be assigned to a Maritimer. Finance they viewed as a portfolio peculiarly identified with the business community, and the only suitable names that either of them could think of were Ralston and Dunning. On the other hand, though French Canadians in the past had been represented very frequently in certain portfolios, notably Public Works and the Post Office, Mackenzie King exhibited in 1935, as he had in 1921, a decided reluctance to place them in French Canadian hands.

To these regional limitations on the distribution of portfolios there must be added another of a more personal nature. Any prime minister, in forming his cabinet, has to take carefully into account the capacities and abilities of the men who are politically available for cabinet posts; if the government is to be a strong one, ministers have to be given the portfolios which are appropriate to their knowledge, experience and interests. These limitations apply, of course, to all ministers, but with respect to the candidates from French Canada they were reinforced, in 1935 at least, by the indifference of the French Canadian leaders to the disposition of the leading economic portfolios. Ernest Lapointe at no time showed interest in any important economic department either for himself or for any French Canadian colleague, nor did he desire one with a heavy weight of administration. Cardin's single objective, as he quite candidly stated it, was to obtain a large-spending department; from his point of view Finance, and Trade and Commerce were inferior to Public Works or the Marine Department. Rinfret, in the judgment of King and Lapointe, was ill-suited to any department with exacting administrative or political responsibilities. Michaud was a young man with no cabinet experience; he was assigned a department of modest importance and of special interest to the region which he represented. Senator Dandurand's age would have ruled out departmental duties, even if Mackenzie King had not believed that all portfolios ought to be held in the House of Commons.

4. During the cabinet formation of 1935 James Gardiner was the only political leader who endeavoured to attach conditions to his entrance into the Government. In an effort to bring grain marketing operations under his control, Gardiner asked to have the Board of Grain Commissioners shifted from Trade and Commerce to Agriculture. King rejected the full request, but he agreed that once Gardiner was in the Government he could continue to press for the transfer, and he arranged, as an immediate compromise, to place the newly established Wheat Board under the supervision of a cabinet committee which would be chaired by the Minister of Agriculture and which would also include the Ministers of Finance, and Trade and Commerce. No other politician, English-speaking or French-speaking, made any attempt to reach an understanding with Mackenzie King on any public question or tried to obtain from him prior commitments on Government policy or legislation.

The only instance, so far as can be determined, of pledges being exacted was a commitment which Mackenzie King obtained from his ministers on the subject of party policy. The Liberal party was committed to a program of moderate economic reform, the Fourteen Points which King had presented to Parliament in February

1933. Its main features were the liberation of foreign trade, the establishment of a national employment commission and a system of unemployment insurance, and the protection of the national credit through a central bank, an investment control board, reduced government expenditures and a balanced budget. The program was generally acceptable to the party, and it formed the basis of the Liberal campaign in the 1935 election. There were, nevertheless, some Liberals who thought it did not go far enough, as well as others who thought it went too far, and Mackenzie King, who had laboured for over two years to keep his party united in support of the program, chose the earliest moment after the sweeping election victory to secure a new endorsement of it from the party leadership. On the evening of October 23, a few moments before the swearing-in ceremony, the ministers designate assembled in the new Prime Minister's office, and Mackenzie King lined them up in order of precedence for presentation to the Administrator. He recorded in his diary:

I then said to them that before they were sworn in I had one or two things I would like to say. The first was that we had fought this election on the fourteen points, which I produced, and that I would like to have the assurance of every one, before he entered the ministry, that he was prepared to support me in carrying out the policies therein set forth without mental reservation of any kind; that this was clearly our obligation, and I intended to see that it was met. I asked if any one had any view to the contrary that he express it at once or forever after hold his peace. Nothing was said, but all enjoyed, as well as appreciated, the situation.⁵⁰

5. What share of the 1935 cabinet did French Canadians receive? And what relation did this proportion bear to the size of the French-speaking population in the total population of Canada?

The French share of the 1935 cabinet was just under one-third: five of the 16 ministers were French-speaking. The total population of Canada, according to the nearest census figures, those of 1931, was about 10,400,000; with the cabinet membership standing at 16, this meant one cabinet minister for each 650,000 of population. The French share was better than this national average. The total French-speaking population of Canada amounted to nearly 3,000,000, and, with five French-speaking cabinet ministers, there was one French minister for each 600,000 of French population in Canada.

When these population figures are broken down on a regional and provincial basis, the French position appears, on the whole, proportionately even stronger. Four of the five French-speaking ministers were from Quebec. Taking the French population of Quebec at the round figure of 2,300,000, this meant one minister for each 575,000 of Quebec French. The Quebec French did well as against the Quebec English; in fact, they did exceedingly well when it is remembered that Power, the only English-speaking minister from the province, represented the Irish Catholic population of Canada rather than the English-speaking population of Quebec, and that the 600,000 English of Montreal and the Eastern Townships received no other representation. The fifth French minister was from New Brunswick, where he represented a total population of 400,000, of whom 137,000 were French-speaking. The French minorities in the other seven provinces—300,000 in Ontario, 151,000 in the four western provinces, and

69,000 in Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island—received no representation. By comparison with the Maritime Provinces, moreover, the French in Canada were greatly under-represented, one minister for 600,000 French as opposed to one for 330,000 Maritimers. As against the western provinces, however, and even more so as against Ontario, the French were distinctly over-represented: one to 600,000 for the French against one to 750,000 in the West and one to 875,000 in Ontario.

There is no evidence of dissatisfaction with the French Canadian share of the 1935 cabinet. The proportion was more than twice as large as it had been in the Bennett cabinet (three out of 19). It was larger, indeed, than it had been in every cabinet but one since 1867; in the Mackenzie King cabinet of 1926 the French Canadian membership formed one-third exactly (six out of 18).⁵¹ No French Canadian leader proposed an equal division of cabinet places among English-speaking and French-speaking Canadians, and none asked that any specific proportion of the cabinet be drawn from Quebec or from French Canada as a whole. The only thing that Lapointe and Dandurand insisted upon was that the French Canadian representation from Quebec must not be allowed to fall below three, the number they had held in the Bennett administration and in most of the preceding ministries since Confederation. Lapointe and Dandurand took the position that the Quebec French ministers represented the whole of French Canada, and they showed no interest in the appointment of a French minister from New Brunswick nor in separate representation for the French Canadian minorities in the other provinces. There was no attempt on the part of any French Canadian leader to change the representation of the English-speaking population of Quebec. No English Canadian leader made representations looking to an increase or a reduction of the number of French Canadians in the cabinet. Within the province of Quebec the distribution of cabinet places favoured the district of Montreal which obtained three French ministers, as opposed to one for the district of Quebec, but this numerical imbalance was offset by the pre-eminence of Ernest Lapointe over all the others.

6. Finally, was any leading Liberal, French or English, left out of the cabinet because it was believed that he would be too inflexible in deliberations on government policy? The only cabinet prospects against whom Mackenzie King raised this objection were Thorson and Glen, and both were left out, though several years later King brought in each of them in turn. King also hesitated about giving Euler the Department of Trade and Commerce on the score of his rigid protectionism, but he yielded at length to Dunning's argument that this quality would make Euler an effective bargainer in trade negotiations. Certainly, inflexibility or unorthodoxy in matters of party policy had nothing to do with the dropping of Cannon and Veniot, or Motherwell and Stewart. And, with respect to the new men, Thorson, Glen and Weir were all excluded because there was a more powerful alternative in Crerar; Howard because of his political weakness and his business connections; and Slaght and probably several other Ontario possibilities were ruled out because of their connection, real or apprehended, with Premier Mitchell Hepburn.

The Theory of Dual Leadership

The theory of dual leadership holds that each of the two major ethnic groups should have a recognizable leader in the cabinet, who should be their principal spokesman. According to this theory, when the prime minister is an English Canadian, he should have at his side a French Canadian leader from Quebec; when the prime minister is a French Canadian, he should have at his side an English Canadian leader. The basic premise of this theory is that no single Canadian can inspire sufficient confidence among members of the two groups to be accepted as their leader, and that a prime minister needs a co-leader to bolster the prestige of the Government among the members of the group to which he does not belong.

An examination of Canadian history reveals few instances of dual leadership, the most outstanding examples being the Macdonald-Cartier and the Mackenzie King-Lapointe relationships. In both instances, an English Canadian was prime minister and felt a need to associate himself with a French Canadian capable of attracting and holding the confidence of Quebec. Neither of the French Canadian prime ministers felt the same necessity to solicit support outside Quebec through an English Canadian intermediary. Interestingly, the two men who made such a virtue of dual leadership were the very English Canadian prime ministers who best understood French Canada. Expressed the other way around the English Canadian prime ministers who stood to gain most by applying this theory were the very ones who eschewed it. This ironic circumstance merely confirms that the latter had little understanding of French Canada.

Macdonald and King, of course, did not actually share the leadership of government with Cartier and Lapointe respectively. Both took their positions as first minister seriously and clung jealously to their prerogatives. The dual leadership they practised was more apparent than real. Notwithstanding anything said in public, Lapointe certainly never had the impression that he was anything approaching a co-prime minister. Nor did Mackenzie King feel constrained to refrain from intervening

personally in matters affecting French Canada, or from seeking advice elsewhere on those matters wherever he saw fit. Lapointe was in a real sense his chief Quebec lieutenant, not his partner.

In short, dual leadership remains a theory in Canada, not a proven method of government. Decentralization of authority, not the two-nation theory, has characterized Canadian cabinets.

The Theory of Dual Leadership and St. Laurent

In some respects, St. Laurent's career seems a rebuttal of the arguments in favour of dual leadership; on the other hand, it may well be the exception that proves the rule. Of mixed parentage, he was completely bilingual and bicultural. Considered by the population as a whole, and by himself, a French-speaking Canadian, he spoke flawless English, thought in many matters like an English Canadian, and was better informed about English Canada as a whole than some of his English-speaking colleagues. He enjoyed a high degree of personal popularity in all parts of Canada, even beating his English Canadian adversary, George Drew, on his own ground. (True, his defeat in 1957 was due in part to anti-Roman Catholic, anti-French sentiment in English Canada but this was not the most significant factor). In other words, St. Laurent did not need an English Canadian leader to enable him to win support outside Quebec.

When St. Laurent entered the federal cabinet in December 1941 as Minister of Justice, he made no attempt to assume the role of Quebec lieutenant left vacant by Lapointe. Devoid of political ambition and opposed to distinguishing among Canadians on an ethnic basis, he considered himself just one more citizen responding to the call of duty. While he felt a particular responsibility to encourage French Canadians to support the war effort, he always referred to Mackenzie King in Quebec as the leader of all Canada and all Canadians. He saw the relationship between French and English Canadians not on a group, but on an individual basis, as citizens of the same state, with equal rights. He described his concept of Canadian citizenship as "a situation of absolute equality, equality not only in the text of our constitutional laws but practical equality in the daily application of these texts, in the real situation of each individual in... his every day relations with his fellow citizens."¹ Although Laurier was a French-speaking Roman Catholic, St. Laurent declared on the same occasion, he had been recognized as "the leader of all the Liberals from the Atlantic to the Pacific," and of "a party where all offices, from the last to the first, were open without any discrimination as to race, religion or language to every member who was felt to be qualified to discharge the responsibilities of those offices."

Concomitant with this principle of "practical equality" was his insistence that French Canadians should demonstrate their competence to occupy positions of responsibility, and not demand a percentage of them merely as a right. This refusal to consider public affairs primarily from an ethnic viewpoint, and his ideal of Canadian unity, made the concept of a cabinet formed of representatives of French and English Canada, each with its recognized leader, foreign to his thinking.

When Mackenzie King set out in the summer of 1947 to persuade St. Laurent to succeed him, the two men discussed the theory of dual leadership. The Prime Minister spoke of the need of a leader from Ontario and another from Quebec, and stated that he had always tried to respect that rule. St. Laurent was sceptical, pointing out that Macdonald had not always found it necessary to do so, and that Laurier did not have an English co-leader. Mackenzie King replied that in those days there were strong men in the cabinet from both sides, so the need to recognize one by giving him formal prominence was less urgent. St. Laurent drew the obvious conclusion that in a cabinet built of strong timber from all parts of Canada, the debate over dual leadership would become an academic one. This became his goal.

St. Laurent's Principles of Cabinet Formation

On November 15, 1948 St. Laurent inherited a cabinet fashioned by a master craftsman possessed of a keen appreciation of political and administrative realities. Except for Prince Edward Island, all the provinces were represented. There were six French Canadians (I include Paul Martin, of mixed parentage and raised in Ontario) on the team, and the Irish Roman Catholics, the labourers, the farmers, the war veterans, the Montreal businessmen, and the Ontario businessmen had their representatives. While recognizing the importance of the factors that had led to the formation of this mosaic, and prepared to respect its general outlines, St. Laurent was determined to follow his own principles in making new appointments. The first priority was to be given to administrative ability, and the second to compatibility with other members of the team. The third priority was to make sure no group of Canadians felt it was not properly represented. Rewards for past political services received a low priority. "It is not what a man has done in the past but what it was felt he might do in the future that was looked upon as important," St. Laurent declared in an interview with the author in 1962.

St. Laurent's first decisions on cabinet membership reflected this preoccupation with quality. When he first contemplated the possibility of accepting the party leadership, he obtained assurances that C. D. Howe would stay on with him in the cabinet. In the same 1962 interview he described the American-born engineer as "the most effective general director of all our economy that Canada has had since Confederation." He sought his services, not as a partner from English Canada, but as an exceptionally competent minister. After he became party leader but before he assumed the prime ministership, he arranged the promotion of L. B. Pearson, Canada's foremost diplomat, from the civil service to the cabinet as Minister of External Affairs. Before that appointment, Pearson had neither political ties nor strong partisan feelings; he was simply the most competent man for the job. Similar considerations prompted two further appointments on the day St. Laurent took office: Manitoba Premier Stuart Garson became Minister of Justice, and Robert Winters, parliamentary assistant to the Minister of Transport, became Minister of Reconstruction and Supply.

It has been argued that the St. Laurent cabinet was based on the dual leadership of the Prime Minister and Howe. This was not so in the sense specified above. Neither for

appearances' sake nor in practice did informed Liberals consider the Government a St. Laurent-Howe team. It is true, however, that Howe was considered the Prime Minister's senior colleague, and that he had more importance than even his portfolios indicated. He was one of the mainstays of the administration, and even in later years when he was in danger of becoming a political liability St. Laurent did not seriously consider trying to get rid of him.

Just as Howe was the "minister of everything" on the administrative side of Government, so his interests were wide and varied in the political domain. As the senior minister from Ontario he was automatically in charge of party matters in that province, although he delegated regional responsibility to other ministers such as Harris, Martin and Chevrier. Because of his cabinet seniority, he was acting Prime Minister during St. Laurent's absences from Ottawa. Because of his wide knowledge, his recognized ability, his seniority, and the great confidence of the Prime Minister in him, he was consulted more frequently than other ministers on a wider variety of matters. His agreement on important policy matters, particularly those of an economic nature, was considered essential and he was able on occasion to block projects of younger cabinet colleagues by withholding his assent. In party matters he was most valuable as a liaison between the cabinet and the business-financial community.

However, advice on matters affecting English Canada came to the Prime Minister from a variety of sources without passing through Howe's hands. Certainly, J. W. Pickersgill offered advice more frequently and was considered a greater authority on political matters; other men such as Claxton and Harris occasionally had great influence as well. In addition, St. Laurent dealt directly with ministers from the various provinces. When he did check with Howe, it was partly to make sure Howe saw no objection to a new step, and partly out of courtesy and respect.

Thus, in a sense, it was possible to speak of a St. Laurent-Howe partnership, but Howe himself would have been the first to reject the suggestion that a system of dual leadership existed. St. Laurent was for him at all times "the Chief" and he respected his prerogatives. St. Laurent did not select an English-speaking minister to act as his principal colleague outside Quebec, much less as co-prime minister. However, in view of the fact that he valued highly Howe's advice, and gave high priority to maintaining a harmonious team, he did check on matters of cabinet formation, particularly outside Quebec, with his senior colleague. For an M.P. to be considered cabinet material by Howe was certainly an important step toward cabinet membership. For instance, Robert Winters owed his rapid advancement in part to the fact that his capabilities were recognized by Howe. On the other hand, other English Canadians entered the cabinet and enjoyed successful careers despite the fact that they did not impress him particularly.

Quebec and Cabinet Formation

St. Laurent believed that competence was the prime prerequisite for cabinet membership, and that French Canadians should prove their ability to compete for promotions with English Canadians. He rejected the view that appointments from

Quebec should be made strictly on the basis of partisan interest and an appropriate share of the spoils of office. By his own example he had demonstrated his ability to compete with English Canadians in both his professional and public life, and he had no patience with French Canadians who sought recognition on any other basis. He considered it his duty to see that they had an equal opportunity to prove their worth and to win promotions, and he spent much time and energy seeking out promising candidates for a wide range of public offices, such as deputy ministerships. The rest was up to them.

Moreover, St. Laurent refused to consider Quebec as a sort of French Canadian "reserve" which English Canadians were forbidden to enter. On the contrary, he sought to encourage an interest on the part of English Canadians in French Canada and in its contribution to the country as a whole. His attitude can be summed up as recognizing for English Canadians the same right to take an interest in French Canada as he took in English Canada, but recognizing as well that language, religion, and history made his province difficult for most English Canadians to understand.

A pragmatist by nature, St. Laurent sought advice on cabinet formation wherever he felt necessary. In English Canada he consulted his colleagues about changes in representation in their own provinces, and about other appointments there. It was basic to his outlook to respect the position of ministers as representatives of their provinces in the cabinet. In Ontario and British Columbia, which had more than one minister, responsibility was subdivided on a geographical basis and a system of seniority was recognized as much as possible.

However, there was no feeling among ministers that they could not express their views to the Prime Minister about the recruitment of new colleagues from other provinces, and this was done frequently. But since St. Laurent had a high reputation for picking out the flaws in an argument, advice was rarely tendered to him unless the person taking the initiative felt on very solid ground. A few ministers, including Howe, Claxton, Pickersgill and others, felt free to express their views; the others practised greater circumspection. These same men were more likely to be consulted about cabinet shuffles. In these instances, the degree of confidence bestowed on a minister by the Government leader was usually a reflection of personal confidence. If an English Canadian minister, such as Claxton or Abbott or Marler, had opinions relating to French Canada that appeared worth receiving, they were given a ready reception. If a French Canadian minister had interesting views on matters relating to English Canada, they were also given attention. Most of these comments referred to the competence of candidates for ministerial positions. However, there were several instances of French Canadian ministers criticizing colleagues or potential colleagues for their lack of understanding of French Canada. There is no evidence of the reverse.

There was much less likelihood that St. Laurent would consult ministers from outside Quebec about the choice of colleagues from that province, than vice versa, primarily because he was the senior minister from Quebec, and his authority there was unquestioned, and secondly because English Canadian ministers accepted the "reserve" idea in fact if not in theory. They presumed that Quebec politics was a world that they would never be able to penetrate or to comprehend completely. Despite St.

Laurent's utterances to the contrary, Quebec remained a province different from the others.

Thus there existed within the cabinet and the Prime Minister's immediate entourage a group of French Canadians who appeared occasionally to take the form of a Quebec lobby, and to enjoy a special relationship to him. He was consulted by them more frequently on matters pertaining to Quebec than he was by English Canadians, and his door was more readily opened to them. This easier access encouraged a special feeling of intimacy and resulted in comments respecting cabinet colleagues and their activities that other ministers did not venture to make. St. Laurent's relations with Jean Lesage and Hugues Lapointe were almost on a father-son basis. These men were part of a special team within the cabinet that worked constantly to improve the lot of French Canadians at all levels of the public service. When cabinet changes relating to Quebec were under consideration, they were taken into his confidence, and served as his lieutenants on occasion. However, their role did not prevent St. Laurent from consulting other persons, such as Claxton, even after the latter retired from the cabinet in 1954.

It is apparent, then, that St. Laurent consulted his colleagues about cabinet representation from their provinces; he also consulted certain colleagues about wider aspects of cabinet formation, and even about the representation of French Canada if he felt their views to be of value. English Canadian ministers were reticent in advising him about French Canadian representation in the cabinet unless asked specifically for their views. French Canadian ministers were less reticent in expressing their views to him about their English Canadian colleagues, particularly in reference to the interests of French Canada.

Ethnic Considerations and the Allocation of Portfolios

Speaking in support of L. B. Pearson during the latter's first election campaign in Algoma East constituency in October 1948, St. Laurent expressed the hope that "it will be established that it is not a matter of one's religion or race, that it is solely one's position as a Canadian citizen that determines whether one will be fitted for the highest office in the land."² This comment reflected a strong determination to treat all Canadians on an equal basis, and not to allow any doors to be closed to French Canadians. Conversely, although this was more implicit than explicit, no posts should be withheld from English Canadians on ethnic or religious grounds.

To illustrate this principle, St. Laurent pointed out proudly in 1949 that two Ontario French Canadians, Martin and Chevrier, had been appointed to the cabinet by Mackenzie King on the basis of their competence, and despite that fact that they held seats outside Quebec. At the same time, two English Canadian ministers, Claxton and Abbott, were appointed from Quebec. "Our unity hasn't suffered," St. Laurent commented, "and we have a much stronger government as a result."³

These remarks reveal a desire to break away from appointments on an ethnic basis, but they also reveal an appreciation of the difficulties of doing so. In fact, St. Laurent's achievements were relatively modest in this field.

St. Laurent's cabinet began with 19 ministers, six of whom (including Martin) were French Canadians. At the time of his resignation in June 1957, the cabinet was composed of 21 ministers, six of whom were French Canadians. One French Canadian, Hugues Lapointe, held two portfolios pending the choice of a further French Canadian colleague. On the other hand, Roch Pinard, Secretary of State, was not a candidate for re-election.⁴ When he became Prime Minister, St. Laurent increased the proportion of French Canadian parliamentary assistants to three out of 10; in June 1957 it was four out of 12. Appointments to posts within the civil service, on boards, commissions, etc. confirm this policy of maintaining a reasonable ratio between French Canadians and English Canadians. This consideration placed practical limits on the policy of putting competence first and of ensuring free competition. At the same time, the preoccupation with competence limited the number of appointments of French Canadians, as is indicated by the failure to appoint a replacement for Postmaster General Alcide Côté following his death in August 1955. In his case there was a move by the friends of Brigadier Jean Allard to have him run as Côté's successor in the constituency of Saint-Jean-Iberville. However, the plan did not materialize, a less qualified man was elected to represent the constituency, and Côté's place in the cabinet remained vacant.

At the time St. Laurent became Prime Minister, certain portfolios were considered particularly important by French Canadians. First among them was the Justice portfolio, which had come to be associated with the French Canadian leadership under Lapointe and St. Laurent. This was something of an illusion, as the Department of Justice was already declining in importance relative to other departments. In appointing Stuart Garson as his Minister of Justice, St. Laurent abandoned what many French Canadians considered a well-established practice of real value to their group. However, this was done from convenience rather than from principle. Similarly, in 1953, he appointed Robert Winters Minister of Public Works, another portfolio that had become identified in many minds with French Canada.

At the same time he broke new ground in appointing Hugues Lapointe as Minister of Veterans Affairs, a portfolio previously held by two English Canadians in succession. And he appointed Jean Lesage as the first Minister of Northern Affairs and National Resources, thus encouraging a trend away from the practice of French Canadian politicians to take little interest in financial and economic matters, or in questions not directly affecting Quebec. In view of his impressive record as parliamentary assistant to the Minister of Finance in 1953, Lesage was considered a likely candidate for the Finance portfolio. Had the St. Laurent ministry remained longer in office, he might well have become the first French Canadian Minister of Finance. The English Canadian ministers whose opinions counted appeared favourable to such an innovation. It is also possible that the future would have seen Lapointe as Minister of Defence, a further break with tradition. If such an appointment appeared logical, it would not have been prevented on ethnic grounds.

On the whole, no cabinet post appeared to be closed to French Canadian ministers during this period on ethnic or religious grounds. The prerequisite did seem to be the necessary competence. In earlier years, many French Canadian ministers had left the impression in Ottawa of being particularly preoccupied with Quebec politics, and little

interested in, or suited to, administering a busy department. They preferred the Post Office or Public Works Departments, which combined a relatively light administrative load with interesting opportunities for patronage. They were less interested in the National Revenue portfolio, which required its occupant to resist continually the strong pressures of anguished taxpayers for special treatment. "A French Canadian would either have to give in, which is no longer possible under the present system," one ambitious young minister commented privately in 1957, "or he would be committing political suicide. We'll leave that one to the English!" On the other hand, any French Canadian would have been pleased to be appointed Minister of National Health and Welfare, the principal "give-away" department.

In summary, St. Laurent did not recognize a French Canadian monopoly of any portfolio. In fact, he encouraged French Canadians to move into fields in which they had not previously taken an interest, such as the economic, financial and resource development fields, and their opportunities were limited only by their abilities. He acted to break the hold of French Canadians on the "patronage" portfolios, hoping thus to end what he considered to be a less desirable aspect of French Canadian tradition. He did not recognize any portfolios as particularly important to the ethnic and cultural interests of French Canadians; conversely, there were no portfolios closed to English Canadians. The only portfolio not likely to be held by a French Canadian was Agriculture, as the practice had developed in the twentieth century of choosing an Agriculture minister from western Canada. Once again, the reasons were functional and unrelated to ethnic considerations.

Prior Commitments

Surely no prime minister could have assumed office with fewer prior commitments than St. Laurent, principally because the office sought the man, not the man the office. As a result, he was not obliged to offer hostages to his personal ambition. The negotiations to make him party leader took the form of persuading him to accept the post, rather than the opposite.

In these negotiations, top-level English Canadian Liberals were as active as French Canadians, and more effective. Mackenzie King was the most influential of all, applying his considerable talents for persuasion and manoeuvre to make St. Laurent his successor. He had decided during the war that the Quebec lawyer was the person most qualified to fill this role, and considered other candidates only at times when he felt there was no possibility of persuading him to accept it. When St. Laurent was persuaded to accept the party leadership, this was achieved by appeals to his sense of duty, and in particular, by holding out the opportunity of serving his ideal of national unity. It was pointed out to St. Laurent especially by his life-long friend, Conservative M.P. John Hackett, that he had a unique opportunity to prove that Laurier's career was not a mere accident, and that the prime ministership was truly open to all Canadians, regardless of race or religion. When he allowed his name to be put forward as a leadership candidate, he refused to make the slightest move to win the position, and warned those working on his behalf that he would refuse to stand if there was the

slightest indication that his candidature was giving rise to controversy on racial or religious lines.⁵

Under the circumstances, English Canadian Liberals were not in a position to endeavour to extract commitments from St. Laurent as a candidate for the leadership, or as a fledgling prime minister. The only person who might have been able to do so was C. D. Howe, since St. Laurent indicated at an early stage in the campaign of persuasion that Howe's presence would be essential in any cabinet he would form. However, Howe was just as keen on having St. Laurent as party leader as were other members of the cabinet, and gave the necessary assurances that he would stay on even before the leadership was offered to St. Laurent by Mackenzie King.

Only two other cabinet ministers hoped seriously to lead the party, Paul Martin and James Gardiner. The former was made to understand in unequivocal terms by Mackenzie King and other Liberals that he had no chance of being chosen in 1948, and that he would be jeopardizing his chances on a future occasion if he did not throw his support behind St. Laurent. He was obliged by circumstances to fall in line, and was in no position to pose conditions concerning either portfolios or future policy. As for Gardiner, he, too, was anxious to continue his career in federal politics, and like Martin was not in a position to bargain with regard to the future. It is significant that the only leadership candidate who demanded changes in the party's attitude and policies, C. G. Power, was not offered a portfolio by St. Laurent.

Of the new ministers named by St. Laurent on becoming party leader, Pearson was appointed as a specialist in international affairs, and Winters, an M.I.T. graduate in engineering, was also chosen largely because of his specialized knowledge. The only person who might be considered as having imposed certain conditions as an English Canadian before accepting a portfolio was Stuart Garson. Before agreeing to become Minister of Justice he did state his position very clearly on some issues, and most probably on federal-provincial relations. As Premier of one of the poorer provinces, he had pleaded for greater "centralization" in fiscal matters, in order to obtain more federal aid for Manitoba. In discussing his possible entry into the cabinet, it is likely that he asked for assurances that there would be no return to a situation under which the poorer provinces would be left without adequate revenues. When he had served as legal counsel to the Rowell-Sirois Commission, before World War II, St. Laurent had heard Garson's arguments along these lines, and had been impressed by the then Manitoba Treasurer's plea for federal action to assist the poorer parts of the country. Thus the two men had no difficulty in reaching agreement on that subject. However, judging from the firm attitude of St. Laurent on the question of prior commitments, it is highly unlikely that he would have altered his position in order to secure the other man's services.

During his period as Prime Minister, St. Laurent made offers of cabinet portfolios that were not accepted, but the persons involved were eminent Canadians who refused on grounds of health or for other personal reasons. There is no evidence of any refusal on ethnic grounds.

It is not inappropriate to ask if any French Canadian attempted to extract commitments from St. Laurent as the price of entering the cabinet, or of supporting the administration. After all, a prime ministerial candidate so readily acceptable to

English Canadians might well have evoked some feeling of doubt in the minds of French Canadians. Born of an Irish-Canadian mother and bearing the names "Louis" and "Stephen," he had spent much of his professional life in English Canadian business circles and was certainly not a typical French Canadian. The charge that he was "*plus Stephen que Louis*," was used frequently by his Conservative-Union Nationale opponents in Quebec.

There is little doubt that St. Laurent's devotion to the cause of national unity was occasionally a source of frustration and embarrassment to his Quebec ministers and supporters. They would have liked him to go faster and farther in promoting the interests of French Canada, for instance in increasing the number of French-speaking civil servants, adopting a Canadian flag, and appointing a Canadian ambassador to the Vatican. One French Canadian minister commented from retirement recently that French Canadians found themselves sometimes at a disadvantage under a French Canadian prime minister and that there was a big price to pay for having a member of their own group at the head of the administration. According to this line of reasoning, a French Canadian prime minister must avoid giving the impression of taking advantage of his position to advance the interests of his group, while pressure can be exerted by French Canadians more openly on an English Canadian prime minister without exposing him to accusations of favouritism to Quebec.

While it cannot be proved that French Canadians endeavoured to extract commitments from St. Laurent before accepting office, it is certain that men like Lesage, Lapointe and Pinard kept up steady pressure on him, both before entering the cabinet and after, to meet French Canada's demands. They became less and less successful as the years passed, as St. Laurent hesitated more and more to endanger national unity by stirring up resentment on one side or the other of the ethnic wall.

The Proportion of French Canadian and English Canadian Ministers

St. Laurent described his approach to Canadian dualism as "a practical recognition of that partnership in government" that was "the source and the very lifeline of Canadian unity."⁶ This concept did not imply equal numbers of French and English Canadians in the cabinet, but rather a proportion corresponding to the numerical size of the two groups, and an equal opportunity for members of either group to serve Canada. The concept of an equal number of portfolios for each group would have been considered in English Canada as a scheme to use the cabinet as a pork barrel of French Canadian patronage. It would also have been contrary to St. Laurent's view that competence was the primary consideration in making cabinet appointments.

St. Laurent did attempt to increase both the number and the quality of French Canadian representation in the cabinet, and in this he encountered no opposition from English Canadian colleagues. Certainly there was no attempt by English Canadian ministers to reduce the number of French Canadian ministers, a situation that might easily have arisen if he had followed a policy of making appointments on a percentage basis, regardless of quality.

The "Co-operativeness" of French Canadians

St. Laurent gave high priority to forming a team of men who would work together smoothly. Such a consideration might appear to imply that extremists from either group were excluded, and that a pre-condition of appointment was an ability to get along with members of the other ethnic group—"se vendre," in extremist French Canadian terms. Does this mean that the French Canadians chosen were considered likely to be more co-operative, in matters of policy, with the English Canadian members of the cabinet, than other French Canadians who were passed over? Certainly a tacitly accepted pre-condition to cabinet appointment was a desire to promote national unity, as well as recognition of the dual nature of Canadian society, and a willingness to provide an equal opportunity to members of the two groups. It is inconceivable that St. Laurent would have invited into his cabinet a person unwilling to try to work in harmony with members of the other group. The concept of two teams of ministers around the same council table, each representing the viewpoint of a particular ethnic group, and negotiating rather than working together as individual members of the same team, was anathema to him.

Since the Liberal party prided itself on being the instrument of this concept of national unity, and since Liberal M.P.'s were elected under that banner, all of them at least paid lip service to it. Thus St. Laurent was highly unlikely to find in his caucus men who were ineligible for cabinet appointment on this basis. Nor was he likely to pick men from outside, whose views were very different from his own on this score. The problem of building a harmonious team is more likely to arise within a party based on autonomists in French and English Canada respectively.

Yet, during St. Laurent's period of office, there were indications that some cabinet ministers did not form part of a harmonious team as far as French-English relations were concerned. One or two English Canadian ministers were suspected by their French Canadian colleagues of having little sympathy for the demands of French Canadians. On the other hand, one or two French Canadians were thought by their English Canadian colleagues to be unduly insistent in their demands for greater recognition of French Canada. The fact remains, however, that these men were appointed, and did work together despite their differences. And there is no evidence that the appointments of other English- or French-speaking candidates, members of the party, were withheld on grounds of inflexibility on important policies affecting relations between the two groups.

Conclusions

The examination of French-English relations at the cabinet level during the St. Laurent years is not very satisfying for those who seek to identify a clear set of principles affecting the relations between representatives of the two groups, and still less satisfying for proponents of the theory of dual leadership. The characteristics of the two groups were interwoven in the Prime Minister's own personality, and he was no more able to conceive of a cabinet composed of two teams representing two separate

groups than he was of splitting his own personality. During his period of office, he made the debate over dual leadership, and partnership at cabinet level almost an academic one, substituting for those concepts his personal credo—equality of opportunity according to competence. However, he merely adjourned the debate for a time and perhaps made it more acute in the 1960's, since no successor has been able to inspire such confidence simultaneously in both parts of Canada. Those who have followed him have had to consider once again the problem of dual leadership.

Co-Prime Minister, Chief Lieutenant or Provincial Spokesman?

If the prime minister was an English Canadian, did he treat the French Canadian leaders of his party solely or mainly as the representatives of a province which, like the other provinces, was entitled to representation in the cabinet? Or did he single out a French Canadian colleague and give him a position of special influence in the process of cabinet-making, perhaps treating him for this purpose as his principal lieutenant or even as co-prime minister? If a French Canadian was singled out in this way, was he given the final say on Quebec representation in the cabinet? Was he given, in addition, a veto power or other special influence on the choice of representatives from other provinces? Did he seek or was he given a particular portfolio so as to recognize his special position in the cabinet? If the prime minister was a French Canadian, did he treat his English Canadian colleagues solely or mainly as representatives of their provinces or did he single out an English Canadian colleague and treat him, for purposes of cabinet-making, in the special manner described above?

Within the ministries which are treated by the foregoing studies two French Canadians—Sir George Cartier and Ernest Lapointe—were singled out from their cabinet colleagues by English Canadian prime ministers and given positions of quite special influence in the making of the cabinet and, subsequently, in the councils of the Government; and one English Canadian minister, C. D. Howe, was assigned a role of comparable authority under a French Canadian prime minister. Yet none of these eminent ministers attained a position of full and recognized co-ordination with the prime ministers under whom they served; and the difference, in power and status, between each of them and his prime minister simply underscores the fact that the political executive of the government of Canada, since 1867, has not had more than one head.

Prior to Confederation, of course, matters were quite otherwise in the province of Canada. The long series of double-headed premierships, following one another in unbroken succession from 1848 to 1864—Baldwin-Lafontaine, Macdonald-Cartier, Brown-Dorion, Taché-Macdonald—were the crowning expressions of the dualism, the

cultural and sectional dualism, which was the dominant feature of the political arrangements in that province.

At Confederation, however, the dual leadership, like the dualism which prevailed in the cabinet and the legislature, was deliberately ended. Ever since Lord Monck, the Governor General, succeeded in establishing, at the formation of the new Dominion, the constitutional convention that the office of first minister should be held by one person, and not by two, the federal executive power has had a single pre-eminent head, and nothing has occurred since then to qualify the pre-eminence of the prime minister. On the contrary, the office has been magnified by social and political change. In Canada, as elsewhere, the enormous growth of governmental activities during the present century has caused a massive shift of power from Parliament to the cabinet and from the cabinet to the prime minister. In addition, the modern practice of selecting a party leader at a national convention has dramatized the single choice, and the development of mass communications has concentrated public attention, to an unprecedented degree, upon the person so chosen. The prime minister, as the head of the majority party in the House of Commons, as the directing force in cabinet and Parliament, and as the final co-ordinator of executive policies, stands on a plane by himself. His powers, in Arthur Meighen's words, are "very great"; his functions and duties are "not only important, they are supreme in their importance";¹ and no prime minister of Canada has been found wanting in a determination to protect the ultimate primacy which his office confers.

For French Canadians the ending of the dual premiership, like the introduction of the principle of representation by population into the House of Commons, implied acceptance of a minority position in the general affairs of the new federation, a position which acknowledged their new situation as a minority in the population of Canada. The decision to create a prime ministership of pre-eminent status made it impossible officially to recognize a French Canadian as a principal lieutenant or co-prime minister to Sir John A. Macdonald. Yet in effect Cartier was the principal lieutenant "both because of the past relations of Cartier and Macdonald in the cabinets of the province of Canada since 1856, and because of Cartier's general weight and influence."²

Although, in the formation of the first Dominion cabinet, he had no veto power over the representation of the English-speaking provinces, Cartier was undoubtedly consulted on the general composition of the cabinet, his nominations for Quebec were accepted by Macdonald, and he received the portfolio which he asked for and which he regarded as the most difficult of all. There can be no doubt that he occupied a special place as Macdonald's senior and most trusted colleague, but it was a position accorded to him not because he was French but because he was Cartier. The relationship, in other words, between the English Canadian prime minister and his principal French Canadian colleague in the first Canadian ministry was an intimate personal partnership for political ends, and, not surprisingly, it did not survive the death of Cartier in 1873.

None of the French Canadian ministers who followed him in the long succession of Conservative cabinets which held office for all but five years from 1867 to 1896 ever

really ascended to the eminence of Sir George Cartier as the acknowledged *chef* of French Canada or to the level of his influence in the Government. The peculiar circumstances of cabinet formation in 1878 thrust L.-F.-R. Masson into a dramatic prominence and he was briefly hailed as the successor to Cartier. But Masson, though he was assigned Cartier's portfolio, never achieved Cartier's ascendancy. His influence never extended beyond French-speaking Quebec and, even in 1878, at his hour of greatest authority, it was not Masson but Charles Tupper who was Macdonald's principal lieutenant and chief confidant.

Once the hand of Cartier was removed, the intense regionalism of Quebec politics surged forth, and for the next 20 years the rivalry between the districts of Quebec and Montreal defied the efforts of every politician, including Sir Hector Langevin and J.-A. Chapleau, to subdue or transcend it. When, in fact, the mantle of Cartier finally came to rest, it descended not upon a Conservative but upon the Liberal Wilfrid Laurier, whose rise to authority as the *chef* of French Canada culminated with his success in uniting the moderate *Rouges* with the Conservative heirs of *l'école Cartier*.

Laurier's final elevation to office as the first French Canadian prime minister was owing to this and to the further fact that he had won for himself solid and widespread backing in English Canada. "By 1896 he was not only the leader of the Quebec wing of the party; he was in most eyes the unquestioned national leader of a national party."³ Having no need of an English co-leader—and there being no one available who could speak for the whole of English Canada—Laurier, as Prime Minister, treated his English Canadian colleagues as the spokesmen for their respective provinces and sections, consulting them freely, but reserving for himself the final decisions on their advice, and preserving, as well, the right to be the final spokesman for the province of Quebec.

The repeated successes of the Liberal party in Quebec during the Laurier administration wholly overshadowed the French Canadian Conservatives and had the effect of diminishing their influence within the Conservative party. The Conservative decline in Quebec was arrested, at length, by the formation of the Conservative-Nationalist alliance under F. D. Monk and Henri Bourassa, and its impressive performance in the general election of 1911 won for Monk a prominent role in the formation of the first Borden cabinet. Yet Monk, before the election, had not been co-leader of the Opposition, and he was not, subsequently, co-prime minister. He was recognized to be *le chef conservateur* in Quebec, he had been left free to run the Conservative campaign in the province, and it was evidently agreed that no Quebecker was to be taken into the cabinet of whom he did not approve. But this was the full measure of Monk's influence. He had nothing to say about the selection of ministers from the other provinces; he was not consulted, so far as the evidence goes, about the general problems of cabinet formation; and the portfolio he received, though important, was not one of signal distinction. Far from being viewed as indispensable, Monk was dispensed with, on a vital issue of policy and after a little more than a year in office, and, although no great effort was made to keep him and few mourned his going, it seems apparent that his departure marked the beginning of the second, and even more prolonged, period of Conservative debility in Quebec.

Monk's successors, the series of inconsequential and harried French Conservatives who flitted in and out of the Borden Conservative and Union cabinets, made very little impression on the conduct of affairs, and found their own political positions progressively undermined by the unpopularity of the Government's war policies in their province. By the end of World War I the Union Government had no following among French Canadians, and the Liberal ascendancy over Quebec was almost completely restored. Arthur Meighen, the successor to Sir Robert Borden, in an endeavour to construct a strong and fully representative Government, was driven to the desperate expedient of raiding the Quebec Liberal party for cabinet recruits. The attempts failed, and in the general election of 1921 the isolation of the federal Conservative party from the province of Quebec was complete.

The same election, however, by placing the Quebec Liberals in the unprecedented position of being a majority in the governing party, saw French Canadian influence at Ottawa return with a rush. Yet, with the death of Laurier, French Canada had lost a towering *chef* and gained two ambitious regional leaders, neither of whom had, by 1921, fully established his title to the succession. Mackenzie King's efforts, before and during the cabinet formation of 1921, to promote one of them to a position of special prominence were foiled by the other, and Lapointe and Gouin both entered the first King cabinet, a combination of uneasy rivals within a lopsided and weak administration.

Ernest Lapointe was the one whom Mackenzie King wanted for his principal lieutenant and whom he treated as his closest colleague throughout the formation of the 1921 cabinet. But Lapointe did not have the final say about cabinet appointments outside the district of Quebec, and he did not obtain the portfolio of his choice. The senior Quebec portfolio went to Sir Lomer Gouin, but Gouin, in turn, was thwarted by Mackenzie King on other aspects of the representation of the district of Montreal, and, most decidedly, he did not win the confidence of the Prime Minister. Lapointe and Gouin were both consulted about the wider issues of cabinet formation, but neither of them sought or was given a veto over the choice of cabinet ministers from the other provinces, and neither of them—nor any other colleague—was in any sense a co-prime minister.

After Gouin's retirement in 1923, Ernest Lapointe stepped forward into a position of full authority as the federal leader of the Liberal party of Quebec, and in the next decade his partnership with Mackenzie King steadily matured. In 1935 he was firmly established as King's principal lieutenant with a special influence over the making of the cabinet as a whole and, subsequently, over the conduct of government. The first man to be called to Ottawa after the election, Lapointe's advice was sought by Mackenzie King more frequently and on more aspects of cabinet-making than any other minister's. On this occasion, his views on the composition of the French Canadian section of the cabinet were decisive, and in recognition of his special position he was assigned his old and very senior portfolio. Yet for all his great weight Lapointe was still not a co-prime minister, nor could he be described, without qualification, as the universally recognized *chef* of French Canada. Mackenzie King took some important decisions without consulting anyone, and he jealously guarded his prerogatives with respect to all portfolio assignments. Ernest Lapointe, for the second

time, was denied the portfolio of his first preference, and he had no veto over cabinet appointments from the English-speaking provinces. Notwithstanding these limitations, however, there is no doubt that by 1935 Lapointe had become to King what Cartier had been to Macdonald—his senior and most trusted colleague, the principal spokesman of French Canada in federal politics, the second man in his party and in the Government.

Lapointe continued to occupy this place until his death in 1941. Afterwards, Mackenzie King, who had grown accustomed to governing in close conjunction with a leading French Canadian, went outside the official Liberal hierarchy and found a new lieutenant in Louis St. Laurent. St. Laurent was brought into the wartime Government as Minister of Justice, Lapointe's old portfolio, and, though he made no attempt to assume Lapointe's special place, the role was increasingly thrust upon him by his own abilities and by events. But for St. Laurent's unflinching support the King Government might not have survived the second conscription crisis, and before the war was over Mackenzie King had decided that St. Laurent was the man who should succeed him. After the war King assigned External Affairs to St. Laurent—the first man to whom he was willing to relinquish it—and in 1948, when at last Mackenzie King stepped down, Louis St. Laurent's succession was a foregone and carefully arranged conclusion.

St. Laurent, like Laurier before him, did not need and did not employ an English Canadian for a co-prime minister. Completely bilingual and bicultural, he swiftly achieved an impressive personal popularity everywhere in Canada, and, besides, the concept of a dual ethnic leadership was foreign to his thinking. What he felt he needed, above all, were colleagues capable of administering the large economic and social programs to which the postwar Liberal Government was committed. C. D. Howe was such a man *par excellence*, and it was because of his exceptional abilities and not because he was an English Canadian that he attained a position of exceptional power and influence within the St. Laurent administration. St. Laurent, before accepting the leadership, made sure that Howe's services would be available; he gave Howe, by turns and frequently at the same time, every important economic portfolio except Finance; and he consulted him more frequently and on a wider variety of problems, including cabinet appointments, than any other minister. Yet Howe's endorsement was not an essential passport to a cabinet position, and he, like most of his English-speaking colleagues, was not usually consulted about Quebec matters. Between St. Laurent and Howe a partnership undoubtedly existed, but it was not an ethnic partnership, nor one between equals. St. Laurent was the Prime Minister; Howe, the senior minister from Ontario and, on the administrative side, "the minister of everything," was the most senior and the most important of his colleagues.

The Range of the Prime Minister's Consultations

If the prime minister was an English Canadian, did he consult French Canadian leaders of his party about the representation of Quebec in the cabinet? Did he consult them about English-speaking as well as French-speaking representation of Quebec in the cabinet? Did he consult them about possible representation of French Canadians from provinces other than Quebec? Did he consult them about

wider problems of cabinet formation, including the representation of other provinces or groups and the assignment of portfolios among the cabinet as a whole? If he consulted French Canadian colleagues on the questions, did he take their advice? Did he receive conflicting advice from them on these matters? To put these questions in a slightly different form, did French Canadian leaders endeavour to influence the choice of ministers or the assignment of portfolios for provinces or groups outside Quebec, or did they concentrate their attention on problems of Quebec representation in the cabinet? If the prime minister was a French Canadian, did he consult English Canadian colleagues simply about the representation of their respective provinces in the cabinet, or did he also consult them about wider aspects of cabinet formation, including the representation of Quebec and the assignment of portfolios among the cabinet as a whole? Did English Canadian leaders attempt to influence a French Canadian prime minister's choice of ministers from Quebec or did they concentrate their attention on the representation of provinces other than Quebec?

It is perfectly clear that the three English Canadian prime ministers—Macdonald, Borden and King—whose experiences of cabinet-making are related in this study, consulted French Canadian colleagues about the formation of their Governments.

The number of French Canadians who were consulted varied from episode to episode according to the general weight and experience of the individuals concerned. When one man stood out as the paramount *chef* of French Canada, as Cartier did, or as Lapointe did in 1935, his recommendations were likely to be conclusive, and the English Canadian prime minister was usually disposed to go very little further for advice on French Canadian cabinet appointments. When, however, no clearly dominant French Canadian spokesman appeared, the prime minister took counsel over a wider field of French Canadian members of his party. This was true of the cabinet formations of 1878 and 1921, and it was also the case in 1911 when Monk's recognized position as the *chef conservateur* in Quebec scarcely concealed the presence of a number of jostling factions.

The French Canadian leaders were consulted, of course, about the composition of the Quebec section of the cabinet, and especially about the French Canadian components of it. The extent to which their advice was sought about other aspects of cabinet formation again depended on their weight and influence and on the attitude of the prime minister to them. Cartier in 1867 and Lapointe in 1935 were consulted on nearly everything, including the representation of the English-speaking population of Quebec, the cabinet appointments from other provinces and portfolio assignments. By contrast, Masson and the French Canadian Conservatives who participated in the formation of the cabinet of 1878 were only asked for their views on the French Canadian membership of the cabinet, and this appears to have been true of Monk and his associates in 1911. In 1921, however, Mackenzie King consulted half a dozen French-speaking colleagues on a very wide range of cabinet-making problems, and this reflected, among other things, the absence of a single dominant French Canadian *chef*, and the very powerful position of the French Canadian wing of his parliamentary following.

The French Canadians who were consulted about cabinet formation were almost invariably Quebecers, and their overriding concern lay with the interests of their

province. Admittedly there were instances, notably in 1921 and 1935, when leading French Canadians showed a definite interest in the representation of other provinces, but even in these cases their attention was concentrated in marked degree on the cabinet positions which the province of Quebec, and particularly the French-speaking sections of the province, was to receive. For them the English-speaking representation from Quebec was a distinctly secondary consideration, and it does not appear that prior to World War II they were much interested in obtaining separate cabinet representation for the French Canadian minorities in the English-speaking provinces.

On the subject of French Canadian representation in the cabinet, the advice tendered by leading French Canadians has frequently been contradictory. The contradictions were usually affected by sharp personal or factional rivalries, as in 1911 and in 1921, but they also sprang from a deeper conflict between the districts of Montreal and Quebec, a continuing tension which was often expressed, as it was in 1878, as well as in 1911 and 1921, in a clash of opinion over the regional distribution of cabinet positions among the aspirants from the province of Quebec.

The two French Canadian Prime Ministers treated their English Canadian colleagues as the representatives of the provinces and sections from which they came, and consulted them accordingly on appointments to the cabinet. Laurier sought the advice of English Canadian colleagues about their own provinces but not, at least not in 1896, about Quebec. As for St. Laurent, "it was basic to his outlook to respect the position of ministers as representatives of their provinces in the cabinet,"⁴ and his practices of consultation were very similar to those of Laurier. There were two or three English-speaking ministers with whom St. Laurent conferred about larger aspects of cabinet reconstruction, and even about the representation of French Canada, if he felt their views to be of value, but for the most part his English Canadian colleagues were very reticent about advising him on appointments from French Canada unless their views were specifically requested. The few English Canadians who have attempted to influence a French Canadian prime minister's choices in Quebec have been, almost invariably, themselves Quebecers.

The Distribution of Portfolios

What portfolios did French Canadian leaders seek for French Canadian representatives in the cabinet? Did they get these portfolios? Did they get the most important portfolios, judging importance by (a) the relevance of a particular portfolio to the distinctive ethnic and cultural interests of French Canadians and (b) by the respect and prestige which the possession of a particular portfolio commanded among French Canadians generally and (c) by the leverage which a particular portfolio could exert on the administration of the central policies of the Government? Was there any understanding among the national party leadership that certain portfolios should be given or should not be given to French Canadians, and, if so, what was the basis of such an understanding? Was there any understanding among the national party leadership that certain portfolios should be given or should not be given to English Canadians, and, if so, what was the basis of such an understanding?

In 1867 Cartier sought and obtained for himself the position of Minister of Militia and Defence; his two French Canadian colleagues were appointed Minister of Agriculture and Secretary of State.

In 1878 Chapleau was the only French Canadian who showed much interest in the question of what portfolios were to be given to French Canadian ministers. Speaking for Masson and himself, Chapleau asked that they be given the same three portfolios that they had held in 1873, at the time of the resignation of the first Macdonald Government—Militia and Defence, Public Works and that of Receiver General, with the possible substitution of the portfolio of Secretary of State or Inland Revenue for the post of Receiver General. The request was accepted in part. Masson was given Militia and Defence, Cartier's old portfolio, and Baby became Minister of Inland Revenue. Langevin, however, was assigned the Post Office, and the Department of Public Works was not restored to him until 1879 when it was stripped of its most important transportation responsibilities by the creation of the Department of Railways and Canals.

In 1896 Laurier, probably because of his confidence that he could speak with full authority in cabinet on all matters affecting French Canada, appears to have been less than fully concerned about the number of French Canadians who should be taken into the cabinet and about their assignments. He himself took the presidency of the Privy Council along with the prime ministership, and Tarte was made Minister of Public Works, the only other French Canadian who was given a portfolio. Geoffrion was brought in as a minister without portfolio, and Joly was appointed Controller of Inland Revenue, a post which made him a member of the ministry but not of the cabinet.⁵

The evidence, unfortunately, does not fully disclose the wishes of French Canadian leaders in 1911 in the matter of portfolios. All that is clear is a desire on the part of one group of Quebec Conservatives that the province be assigned two "good" departments plus the solicitor generalship. Their wishes, being interpreted as a request for two large patronage-dispensing departments, were, to that extent, granted. Monk became Minister of Public Works and Pelletier Postmaster General. Nantel, the third French Canadian cabinet minister, was given the Department of Inland Revenue.

Each of the several French Canadians whom Mackenzie King consulted in 1921 had recommendations to make, either about a portfolio for himself or with respect to assignments for French Canadian colleagues. Their recommendations, lumped together, proposed French Canadian ministers for the following portfolios: Justice, presidency of the Privy Council, Public Works, Marine and Fisheries, the Post Office and the office of Secretary of State. In the end, only two of these portfolios were allotted to French Canadians: Justice was given to Gouin, and Marine and Fisheries to Lapointe. The other two French Canadian ministers were appointed to departments which they had not requested: Bureau became Minister of Customs and Excise (a compound of the old Departments of Customs and Inland Revenue), and Bélard was made Minister of Soldiers' Civil Re-establishment and also put in charge of the Department of Health.

In 1935 Lapointe and Cardin were the only ministers who were much concerned—or given an opportunity to express their concern—about French Canadian portfolio assignments, and in each case the interest was directed to his own portfolio. Lapointe had a preference for External Affairs, but he received Justice, the department in which

he had previously succeeded Gouin. Cardin wanted to recover Marine and Fisheries, his old portfolio, but it was withheld from him, and he obtained Public Works. The two remaining French Canadian ministers, Michaud of New Brunswick and Fernand Rinfret, were appointed, respectively, Minister of Fisheries and Secretary of State.

In the last Mackenzie King cabinet, which St. Laurent inherited in 1948, six of the 19 members were French Canadians. Among the six of them, they held Justice, Health and Welfare, Transport, Public Works, the Post Office, and the office of Solicitor General. St. Laurent, when he became Prime Minister, took on the presidency of the Privy Council and vacated Justice, but did not appoint a French Canadian to succeed him in that post. The French Canadian incumbents of the other five portfolios were not immediately disturbed, and one of them, Paul Martin, was left in uninterrupted possession of Health and Welfare throughout the nine years of the St. Laurent administration.

During that period, however, four of the original French Canadian ministers dropped out, at intervals—as did seven English Canadian originals—and were replaced by other French Canadians. Not all the newcomers were assigned to the portfolios occupied by their predecessors. To be sure, St. Laurent appointed only French Canadians to the Post Office. When Bertrand went on the bench, he was replaced by G. E. Rinfret; when Rinfret followed the same course, he was succeeded by Côté; and on Côté's death, Hugues Lapointe was made Postmaster General until another French Canadian could be found. When, at an earlier stage, Jean resigned as Solicitor General, St. Laurent brought in Hugues Lapointe to succeed him, but he subsequently promoted Lapointe to Veterans Affairs. On Fournier's resignation as Minister of Public Works, that department was assigned to an English Canadian, and Jean Lesage, Fournier's replacement in the Government, was appointed Minister of Resources and Development, and then, when this portfolio was superseded by the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources, Lesage became its first minister. Similarly, when Chevrier resigned as Minister of Transport, the portfolio was turned over to Marler, and Pinard, Chevrier's successor in the Government, was made Secretary of State.

This résumé of the portfolios which French Canadians sought and those which they obtained during seven cabinet formations suggests certain historical tendencies in the distribution of portfolios. Some of these tendencies appear with greater clarity if the examination is extended to include portfolios which French Canadians held at later stages in the cabinets described above, and to include also portfolios which they procured in ministries other than those which have been considered in this study. It then becomes possible to see which portfolios French Canadian ministers have held most frequently since 1867, as well as those in which their occupancy has been sporadic and those in which they have had no representation at all.

From the date of the formation of the first Macdonald cabinet to 1966 there have been 19 ministries in the government of Canada. French Canadians have been Postmasters General in 15 of the 19, and in nine cases throughout the entire life of the ministry. They have been represented in the office of the Secretary of State in 12 ministries and in the Department of Public Works in 11. A French Canadian has been Solicitor General in eight ministries; has been President of the Privy Council in eight;

Minister of Marine and Fisheries, or of Marine, or of Fisheries, in seven; and Minister of Justice in six. These, then, are the portfolios which French Canadian ministers have most frequently occupied.

There are other portfolios in which French Canadian representation, after showing a definite prominence for a prolonged period, faded away and has not been fully restored. There was a French Canadian Minister of Agriculture during four of the first six ministries, but this portfolio has not been held by a French Canadian since 1895. In the set of revenue departments—Inland Revenue, Customs, Customs and Excise and that of Receiver General—there were French Canadian ministers, frequently though not invariably, from the first Macdonald Government to the first King Government; but the Department of National Revenue, which has performed all the tax-collecting functions since 1927, has never been headed by a French Canadian minister. Sir George Cartier was the first of five French Canadians who occupied the position of Minister of Militia and Defence in four of the first six ministries; since 1896, however, no French Canadian has been appointed to the main defence portfolio, though several have held lesser defence posts of cabinet rank during the present century.⁶ So long as the federal government's responsibilities for immigration were discharged by the Department of Agriculture, as they were for 25 years after Confederation, French Canadians were frequently in charge of immigration policy and administration. In the nineties, however, immigration made the first of a long series of departmental shifts—to Interior in 1892, to Immigration and Colonization in 1917, to Mines and Resources in 1936, to Citizenship and Immigration in 1950 and, most recently, to Manpower and Immigration—and only the last two of these departments has ever had a French Canadian head, and that only in the Pearson administration which has seen three of them.

There is a third group of portfolios in which French Canadian ministers have made their appearance at different times in the present century. The Department of Railways and Canals, which was carved out of Public Works in 1879, never had a French Canadian minister during the 57 years of its existence, but shortly after it was combined with Marine to form the Department of Transport in 1936, French Canadians began to appear at the head of the new department, and since then they have been appointed to this post in three of the last four ministries.⁷ Aside from their early occupancy of the Department of Agriculture, it was a long time before French Canadians were appointed to head any of the several departments having to do with the development of natural resources, and even in the present century, as noted above, none became Minister of the Interior or of Mines and Resources. In 1902, however, the consistent monopoly which ministers from the Maritime Provinces had enjoyed in the Department of Marine and Fisheries was broken, and the portfolio was assigned to a French Canadian; since that date French Canadians have frequently held this post or its derivatives, the Department of Marine and the Department of Fisheries (two of the Fisheries ministers have been French Canadians from New Brunswick). During the first Borden administration the newly established Department of Mines was headed frequently by French Canadians, but none was appointed to it subsequently, and the importance of the portfolio may be estimated from the fact that it was always held jointly with some other portfolio. French Canadians have appeared more

prominently in the new resources departments which have been set up since World War II. St. Laurent appointed one to Resources and Development, and then to its successor, Northern Affairs and National Resources, Diefenbaker appointed three French Canadians in succession to head Mines and Technical Surveys and one to Forestry. Pearson has appointed one French Canadian to Forestry and Rural Development, one to Mines and Technical Surveys and one to its successor, Energy, Mines and Resources. The same is true of the Department of External Affairs.⁸ The first two Secretaries of State for External Affairs were English Canadian ministers whose tenure lasted from 1909 to 1912; from that date until 1946 the portfolio was held by an unbroken succession of English Canadian Prime Ministers; since World War II two French Canadian ministers have been appointed to it.

Finally, there are three portfolios of long standing—all of them still in existence and one of them as old as the Dominion—which have not at any time been held by a French Canadian. They are Finance, Trade and Commerce, and Labour.⁹

What, then, is to be said about the degrees of importance attaching to the seven portfolios—the Post Office, Public Works, Marine and Fisheries, Justice, Secretary of State, President of the Privy Council, and Solicitor General which French Canadian ministers have most consistently held? It may be useful to note, in general and in passing, that several of these portfolios, like many of the others, have changed in weight and influence, from time to time, according to altered circumstances. Public Works, for example, beginning in 1879 with the creation of the Department of Railways and Canals, has suffered from intermittent attrition. The Department of Agriculture lost much of its significance once the salient agricultural problem became one of marketing rather than production. The defence portfolios, all of signal importance in time of war or rumours of war, have been much less highly prized at other times.

With regard to three criteria of importance—the relevance of a portfolio to ethnic and cultural interests, the respect and prestige that it commands, and its influence upon government policy—which the contributors to this study have been invited to bring to bear upon a judgment of the portfolios received by French Canadians, it is apparent that the first criterion has been difficult to apply. Several contributors have evaded it, and one of them has described it as “a modern notion which might have puzzled the Fathers of Confederation and their immediate successors, and with which they almost certainly would have disagreed.”¹⁰ The difficulty, it appears, arises partly from the fact that at Confederation most of the fields of state action which possessed the closest relevance to “the distinctive ethnic and cultural interests of French Canadians” were assigned, exclusively or principally, to the provinces by the terms of sections 92 and 93 of the British North America Act; and also from the related fact that the powers of the federal Parliament were deliberately and hopefully framed so as to comprehend, in Cartier’s words, “these large questions of general interest [defence, tariffs, excise, public works] in which the differences of race or religion had no place.”¹¹ It is true of course, that some of “these large questions of general interest” were found, subsequently and intermittently, to be productive of acute ethnic conflict, but when this occurred, as it did in 1885 and again in 1917 and 1944, it was usually the result of a general policy in which all ministers participated, and not solely a

consequence of the operations of a particular department of state. Of the departments which were established to administer the powers assigned to the federal Parliament, the two which appear to have had the closest continuing relevance to the distinctive ethnic and cultural interests of French Canada are Justice and the department in charge of immigration. The extent of French Canadian participation in the series of portfolios which have been vested with responsibility for immigration has been noted above. The Justice portfolio, by virtue of its connection with the dual system of law and for other reasons, has been of special interest to French Canada and may be considered now.

Justice is far and away the most important of the group of portfolios which French Canadians have most frequently held. As the chief legal adviser of the Government, the Minister of Justice conducts all litigation for or against the Crown or any federal public department. He is called upon not only to advise the departments upon the multitude of legal questions arising out of their business but also to advise the Governor General-in-Council on the exercise of important executive powers, including the giving of royal consent to legislation, the disallowance of provincial legislation, the grant of petitions of right, the prerogative of mercy, and the appointment of judges. The weight and range of these duties make the Justice portfolio one of the most responsible, as well as onerous, of cabinet offices and bring to its occupant great influence in the Government and high prestige in the country. Though the federal power of disallowance has recently fallen into desuetude, its use in the past has frequently made the minister a figure of prime political significance in the relations between the Dominion and the provinces. His powers of appointment, which place at his command an exceptionally dignified and important kind of patronage, virtually assure the Minister of Justice of great respect and prestige throughout the country, and nowhere more so than among the legal profession from which the overwhelming majority of French Canadian political leaders has been drawn.

The other legal portfolio, the office of Solicitor General, stands at the opposite end of the scale of importance. The traditional duties of the incumbent are to assist the Minister of Justice in the counsel work of his department and, though there have been exceptions, most Solicitors General have found themselves with little to do and have carried little weight inside or outside the Government. In 1966 the duties of the Solicitor General were enlarged considerably, but prior to that time the office could hardly be considered a "portfolio" at all. Its holder was never in the cabinet until 1915 and, even since that date, the office has frequently been denied cabinet rank and one Prime Minister left it vacant for 10 years.

Public Works has always been one of the big-spending departments of the federal government. Its expenditures, made up for the most part of comparatively small sums for the construction or maintenance of public buildings and other public utilities, have afforded abundant opportunity for the distribution of patronage. It was, at least until recently, the principal patronage portfolio, and it is no accident that it was often assigned to men like Tarte and James Sutherland, Pugsley and Robert Rogers who had general responsibilities for party organization.

In this respect the Post Office is a very similar portfolio. The Postmaster General, by reason of his monopoly of the privilege of collecting, sending and delivering letters within Canada, regulates the postal arrangements in every community throughout the

country. The business of the department is conducted by local postmasters and assistants, and their appointments, running into the thousands, are for the most part in the gift of the Postmaster General whose generosity has been left substantially unhampered by the Civil Service Commission. These sweeping powers of appointment, extending into every village and hamlet, and amplified by the power of the Postmaster General to enter into contracts for the conveyance of the mails, offer quite exceptional advantages to any Government which is concerned to support its supporters.

Marine and Fisheries was a department of distinct but limited regional significance. Its officers exercised a variety of powers—inspective, supervisory and regulatory—appropriate to their responsibility for the protection of shipping and improvement of navigation on seacoast and inland waters and to the measure of federal jurisdiction over seacoast and inland fisheries. Its Marine Division was of special importance to the medley of interests which employed the St. Lawrence-Great Lakes system as a channel of commerce.

The duties of the Secretary of State are a curious mixture of the ceremonial and the pedestrian. He is the medium of official communication between the federal government and the provincial governments. As the custodian of the great seal of Canada and the privy seal, he is responsible for affixing them to the appropriate official instruments and for registering all documents issued under the great seal and all other public documents requiring registration. On the prosaic side, he administers a scattering of statutes, and he is charged with all matters not specially assigned to any other minister. The only practical political significance of the portfolio derives from the fact that the government printing and stationery offices come under its control, a relationship which confers upon the Secretary of State certain powers with respect to the letting of printing contracts and the purchase of supplies for the public service.

The presidency of the Privy Council is another portfolio heavily honorific in character. The President's main duty is to preside at meetings of the cabinet and, although he may be assigned other duties by the cabinet, he has no formal departmental responsibilities. In the early years of Confederation the portfolio was held by the junior minister, and with one exception this continued to be the practice until 1883 when Macdonald took it over. Since then, 11 other Prime Ministers, including Laurier and St. Laurent, have held it, so that it became identified, over a long period of time, with the office of Prime Minister from which it is, however, distinct. As a portfolio held separately from the prime ministership, it attained its highest prestige during and immediately after World War I when it was used to signify the position of the leader of one section of the Union Government.

Was there any understanding within the leadership of the national parties that certain portfolios were to be allotted to French Canadians and certain others to English Canadians? It is not evident, from the foregoing studies, that there was deliberate discrimination against French Canadians as such or against English Canadians as such. What does emerge, however, is the development, over an extended period of time, of settled practices with regard to the allocation of certain portfolios, and it seems equally clear that such practices went largely unchallenged until quite recently.

It was recognized, from the beginning and by the leaders of both national parties, that some portfolios were more relevant to particular regional and other group interests

than they were to others. As these priorities were accepted, in one cabinet formation after another, precedents were established and expectations were built up which no Prime Minister could ignore, and which none before St. Laurent was prepared to challenge. In the result practice hardened into custom, and a number of steadily crystallizing conventions tended to narrow the range of departments for which any prospective minister was, in fact, eligible.

Marine and Fisheries, for example, was recognized to be a portfolio of special interest to the Maritime Provinces; their hold upon it, for the first 35 years after Confederation, was unbroken and has continued to be strong up to the present day. The Department of the Interior, beginning in 1888 and persisting for the remainder of its existence, was viewed as a western portfolio and assigned to western ministers; and when Interior gave way to Mines and Resources the same practice was followed. The dominant position of the western provinces over Canadian agricultural production in the twentieth century ensured that the Agriculture portfolio went to an uninterrupted succession of western ministers from 1911 to 1966. The Department of Labour, it was assumed, should go to a minister with some knowledge of the theory or practice of trade union organization in Canada, and the greater prevalence of such men among the politicians of Ontario preserved it, from 1909 to 1950, for the representatives of that province.¹² The repeated appointment of French Canadians to the office of Postmaster General, the ministry of Public Works and, in the present century, the ministry of Justice had the effect, over a considerable period, of identifying these portfolios with French Canadian interests. Similarly, the assignment, time after time, of Trade and Commerce to an Ontario minister (of the 17 ministers of Trade and Commerce, 11 have been from Ontario) gave it the appearance of being a distinctively Ontario portfolio, despite the prolonged dominance of agricultural products in Canada's foreign trade.

The Department of Finance, before Confederation and ever since, has always been regarded as a portfolio to be given to an eminent member of the Canadian business community. For a very long time there were few such French Canadians and fewer still in public life. The political leaders of French Canada, it bears repeating, have come from the professions, and especially from the legal profession, and they have not moved into the main currents of business and finance. To this general observation there are, among the French Canadian politicians who have been appointed to the federal cabinet since 1867, three outstanding exceptions: Sir George Cartier, Sir Lomer Gouin and Louis St. Laurent. All three, it is true, were lawyers, but each of them had close connections with leading elements in the business community, and each in turn, it may safely be ventured, would have been acceptable to that community had he desired to be Minister of Finance. There is not the slightest evidence that any one of them so desired. Cartier wanted and obtained Militia and Defence; Gouin's choice, also fulfilled, was the presidency of the Privy Council or Justice; and St. Laurent, once World War II was over, was only persuaded to stay on in the Government by the offer of External Affairs, the department which he then considered to be the most important and interesting of all, and an assignment which his sense of duty compelled him to accept, at least on a temporary basis. With these three exceptional public figures ruled out by their own choice, the general observation stands as true. The

socioeconomic structure of Canada discriminated against French Canadians for posts of financial leadership and, reinforced by the salient eligibility of men like Galt and Hincks, Tilley and Foster, Fielding and White, Dunning and Ilsley, preserved the ministry of Finance exclusively for English Canadians.¹³

The Finance portfolio, though it has been kept in English Canadian hands, has frequently been assigned to English-speaking Quebecers, and no attempt has been made to treat it as the property of a particular province. To be sure, a majority of Finance ministers have come from the two central provinces, but four other provinces have been represented in the portfolio, and one of the four very handsomely. Since Confederation 24 men¹⁴ have held Finance: eight from Ontario; six from Quebec, all of them English-speaking; six from Nova Scotia;¹⁵ two from New Brunswick; and one each from Alberta and Saskatchewan.

The sociological conditions which discriminated, so heavily and so persistently, against French Canadians in the awarding of the Finance portfolio, as well as those of Trade and Commerce, and Labour, have not shut them out of the entire range of departments concerned with financial and economic matters. French Canadians have occupied, at various times and not infrequently, the ministries of Agriculture, Inland Revenue, Customs and Excise, Marine and Fisheries, and the short-lived departments of Receiver General and Mines. Only two of these, Agriculture, and Marine and Fisheries, were posts of much consequence, but it is not evident, with respect to the others, that the French Canadian appointees received them with dissatisfaction, or that they aspired to other portfolios which could exert greater influence on financial and economic policy. J.-A. Chapleau, in 1888, protested to Sir John Macdonald that the province of Quebec was not getting a fair share of those economic portfolios which he described as "the four traction engines carrying the country to its future destinies" (Finance, Agriculture, Interior, and Marine and Fisheries), but Chapleau, so far as the evidence shows, appears to have been, in this respect at least, a quite exceptional complainant.¹⁶ Far more numerous, if not more striking, are the indications, in the foregoing studies, of a repeated indifference on the part of French Canadian leaders, including, in 1878, Chapleau himself, to the disposition of the principal economic and financial portfolios.

The present-day concern of French Canadians with, for example, departments having to do with natural resources is, with the exceptions of Agriculture, Mines, and Marine and Fisheries, a phenomenon of comparatively recent origin, which owes much of its force to the greatly accelerated pace of change in the province of Quebec during the past 20 years. The concern was recognized and, indeed, encouraged by St. Laurent, the first prime minister to demonstrate a real willingness to challenge traditional practices in the distribution of portfolios. Though he left the Post Office in French Canadian hands, St. Laurent transferred Justice and Public Works to English Canadians. His appointments of a New Brunswicker to Labour and of a British Columbian to Fisheries were, like Mackenzie King's appointment of an Albertan to Fisheries, breaks with the past. In addition to these innovations, St. Laurent encouraged French Canadian ministers to move into departments in which they had hitherto shown little interest and, especially, into the new portfolios responsible for resources development. Hugues Lapointe, after a brief apprenticeship in the solicitor generalship, was promoted

to Veterans Affairs, the first French Canadian to hold that portfolio; and Jean Lesage, following a stint in Resources and Development, became the first Minister of Northern Affairs and National Resources. Had the St. Laurent administration been returned to office in 1957, it is likely that Lesage would have been offered the portfolio of Finance.¹⁷

St. Laurent's principal object, in the matter of portfolio assignments, was to see that they were put in the charge of men who had the administrative competence necessary to direct the large and complex operations of a modern government. Yet, although he was far more sensitive to this qualification than he was to the representational implications of his choices, there is no doubt that one effect of his cabinet appointments was to modify traditional ethnic and provincial patterns of portfolio distribution. What is more, the resulting gains in flexibility have not been lost in the two succeeding administrations. The range of portfolios occupied by French Canadian ministers was broadened to include the Departments of Forestry, Mines and Technical Surveys, and Citizenship and Immigration; and in the most recent reorganization of the Pearson Government, on April 4, 1967, it has been further amplified in the appointment of French Canadian ministers to three new departments—Forestry and Rural Development, Manpower and Immigration, and Energy, Mines and Resources.

Ethnic considerations are, of course, only one factor, and by no means necessarily the decisive one, in the allocation of portfolios, but what has been said above on the subject of ethnic distribution prompts one or two further comments. It is true that French Canadian ministers have appeared most consistently in a few departments, notably the Post Office and Public Works, the essential political significance of which was their capacity to dispense patronage on a generous scale. It is also clear that English Canadian ministers have predominated in some portfolios, most conspicuously in Finance, and Trade and Commerce, but also in Labour, Railways and Canals, Interior, and Mines and Resources, which have been primarily concerned with national economic development. These are facts and there is no need to cavil at them. It would be quite wrong, however, to be drawn from these simple and partial truths into any invidious comparisons which might depict the traditional French Canadian politicians as men who were uniquely or solely concerned with handing out jobs and contracts; and which might present English Canadian politicians as a morally superior breed whose sights were consistently set on higher issues of national policy removed from earthly considerations of particular material and local interest. There are other facts which make any such distinction patently absurd. It is worth remembering, for example, that no portfolio has been a monopoly of French Canadians; that English Canadians have frequently sought and frequently held both the Post Office and Public Works; and that, for the greater part of Canada's existence, all federal departments of government, whether headed by English or French, Roman Catholics or Protestants, easterners or westerners, old ministers or young, were permeated by the patronage system.

Most politicians, it may be hazarded, and almost all cabinet ministers are men who want, among other things, the authority and prestige which power and office confer. And the answer to the question of which cabinet posts will best afford the desired

authority and prestige depends on a number of factors, including the needs and outlook of the people whom a minister represents and whose support, in one form or another, is necessary to his continued success, and including, as well, considerations of a more general kind, such as the nature of the economic and social structure and the character of the political system.

At Confederation and for many years afterwards, the Canadian people, a small and widely dispersed population, formed a simple and individualistic society exhibiting strong local loyalties. They were organized into a number of decentralized, mixed staple-producing and commercial economies, each with varying degrees of self-sufficiency and of vulnerability to external forces. The political system reflected the dominant features of this society. The powers of government were divided federally, the role of government was severely limited, and the party system which directed the executive and legislative branches of government was itself localized, undisciplined and unsystematic. Since there was little government, the burdens of administration and law-making were light, and the leaders of the political party in power, the cabinet, devoted most of their time and energy to the intricate task of holding together a majority in the legislature and of employing, for this purpose, the patronage at the disposal of the government. In this society, in other words, the principal role of political life was not the administration of existing law and the making of new laws, but the rewarding of those who took part in public life by the distribution of patronage. Patronage was a natural currency of public life, and the power to dispense it was what, for the most part, gave a cabinet minister the authority and prestige that he desired. "The distribution of patronage," Sir Wilfrid Laurier's biographer wrote of the Laurier administration, "was the most important single function of the government."¹⁸

The patronage which was then available for distribution consisted, in the main, of a large number of small items: minor jobs, assistance for individuals in want or in trouble, and small expenditures for roads, bridges and harbours, for post offices, customs houses and other works of local improvement. All these items—the principal components of the old-fashioned "staple" patronage—could be dispensed, widely and frequently, among those who worked for and subscribed to the party in power, and they were, in large measure, what held each party together and gained for it the support it needed. The resources of all departments of government were used for this purpose, but there were some, like Public Works and the Post Office, which had a much higher patronage potential than others and, so long as the social and political conditions described above persisted, these portfolios were prized by ministers from every part of the country regardless of ethnic affiliations. There were other departments—Fisheries, Interior and Agriculture—which not only offered opportunities for the distribution of staple patronage but also possessed the power to confer special benefits or compensation to particular regional economies, and it was only natural, therefore, that the leading spokesmen of the regions affected should have established strong claims to these portfolios. In the passage of time, however, changes in the economic and social structure gave rise to new centres of power, and their needs called into existence new forms of patronage.

Late in the nineteenth century economic expansion, developing within the limits of the National Policy, began to erect upon the older and simpler economies a new structure of transcontinental transport, manufacturing and finance, merchandising and insurance, all organized in great corporate aggregates under private ownership and control. The controllers of corporate capitalism, though they were by no means shy about seeking governmental assistance where it would be useful, were not greatly interested in the petty jobs or minor contracts which the traditional varieties of staple patronage had to offer. They sought other and grander advantages: tariff adjustments and trade treaties to protect particular industries and firms; government guarantees for corporate bond issues; subsidies and subventions for iron and steel, for railways and shipbuilding; tax concessions; and preferential access to natural resources. These forms of corporate patronage came within the purview of the Departments of Finance, and Trade and Commerce, and, to a lesser degree, Interior, and Railways and Canals, and the ministers of these departments found themselves to be just as closely and continuously engaged in what was essentially the distribution of patronage as their colleagues, the Postmaster General and the Minister of Public Works had ever been. It is not surprising that the cities of Ontario and Quebec, where business and finance came to be concentrated, should have directed their political energies to pushing their representatives forward into those portfolios which were the principal distributing points of corporate patronage. Nor need it occasion the least astonishment that French Canadians, whose leaders were rarely to be discovered among the controllers or owners of the great corporate enterprises, should have so infrequently obtained or sought access to these portfolios. The essential point, however, is that a concern for government "patronage," defined as the practice of giving support and encouragement, preferment and reward to the supporters of the political party in office, has never been a monopoly of any group or section of the Canadian population.

The Question of Prior Commitments

Did French Canadian leaders endeavour to extract commitments from the prime minister, or to reach an understanding with him, on issues of policy and legislation during the period of cabinet formation? If so, on what issues and with what success? Did English Canadian leaders endeavour to extract commitments from the prime minister, or to reach an understanding with him, on issues of policy and legislation during the period of cabinet formation? If so, on what issues and with what success?

The short answer is that such attempts have been few and that the instances in which they have been successful are still more infrequent.

It might be expected that the political leaders of a particular group or section, if their views were sharply at variance with the program or practice of the national party to which they belonged, or if they felt themselves likely to be at a serious disadvantage in defending their interests within a cabinet dominated by other groups and sections, should have endeavoured to obtain from the prime minister commitments on policy or administration in advance of their entry into the Government. And it is interesting,

therefore, that three of the instances in which such attempts are known to have been made involved leading spokesmen of the Prairies, a region whose people have frequently viewed themselves as a hard-pressed minority. In 1921 T. A. Crerar and A. B. Hudson, both of them highly suspicious of Liberal professions on economic issues of urgent importance to western Canada, and fearful of being overshadowed in an eastern-dominated Liberal cabinet, made a strenuous effort to extract from Mackenzie King large and specific commitments on policy and legislation as a condition of their entry into the Government. They obtained no more than a few modest and general concessions, and even these fell to the ground with the collapse of Liberal-Progressive negotiations. James G. Gardiner, in 1935, was slightly more successful when he sought to have the administration of grain marketing placed under the supervision of a western minister. Stuart Garson, before entering the St. Laurent cabinet in 1948, secured an undertaking of a general kind that the poorer provinces would not again be allowed to fall back into a condition of peonage.

There was, in addition to these three cases of western bargaining, an earlier case involving anxious English Canadian politicians. In 1896 Laurier found it necessary to give assurances to leading Liberals from Ontario and Quebec, specifically to Sir Oliver Mowat and R. R. Dobell, that the trade policy of his Government would not be unsympathetic to the interests of Canadian manufacturers; and Laurier's choice of Fielding over Cartwright for the Finance portfolio was, in a sense, a further undertaking that impulses towards unrestricted reciprocity or free trade would, in future, be firmly subdued.

The evidence of the seven cabinets which have been examined in this study discloses, however, only a single instance in which a French Canadian leader sought commitments of this kind during the period of cabinet formation, and even in this case, that of F. D. Monk in 1911, the facts are not clear beyond dispute.

From the isolated character of this episode, it may be reasonable to infer that French Canadian leaders have not normally felt themselves to be at a serious disadvantage in dealing with the English Canadian leaders of the national party to which they belonged—or at least not when that party was in office. Certainly, on most of the great economic issues—tariffs and transportation, Dominion-provincial financial relations, social welfare programs—French Canadians from Quebec and English Canadians from Ontario have usually formed a large majority bloc, an alignment of the central provinces which has sometimes reduced the spokesmen of the Maritimes and the West to the position of disappointed and frustrated minorities. The two principal issues on which French Canadians faced a closing of English Canadian ranks against them within one or both of the national parties were the naval defence question, involving the larger problem of Canada's military responsibilities to Great Britain, and the question of federal responsibility for the protection of the educational rights of minorities in the provinces. And it was on these two issues that Monk endeavoured, it would appear, to reach an understanding with Borden during the formation of the 1911 cabinet. Unfortunately, however, it is not possible to be sure of what precisely happened. Monk, according to several of his Nationalist associates, obtained from Borden undertakings on both questions; Borden publicly denied that he had given any such undertakings.

Without trying to settle that dispute, it may be observed in general that the circumstances of cabinet formation are not propitious for efforts to secure from a prime minister commitments on Government policy or future legislation. Normally, the prime minister-elect comes to the business of cabinet-making fresh from a solid victory at the polls with the assurance of a stable parliamentary majority and strong popular support. The door to power has opened before him; the prime ministership is in his grasp. He has in his gift the highest executive offices in the state, and although he is limited, by custom and convention, in his distribution of them, his problem is not usually one of persuading men to accept cabinet appointments but of choosing among the aspirants. "Many are called, but few are chosen." At no time does the pre-eminence of the prime minister over his colleagues appear with sharper clarity. His colleagues, the other and lesser leaders of the party, though also fortified by electoral success, are still to be admitted to the charmed circle of those who govern, and the key to their hopes is in the hands of the prime minister-elect. Desiring portfolios for themselves or their friends, they await, with varying degrees of confidence and anxiety, the all-important summons to Ottawa. When it comes, few of them are prepared, at this stage of exquisite expectation, to raise issues or to exact terms which might diminish their chances of appointment. This applies, of course, with special force to the weaker brethren among the party leadership—those whose services may be the more readily dispensed with and who are not in a position to make demands of any kind. The more powerful ones, though much less fearful of exclusion, are usually disposed, by their greater strength and self-confidence, to believe that their influence on cabinet deliberations will be sufficient to prevent major decisions from being taken which are seriously to their detriment. Amidst all the lobbying and negotiation, the inevitable pushing and pulling, which attend the formation of a government, close discussions of future policy and legislation seldom arise.

The French Canadian Share of the Cabinet

Did any French Canadian leader propose that the cabinet be composed of equal numbers of English Canadians and French Canadians? Did French Canadian leaders press for an increase of French Canadian representation in the cabinet above the number in the previous administration? Did French Canadian leaders ask that any specific proportion of cabinet members be drawn from Quebec or from French Canada as a whole? Did French Canadian leaders endeavour to enlarge or to reduce the representation of the English-speaking minority of Quebec in the cabinet? Did English Canadian leaders endeavour to enlarge or to reduce the number of French Canadian representatives in the cabinet?

None of the French Canadian leaders whose participation in cabinet formation has been discussed in this study proposed that the cabinet be composed of equal numbers of English Canadians and French Canadians. Dualism in the composition of the cabinet, like the dual premiership and the other conventions of political dualism which had been practised in the province of Canada, was ended at Confederation and replaced by a more complicated and a more subtle system of representation. The

cabinet ministers in the government of the Dominion of Canada "were to represent regions in their sections, or provinces, and population in its actual varieties—political, sectarian and economic interest—at least roughly and as far as possible."¹⁹

The Canadian delegates to the Westminster Conference reached agreement not only on the size of the first Dominion cabinet but also on the number of places to be allotted to each province. Nova Scotia was to have two, New Brunswick two, Quebec four, and Ontario five. Each section would thus have four ministers, and the most populous section would also receive the prime ministership.

Cartier insisted that three of the four Quebec ministers must be French Canadians. It was a moderate—indeed, in the circumstances, an irresistible—demand; there had always been four French Canadian ministers in the cabinets of the province of Canada since 1848. It was accepted, and it was agreed, as well, that the fourth Quebec minister would represent the English-speaking population of the province. In the first Dominion Government French Canadians got three places in a cabinet of 13, 23 per cent of the cabinet membership. The French-speaking elements in Ontario and the Maritimes received no separate representation in the cabinet. The French-speaking population of all the provinces then formed 30.7 per cent of the total population of Canada.

These proportions, including the three-to-one French-English ratio for Quebec were maintained in succeeding administrations for a long time. The Dominion cabinet grew very slowly during the first three decades after Confederation. It was usually not more than 14 until 1894, and, indeed, the size and composition were altered very little until the necessity of giving representation to the West finally compelled an increase. Even with a western minister, Abbott and Thompson succeeded in holding their cabinets to 14, though Thompson managed it only by leaving three ministers (the Solicitor General and the Controllers of Customs and Inland Revenue) out of the cabinet. Bowell raised the number to 15 and then to 16; and Tupper, by appointing two ministers from the West and by increasing the French Canadian representation for the first time to four, brought the total to 17.

From Confederation until Tupper became Prime Minister the French Canadians never had more than their original three ministers in the cabinet. Their maximum proportion of the total was 30 per cent, and they held it for only seven months in 1868-69. They never had more than 25 per cent of the total after May 20, 1873, and for all but three of the first 29 years of federation their proportion was below 25 per cent, usually somewhere between 21 and 23 per cent. Even Tupper's appointment of four French Canadian ministers left their share of his 17-man cabinet at 23 per cent. Over the same period the French-speaking proportion of the total population of Canada hovered in the neighbourhood of 30 per cent: it was 30.7 in 1867; 31.4 in 1871; and 30 in 1881, the last nineteenth century year for which the appropriate census figures are available.²⁰

This prolonged under-representation of French Canadians in the cabinet in relation to their share of the population of the country does not appear, so far as the evidence shows, to have provoked dissatisfaction or at any rate, protest among the leaders of French Canada during that period. Chapleau's solitary outburst, to Macdonald in 1888, was directed not at the number of places which French Canadians received in the

cabinet but at the kind of portfolios which they were regularly assigned. And Laurier, when he took office, made no attempt significantly to alter the numbers or change the proportions.

In the first six months of the Laurier administration, there were three French Canadian ministers in a cabinet of 14, a proportion amounting to 21 per cent, though only two of them, including Laurier, held portfolios. Within a year another French Canadian and another English Canadian were added to the cabinet, giving the French Canadians four out of 16 and bringing their share up to 25 per cent. About two years later one of the French Canadians dropped out, and from then until 1911 there were never more than three French Canadians in a cabinet which numbered 15 or 16. The French Canadian share of the Laurier cabinet thus varied from 14 per cent (for about six months) to 25 per cent (for a little more than two years) and was usually about 20 per cent. French-speaking people formed 29.6 per cent of the population of Canada in 1901, and 29.1 per cent in 1911.

During the Borden administrations the French Canadian share of the cabinet—like the Maritime share—declined both relatively and absolutely. For all but four months of Borden's first Government there were three French Canadians in the cabinet, but the sharp rise in the number of western ministers, first to four and then to five (the gain of two places by Ontario offset the loss of two by the Maritimes), brought the total cabinet membership up to 18 and then to 19, thereby reducing the French Canadian share to 16.6 per cent and then to 15.7 per cent. In June 1917 one of the three French Canadians departed, and in April 1918, six months after the formation of Union Government, the number fell to one and remained at that figure for the remainder of the life of the Government. For nearly the whole of the time from October 1917 to July 1920 French Canadians had one minister in a cabinet of 22, giving them a proportion of 4.6 per cent of the total. Meighen's first Government, as it appeared after the reconstruction which took place on September 21, 1921, gave French Canadians three places in a cabinet of 21, plus the solicitor general outside the cabinet. French Canadian representation in the cabinet thus stood at 14 per cent at a time when their share of the population of Canada amounted to 28.4 per cent.

French Canadian representation in the cabinet rose sharply in the Mackenzie King administrations. In 1921 French Canadian members of Parliament formed for the first time a majority of the governing party, and their leaders were in a quite exceptional position to press for a larger quota of ministers. Lapointe began by asking that it be kept at least as high as it had been in the Meighen cabinet—namely, three full ministers plus the solicitor general—but as cabinet-making negotiations proceeded he raised his sights to five French and one English for the province of Quebec; and Gouin pressed for four French and two English. In the end, five French Canadians were appointed to the first King cabinet out of a total of 19 ministers, a proportion amounting to 26 per cent. When King formed his second Government in 1926, he added a French-speaking Canadian from New Brunswick, for a quota of six French ministers in a cabinet of 18, giving them precisely $33\frac{1}{3}$ per cent—their highest proportion since Confederation up to that time, and exceeding the French share of the population of Canada which in 1931 stood at 28.8 per cent. In the Bennett cabinet, the number of French Canadian ministers fell back to the original figure of three, all from the province of Quebec, but the return of

Mackenzie King to office in 1935 signalled a restoration of his earlier practices of cabinet composition. In the King ministry of 1935 there were five French Canadians (four from Quebec and one from New Brunswick) in a smaller cabinet of 16. The French Canadian share of the cabinet was thus 31 per cent, and once again this was slightly greater than their share of the population of Canada which amounted to 28.8 per cent in 1931 and 30 per cent in 1941. These proportions remained substantially unchanged throughout the final King administration, and when Mackenzie King retired in 1948 his cabinet was composed of 19 ministers, six of whom were French Canadians (four from Quebec and two from Ontario), for a proportion of 31.5 per cent.

St. Laurent, whose idea of a proper balance between English and French in the cabinet was "a proportion corresponding to the numerical size of the two groups, and an equal opportunity for members of either group to serve Canada,"²¹ allowed the French share to fall slightly. At the time of his resignation in 1957, St. Laurent's cabinet was made up of 20 ministers, five of them French Canadians (three from Quebec and two from Ontario). The French share was thus 25 per cent but Hugues Lapointe was then carrying two portfolios pending the choice of a sixth French Canadian, and, if a suitable one had been found before the 1957 election, his appointment would have raised the French quota to six out of 21, for a proportion of 28.5 per cent—a percentage slightly lower than the French share of the population of Canada which was 30.7 per cent in 1951.

The Diefenbaker government started out in June 1957 with one French Canadian minister in a cabinet of 17. By the end of 1957 French Canadian representation rose to two in a cabinet of 22, or 9 per cent. In 1958 a third and then a fourth French Canadian were added, and from that time until August 1959 the proportion was four (all from Quebec) out of 22 or 24, thus varying from 18 to 17 per cent. In 1959 a fifth French Canadian appeared, and henceforth until the end of the ministry the number was normally four or five out of a cabinet which fluctuated between 21 and 24, thus yielding a percentage of 19 to 21. At the very last, one of the French Canadians was from Alberta. The French Canadian share of the population of Canada was 30.7 per cent in 1951 and 30.2 per cent in 1961.

The Pearson administration has raised the French Canadian position in the cabinet, in numbers, in percentages and in geographical distribution, to an all-time peak. When Pearson took office in 1963, he appointed 10 French Canadians to a cabinet of 26 ministers, giving them 38 per cent of the cabinet at a time when they formed 30.2 per cent of the population of Canada. Of the 10 French Canadian ministers, there were six from Quebec, two from Ontario,²² one from New Brunswick and one from Manitoba. Since then the number of French Canadian ministers has remained the same, but their share of the cabinet has fallen by one percentage point, and there has been a slight alteration in their geographical distribution. In the most recent cabinet reorganization, that of April 4, 1967, 10 of the 27 cabinet members, that is 37 per cent, are French Canadians. Of the 10, seven are from Quebec, one from Ontario, one from New Brunswick, and one from Manitoba.

With respect to the last two questions posed in this section, French Canadian leaders have been largely indifferent to the representation of the English-speaking population of Quebec in the cabinet; the difference of opinion on this subject between

Lapointe and Gouin in 1921, as to whether it should be one or two, is the only evidence of French Canadian interest. And it is equally clear that, with very rare exceptions, the only English Canadians who have made representations on the size or composition of the French Canadian quota of ministers have themselves been Quebecers.

Inflexibility as an Obstacle to Cabinet Appointment

With respect to those French Canadians who were taken into the cabinet, were the choices influenced by a belief that they would be more co-operative, on matters of policy, with the English Canadian members of the cabinet than would other French Canadian leaders who were left out? Turning the question around, were some French Canadian leaders excluded from the cabinet because they were believed to be too inflexible on important policies or because they were opposed by other and more powerful French Canadian leaders, or for other reasons? Did similar considerations apply with equal force to the inclusion or exclusion of English Canadian leaders?

Neither inflexibility on matters of public policy nor intransigence in defence of group interests have been dominant characteristics of federal political leadership in Canada. Most federal politicians, whether French or English—or at any rate, most of those who have belonged to one or other of the two political parties which alone have had the opportunity to form a government—have been men of the centre, more or less vigorous spokesmen for their particular region or group, but accustomed to the discipline of party loyalty and intra-party accommodation, and disposed to compromise and conciliation.

Among the leading French Canadians in federal politics the three outstanding exceptions to this generalization were F. D. Monk and his two principal Nationalist associates, Henri Bourassa and Armand Lavergne. Bourassa, by his own testimony, had neither expectation nor desire for a place in the Borden cabinet of 1911 ("... Mr. Borden, said I, cannot decently offer me a portfolio; and I cannot, for any consideration, enter a Conservative cabinet").²³ Lavergne, also according to his own testimony and that of Bourassa, was offered a portfolio but declined.²⁴ And Monk, who was accepted by Borden as the *chef conservateur* in Quebec, was one of the first to receive an invitation to join the Government. A year later, after he had failed to secure specific concessions in the naval policy of the Government of which he was a member, he was the first minister to resign.

Among English Canadian politicians, as well, the instances of exclusion from the cabinet because of inflexibility or political unorthodoxy, real or apprehended, have been rare. This was what barred the door of the Finance Department to Cartwright in 1896 and kept Joseph Martin out of the cabinet altogether; and it was undoubtedly a handicap to the aspirations of Mitchell and McMaster in 1921, and of Thorson and Glen in 1935. Aside from these few cases, however, it does not appear to have been a major obstacle to cabinet appointment.

Chapter 1

1. John Boyd, *Sir George Etienne Cartier, Bart.* (Toronto, 1914), 282. Isabel Skelton, *The Life of Thomas D'Arcy McGee* (Gardenvale, Quebec, 1925), 529. Sir Joseph Pope, *Memoirs of the Right Honourable Sir John Alexander Macdonald, G.C.B., First Prime Minister of the Dominion of Canada* (rev. ed.; Toronto, 1930), 349-50.
2. Sir Joseph Pope, *The Correspondence of Sir John Macdonald* (Toronto, 1921), 45-6. Letter from Governor General Viscount Monck to Macdonald, May 24, 1867. D. G. Creighton, *The Road to Confederation* (Toronto, 1964), 432.
3. For the exact figures see A. Shortt and A. G. Doughty (eds.), *Canada and Its Provinces* (Edinburgh, 1915-17), III, 204; IV, 587 and IX, 102. Also see Dominion Bureau of Statistics, *Census of Canada, 1870-71* (Ottawa, 1878), V, 10-12, and D.B.S., *Seventh Census of Canada, 1931* (Ottawa, 1936), I.
4. O. D. Skelton, *Life and Times of Sir A. T. Galt* (Toronto, 1920), 420. Letter to his wife upon refusing C.B.
5. Boyd, *Cartier*, 283-6.
6. The delegates did not leave London at the same time. Tupper returned to Halifax in March, Macdonald did not return till early in May. See Creighton, *The Road to Confederation*, 430-1.
7. Pope, *Memoirs of Macdonald*, 349.
8. W. P. M. Kennedy, *Documents of the Canadian Constitution, 1759-1915* (Toronto, 1918), 611. J. C. Dent, *The Last Forty Years* (Toronto, 1881), II, 468-9.
9. D. G. Creighton, *John A. Macdonald: The Young Politician* (Toronto, 1956), 471.
10. The Privy Council was sworn in on July 1, 1867, with the exception of Kenny, who was sworn in on July 4.
11. See Pope, *Memoirs of Macdonald*, 348; also see Sir Charles Tupper, *Recollections of Sixty Years* (Toronto, 1914), 52.
12. Creighton, *The Young Politician*, 472.
13. For the election results of 1863, see Paul G. Cornell, *The Alignment of Political Groups in Canada 1841-1867* (Toronto, 1962). Figure VI gives the members of each Parliament, 1841-1867. The returns for the election of 1863 were: Tory 20, Reformer 3, Grit 41, Unknown 1.
14. *Ibid.*, 60. Cornell states the effect on party lines caused by Brown's withdrawal from the coalition.
15. Creighton, *The Young Politician*, 471.

16. Pope, *Memoirs of Macdonald*, 349. Also see W. L. Morton, "Formation of the First Federal Cabinet," *Canadian Historical Review*, (hereafter *C.H.R.*), XXXVI (1955), 115-6. Point four of McDougall's letter to Macdonald states his request for three Liberals, which Macdonald had agreed to.

17. See *Canadian Almanac, 1866-1870* (Toronto, 1870).

18. Tupper, *Recollections*, 53.

19. See Creighton, *The Young Politician*, 473; and Boyd, *Cartier*, 282.

20. Cornell, *Alignment of Political Groups*, 56. He does not give the figures for 1848, but says that the cabinet of 1864 followed the same lines as its predecessor, which had four French Canadians.

21. A.-A. Dorion, *La Confédération couronnement de dix années de mauvaise administration* (Montreal, 1867).

22. Pope, *Correspondence of Macdonald*, 50-2. Letter from Macdonald to the Hon. John Rose, Oct. 8, 1867. Also see Public Archives of Canada, Macdonald Papers, 26 A 1 (b), 258.

23. Walter Ullman, "The Quebec Bishops and Confederation," *C.H.R.*, XLIV (1963), 213-34.

24. See Pope, *Correspondence of Macdonald*, 42-3. Letter from McGee to Macdonald, April 9, 1867.

25. Skelton, *Life of McGee*, 534. "He was to have been appointed Commissioner of Patents, with a salary of \$3,200 a year."

26. For party affiliation see Dent, *The Last Forty Years*, 471; W. L. Morton, "The Formation of the First Federal Cabinet," *C.H.R.*, XXXVI (1955), 118.

27. In all, five cabinet ministers were appointed to the Senate. Of these, four were original appointees: A. J. Fergusson-Blair and Alexander Campbell from Ontario, Edward Kenny from Nova Scotia and Peter Mitchell from New Brunswick. To these was added J.-C. Chapais, following his defeat in the election of 1867.

28. Pope, *Correspondence of Macdonald*, 102-5. Letter from Sir John Macdonald to Hon. John Rose, Nov. 16, 1869. Macdonald expresses the view that Aikins "will come in unconditionally under Hincks." Hincks became Minister of Finance on Oct. 9, 1869. Both men were from Ontario.

29. British North America Act, 1867, 30-1 Vic., c.3, s.22(3).

30. B.N.A. Act fixed representation in the House of Commons assured to Quebec, s.51(1); fixed representation in the Senate assured to Quebec, s.22(3).

31. *Census of Canada, 1870-71*, 18, 20. The French population of Quebec in 1861 is given as 847,615. For 1871, it was 929,817. It is to be noted that representation in the cabinet was not given on the basis of population only. Region and interest (including religious persuasion), were equally, and sometimes more important. The test by population is approximate at best, and was superseded by the other factors in the Maritime Provinces.

32. Boyd, *Cartier*, 285.

33. *Census of Canada, 1870-71*, 20. The figure of 260,000 includes the Irish population of Quebec, given as 123,478.

34. Archives provinciales du Québec, Collection Chapais, Langevin à Mme. Langevin et Mgr. Jean Langevin, novembre 1866, *passim*.

Chapter II

1. Public Archives of Canada (hereafter P.A.C.), Macdonald Papers, 524, Macdonald to Graham, Nov. 6, 1878.

2. *Mail* (Toronto), June 11, 1877.

3. B. Fraser, "The Political Career of Sir Hector Louis Langevin," *Canadian Historical Review*, XL11 (1961), 93-132.

4. D. G. Creighton, *John A. Macdonald: The Old Chieftain* (Toronto, 1955), 154.

5. P.A.C., Macdonald Papers, 276, Tilley to Macdonald, July 26, 1878.

6. *Ibid.*, 517, Nov. 1, 1870.

7. Sir Joseph Pope, *The Correspondence of Sir John Macdonald* (Toronto, 1921), 245.

8. P.A.C., Macdonald Papers, 79, Dufferin to Macdonald, Oct. 5, 7, 1878.
9. *Ibid.*, 255, J. C. Pope to Macdonald, Sept. 23, 1878.
10. *Ibid.*, 39, Ryan to Macdonald, Sept. 20, 1878.
11. *Ibid.*, Merrick to Macdonald, Sept. 20, 1878.
12. *Ibid.*, Campbell to Macdonald, Oct. 5, 1878.
13. *Ibid.*, Schultz to Macdonald, Sept. 21, 1878.
14. *Ibid.*, Hayes to Macdonald, Sept. 27, 1878; Armour to Macdonald, Sept. 30, 1878; Woods to Macdonald, Sept. 21, 1878; Griffith to Macdonald, Sept. 24, 1878; Merrick to Macdonald, Sept. 20, 1878; Wright to Macdonald, Oct. 1, 1878.
15. *Ibid.*, Chapleau to Macdonald, Sept. 19, 1878.
16. Archives provinciales du Québec, Collection Chapais, Chapleau à Langevin, 3 octobre 1878.
17. P.A.C., Macdonald Papers, 39, Chapleau to Macdonald, Sept. 19, 1878.
18. *Ibid.*, Desjardins to Macdonald, Oct. 1, 1878.
19. Archives provinciales du Québec, Collection Chapais, Chapleau à Langevin, 3 octobre 1878.
- (Original French text: après le résultat des deux dernières élections, nous avons droit à cela).
20. *Ibid.* (Original French text: De fait, tous comprennent que le Département des Travaux Publics nous échappe si on ne se range pas tous auprès de vous.)
21. P.A.C., Macdonald Papers, 39, Ross to Macdonald, Sept. 21, 1878; Tourangeau to Macdonald, Sept. 23, 1878; Robin to Macdonald, Sept. 21, 1878.
22. *Ibid.*, Mousseau to Macdonald, Oct. 12, 1878.
23. *Ibid.*
24. *Ibid.*, Chapleau to Macdonald, Sept. 19, 1878.
25. These letters are all in Macdonald Papers, 39.
26. *Ibid.*, 39, Langevin to Macdonald, Sept. 18, 1878.
27. Creighton, *The Old Chieftain*, 233.
28. P.A.C., Macdonald Papers, 229, Masson to Macdonald, June 6, 1878.
29. *Ibid.*, 39, Desjardins to Macdonald, Oct. 1, 1878.
30. *Ibid.*, Chapleau to Macdonald, Sept. 19, 1878.
31. *Ibid.*, Desjardins to Macdonald, Oct. 1, 1878.
32. *Gazette* (Montreal), Oct. 9, 1878.
33. *Ibid.*, Oct. 10, 1878.
34. P.A.C., Tupper Papers, 4, Macdonald to Tupper, Oct. 9, 1878.
35. P.A.C., St. Aldwyn Papers, 92, Dufferin to Hicks Beach, Oct. 12, 1878.
36. P.A.C., Tupper Papers, 4, Macdonald to Tupper, Oct. 9, 1878.
37. *Ibid.*
38. *Ibid.*
39. *Ibid.*
40. *Ibid.*, 524, Macdonald to Wilmot, Oct. 23, 1878.
41. *Globe* (Toronto), Oct. 12, 1878.
42. *Ibid.*
43. *La Minerve* (Montreal), 16 octobre 1878.
44. *Ibid.*, 16 octobre 1878; *Globe* (Toronto), Oct. 16, 1878.
45. *Gazette* (Montreal), Oct. 18, 1878; *Globe* (Toronto), Oct. 18, 1878.
46. *La Minerve* (Montreal), 18 octobre 1878.
47. *Gazette* (Montreal), Oct. 18, 1878.
48. P.A.C., Macdonald Papers, 39, two letters opposing Campbell's appointment.
49. *Globe* (Toronto), Oct. 18, 1878.
50. *Gazette* (Montreal), Oct. 18, 1878.
51. *La Minerve* (Montreal), 19 octobre 1878.
52. *Gazette* (Montreal), Oct. 19, 1878.
53. *Ibid.*
54. *Ibid.*, Oct 21, 1878.
55. *Ibid.*

56. *La Minerve* (Montreal), 21 octobre 1878. (Original French text: pour finir la tâche commencée à Québec et renverser le gouvernement Joly.)
57. P.A.C., Macdonald Papers, 204, Chapleau to Macdonald, June, 5, 12, 16, 1878.
58. *Ibid.*, 39, Tarte to Houde, Oct. 17, 1878. (Original French text: Chapleau nous ferait du mal à Québec en nous laissant.)
59. Archives provinciales du Québec, Collection Chapais, Chapleau à Langevin, 3 octobre 1878.
60. P.A.C., Macdonald Papers, 204, Chapleau to Macdonald, Oct. 31, 1880.
61. *Ibid.*, 188, Baby to Macdonald, Oct. 22, 1878.
62. *Ibid.*, 195, Campbell to Macdonald, Oct. 23, 1878.
63. *Ibid.*, 524, Macdonald to Wilmot, Oct. 23, 1878.
64. *Gazette* (Montreal), Oct. 21, 1878.
65. Province of Canada, *Parliamentary Debates on the Subject of Confederation* (Quebec, 1865), 61.
66. P.A.C., Macdonald Papers, 276, Tilley to Macdonald, July 26, 1878.

Chapter III

1. Public Archives of Canada (hereafter P.A.C.), Laurier Papers, Laurier to Ewart, April 20, 1896.
2. *Ibid.*, Ewart to Laurier, April 22, 1896.
3. Public Archives of Ontario, Blake Papers, Mowat to Blake, June 25, 1896.
4. P.A.C., Laurier Papers, Willison to Laurier, June 25, 1896.
5. *Ibid.*, Scott to Laurier, June 30, 1896.
6. University of Toronto Library, John Charlton's Diary, August 27, 1896.
7. P.A.C., Laurier Papers, Fitzpatrick to Laurier, May 28, 1896.
8. *Ibid.*, Laurier to Dobell, June 30, 1896.
9. *Ibid.*, Fitzpatrick to Laurier, May 27, 1896.
10. *Ibid.*, Fitzpatrick to Laurier, Feb. 28, 1897.
11. J. T. Saywell (ed.), *The Canadian Journal of Lady Aberdeen* (Toronto, 1960), 315 (Jan. 29, 1896).
12. P.A.C., Laurier Papers, Fréchette to Laurier, June 29, 1896.
13. *La Presse* (Montreal), 21 septembre 1898.
14. *Le Temps* (Ottawa), cited in *La Presse*, 16 juillet 1896.
15. *La Patrie* (Montreal), 14 juillet 1896.
16. *Le Temps* (Ottawa), cited in *La Presse*, 16 juillet 1896. (Original French text: M. Laurier règnera mais ne gouvernera point. . . la plus profonde humiliation nationale qui eût pu être infligée à la race française.)
17. *Ibid.*, 18 juillet 1896. (Original French text: Nous formons dans le pays une minorité dont les traits ont été assez méconnus pour qu'il ne soit pas permis de sacrifier la moindre parcelle de notre influence. . . Nous aurons l'honneur d'avoir un premier ministre français, mais c'est un honneur vide qui va nous coûter trop cher.)
18. *La Minerve* (Montreal), 14 juillet 1896. (Original French text: En parcourant cette liste, on constate tout de suite—et avec regret—que M. Laurier a commencé son règne en sacrifiant la province de Québec pour se faire pardonner d'être catholique et canadien-français. La province de Québec ne reçoit que deux ministères importants, l'agriculture qui est confiée à M. Fisher, anglais et protestant, et les travaux publics, donnés à M. Tarte—un triste représentant de notre race. M. Laurier ne prend que la présidence du Conseil. Quant à M. Joly, un protestant, et M. Fitzpatrick, un irlandais catholique, ils ne sont mis que dans des postes secondaires, sous la dépendance de leurs collègues. M. Joly relève de sir Richard Cartwright et M. Fitzpatrick est soumis à sir Oliver Mowat. Ils sont ce que les libéraux nommaient, avec toute l'ironie possible, des apprentis ministres. Et dans tout le ministère, on ne trouve que quatre [*sic*: cinq] catholiques. Jamais la représentation de nos coréligionnaires n'a été aussi faible dans le gouvernement fédéral. . . Malgré cela, il a pitoyablement échoué. Pourquoi? En vertu du préjugé qu'un Canadien-français ne peut pas faire un bon ministre des chemins de fer, tout comme on croyait à Québec que seul un Anglais pouvait être trésorier, et au conseil de ville, que les Canadiens-français n'avaient pas le droit de préendre [*sic*] à la présidence du comité des finances.)

19. *Ibid.*, 15 juillet 1896. (Original French text: A la porte les Canadiens! Tout le monde en parle, conservateurs comme libéraux. Sur la rue, dans les bureaux, dans les clubs, personne ne fait mystère de l'humiliation sanglante qui nous est infligée. . . . Il a sacrifié ses compatriotes, il a ignoré le district de Montréal tout entier. Sur quatorze ministres, il ne nous accorde que deux Canadiens-français, lui-même qu'il ne pouvait raisonnablement exclure, et l'honorable M. Tarte. . . . Est-ce faiblesse, est-ce lâcheté, est-ce trahison, nous ne savons; mais la province de Québec se trouve profondément humiliée et rabaisée. C'est le premier acte ministériel de M. Laurier, et ce début est une capitulation honteuse, presque un déshonneur national.)

20. *Ibid.*, 17 juillet 1896. (Original French text: Est-ce par trahison? M. Laurier, nous le croyons maintenant, n'est pas un Machiavel. Est-ce par un sentiment anti-national, c'est-à-dire anti-Canadien-français? Sans être épris outre mesure de sa nation, M. Laurier ne fera rien de propos délibéré, nous disent ses amis, pour simplement et uniquement l'humilier et l'ignorer.)

21. *Morning Chronicle* (Quebec), cited in *La Presse*, 17 juillet 1896.

22. *La Presse* (Montreal), 15 juillet 1896. (Original French text: Hélas! ce n'est probablement pas la dernière capitulation que nous aurons à enregistrer : la peur de cri de «French domination», la nécessité de donner l'exemple [*sic*] du désintéressement pour maintenir la concorde dans le cabinet, exigeront bien d'autres sacrifices.)

23. *Le Monde*, cited in *La Presse*, 15 juillet 1896. (Original French text: M. Laurier a tenu sa promesse: il a oublié qu'il est Canadien-français et catholique. . . . C'est bien ce que nous avions prévu. Quatre catholiques seulement dans tout le ministère. Les Canadiens-français relégués à l'arrière-plan; voilà tout ce que les nôtres ont gagné à voter pour un emballement tout chauvin, pour un des leurs.)

Chapter IV

1. Public Archives of Canada (hereafter P.A.C.), Borden Papers, OC 47, Van Horne to Borden, Sept. 24, 1911.

2. *Ibid.*, W. B. Nantel to Borden, Nov. 28, 1911.

3. Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, 1911-12, I, 233.

4. Heath N. Macquarrie. "The Formation of Borden's First Cabinet," *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, XXIII (1957), 97, n. 22.

5. Quoted by Rodolphe Lemieux in House of Commons, *Debates*, 1911-12, I, 257. Lemieux's speech is an admirable example of the parliamentary debating art of convicting one's opponents out of their own mouths.

6. Robert Rumilly, *Henri Bourassa: la vie publique d'un grand Canadien* (Montreal, 1953), 337-8.

7. *Ibid.*, 385.

8. *Ibid.*, 415. (Original French text: . . . chez lui quatre chefs: Herbert B. Ames, très impérialiste; C. J. Doherty, moins impérialiste; F.-D. Monk, un peu nationaliste; et Bourassa, nationaliste intégral. Ainsi se conclut une entente tacite, en vertu de laquelle Borden laissera virtuellement la province de Québec entre les mains de Monk; et Monk lui-même subit l'influence de Bourassa.)

9. Macquarrie, "The Formation of Borden's First Cabinet," 97.

10. Rumilly, *Henri Bourassa*, 424. (Original French text: . . . considéré comme le plus impérialiste des Canadiens-français.)

11. P.A.C., Borden Papers, RLB 2993 (6), B. E. Drummond to Borden, Sept. 29, 1911, private.

12. *Gazette* (Montreal), Oct. 5, 1911.

13. Oct. 6, 1911. Quoted in Macquarrie, "The Formation of Borden's First Cabinet," 97.

14. P.A.C., Borden Papers, RLB 2993 (7), Sharpe to Borden, Oct. 2, 1911, private.

15. *Ibid.*, Willison to Borden, Oct. 5, 1911.

16. *Ibid.*, OC 47, Grey to Borden, Oct. 2, 1911.

17. *Ibid.*, RLB 2993 (7), Flemming to Borden, Oct. 3, 1911.

18. *Ibid.*, OC 103g, Sifton to Borden, Sept. 30, 1911.

19. *Ibid.*, OC A 207, Cahan to Borden, Oct. 1, 1911, confidential.

20. Macquarrie, "The Formation of Borden's First Cabinet," 101.

21. P.A.C., Borden Papers, OC 47, Price to Borden, Oct. 2, 1911, and accompanying memorandum.
22. *Ibid.*, Van Horne to Borden, Sept. 14, 1911.
23. *Ibid.*, RLB 2993 (5), Léonard to Borden, Sept. 25, 1911.
24. P.A.C., Monk Papers, Borden to Monk, telegram, Sept. 27, 1911; Borden Papers, OC 47, Monk to Borden, telegram, Sept. 27, 1911.
25. In the spring of 1913 a series of fourteen articles by Bourassa was published in *Le Devoir* under the general title "Nationalism and the Parties." These quotations are from the twelfth article, "The Formation of the Cabinet: Borden Sold to the Nationalists," and are taken from a translation of the entire series in the Borden Papers, OC 37, as are other passages quoted subsequently in this paper.
26. Rumilly, *Henri Bourassa*, 433. (Original French text: Borden fait appeler Monk, qui choisira les ministres représentant la province de Québec.)
27. Bourassa, "Formation of the Cabinet."
28. House of Commons, *Debates*, 1911-12, I, 526.
29. *Ibid.*, 546.
30. Bourassa, "Formation of the Cabinet."
31. Macquarrie, "The Formation of Borden's First Cabinet," 98.
32. Bourassa probably meant solicitor general, as the minister of Justice is also attorney general.
33. Bourassa, "Formation of the Cabinet."
34. P.A.C., Borden Papers, RLB 2993 (7) and (8).
35. *Ibid.*, RLB 2993 (7), David Watson to Borden, telegram, Oct. 4, 1911.
36. *Ibid.*, OC 47, Price to Borden, telegram, n.d.
37. Bourassa, "Formation of the Cabinet."
38. House of Commons, *Debates*, 1912-13, I, 582.
39. *Ibid.*
40. Macquarrie, "The Formation of Borden's First Cabinet," 98.
41. *Gazette* (Montreal), Oct. 9, 1911.
42. *Montreal Star*, Oct. 10, 1911.
43. Presumably Monk meant D. O. Lespérance, who had defeated Hon. H.-S. Béland in Montmagny. A. A. Mondou was the member for Yamaska.
44. P.A.C., Borden Papers, OC 47, Monk to Borden, "Saturday 1 p.m."
45. The office of solicitor general was not then of cabinet rank.
46. P.A.C., Monk Papers, Lavergne to Borden, Oct. 8, 1911, confidential. I have not found this letter in the Borden Papers. This is a rough, handwritten copy which Lavergne may have submitted for Monk's approval or merely for his information. In any event, by the time it would reach either Borden or Monk the arrangements to which Lavergne objected had gone by the board.
47. P.A.C., Borden Papers, RLB 2993 (8), Monk to Borden, Oct. 8, 1911.
48. Henry Borden (ed.), *Robert Laird Borden: His Memoirs* (Toronto, 1938), I, 331.
49. P.A.C., Bourassa Papers, Bourassa to Cahan, Jan. 25, 1912.
50. P.A.C., Borden Papers, RLB 2993 (7), Burnham to Borden, n.d.
51. *Ibid.*, OC A 207, Cahan to Borden, Oct. 12, 1911, confidential.
52. Bourassa, "Nationalism and the Parties: The Conditions of the 'Autonomist' Ministers. The Keewatin School Question." (Thirteenth article in *Le Devoir* series.)
53. House of Commons, *Debates*, 1911-12, I, 526.
54. Bourassa, "The Conditions of the 'Autonomist' Ministers. The Keewatin School Question."
55. House of Commons, *Debates*, 1912-13, I, 590-91.

Chapter V

1. Roger Graham, *Arthur Meighen, II: And Fortune Fled* (Toronto, 1965), 167. The Conservatives fared much better in the popular vote. They polled a substantial vote in most

provinces and their national total was 972,100, as opposed to 1,297,000 for the Liberals and 769,000 for the Progressives, and the Conservative vote in the Prairie Provinces exceeded the Liberal vote by 16,000.

2. *Ibid.*, 21.

3. Public Archives of Canada (hereafter P.A.C.), Mackenzie King Papers, G.H.O. Thomas to King, Dec. 12, 1921, and Raoul Dandurand to King, Dec. 12, 1921.

4. Mackenzie King had been certain, at least six months before the election, that the Government would be defeated, but he had never counted on a clear Liberal majority: in mid-September he estimated that the Liberals would take from 112 to 116 seats, and on election eve his prediction was 110 to 115. The Progressives, on the other hand, did not do as well as their leaders and some of their friends had predicted: Crerar was counting on a Progressive total of at least 75 to 80 and possibly 90 seats; other predictions from this quarter ran as high as 100.

5. King obtained the requested endorsement from Lemieux whose letter to King was published in the *Montreal Gazette* of Dec. 3, 1921. All that King got from Gouin was a private assurance, delivered by S. W. Jacobs of Montreal, to the effect that he endorsed the Lemieux letter.

6. Currie, a Liberal before the war, was no longer in political life, but King admired his war record and felt he needed a prominent soldier in his Government.

7. Mackenzie King Diary, Dec. 10, 1921, cited in R. MacGregor Dawson, *William Lyon Mackenzie King: A Political Biography, 1874-1923* (Toronto, 1958), 362.

8. Robinson was Minister of Lands and Mines in the New Brunswick Government. The election returns from the Yukon were not in yet; when they were completed, Congdon was defeated. King readily accepted Lapointe's suggestions about Congdon and about the New Brunswick representation, but he objected to McKenzie whom he was thinking of sidetracking on to the bench.

9. The Meighen cabinet, prior to the 1921 election, had contained four ministers from Quebec, including three French Canadians, L. P. Normand, L. de G. Belley and Rodolphe Monty, and one English Canadian, C. C. Ballantyne. A fifth member of the ministry, G. A. Fauteux, was Solicitor General, a post which was not of cabinet rank.

10. P.A.C., King Papers, Ernest Lapointe to King, letter undated but probably written on Dec. 11, 1921. In the same letter Lapointe asked what King would think, in the event of Gouin taking a department, of appointing Bureau to the cabinet without portfolio, and in a final paragraph he disclosed again his sensitivity on the score of Lemieux: "I would also suggest that you don't mention to Rodolphe that you sought my opinion on any matter which he will submit to you. He is very sensitive; but I think that you will succeed to convince him on all things without mentioning me."

11. The evidence of what was said in these meetings is to be found in the telegrams between Haydon and McGregor which are preserved in the Mackenzie King Papers and in the A. B. Hudson Papers which contain a memorandum by Hudson, together with the telegrams.

12. Hudson recorded the list as follows: Fielding, Sinclair, Copp, Lapointe, McMaster, Béland, Gouin (without portfolio), Gen. Currie, Drury, Murphy, Kennedy, Murdock, Crerar, Motherwell, Duncan Marshall, Bostock.

13. P.A.C., King Papers, Haydon to McGregor, Dec. 12, 1921.

14. The Prairie Provinces had been represented by five ministers in the Union Government of 1917 and by four in the Meighen Government.

15. P.A.C., King Papers, Haydon to McGregor, Dec. 12, 1921.

16. King did send Haydon one telegram on Tuesday, December 13, but it did not deal directly with the westerners' terms; instead, the telegram instructed Haydon to sound "feelings friends" with respect to the members of Parliament for Winnipeg North (E. J. McMurray) and Winnipeg Centre (J. S. Woodsworth) as cabinet possibilities and asked Haydon to hold the fort until King's return from his visit to Drury. Clearly, when King sent this telegram, he was sounding opinion in Ottawa, considering other alternatives to the western Progressives, and deliberating on what his reply to Crerar and Hudson should be.

17. P.A.C., King Papers, Haydon to McGregor, Dec. 14, 1921.

18. *Ibid.*, McGregor to Haydon, Dec. 14, 1921.
19. J. F. Fisher of the Manitoba Liberal Executive was also present at this conference.
20. *Ibid.*, Haydon to McGregor, Dec. 14, 1921.
21. *Ibid.*, McGregor to Haydon, Dec. 15, 1921.
22. *Ibid.*, Lapointe to Haydon, Dec. 15, 1921.
23. Dawson, *Mackenzie King*, I, 364.
24. P.A.C., King Papers, Haydon to McGregor, Dec. 16, 1921.
25. *Ibid.*, McGregor to Haydon, Dec. 17, 1921.
26. Ramsay Cook, *The Politics of John W. Dafoe and the Free Press* (Toronto, 1963), 108-20.
27. *Ibid.*, 109.
28. P.A.C., J. W. Dafoe Papers, Sifton to Dafoe, Dec. 14, 1921.
29. *Ibid.*, Sifton to Dafoe, Dec. 8, 1921, Dec. 14, 1921, and Dec. 16, 1921.
30. *Ibid.*
31. P.A.C., Sir Clifford Sifton Papers, Sifton to Crerar, Dec. 12, 1921.
32. *Ibid.*, Crerar to Sifton, Dec. 9, 1921. The silence of Crerar and Hudson on this point, in their discussions with Haydon, is difficult to explain. It is possible that, in view of the election returns which gave the Progressives only a little over half of the number of seats won by the Liberals, Crerar did not feel that he was in a position to demand a coalition along the lines that Sifton was urging. This, however, is only an inference from the fact that Crerar was disappointed in the election: he had expected the Progressives to win between 70 and 80 seats, including at least four in the Maritimes and a larger number than they did in Ontario, and he had hoped for a total figure exceeding 90.
33. P.A.C., A. B. Hudson Papers, copy of an unsigned, undated memorandum in Hudson's handwriting.
34. P.A.C., Dafoe Papers, Dafoe to Sifton, Dec. 19, 1921.
35. This was the advice of the New Brunswick Government, including Premier Foster who ruled himself out as a federal prospect. (P.A.C., King Papers, W. E. Foster to King, Dec. 9, 1921, and C. W. Robinson to King, Dec. 12, 1921.) Mackenzie King was reluctant to pass over the two Acadians, Onésiphore Turgeon and J.-E. Michaud, but he concluded that the appointment of either would antagonize the supporters of the other.
36. P.A.C., King Papers, Hardy to King, Dec. 17, 1921.
37. P.A.C., Hudson Papers, Crerar to Hudson, Dec. 19, 1921.
38. *Ibid.*, Hudson memorandum on 1921 cabinet formation.
39. *Ibid.*, Hudson to Crerar, Dec. 20, 1921, copy of an unsigned, undated telegram in Hudson's handwriting.
40. P.A.C., A. K. Cameron Papers, Lapointe to Cameron, Dec. 20, 1921.
41. Mackenzie King Diary, Dec. 21, 1921, cited in Dawson, *Mackenzie King* I, 368.
42. P.A.C., Hudson Papers, Crerar to Hudson, Dec. 21, 1921.
43. Mackenzie King Diary, Dec. 21, 1921, cited in Dawson, *Mackenzie King*, I, 368.
44. Mackenzie King Diary, Dec. 23, 1921, cited *ibid.*, 369.
45. The evidence does not indicate specifically whether King told Lapointe that he had agreed to take Lemieux in as Minister of Marine and Fisheries.
46. P.A.C., Hudson Papers, Hudson memorandum.
47. There is no doubt that Crerar, when he left the West, still felt free to enter the Government if certain conditions were met. A few hours before he left Winnipeg one of his confidants in the city wired Hudson in Ottawa: "Crerar leaves this evening Toronto Ottawa Saturday. Present attitude towards joining subject condition and opinion yourself and Drury. We think conditions should be written and include Crerar caucus with Progressives." (P.A.C., Hudson Papers, H. J. Symington to Hudson, Dec. 21, 1921.) Two days later, while Crerar was still en route to Ottawa, J. W. Dafoe wrote to a western friend: "If Mr. King and Mr. Crerar don't come together it will be K's fault for Crerar who is a trustful soul is prepared to sign up if given any kind of a half square deal." (P.A.C., Dafoe Papers, Dafoe to W. A. Buchanan, Dec. 23, 1921.)

48. P.A.C., Hudson Papers, Hudson memorandum. The same memorandum reports Crerar as saying, early in this interview: "Crerar said that progressives quite determined to maintain their party intact. Decisions reached during [*sic*: due to] resentments and animosities during elections."

49. Hudson copied out the list of names that King read on Dec. 24. Excluding Mackenzie King and Crerar it was as follows: Fielding, D. D. McKenzie, Sinclair (without portfolio), Copp, Lapointe, Bureau, Lemieux (Speaker), Gouin, Béland, Robb, (J. H.) King, Kennedy, Murphy, Graham, Murdock and Motherwell. (A.B. Hudson Papers, Hudson memorandum.)

50. P.A.C., Dafoe Papers, Sir Clifford Sifton to Dafoe, Dec. 30, 1921.

51. *Ibid.*, Dafoe to Sir Clifford Sifton, Dec. 31, 1921.

52. P.A.C., King Papers, P. C. Larkin to King, Dec. 29, 1921, enclosing copies of Larkin to E. L. Pease, Dec. 27, 1921, E. L. Pease to Larkin, Dec. 28, 1921, and Larkin to E. L. Pease, Dec. 29, 1921.

53. *Ibid.*, W. S. Fielding to King, Dec. 26, 1929.

54. Dr. J. H. King was not sworn in until Feb. 3, 1922. Senator Hewitt Bostock served as Minister of Public Works, as a stopgap measure, from Dec. 29, 1921 to Feb. 3, 1922; on the latter date he became Speaker of the Senate and the Public Works portfolio reverted to Dr. King in the Commons.

55. The French Canadian share of the Liberal membership in the new House of Commons was 50 per cent: 58 out of 117.

56. Aside from the three days in 1896 when Laurier was the whole cabinet, the highest percentage of French Canadian representation in the cabinet before 1921, namely 30 percent, was in the periods July 15, 1868 to January 29, 1869, and October 1 to 8, 1869. It never exceeded 25 per cent from May 26, 1873 until July 11, 1896. It was 25 per cent under Laurier from June 30, 1897 to July 18, 1899. King began in 1921 with just over 25 per cent.

Chapter VI

1. The first was Dr. R. D. Morand of Windsor, Ontario, who was appointed to the Meighen cabinet on July 13, 1926.

2. The seven were Lionel Chevrier, C. D. Howe, Paul Martin, W. P. Mulock, James J. McCann, Norman McLarty and Norman Rogers.

3. Public Archives of Canada (hereafter P.A.C.), Mackenzie King Diary, June 4, 1926.

4. *Ibid.*, Oct. 14-16, 1935.

5. It is difficult to assess precisely the role of Lapointe or his relations with King in the formation of the cabinet. For one thing, the evidence, based as it is on the Mackenzie King Diary, must be viewed with caution. King dictated almost all of the Diary for this week, almost one hundred pages, and the dictation sometimes took place after 48 hours had elapsed, so that King's recollections may have been affected by subsequent events. Moreover, King does not report his discussions with Lapointe in complete detail: the terse "we agreed on . . ." or "he agreed that . . ." seem to imply that King had proposed and Lapointe had acquiesced, whereas the tenor of the discussion may have been quite different.

6. P.A.C., King Diary, Oct. 17, 1935

7. *Ibid.*

8. *Ibid.*

9. *Ibid.*

10. *Ibid.*

11. *Ibid.*

12. *Ibid.*

13. *Ibid.*

14. *Ibid.*

15. *Ibid.* At a later stage in the cabinet-making, King decided to create a set of parliamentary assistants for ministers of the Crown, thus making it possible to placate Prince Edward Island, but

when, still later, arrangements were made for Dunning, as Minister of Finance, to represent an Island constituency, the parliamentary assistants were forgotten.

16. *Ibid.*

17. *Ibid.*

18. *Ibid.*, Oct. 19, 1935.

19. *Ibid.*, Oct. 17, 1935.

20. *Ibid.*, Oct. 18, 1935.

21. *Ibid.*

22. *Ibid.*

23. On the day after his talk with Rogers, Mackenzie King received a similar warning from J. E. Atkinson, the publisher of the *Toronto Star*, whose advice he sought by telephone. Atkinson told King "that there was only one man he thought care should be exercised about. I pressed him as to who this was, and he said Slaght. He thought Slaght was in with the mining crowd, was materialistic, etc. . . . I said to Atkinson I felt Slaght was the one Queen's Park people would like, and great pressure would be brought to have him included. He said I was exactly right, but agreed that it was wise not to let that influence develop. He said Slaght had been in to see him, but he had not encouraged him." (P.A.C., King Diary, Oct. 19, 1935).

24. *Ibid.*

25. *Ibid.*

26. *Ibid.*

27. *Ibid.*

28. *Ibid.*, Oct. 21, 1935.

29. *Ibid.*

30. *Ibid.*

31. Gardiner did not enter the Government until October 28.

32. P.A.C., King Diary, Oct. 22, 1935.

33. *Ibid.*

34. *Ibid.*, Oct. 21, 1935.

35. *Ibid.*, Oct. 22, 1935.

36. *Ibid.*

37. P.A.C., Mackenzie King Papers, M. F. Hepburn to King, Oct. 21, 1935.

38. *Ibid.*, King to M. F. Hepburn, Oct. 22, 1935.

39. P.A.C., King Diary, Oct. 21, 1935.

40. *Ibid.*, Oct. 22, 1935. W. A. Fraser had been the member for Northumberland since 1930.

41. *Ibid.*, Oct. 23, 1935.

42. *Ibid.*

43. These arrangements to provide Dunning with a constituency in the Eastern Townships subsequently fell through, and a seat was found for him in Queen's, Prince Edward Island.

44. P.A.C., King Diary, Oct. 23, 1935.

45. *Ibid.*

46. *Ibid.* In his letter to King, dated Oct. 22, 1935, Cardin said: "I cannot go to the humiliation of accepting." He regarded the offer of Secretary of State as "a notice that I am something of the past, and that you would prefer to go without me. Very well, you are in control now. I have nothing to say."

47. *Ibid.*, Oct. 23, 1935.

48. *Ibid.*

49. Gardiner was sworn in on Oct. 28, 1935.

50. P.A.C., King Diary, Oct. 23, 1935.

51. The French share of the 1935 cabinet corresponded almost exactly to the proportion of French Canadian Liberals in the total Liberal membership in the House of Commons (55 out of 171).

Chapter VII

1. Address to Manitoba Liberal Association, Jan. 22, 1948.
2. *Ottawa Citizen*, Oct. 11, 1948.
3. Address at Victoria, B.C., Apr. 14, 1949.
4. For details of the list of ministers and their portfolios, see Canada, Privy Council, *Guide to Canadian Ministries since Confederation—July 1, 1867-January 1, 1957* (Ottawa, 1957).
5. *Ottawa Journal*, Jan. 23, 1948.
6. Address to Advisory Council of National Liberal Federation, Ottawa, Jan. 25, 1949.

Chapter VIII

1. Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, Jan. 8, 1926, speech by Arthur Meighen, 15-16.
2. See p. 16.
3. See p. 37.
4. See p. 147.
5. The two portfolios of Customs and Inland Revenue were abolished by a statute which was passed in 1887 and came into force in 1892, and the post of controller was substituted therefor in each case. In 1897 the two controllerships were abolished by statute, and the separate portfolios revived.
6. The first two Ministers of the Department of Naval Service were French Canadians. In World War II a French Canadian was Minister of National War Services. French Canadians have held the post of Associate Minister of National Defence in both the Diefenbaker and Pearson cabinets.
7. It should be noted, however, that transportation matters came under Public Works from 1867 to 1879, and that a French Canadian held this portfolio for four of those years.
8. From 1909 to 1912, by statute, External Affairs had to be held by the Secretary of State for Canada; from 1912 to 1946, by statute it had to be held by the Prime Minister.
9. There have been nine other portfolios, each of short duration and eight of them arising out of wartime and postwar conditions, which were never held by a French Canadian. They are: the Secretary of State for the Provinces, Overseas Forces, Pensions and National Health, National Defence for Air, National Defence for Naval Services, Munitions and Supply, Reconstruction, and Reconstruction and Supply. The new Department of Industry has not yet had a French Canadian minister.
10. See p. 34.
11. *Ibid.*
12. The sole exception, for the period from 1909 to 1950, occurred during Meighen's short-lived Government of 1926 when the Labour portfolio was assigned to a New Brunswick minister. It is worth noting that the overwhelming bulk of trade union members has always been in Ontario and Quebec, and more particularly in Ontario. Even the latest figures (those of 1965) show 614,900 in Ontario and 455,300 in Quebec, out of a total of 1,589,000.
13. The same reasons, it may be assumed, explain the historic predominance of English Canadians in the post of provincial treasurer in the government of the province of Quebec. Since Confederation 30 men have held the office of provincial treasurer; 18 of them English speaking, 12 French speaking.
14. The correct number of men is actually 23. The number 24 is used here because Charles Dunning should be counted as two for the purpose of calculating the distribution of the portfolio among the provinces. Dunning was twice Minister of Finance: the first time in 1929 and 1930 when he was a Saskatchewan minister; the second from 1935 to 1939 when he was, in fact but not in form, a Quebec minister. Although he represented a Prince Edward Island constituency after the 1935 election, by that time his real economic and political connections were with Montreal. For the same reason J. L. Ralston, who represented a Prince Edward Island constituency while he was Finance Minister in 1939-40, has also been counted, for this purpose, as a Quebec minister.

15. The frequency of Nova Scotian representation in Finance is impressive. Three explanations may be suggested: the distinguished qualifications of several of the province's leading representatives; the relative ease with which a Nova Scotian—for example, Fielding—could be presented as a compromise choice on issues of economic policy; and the necessity, in the twentieth century, to compensate the Maritime Provinces for the decline, absolute and relative, in the number of cabinet places which were allotted to them.

16. "It is admitted," wrote Chapleau, "that three of four portfolios resume [*sic*] the political progress of the country. The financial and fiscal departments, the Department of Agriculture, Emigration and Statistics, the Department of the Interior, and in a smaller measure Marine and Fisheries, are the four traction engines carrying the country to its future destinies. The Militia, Post Office, Inland Revenue, Justice, Secretaryship [of State] and even Public Works (when Canals and Railways are excluded) are merely local and administrative posts, without any leading power in the direction of the country's future. I assure you that the people of the Province of Quebec are keenly feeling that its representatives in the Council are excluded from the former and politically more important offices . . ." (Chapleau to Macdonald, June 4, 1888, printed in Sir Joseph Pope, *Correspondence of Sir John Macdonald* [Toronto, 1922], 412-13). Macdonald's reply, dated June 6, 1888, reads in part as follows: "The position of a premier is sometimes a perplexing one—especially when called upon to balance interests and pretensions. I am now receiving from my Ontario supporters daily, letters complaining that their Province has only two Departments, and those of secondary importance, viz.: Customs and Agriculture; while Quebec has four, viz.: Public Works, Militia, Railways and now the Department of the Secretary of State (with the new Printing Bureau). This reminds me that Ontario returns a majority of 22 and Quebec of 9 for our support. . . ." (*Ibid.*, 413-14).

17. See p. 149.

18. O.D. Skelton, *Life and Letters of Sir Wilfrid Laurier* (New York, 1922), II, 270.

19. See p. 6.

20. These figures pertaining to the composition of the nineteenth and early twentieth century cabinets are taken from an unpublished paper by Dr. Eugene Forsey entitled "Provincial and Sectional Representation in the Cabinet," which deals with the cabinets from Macdonald's first one to Borden's last one, and which the author, with characteristic generosity and concern for accuracy, has permitted the editor of the present study to consult.

21. See p. 152.

22. In this study Paul Martin has been classified as a French Canadian minister in the three governments in which he has served.

23. See p. 56.

24. See p. 58.

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7

The Italians of Montreal

Social Adjustment in
a Plural Society

Jeremy Boissevain



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The Italians of Montreal

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The Italians of Montreal

Social Adjustment in
a Plural Society

Jeremy Boissevain

Professor of Social Anthropology
University of Amsterdam

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To my mother

Mildred G. Boissevain

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This study examines in some detail the structure of the community in which persons of Italian descent live in Montreal. It also seeks to determine the nature of their contacts with Canadians of French and British origins (the latter comprising those stemming from the British Isles) and to gauge the position of the Italian community in relation to the conflict of interest between the two dominant ethnic groups.

The report opens with a brief consideration of the community in time and space. Chapter II examines the social framework of the community and Chapter III some of the important divisions that cut across it; Chapter IV systematically explores the more important points of contact between individual Italian Canadians and their community on the one hand, and the rest of Canadian society on the other. In Chapter V the growing pressure on Italian Canadians to commit themselves culturally and politically to one or other of the two dominant groups in Montreal is considered, together with their reaction to it. The report ends with a summary and an appraisal of the position of the Italian Canadians in Montreal.

The research on which this report is based was carried out in two phases. The first phase, from August, 1964 to April, 1965, consisted of a large number of detailed interviews with key persons in the Italian community, with members of many families of old and new immigrants, and with Canadian-born persons of Italian descent. These interviews, which resulted in reports running to 450 single-spaced typewritten pages, were carried out by a research assistant and myself. Formal and informal interviews were supplemented, as far as possible, by participant observation at club meetings, religious celebrations, parish feasts, sporting events, dances, banquets and similar events organized by persons of Italian descent. We also read faithfully all the Italian Canadian newspapers, listened to Italian radio and television programmes, shopped at Italian stores, and in every way tried to establish as much contact as possible with the Italian milieu. It should be understood, however, that owing to heavy teaching commitments, I carried out this research on a part-time basis only, working a few afternoons each week and bits and pieces of weekends and other holidays for most of the year. It engaged me intensely.

Moreover, my research assistant, though Italian-speaking and very quick to learn, was untrained in sociological and anthropological research. Our contact with the Italians of Montreal was relatively superficial by the standards of anthropological field research—we did not live, eat, work, and relax with our informants. This is a major shortcoming of the study.

The second phase of the research, which took place during May and June 1965, consisted of a questionnaire survey of a sample of male household heads of Italian descent. A list of 261 addresses for the survey was compiled from two sources. The first was a random sample of 219 addresses drawn from the files of the Italian national parishes and missions. To this was added a list of 42 addresses, representing all persons with Italian names in four particular census tract areas listed in *The Greater Montreal Cross Reference Directory 1964-1965*.^{*} These four tract areas were chosen at random from among those outside the territorial limits of the national parishes and missions. Because many apartments were no longer occupied by Italians and some Italians refused to be interviewed, the interviewers—for the most part Italian Canadian teachers, students and housewives—were obliged to search in the immediate vicinity of the address given for persons of Italian descent willing to help with the inquiry. In the end, 197 usable interviews were completed, of which 132 or 67 per cent were with family heads at the addresses on the original random sample; 38 or 19 per cent with persons living outside the parish and mission areas.

As soon as we began to tabulate our results it became evident that our sample of Canadian-born persons of Italian descent, 21 in all, was too small to have much statistical validity. Our general sample had simply not been large enough to throw up a greater number of random cases of Canadian-born respondents. I should, of course, have used either a larger general sample or tried to stratify the sample I had according to place of birth, and not residential zone as was done. I realize this now with the wisdom of hindsight. Nonetheless, I have decided to compare the data on the 21 Canadian-born persons with the much larger sample of immigrants, in the belief that some information is better than none. Statistical purists are invited to disregard those sections of the report dealing with Canadian-born persons of Italian descent where the analysis is based primarily on the survey. Others can use the conclusions based on these sections as hypotheses for further testing. All readers, however, are reminded again that the sample of Canadian-born persons of Italian descent is too small to have much statistical significance.

It will be evident to most readers that my use of the survey data differs somewhat from the way many would have used them. Our primary research instruments were participant observation and long, free interviews. After almost nine months' work with these instruments, the results of the survey held no great surprises for us (save for the insignificant number of Canadian-born persons!). The statistical conclusions of the survey are consequently used primarily as material to corroborate or illustrate conclusions largely reached through the use of the principal research instruments.

^{*}For further bibliographical information on this and other reference works mentioned in this study, see Bibliography, pp. 83-4.

This study is thus neither wholly sociological nor wholly anthropological. It is a pilot study based upon a compromise between two research techniques: participant observation and the survey. From it, however, I have built a model of the Italian community in Montreal. Future students using both anthropological and sociological techniques must test my findings of the principles and processes which govern the structure of the Italian community and its articulation with Montreal Canadian society.

Intensive studies of single neighbourhoods are needed. These will, of course, require the researchers to live in Italian neighbourhoods for many months. They must explore in detail the recruitment and operation of networks of persons in the various institutional areas; the issues that divide local opinion; informal groups and associations, and the way individuals manipulate these for their own ends. The field of kinship is another area in which intensive study would be most rewarding. Detailed comparison with studies of kinship in Italy as well as of groups of persons of Italian descent elsewhere,¹ would enable one to follow in detail the way in which relations in this institutional area are adjusted to meet the contingencies of Canadian society. Further investigations thus require an intensive rather than extensive approach. I hope that this report, in spite of its limitations, will provide a basis for further research along these and other avenues.

A study of this kind owes many things to many people. My greatest debt, quite obviously, is to the scores of Italian Canadians and other persons interested in the Italian community who gave so generously of their time. Without their co-operation and willing help this study could not have been completed. I would also like to record my special gratitude to Mrs. Carla Melvyn, who for many months worked as my very able research assistant and through whose eyes and ears I observed much of what is recorded in the following pages. The Canada Council very kindly provided an initial grant for a pilot study of the Italian community which whetted my appetite and laid the groundwork for the more ambitious study reported in these pages. This in turn was made possible by the generosity of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism.

I am also most thankful to the University of Montreal for office space and many services, both large and small; to our many interviewers for their help and enthusiasm; to Mrs. Lily Liquornik and Miss Rosemary Slough for their help in typing the research reports and final report; and to Mr. Claude Godin and De Heer Lodewijk Brunt for general assistance. Professor Frank C. Innes and Mr. James Hogg of the Department of Geography, McGill University, kindly prepared the map.

Last but not least, particular thanks go to my wife for proofreading the final manuscript copy and for her great patience and help in many ways during the year and a half that the 130,000 Italians of Montreal were part of our daily lives.

University of Amsterdam
June 1967

J.F.B.

The Italian community in Montreal has grown at an ever increasing pace. Looking at it through time, three stages in its development may be distinguished. The first began just before the turn of the century and lasted until the early 1920s; the second extended from the 1920s to the end of the Second World War; and the third from the end of the war to the present day. As each of these stages is related to the number of arriving immigrants, we shall first examine the population figures and then move on to a closer look at the social history of the community.

Although an Italian in the service of Great Britain, Giovanni Caboto, otherwise known as John Cabot, discovered Newfoundland in 1497 and a number of Italians—missionaries, soldiers and traders—played a part in the country's early history,¹ Italian colonization began in earnest only towards the end of the last century. Unsettled economic and political conditions following the unification of Italy between 1859 and 1870, the pressure of over-population, and the chronic poverty of the south were among the factors which drove Italians to emigrate. In Canada the construction of the Canadian Pacific Railway between 1880 and 1885 and other large building projects created a demand for unskilled labour which Italians were able to meet. The steady trickle of immigrants from Italy soon swelled into a stream.

A. Demographic Considerations

In 1901 persons of Italian descent in Montreal numbered only 1,600 (*see* Table 1.1). But under the impact of the massive waves of immigration immediately preceding and, to a lesser extent, following the First World War, the number of persons of Italian descent increased almost tenfold until they reached 14,000 by 1921. The influx diminished after 1927, for the Italian Fascist party, which by then had assumed full control in Italy, discouraged emigration. Restrictions placed on immigration by the Canadian government during the economic depression of the 1930s and the Second World War were also important factors in reducing the flow of Italian immigrants. From 1921 to 1941 the Italian population of Montreal expanded very slowly. The number of Italians which had

increased almost tenfold between 1901 and 1921 did not quite double between 1921 and 1941. During the war years, 1939-1945, virtually no immigrants of Italian origin entered Canada.

Table 1.1. Total population of Montreal and population of Italian origin in Montreal, 1901-1961

Census year	Total population	Italian origin		Persons of Italian origin as % of total population	Italians born outside Canada as % of Italian population
		Total	Born outside Canada		
1901	268,000	1,600	†	1%	—
1911	468,000	7,000	†	2	—
1921	619,000	14,000	†	2	—
1931	819,000	21,000	9,000	3	43%
1941†	1,140,000	25,000	9,000	2	36
1951†	1,395,000	31,000	†	2	—
1961‡	2,110,000	101,000	63,000	5	62

Sources: Census of Canada 1901, I, Tables XI and XIV; 1911, II, Tables VIII and XVI; 1921, I, Table 27, II, Table 54; 1931, IV, Table 6; 1941, IV, Table 21; 1951, I, Table 36; 1961, Catalogues 92-560 and 92-547.

†Figure not available.

‡Metropolitan area.

Following the Second World War the situation changed dramatically. To escape the disastrous economic conditions and the appalling misery then prevailing in large areas of Italy, especially in the south, many set out to join relatives and fellow townsmen in the new world. The new wave of immigration developed slowly at first. From the beginning of 1945 to the end of 1950 just over 20,000 Italians immigrated to Canada.² But after 1951 the flood-gates opened: in 1951 alone 24,000 Italians arrived. Altogether, from the beginning of 1951 to the end of May 1961, 216,000 Italians settled in Canada. Of this total, 56,000—roughly 26 per cent—settled in Quebec. The majority went to Ontario.

According to the 1961 census, about 108,500 persons of Italian descent live in the province of Quebec. Of this number more than 101,000, or about 94 per cent, live in the Montreal metropolitan area. The remaining 7,000 are scattered fairly evenly, though very lightly, over the province's many towns, villages and hamlets. Only two of Quebec's 75 census divisions—Îles-de-la-Madeleine and Montmorency No. 2 (Île-d'Orléans)—had no persons of Italian descent living in them in 1961. On the other hand, apart from the census divisions comprising the Montreal metropolitan area, only nine divisions contained more than 300 Italians each. Of these, Abitibi, Terrebonne, Temiscaming, Saguenay, Quebec and Chambly each had more than 500—the last two more than a thousand.

In 1965 persons of Italian descent in Montreal were increasing at the rate of approximately 6,000 per year. Of these, about 2,100 represent the natural increase, for during the last few years births have averaged 2,400 and deaths 250 per year.³ The remaining 3,900 are immigrants. Thus in the four years since the 1961 census the number

of Italians in Montreal has increased by approximately 24,000 bringing the total to around 126,000.

Until 1951 the growth of the Italian population in metropolitan Montreal kept pace with the increase in the city's population. The Italian group remained at approximately 2 per cent of the total. After the massive immigration beginning around 1951, the proportion of Italians jumped to 5 per cent (*see* Table 1.1), making it the third largest ethnic group in the city.

Another variable must be considered in order to appreciate the importance of demographic factors to the problems under investigation. While from 1901 to 1951 the proportion of persons of Italian descent in Montreal remained about 2 per cent of the city's total population, the proportion of immigrants fluctuated considerably. This is shown in Table 1.1. The proportion of immigrants determines the "Italianness" or degree of ethnicity of the community, that is, the degree to which Italian culture, language and values are emphasized. This is directly related to the length of time persons for whom these factors are important have been away from Italy. The justification of these remarks will be given a little later. What we find upon examining this variable in Table 1.1 is that the proportion of Italians born outside Canada (which means in the vast majority of cases, born in Italy) dropped to a low of 36 per cent in 1941 due to the reduction in the number of immigrants during this period. But by 1961, as a result of the heavy postwar immigration, the proportion of those born in Italy had risen to more than 60 per cent. Thus today approximately two-thirds of all persons of Italian descent in Montreal are immigrants.

From the foregoing very brief examination of some demographic considerations it will be evident that the Italian population of Montreal is composed of three groups. The first comprises those who came before the war—the old immigrants; the second, those who were born in Canada; and finally the large numbers that have come since the war. This last group represents approximately half the total Italian population of Montreal. The position occupied by Italians in one of these groups determines, to a very considerable extent, the outlook and behaviour which lie behind their answers to certain of the questions to be examined later in this study.

B. Settlement Patterns

Persons of Italian descent in Montreal are spread over the entire metropolitan area. However, as the map of the Montreal metropolitan area by 1961 census tracts indicates, they are mainly concentrated in five areas. In general the growth and movement of the Italian population mirror similar developments in the city—from a beginning close to the river, settlement spread to the north, east, west and south.

The first Italian settlements developed adjacent to the Bonaventure Station along the Canadian Pacific Railway tracks and below St. Catherine Street between St. Laurent Boulevard and St. Denis Street, chiefly on Sanguinet, La Gauchetière and Craig Streets. This was an area where cheap housing was available near the railway yards and the port, which in themselves provided employment for the unskilled immigrant labourers.⁴ Around 1900 there were about five Italian nuclei in the French Canadian parishes of St.

Joseph and St. Henri between the Lachine Canal and the CPR tracks in an area extending from a few blocks west of the Atwater tunnel to the Windsor Station. Other Italian settlements were Goose Village, which lay mostly along Conway and Britannia Streets between the stockyards and the Victoria Bridge approaches; the Mount Carmel area below St. Catherine Street, between St. Laurent Boulevard and Amherst Avenue; and, considerably further to the east, Hochelaga, principally along Pierre Bernard Boulevard in the present Tetreaultville area.

During this period the Italian settlement was clearly dominated by the Mount Carmel area. In 1905 the first Italian national parish was established there by the Archbishop of Montreal. At the same time a number of Italians moved to Mile-End in the north and built little country houses surrounded by gardens in which they grew vegetables and grapes for wine. The small settlement gradually became a focal point and in 1910, following severe friction with their fellow parishioners in the French parish of St. Édouard, Italians in the area petitioned the Archbishop of Montreal for permission to establish their own parish.⁵ The Archbishop granted permission immediately and the new parish was dedicated to the Madonna della Difesa, for whom those coming from the Italian province of Campobasso had developed a strong cult following the manifestation of the Virgin near the small town of Casacalenda at a locality known as La Difesa.⁶ The majority of the founders of the new parish were from Campobasso. Even today *Campobassani* are very numerous. No less than 20 per cent of our informants born in Italy (35 out of 136) had emigrated from that province.

The Mount Carmel area, which had dominated the Italian community in the years before the First World War, was soon replaced in importance by Mile-End. A steady stream of Italians moved into the area from the older and less well-situated settlements in the south of the city. It was not long before a small dependent nucleus developed in the Montcalm district a mile to the east along Jean Talon Boulevard near Papineau Street. A gradual movement also took place towards Ville Émard, a pleasant, long-established municipality south of the city between the Lachine Canal and Aqueduct. Thus, by the end of the 1930s, Italians in Montreal were firmly established in Mount Carmel, Ville Émard, Hochelaga, Mile-End, and Montcalm—not to mention the St. Joseph and St. Henri areas and Goose Village near the stockyards in the south. Even today these last three areas have a high concentration of Italians who live there because of cheap housing and the availability of unskilled employment. Finally, before the war a small group of Italians settled in the town of Lachine, just west of Montreal.

The massive waves of immigrants that flowed into Montreal after the war followed channels already opened by relatives and fellow villagers (*paesani*). Areas which were important before the war absorbed new immigrants and grew rapidly. The group in Ville Émard succeeded in establishing San Giovanni Bosco in 1949—the third Italian national parish. In 1953 the Montcalm area, long a dependency of the church of La Difesa in Mile-End, became the independent parish of Madonna della Consolata. But Montrealers as well as immigrants, attracted by the open country, continued to move northwards. In the last 15 years Ville St. Michel, Ville St. Léonard and Montréal-Nord have come into existence. Large parts of these areas were built by Italians for Italians. In 1961 a new Italian parish, the fifth, dedicated to the Madonna di Pompei was established at the corner of St. Michel and Sauvé Boulevards. In the same year church missions were

founded to look after the spiritual needs of the sizable Italian settlements in suburban Lachine, and the St. Henri and St. Joseph areas in the south of the city. A year later church authorities established another Italian mission in the east of the city in the old settlement along Pierre Bernard Boulevard off Hochelaga Street.

Table 1.2 which shows the number of parishioners in the Italian parishes and mission areas provides another indication of how the Italian population is distributed. The figures in this table must be complemented, however, by those in Table 1.3 which includes not only those Italians who are members of Italian parishes but those who are not.

Table 1.2. Population of the Italian national parishes, 1965

Parish	Families [†]	Persons [‡]	%
Madonna del Carmine (1905)	1,500	7,050	7
Madonna della Difesa (1910)	6,000	28,200	27
San Giovanni Bosco (1949)	1,700	7,990	7
Madonna della Consolata (1953)	6,000	28,200	27
Madonna di Pompei (1961)	4,000	18,800	18
Missione dell'Ovest (1961)	1,500	7,050	7
Missione dell'Est (1962)	1,500	7,050	7
Total	22,200	104,340	100

[†]To nearest 100, provided by the Italian parishes.

[‡]Estimate based on 4.7 persons per family, the average size of households in the general sample.

As previously noted, not all persons of Italian descent are in fact parishioners of the Italian national parishes. The largest settlement of those who live outside the parishes is the heavy concentration in the south of the Notre Dame de Grâce district, just north of the Lachine Canal. This is a well integrated group of mostly new arrivals who are apparently served satisfactorily by a number of French- and English-speaking Roman Catholic parishes in the vicinity. In addition to those living outside the territorial limits of the parishes and mission zones, many persons of Italian descent live in these areas but are not enrolled as parishioners. This is because they are not Roman Catholics or because they have become members of French- or English-speaking parishes or simply because they do not wish to practise their religion. These I have estimated as approximately 1,400 families or about 5 per cent of the total. I shall come back to the subject in a later section.*

Table 1.3. Population of Italian origin within and without the Italian parishes, 1965

Parish membership	Families	Persons	%
Members of Italian parish	22,200	104,340	79
Outside Italian parish [†]	4,500	21,150	16
Resident in, but not member of, Italian parish	1,400	6,580	5
Total	28,100	132,070	100

[†] A projection based on 16 per cent (the 1961 figure of those resident outside territorial limits of Italian parish and mission) of the estimated Italian population (see n. 3, Chap. I, p. 85).

*See "The Church", pp. 18-21.

C. Social History of the Italian Community

The social history of the Italian community in Montreal is divided into four distinct periods. The first, which ended in the early 1920s, was the period of first arrivals and marked the birth of the settlement. The second, which extended from the mid-1920s to the beginning of the war, was a period of stabilization and internal development. The third was the war period itself. This was a troubled time during which many of the leading members of the community were placed in internment camps; others studiously avoided mentioning their Italian descent. The fourth and present period began after the war and has in a sense seen the rebirth of the Italian community under the impetus of new waves of immigrants.

The formative period of the Italian settlement was one of great difficulty. New arrivals found the economic and social climate totally unprepared for them. Having no one to whom they could turn for advice or assistance, they were forced to create their own opportunities. Although a number had relatives and fellow townsmen in Montreal, few of these had attained social or professional prominence in the wider Montreal society. Thus the community had no leaders who had the social prestige to represent effectively their interests with French- and English-speaking Canadians who controlled the economic and political life of their new home. Elderly informants repeatedly stressed the struggle they had in maintaining their own customs and in earning a living in the face of discrimination by their Canadian workmates and neighbours.

This period, however, came to an end when the government of Mussolini abolished the *Commissariato Generale dell'Emigrazione* (General Commissariat for Emigration) and replaced it with the *Direzione Generale degli Italiani all'Estero* (General Agency for Italians Overseas), a government agency attached to the Italian Foreign Office. Henceforth emigration was not only curtailed drastically but all Italians overseas, including immigrants, were regarded as citizens of Italy living temporarily abroad. This meant that the government of Italy expected them to remain loyal, to heed the directives of its official representatives abroad, and to serve in its armed services.⁷ Thus the Italian government concerned itself with the Italian settlement in Montreal and the Italian Consul General began to play an increasingly active role in the community.⁸

With the encouragement and help of the Consul General, Italian Fascist leaders in Montreal developed a series of national-political associations which were counterparts of those existing in Italy. *Fasci* and *Dopo Lavoro* clubs were established in Montcalm, Mile-End, St. Henri, Ville Émard and Lachine. The leaders also sought to weld the Italian community together by forming the *Fronte Unico Italiano di Montreal*, an organization in which most of the Italian associations and clubs were asked to participate. Its object was to provide material and moral support for the Italian government and to augment the prestige of Italians in general, and Fascists in particular. Bayley⁹ notes that the Italian Consul was an honorary member of the organization's executive council, which was composed of selected representatives of selected associations. The Italian national parishes in Montreal became very closely identified with the *Fronte Unico*, as did a number of the mutual benefit and friendly societies such as the Sons of Italy. But all Italian leaders and associations did not participate in these Fascist-inspired activities. The leaders of the Sons of Italy, for example, had a falling out over the matter, and a group hived off to form a separate, anti-Fascist association, the Order of Italo-Canadians.

Nonetheless, a certain co-operation was achieved through the Fronte Unico, for it was able to generate a good deal of enthusiasm and popular support. During this period the only non-religious buildings of the community were constructed and these became part of the patrimony of the Italians in Montreal. The most important was the Casa d'Italia built on property given to the Italian community by the city of Montreal through the good offices of Mayor Camillien Houde. Funds for this building, erected on the corner of Jean Talon Boulevard and Lajeunesse Street, were contributed partly by the Italian government, and partly through many small donations from the Italian community at large.

If at a political level the community was perhaps stronger than ever before, economically the picture was somewhat different. The period of Fascist dominance in the Italian community coincided more or less with the depression. As a very large number of the Italians in Montreal occupied positions at the lowest levels of the socio-economic hierarchy, they were among the first to be affected by the depression. Informants tell of a period of great misery and suffering. Montreal-born Italians, and even many newcomers, are quick to point out that those who lived in Montreal before the war were the pioneers of the community—men and women who made great sacrifices for their children and future generations. Many were forced to sell newly bought houses in order to meet debts; mortgages were foreclosed on others.

In retrospect, and judging from the rate at which the postwar immigrants have been able to forge ahead economically as well as socially, I think one must say that the depression effectively prevented the prewar generation of Italian immigrants from gaining a larger slice of the Montreal economic and social pie. Many of those who have arrived since the war criticize the prewar immigrants for lack of ambition and failure to make the most of their opportunities (see Table 3.2). But they overlook the smothering effect the depression had on those who had just begun to establish themselves in their new country.

Most older Italians like to forget the years of the war. In 1940, almost overnight, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police wiped out the leadership of the Italian community by sending virtually all the leaders to the internment camp at Petawawa. Italians, who up until then had been increasingly accepted by the French- and English-speaking communities, were suddenly shunned. Italians themselves played down or hid their Italianness; they had suddenly become enemy aliens. The Church was also affected. Its leaders had been among the most vocal partisans of Mussolini's policies, and had even had a huge fresco of Il Duce painted in the church of the Madonna della Difesa. Many Canadian Italians were conscripted into the Canadian armed services, where they passed several years away from their families and other Italians. They returned home far more Canadianized than they would have been had they remained in Montreal.

If being Italian was de-emphasized during the war years, the opposite was true after the war. Only some of the trained, experienced leaders returned to take charge of the affairs of the Italian community. But many newcomers stepped forward to fill the roles left vacant. After the devastating experience of the war it is all the more surprising that the Italian community was able to reestablish itself so rapidly. The Casa d'Italia, sequestered by the government during the war, was returned and again became a social centre. Associations such as the Sons of Italy were reactivated and the triumphant processions honouring regional and parish saints again took place with whole-hearted

enthusiasm. Much of the credit for this renewed activity after so many depressing years must be given to young leaders untarred by the Fascist brush which had smeared so many of their elders. But it was largely the impact of the many thousands of new immigrants that shook the Italian community out of the despondency of the war years. Italian Canadians, for years shunned as enemy aliens or looked down upon as second-class citizens, suddenly found that they were looked up to by the newcomers as experienced and knowledgeable local citizens. Most found themselves with dependents—newly arrived relatives and *paesani*—who sought advice from them on housing, employment, the mysteries of Canadian bureaucracy and education. Many of the older immigrants and Canadian-born Italians seized with alacrity the opportunity for leadership that the newcomers offered them.

Far from the liability it had been during the war, Italianness became an asset. By activating connections with Italy and using Italian as a business as well as a family language, the Italian Canadian contractor, for example, was able to find a source of cheap labour that helped him forge ahead of his rivals of French and British origins. Small shopkeepers of Italian descent doubled and trebled their clientele within the space of a year. Tradesmen suddenly found a market growing so fast that assistants were needed to help meet the demands. Italian Canadian professionals, many of whom had almost succeeded in becoming part of French-speaking Canadian society, reactivated their Italian contacts and studied the culture and language of their immigrant parents in order to attract clients.

The dying Italian community thus surged into vigorous new life, generating economic, political and social ties with the Canadian-born persons of Italian descent who were moving out of it. The next two chapters examine the structure of this community.

The many ties that cut across the Italian community in Montreal bind together persons of Italian descent into a unity that is not just a sociological abstraction. The more important ties derive from a commitment to family, neighbourhood and friendship groups, interaction through economic activity, and finally the common culture and experience shared by persons of Italian descent. More formal institutions such as the Italian national church and a host of associations and clubs founded by Italian Canadians for Italian Canadians, reinforce these ties. Even the Italian Consulate plays a role. From within the community spokesmen have emerged who represent its interests in dealing with the world around it, and a system of social control operates to enforce values which are particular to it.

A. Family and Kinship

Because of the importance to Italians of the rights and obligations of their membership in a family and of a wider kinship network, it is convenient to begin our examination of the Italian community by exploring very briefly the nature of this commitment.

In general, kinship occupies a much more important place in a person's social life in Italy than it does in North America.¹ In fact, the central institution of Italian society is the nuclear family. The rights and obligations which derive from membership in it provide the individual with his basic moral code. Moreover, a man's social status as a person with honour is closely linked with his ability to maintain or improve the economic position of his family and to safeguard the purity of its women, in whose virtue is enshrined the family's collective honour. A person's responsibility for his family is thus the value upon which his life is centred. Other values and organizational principles are of secondary importance. If they interfere with his ability to carry out his primary obligations to his family, he combats them with intrigue, force and violence if necessary. In so doing, he is supported by public opinion, even though he may be acting contrary to the law.

Because kinship is reckoned equally through both parents, each person stands at the centre of a vast network of individuals to whom he is related through both mother and father, and through marriage. Relatives are expected to help one another. But the help one can expect from kinsmen and, reciprocally, the obligation one has to assist them, diminish as the genealogical distance between the two increases. In general, it is extended to blood relatives as far as second cousins, the limit of the range within which the Church prohibits marriage. Effective recognition for the purposes of mutual aid and friendship generally goes only as far as first cousins. It is strongest between members of the same nuclear family, that is, between parents and their children and between brothers and sisters. This obligation to the members of one's own natal family diminishes once a person marries and founds his own family.

Thus the southern Italian divides the world around him into kin and non-kin. The former are allies with whom he shares reciprocal rights and obligations of mutual assistance and protection. The latter are either enemies or potential enemies, for each seeks to protect and improve the position of his own family, if need be at the expense of others.

This attitude and the values upon which it is based are brought over and, to a considerable extent, perpetuated among the immigrants of Italian origin in Canada. It is obvious that this outlook serves to preserve and even to reinforce the importance of the family. Italian families in Montreal are close groups, and members see each other often, even though they live in widely separated sections of the city. Thus the kinship network provides a resilient fabric which binds together the members of the Italian community and links people who are geographically separated and who may even belong to different socio-economic classes.

The presence of most Italians in Montreal is due to the help they have received from kinsmen. According to Greenwood,² whereas 91 per cent of all Italian immigrants were sponsored by close relatives, the proportion of German immigrants who have received this kind of help was 37 per cent, and the average from all countries 47 per cent. Many Italians borrowed money from relatives already in Canada in order to finance their passage; others received the necessary legal guarantees and help in finding both accommodation and employment upon arrival. Relatives cluster near each other; many share the same house. As Table 2.1 shows, a third of the immigrants in our sample had

Table 2.1. Proximity of nearest close relative†

Proximity	Immigrant	Canadian-born
Same building	10%	52%
Within five minutes	23	14
Elsewhere in Montreal	35	29
Elsewhere in Canada or U.S.A.	4	5
Italy and elsewhere	28	0
Total %	100	100
Number	176	21

† Including parents, grandparents, and married children; but excluding spouse and unmarried children living at home.

close relatives living either in the same building or within five minutes of their own house. Even among those persons of Italian descent born in Canada, ties of kinship are still very strong. A full two-thirds had close relatives living within five minutes, including over one-half who had relatives living in the same building, though not necessarily in the same dwelling area, for most live in duplex apartments.

In addition to providing help for those wishing to immigrate, find housing and work, relatives assist each other in many other ways. They extend hospitality, give discounts in business, and lend a hand in caring for sick or indigent relatives. It is very often through the network of relatives already in Canada that the immigrant makes his first contact with Canadian society. This network thus provides a cushion against the shocks of acculturation and the sense of isolation which any new immigrant feels as a result of his ignorance of the customs and language of the host country. But if a person can expect help and protection from his relatives, he also has obligations to them. If he is able to, he is expected to return hospitality, provide protection, and give help in other ways. Garigue and Firth³ note of Italian kinship relations in London that “kinship is less an instrument of *social expression* as in English kinship, than a *formal tie* implying rights and obligations.”

Italian Canadians and their relatives not only live near each other, they also see a great deal of each other. As shown in Table 2.2, 59 per cent of all immigrants had contact with their close relatives during the previous week, and 36 per cent had seen them during the previous 24 hours. These contacts were even more pronounced among those born in Canada, among whom 76 per cent had seen their relatives in the previous week, and a full 71 per cent during the previous 24 hours.

Table 2.2. Frequency of contact with close relatives

Frequency	Immigrant	Canadian-born
Previous 24 hours	36%	71%
Earlier in previous week	23	5
Not seen in previous week	41	24
Total %	100	100
Number	176	21

Almost invariably during the course of an evening’s interview one or more cousins or aunts, uncles or possibly a brother, son or daughter would come into the home of an informant and visit for anywhere up to the whole period of the interview. More formal visiting usually takes place on Saturday afternoon or Sunday. These days are very often reserved for calls on relatives who live at some distance and for the many formal celebrations such as births, confirmations, marriages, and deaths. The visit then becomes a formal affair in the sense that invitations are sent out or passed on by word of mouth, and it is a positive obligation to attend or to send a representative to such ceremonies. As the success of these functions is usually measured by the lavishness of the arrangements as well as by the number of persons attending, a good deal of informal pressure is placed on relatives to attend and help make a good showing. In order to accommodate the many

guests invited (at times as many as 200 people), such receptions are often held in specially hired halls. Thus each kinship ceremony provides the occasion for the meeting of a large body of persons who are either blood relatives or relations by marriage. Such occasions very often offer the means for more distant relatives to remain in contact with each other, as well as for younger members of the family to learn the names of, and to meet personally, those who make up the kinship network into which they were born and which will become increasingly important to them in their own social life. As there are approximately 2,400 births and 550 marriages a year, about 3,000 celebrations involving these two kinship ceremonies alone take place annually. Confirmations, name-day parties and funerals provide other occasions at which relatives meet each other.

Such occasions also enable persons of Italian descent to keep in contact with the Italian element of the society in which they live. Kin relations are almost by definition couched in the idiom of Italian culture. Italian is used to speak to older relatives who have not learned French or English. Italian dishes are served and news is exchanged about more distant kinsmen who live elsewhere in North America or who have remained in Italy. There is a constant flow of correspondence and news passing between immigrants and their families in Italy. Seven out of 10 receive letters from Italy at least once a fortnight. Even 28 per cent of those born in Canada receive letters fortnightly, although many have never been to Italy and have never met the relatives from whom they hear so frequently.

Table 2.3. Frequency of mail from Italy†

Frequency	Immigrant	Canadian-born
Fortnightly	70%	28%
Less than fortnightly	27	5
Never	3	67
Total %	100	100
Number	176	21

† None of the 21 persons born in Canada had visited Italy.

B. Neighbourhood and Friendship

If kinship provides a complex system of personal links which help bind together persons of Italian descent in Montreal, so do the ties of neighbourhood and friendship. Most of the Italian immigrants in Montreal were born in small villages and towns in the south of Italy. These villages and towns are face-to-face communities where most persons not only know each other by name but know an uncomfortable number of personal details about each other. The social life in a small face-to-face community is very different from that in a large, cosmopolitan city such as Montreal. Many immigrants would find themselves leading isolated and lonely lives if it were not for the Italian neighbourhoods they live in.

A glance at the map will recall that in a number of areas of the city almost half the population is composed of Italians. In some streets they make up an even larger proportion. The points of greatest concentration are centred around Italian parish churches. These churches, of course, were built in particular places because Italians lived there. But once established, they drew new immigrants into the neighbourhood. Italian neighbourhoods, such as those centring on the Madonna della Difesa at the corner of Dante and Henri Julien Streets and San Giovanni Bosco on Springland Street in Ville Émard, are areas in which there are clusters of little food shops, cafés, and small business enterprises, such as photographers', tailors' and cobblers' shops run by Italians very largely for Italians.

It is obviously not possible for any one Italian to know all other persons of Italian descent in Montreal. Thus in this respect persons of Italian descent in Montreal do not make up a single face-to-face community. But it is possible to know many persons living in one's neighbourhood. Thus these neighbourhoods recreate in a certain sense the face-to-face communities composed of relatives, friends, and neighbours which the average immigrant left behind in Italy. Because immigrants establish their first contacts with Canadian life through such a neighbourhood, they very often settle there permanently. Their children are born and grow up there. Thus an Italian neighbourhood is, to a certain extent, a self-perpetuating group of friends and relatives who own property there. The second generation continues to live in a neighbourhood chosen by their parents. In point of fact, 52 per cent of the immigrants and 57 per cent of the Canadian-born in our general sample chose to buy houses in neighbourhoods with which they were already familiar and in which relatives and other Italians lived. The factors, other than cost, governing the choice of residential area are set out in Table 2.4.

Table 2.4. Factors (other than cost) governing choice (or future choice) of residential area

Factor	Immigrants	Canadian-born
Familiar with neighbourhood	28%	38%
Relatives nearby	14	14
Other Italians nearby	10	5
Good schools nearby	20	10
Work nearby	5	10
Other, or no particular reason	23	23
Total %	100	100
Number	176	21

C. Italian Culture

Aside from Italian institutions concentrated in Italian neighbourhoods, there are also a number which cater to Italians wherever they live in the city. In particular, I refer to the

Italian press, radio and television. The four Italian weeklies published in Montreal—*Il Corriere Italiano*, *La Tribuna*, *Il Cittadino Canadese*, and *Il Corriere del Quebec*—reach a large proportion of the population. In fact, 86 per cent of the persons interviewed reported that they read an Italian paper at least several times a week. Moreover, Radio Station CFMB broadcasts daily programmes in Italian. From 2 p.m. to 3 p.m. there is a programme of light music, and in the evening from 6 p.m. to 8 p.m. music, news and a sports commentary are broadcast. Mass from one of the Italian churches is generally broadcast on Sunday mornings, and at noon Station CFCE often televises a half-hour Italian musical review. These programmes are extremely popular; every house that we visited between 6 p.m. and 8 p.m. in the course of this study had the Italian programme turned on full blast. Thus news is circulated not only by word of mouth but also through the Italian-language news media.

Although we studied few elements of Italian culture other than language (about which more will be said in a later section), Italian food habits deserve a note in passing. They are extremely important; many of our informants told us that one of the greatest problems they had in adjusting to life in North America was the diet. To overcome this as far as possible, almost nine out of 10 continued to do a considerable proportion of their shopping at Italian stores, and two-thirds of the persons interviewed (67 per cent) made their own wine with grapes imported from California.

D. Earning a Living

Almost without exception immigrants left Italy because they could not find satisfactory work or because they saw no possibility there of bettering their socio-economic position. In general immigrants are recruited from the lowest socio-economic categories in Italy: peasants and day labourers who move into the corresponding socio-economic categories in the Canadian economy. That is, they become factory workers and unskilled or semiskilled labourers. Their children, however, by and large move up in the socio-economic hierarchy. These general statements are borne out by a detailed examination of the occupational statistics of Italian Canadians in Quebec.

In Table 2.5 I have compared the occupations of men of Italian descent to the Quebec male labour force. From this comparison it will be seen that in only three occupational categories does the proportion of persons of Italian descent exceed the average for the province. These, significantly, are (a) unskilled labourers, (b) craftsmen (which in this case means construction, building and textile workers), and (c) service and recreation workers—comprising 45 per cent, 17 per cent and 10 per cent respectively of the Italian working force, or almost three out of every four persons of Italian descent.

If one compares the occupations in which Italians were engaged in Italy and their present employment in Canada, and these two with the occupations of persons born in Canada of Italian descent, it becomes apparent that there is a clear occupational shift (see Table 2.6). Almost 50 per cent of the immigrants were small farmers or agricultural labourers in Italy. Once in Canada they have moved into jobs as labourers and factory workers. Many of their children, however, leave manual occupations for white-collar work, becoming businessmen and shop owners (24 per cent), professional and technical

Table 2.5. Occupations of males of Italian origin compared to total Quebec male labour force†

Occupation	Total Quebec	Italian origin
Managerial	9.6%	6.1%
Professional and technical	7.8	3.5
Clerical	7.8	4.9
Sales	5.8	3.4
Service and recreation	7.5	9.9
Transport and communication	8.1	4.6
Primary (farming, logging and mining)	12.8	3.9
Craftsmen	31.0	45.0
Labourers	6.7	17.4
Not stated	3.0	1.6
Total %	100.1	100.3
Number	1,289,425	34,211

Source: Census of Canada, 1961; Catalogue 94-515.

†“Labour force” is here defined to include all males 15 years of age and over working or looking for work.

specialists (10 per cent), clerical workers (14 per cent), and salesmen and shop attendants (9 per cent). Thus, while only 14 per cent of the immigrant generation work in white-collar occupations, 57 per cent of the second and third generation Italians do. This is a striking commentary on the social mobility of persons of Italian descent. Almost without exception, teachers, lawyers, doctors, specialists, leading industrialists and business executives of Italian descent are the sons of Italian peasants who worked as unskilled and semi-skilled industrial and construction labourers in Montreal. Because so many families have moved up the scale from ditchdigger to medical specialist, from peasant to industrialist, in a single generation, the status ranking in the Italian community is extremely complex. This is a subject with which we shall deal a little later.

Table 2.6. Occupations of immigrants and Canadian-born Italians

Occupation	Immigrants		Canadian-born
	Occupation in Italy	Present occupation	
Managerial	2%	5%	24%
Professional and technical	6	4	10
Clerical	1	2	14
Sales	7	3	9
Service and recreation	5	8	5
Transport and communication	2	6	0
Primary (agriculture, fishing, etc.)	42	1	0
Craftsmen, production, etc.	23	40	38
Labourers	10	31	0
No occupation	2	0	0
Total %	100	100	100
Number	176	176	21

Occupation provides an important social field in which persons of Italian descent interact with one another. In Chapter IV, I shall discuss how it also provides an important link with French- and English-speaking society. At this point, however, I would like to stress that six out of 10 immigrants speak only Italian or some Italian at their place of work and more than two out of 10 use only Italian (*see* Table 2.7). This, in a sense, is understandable in the case of the immigrant who arrives without any knowledge of either French or English. But almost half of those born in Canada also use Italian at their place of work. Thus the social field of labour provides an area in which Italian culture is perpetuated and persons of Italian descent come in contact with each other, creating a further set of ties that link Italian Canadians to each other.

Table 2.7. Use of Italian at work

Use	Immigrants	Canadian-born
Italian only	24%	0%
Some Italian	35	47
No Italian	41	53
Total %	100	100
Number	171	19

If persons of Italian descent work *with* each other, they also work *for* each other. As indicated in Table 2.8 three out of 10 persons of Italian descent work for Italians, and 46 per cent work with them (*see also* Table 4.11).

Table 2.8. Ethnic group of employers and workmates

Ethnic group	Employer/ supervisor	Workmates
Italian	31%	46%
French	16	31
English	25	7
Other	28	16
Total %	100	100
Number	190	188

These isolated figures do not show how hard Italians, especially the immigrants, work. They have come to Canada at great sacrifice, having left behind relatives, friends and familiar conditions to make a better life for themselves and their children. To attain their objectives they work long hours and often send their wives out to work (35 per cent of the wives of immigrants and 24 per cent of the wives of Canadians of Italian origin work outside the home) in order to save enough money to buy a house and thus provide a focal point for their family. Nearly one-half (43 per cent) of the persons interviewed owned their own house and several owned a number of houses in addition. Of those who owned houses, seven out of 10 purchased them between five and 10 years after their arrival in

Canada. Many owned expensive homes for which they were required to make a cash down payment of from 20 to 30 per cent of the value. In point of fact, 45 per cent of our informants had bought homes valued at \$15,000 to \$25,000, 25 per cent valued at less than \$15,000, but 30 per cent at more than \$25,000.

How do immigrants who arrive penniless manage to save such large sums of money in such a short time? This is a question which we asked many times, knowing as we did that 26 per cent had purchased their houses in less than five years, 60 per cent in from five to 10 years, while only 14 per cent had been obliged to work and save for more than 10 years to acquire a home of their own. This is what one family told us about the general situation—an account which is virtually similar to many other stories we heard.

All feel that a family with more than one person able to work can purchase a house between five and eight years after their arrival. The family's financial policy is to live on 50 per cent of what its members earn. During the first few years savings are set aside to repay debts. Most Italian families arrive with a debt to a relative who loaned them money for their trip. Very few families are able to pay for their trip out of their own money. In order to repay this loan, each family needs about two to three years, after which, if everybody is working, they can set aside money for the purchase of a house. Italian families do not try to save on food. They eat well; their children are well fed. They do, however, save by not having a car and not going out to eat. Only when the house is paid for will the family consider going out on Saturday or Sunday evenings.

These observations were made by the oldest son of a family of six who arrived in 1956 and purchased their \$25,000 house in 1961, making a down payment of \$13,000. The experience of this family is perhaps a little unusual because three of the children were working during part of that time. They were thus able to supplement the income of the father, a night watchman in a restaurant. But it does give an idea of what can be done and is being done.

Although we asked questions about savings, many replies, as expected, were evasive. Of the 171 persons who did reply, 24 per cent reported that they saved less than \$1,000 a year, 29 per cent between \$1,000 and \$3,000, 10 per cent between \$3,000 and \$5,000. Thirty-seven per cent replied that they saved nothing, although this figure was in many cases a way of refusing to answer the question.

This brief digression from our main theme serves to illustrate the dynamic aspect of the Italian Canadian community. The drive to buy a house, to own property, is one of the fundamental reasons why the immigrant left his own country. It is only when he has acquired a house that he begins to put down roots in his new homeland. The importance of owning property and thus providing a focal point for future generations of his family, is a value which the immigrant has brought with him from Italy. In order to meet this housing demand whole sections of Montreal are being constructed by Italian builders for Italians.

This economic pragmatism which caused most Italian immigrants to leave their own country has resulted in a set of values embodying a materialistic outlook and a rather conservative economic philosophy. Because in one generation so many have become successful businessmen and members of the professions by their own hard work and sacrifices, many have the feeling that if "we can do it, so can they." The "they" refers to

the poorer members of their own ethnic group as well as those of other ethnic groups, notably the French. The quest for money, the emphasis on savings, the long hours of work necessary to buy a house, a television set, eventually a car and other possessions have resulted in extreme importance being placed on material values. It is striking, for example, that very few Italian Canadians feel a vocation for the priesthood. The fact that there are only about 12 Italian Canadian priests has caused Bishop Cimichella some concern, as witness a number of speeches he made on this subject to meetings of Italian associations during 1964-1965.

There are also very few artistic activities, such as the poetry contests, song festivals, dramatic performances and folklore recitals which enliven the Ukrainian community.⁴ Only one folklore group, the north Italian Friulani group *Furgolar Furlan*, is really active among the Italians. The Dante Alighieri Society, a cultural organization fostered by the Italian government, has met with little success in Montreal. The values brought to Canada by the immigrants have not included any great interest in the arts; this is part of the culture of the *borghesi*, the middle and upper classes which stayed behind in Italy. Immigrants amuse themselves much as their forefathers did in Italy: they organize family celebrations, banquets, football matches, bicycle races, and popular song competitions. These, with the religious *feste*, are the popular cultural activities of the Italian countryside today and are also those of the Italian community in Montreal.

It should be noted, however, that in the second and third generations, individuals have arisen out of this community who have made important contributions to the artistic life of Canada, particularly in the fields of music, painting and the theatre.

Material success has generated a rather self-satisfied outlook which reinforces the importance given to the family and the responsibility that men have to maintain it and provide for future generations. As so many Italian Canadians have been able to better their economic conditions so strikingly in one generation, many have adopted very conservative attitudes towards the increasing role which the government is playing in welfare services, education, and public health. The middle-class sons of penniless peasant immigrants who in the twenties and thirties depended upon the charity of church and friends if they became ill, criticize the Quebec government's increasing involvement in medical aid. At a banquet organized by the Canadian Italian Business and Professional Men's Association (CIBPA) one informant remarked to me, "If people are sick they should be able to pay for a doctor themselves." At this remark, the other successful Italian Canadian businessmen surrounding us nodded their heads in full agreement. Several cited examples of "lazy," "unambitious" new immigrants and French Canadians, who receive free hospitalization and medical care paid for with the taxes which they, the more ambitious and harder working members of the community, were obliged to contribute.

E. The Church

Religion provides another social field in which persons of Italian descent meet each other and interact as members of a particular ethnic group. To a very large extent, the structure of the Italian ethnic church provides the territorial framework of the Italian

community. Of all persons of Italian descent in Montreal, 97 per cent are Roman Catholic (see Table 3.4). By virtue of belonging to one church a person belongs to a community which is defined in territorial terms. Membership in a parish includes the right as well as the duty of participating in the vital *rites de passage*—baptisms, marriages and funerals; and the obligation of supporting the parish financially.

There are, as already noted, five Italian national parishes and two mission areas.* The Italian national parishes do not include all persons of Italian descent living in Montreal (see Table 1.3). Roughly 16 per cent live outside the areas covered by the Italian national parishes. Moreover, a number of Italian Canadians who live within the territorial limits of the Italian national parishes have chosen, for one reason or another, to associate themselves with either a French- or an English-speaking parish. Roman Catholics of Italian descent automatically become members of the congregation of the national parish in which they live, but may petition to change their membership to one of the other ethnic parishes. Although this matter was not examined systematically, a number of Canadian-born informants told us they became members of French-speaking Canadian parishes because these were closer to their homes; others did so to become more completely involved in the social life of an ethnic group other than Italian. Yet others attended mass at the nearest French-or English-speaking parish church while remaining registered members of a particular Italian parish.

The proportion of immigrants attending services in Italian regularly was 53 per cent; about 10 per cent reported attendance at French services regularly, and 4 per cent at English services. It is significant that nine out of every 10 Italians attended services at least once a year in Italian, while only 38 per cent and 19 per cent respectively went to French or English services during the year. On the other hand, of the Canadian-born Italians interviewed, a much larger proportion attended weekly services in French or English. One-fourth attended services in Italian regularly. Moreover, six out of 10 reported that they went to Italian churches at least once a year. These figures are set out in Table 2.9.

Table 2.9. Frequency of church attendance and language of church services

Frequency	Language of church services					
	Italian		French		English	
	Immi-grants	Canadian-born	Immi-grants	Canadian-born	Immi-grants	Canadian-born
Weekly	53%	24%	10%	41%	4%	23%
At least once a year (but not weekly)	36	33	28	30	15	12
Less than once a year (or never)	11	43	62	29	81	65
Total %	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number	176	21	172	17	171	17

*See map.

As with other Roman Catholic parishes in Quebec, each Italian national parish is a property-owning legal corporation whose trustees are the vestrymen. The latter are laymen appointed by the parish priest upon the recommendation of the other vestrymen, a new one being added to the group annually. The vestrymen are responsible to their fellow parishioners as well as to the law for the administration of the funds which they collect; these may be for the building of the church and other special activities such as parish feasts, testimonial banquets, and charities. Thus a number of Italian Canadians are now legally a part of the institution which provides the territorial framework of the Italian community.

The person ultimately responsible for the spiritual affairs of the congregation of souls which makes up a parish is the parish priest. He is a link between the local parish and the church hierarchy. Because of this role and the prestige associated with it, he is respected not only in the Italian community but also outside it. He has a standing and a range of contacts which make him very useful to parishioners who are not so well placed. He is often called upon to represent their interests with the higher authorities, not only those authorities who are concerned with religious affairs but also those with responsibilities in secular fields such as education, health, welfare, and employment. The parish priests are the persons who articulate the territorial framework of the Italian community and as such, are key figures. They are usually assisted by one or more priests.

All clergy serving in Italian national churches belong to religious orders. The administration of the five parishes and two mission areas is in the hands of four orders: the Servants of Mary (Madonna del Carmine and Madonna della Difesa), the Consolata Society for Foreign Missions (Madonna della Consolata and San Giovanni Bosco), the Scalabrini Missionary Fathers (Madonna di Pompei and the Western Mission), and the Salesian Fathers (the Eastern Mission). These are all Italian mission societies in which almost all priests are Italian-born. Of the 24 priests attached to the Italian national parishes and missions, all but one, a French-speaking Canadian, are of Italian descent, and of these all but two were born in Italy. Of the two, one was born in the United States and the other in Manitoba.

The Italian national church in Montreal is an Italian mission church and not an Italian Canadian church. It is run by Italian missionaries for Italian immigrants. Most of the priests speak to each other, preach and carry out their business in Italian. In every neighbourhood the parish church provides the focal point of Italian culture. Several informants born in Canada told us that they often stopped by to practise their Italian with the priest. There are 12 ordained Canadian Italian priests, but none is attached to any of the Italian parishes. Six are in Montreal working in French Canadian parishes.

Because there is a certain exchange of personnel between the parishes run by any given order, several parishes have contacts through their priests with other parishes administered by the same order. Madonna della Consolata and San Giovanni Bosco, Madonna di Pompei and the Western Mission, Madonna della Difesa and Madonna del Carmine have links with each other not shared with other Italian parishes. These links help unite the geographically dispersed groups of persons of Italian descent.

It is at the level of the diocese, however, that the representatives of the Italian national parishes meet each other more frequently, under the aegis of Bishop Andrea Cimichella and the Archbishop of Montreal, Cardinal Paul-Émile Léger. Monsignor Andrea

Cimichella, formerly parish priest of Madonna del Carmine, was appointed prior provincial of the Servants of Mary in Canada on May 19, 1964, and three weeks later became auxiliary bishop. Bishop Cimichella is the only manifestly Canadian member of the clergy of the Montreal Italian church. The son of the head gardener at the Grand Seminary in Montreal, he came to Canada at the age of six from the province of Viterbo and, though a member of an Italian mission order, was educated in Canada. Although Bishop Cimichella (one of six auxiliary bishops who assist the cardinal archbishop) has no particular terms of reference linking him officially to the Italian community, his elevation to the office of bishop has made him one of its most important leaders. Although officially part of the administration of a diocese embracing more than 250 parishes and two million persons, he none the less spends a substantial portion of his time attending various Italian activities as guest of honour, and officiating at religious ceremonies for the Italian community. He also acts as mediator between the many conflicting interest groups which divide the Italian community and presides at regular meetings of the Italian parish priests.

The Italian national church not only provides structural form through its ready-made territorial framework of parishes, but also represents a source of Italian culture for the Canadian-born and a comforting buffer between the somewhat bewildered new immigrant and Canadian society. The church also provides a channel whereby Italian neighbourhoods may come into contact with each other. While there is no institutionalized meeting point between Italian residential areas as neighbourhoods, there is between Italian neighbourhoods as parishes. Weekly masses, important annual festivals such as Christmas and Easter, enthusiastically celebrated feasts of Sant'Antonio of Padua and parish patron saints, in addition to baptisms, confirmations, weddings and funerals are occasions when persons of Italian descent meet each other on a recurring basis. These meetings provide the ceremonial core of the community, for the Italian community is not only a network of kinsmen, friends, neighbours and workmates—it is also a ritual group.

F. Associations⁵

The many associations for Italian Canadians provide another set of institutional bones which give form to the network of interpersonal relationships based on kinship, friendship, the neighbourhood and marketplace. Although only 13 per cent of the immigrants and 28 per cent of the Canadian-born are members of such clubs, the officers, who together probably number no more than 600, are an important group. They are the leaders of the Italian community. Through their roles within their respective organizations they co-ordinate the numerous activities which enable persons of Italian descent to renew and extend their personal contacts. They also represent the interests of the rank and file to other associations and to the Italian community at large, as well as to the rest of Canadian society.

The associations thus provide a social milieu within which persons desiring to become prominent in the community compete with each other for position. In this sense, the milieu of the associations is also a political milieu.

About 19 per cent of all the persons interviewed belonged to one or more of the associations. Given the total adult male population of approximately 34,000 (see Table

2.5), this means that around 6,500 Italians belong to one or more of the approximately 60 associations organized for and by Italian Canadians. Very briefly, these clubs may be divided into mutual aid, regional, church, occupational and professional, and social organizations. These categories are by no means exclusive. A number of clubs fall into several classifications: many mutual aid societies are also regional groups and social clubs.

The mutual aid societies are the oldest. Formed shortly after the arrival of the first immigrants around the turn of the century, they provide a measure of collective security to replace the support which the immigrant was used to receiving from his relatives in Italy. These societies function very much like insurance companies and are often organized on a regional basis. For as little as a dollar a month, members receive up to 10 dollars a week allowance if they are unable to work. When they die their widows receive four or five hundred dollars to cover funeral expenses. Although their insurance function is decreasing, owing to the increasing activity of the Quebec government in this field, the importance of the mutual benefit societies is still considerable. The largest are the Order of the Sons of Italy and the Order of Italo-Canadians—the latter having broken from the Order of the Sons of Italy during the Fascist period. Each numbers well over a thousand members. Of the two, the Sons of Italy is the more important politically, for it is organized in nine lodges which have a semi-autonomous status and serve as focal points for members in various sections of the city. Its president is Alfredo Gagliardi, an ex-member of the Montreal Municipal Council, publisher of *Corriere Italiano*, the largest Italian newspaper in Canada, and owner of a prosperous travel agency. Individual lodges hold seasonal banquets, card and spaghetti parties, and dances for members. The Order also organizes chartered tourist flights to Italy.

Regional associations, many of which are also mutual benefit societies, number at least 15. Many have premises fitted out very much like social clubs. For example, the Sicilian Association, composed mainly of persons born in Cattolica Eraclea, a town of some 8,000 inhabitants in the province of Agrigento, has a well-equipped clubhouse in Ville St. Michel. Its annual Christmas banquet was attended by more than 400 persons in 1964. Other active regional associations include several from the province of Campobasso, and the Friulani association already mentioned.*

Church associations are also numerous. Some have city-wide organizations, others are centred on particular parishes. One of the most interesting is the Roman Catholic Association of Italian Workers (Associazione Cattolica dei Lavoratori Italiani—ACLI), a group which recently established language and vocational training courses for new immigrants. Several sports clubs are dedicated to organizing football matches and bicycle races. The largest association is Local 274 of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, which is the Italian branch of the Clothing Workers Union and numbers some 4,000 members.

The most important society in terms of influence within as well as outside the community is the Canadian Italian Business and Professional Men's Association (CIBPA). Established in 1949 it was modelled on a similar organization in Toronto. Garigue¹ has called it the "most important single development in the Italian community since the

*See p. 18.

Second World War.” The total membership is close to 400 and is composed of most of the leading Italian Canadian professionals and businessmen in Montreal. Its leaders claim to speak on behalf of the rest of the Italian community to the provincial and federal governments—to both of which it periodically presents briefs. For example, in 1962, CIBPA presented a petition to the Prime Minister requesting, among other things, more education for immigrants both before they left Italy and after their arrival in Canada; greater recognition by Canadian authorities of technical trade certificates obtained in Italy; and the appointment of a senator and a judge of Italian descent at the federal level. It also came out against the atomic bomb, but suggested “that nuclear armaments for the defence of Canada should not be rejected lightly”; advocated a Canadian national anthem and national flag; and deplored the “amplitude of communist infiltration prevailing in publicly owned agencies” and urged the government to take preventive measures to “stem this threat which is undermining public opinion and Canadian ideals through insidious propaganda under the guise of freedom of speech and the respect of democratic rights.”

Many prominent persons, especially important members of other associations, deny that the CIBPA speaks for the Italian community. They claim that its proposals are platitudes formulated to enable the CIBPA to attract attention and make itself appear important. Undeniably a number of its directors and staff take themselves very seriously. Nonetheless, CIBPA is well organized, with a well-edited annual directory and a monthly information bulletin. It also has an active women’s auxiliary which functions very much as similar North American women’s clubs—organizing fashion shows, cultural talks, and charitable activities. Garigue’s evaluation of the organization in 1955 still holds true today: “While this organization claims to speak for the whole community, effective membership and certainly leadership within it is limited to a narrow group of Italians who have wealth and important status within the community.”⁷ This élite is almost exclusively composed of persons born in Canada, many of whom occupy important positions in other associations. When they choose to do so, many move in the community as French Canadians, a lesser number as English Canadians. All retain their links with the Italian community for reasons of prestige, business and politics.

A few years ago, a group of Italian-educated professional men and business executives, almost all recent arrivals, left the CIBPA and founded a more exclusive organization, the Association of Italo-Canadian Professional Men (*Associazione dei Professionisti Italo-Canadesi*—APIC), so that they would not have to rub shoulders with shopkeepers and contractors whose peasant origins were often all too obvious to them. Doctors and lawyers of Italian descent have also founded their own associations to represent their particular professional interests. None of these associations, however, performs political functions analogous to those of CIBPA.

Finally, there are the social clubs, the most important of which are the Casa d’Italia and the Bella Vista Golf Club, the latter patronized by many CIBPA members. The Casa d’Italia, as already noted, was the centre of prewar Fascist activity. Until a few years ago it was run by an exclusive group, most of whom were also important members of the Sons of Italy and the CIBPA. With a restaurant and tavern in the basement and meeting rooms and offices for associations on the first floor, it appears to have been organized more as a money-making concern than anything else. But in 1963 a new committee, composed of some of the most influential persons in the Italian community, appointed

some of their own number to convert it into a true cultural and social centre for the Italian community. The new committee plans to renovate the building's rather seedy exterior. As the committee must go to the community at large to collect funds, the motives of the committee and their ambitious plans have come under close scrutiny by the Italian press, notably *La Tribuna*. If the committee succeeds in attaining its goal, the head of the Casa d'Italia will become the likely candidate for senator—if the government ever decides to heed the continued pressure of the Italian community to appoint one of their number to the Senate. It is partly because of this expectation that the activities of the committee have aroused great controversy.

Noticeably absent from among the many Italian voluntary associations are any designed to assist the needy or to help new immigrants adjust to their surroundings in Canada. Until 1961 there was an Italian Immigrant Aid Society which was run by one person on a part-time basis with headquarters in a basement room of the Casa d'Italia. Its endowment, however, became exhausted and no organization has replaced it. In spite of periodic soul-searching and repeated pressure from the Italian Consul General and the parish priests, no action has been taken. Aside from several thousand dollars' worth of scholarships presented by the CIBPA to deserving university students, the lady bountiful activities of the CIBPA Ladies Auxiliary, and a certain number of Christmas baskets delivered to poor families by other organizations, nothing is done to help the many hundreds of immigrants who arrive nearly destitute. As one of the priests who works closely with the poorer segment of the Canadian Italian community in the south of the city remarked of the CIBPA, "The gentlemen members of the association don't want to know anything about the poor who live here. The less they hear about them, the happier they are, for these immigrants are an embarrassment to them."

In this respect, the Italian community might be contrasted with the Jewish community, which has an active charitable organization and takes care of its own poor in so far as it is able to. The lack of activity in this field on the part of the Italians may be explained by several factors. First of all, there is the difficulty of getting the necessary co-operation from a wide range of Italian associations. Secondly, there are the traditional values which have been touched upon above and which require each family to look after its own. In the third place, there is the traditional role which the Church has played in Italian society, with charity as its exclusive preserve. Finally, there is the attitude of the wealthy, already mentioned, that the destitute could improve their lot if only they would work harder.

Italian associations not only act as the organizers and focal points for much of the social activity within the Italian community, but also as pressure groups which make known to agencies and authorities outside the community the current problems and thoughts of their members. Between September 1964 and May 1965, 144 public events were organized by Italian Canadian associations. These ranged from the May dance for the élite at the Bella Vista Golf Club to the popular party organized in April by the Casacalenda Society; from Sons of Italy spaghetti nights to the mammoth benefit banquet to honour the Italian Canadian police chief of Ville d'Anjou and to raise funds for the next, and sixth, Italian parish in the east end of the city. This affair had to be held in an armory to accommodate the 1500 Italian Canadians who paid \$10 apiece to dance and enjoy the superb buffet and musical review.

G. Leadership

No one person can claim to speak on behalf of all Italians in Montreal. That no such leader exists is deplored by many people who would be among the first to challenge the right of any individual who did assume the role of spokesman. But if we cannot speak of any one leader, we can speak of a leadership or an élite group who, because of their wealth and the positions they occupy in the mass media field and in Italian societies and parish organizations, are able to interpret the various shades of Italian opinion both to each other and to the world outside the Italian community.

H. The Italian Consulate

What position does the representative of the Italian government in Montreal play in the affairs of the Italian Canadian community? Bayley⁸ has drawn a vivid picture of the instrumental role that the Italian Consul General played in the Italian community by shaping the Fascist national front during the 1930s. The Italian representative no longer plays such a decisive role. The official duties of the Consul General and his staff of 18, of whom 15 are immigrants who have retained their Italian nationality, are to foster the increasingly important commercial relations between Quebec and Italy, to handle passport renewals for Italian citizens, and to help solve any problems they may have with Canadian authorities. He also provides certain welfare services to needy Italian nationals who, by and large, are the newly-arrived immigrants. The Consul General declines any formal involvement in the affairs of persons of Italian descent who are Canadian citizens. But if the official policy of the consulate is one of non-involvement in the affairs of Canadians of Italian descent, its informal involvement in the Italian Canadian community, while not as pronounced and comprehensive as in the 1930s, is none the less considerable.

To begin with, the Consul General acts as host several times a year at receptions to introduce visiting Italian cultural, industrial, and commercial dignitaries to Montreal society. Key persons within the Italian Canadian community are invited to meet these dignitaries, not only because of the position they occupy in commerce and industry in Greater Montreal, but also because they are the élite of the Italian Canadian community. An invitation by the Consul General thus validates publicly a person's claim to social importance within the community. Secondly, he is generally invited to lend dignity and importance to the numerous dances and banquets organized by Italian associations. While the Consul General himself rarely attends these functions, the two Vice-Consuls spend a good deal of time doing so. In the third place, because he is a person with great prestige who is not Italian Canadian yet is Italian, the Consul General is frequently called upon to act as a peacemaker and mediator between squabbling factions and interest groups within the Italian Canadian community. I suspect, however, that this function will be assumed to an increasingly important extent by Bishop Cimichella. There is of course constant pressure upon the Consul General to support one particular faction against its rival, and so to become actively involved in the many quarrels which are so much a part of the Italian community.

Immigrants who have chosen to make their homes in Montreal also look to the Consul General to solemnize Italian national celebrations. His reluctance to encourage such celebrations by persons who have become or plan to become Canadian citizens is resented by many. For example, many hurled insults at the Consul General for his failure to organize a celebration to commemorate the twentieth anniversary of the end of the Second World War.⁹

I. Conclusion

The Italian community in Montreal is a viable whole, composed of multiple, overlapping networks of social relations originating in the fields of kinship, friendship, neighbourhood, and the marketplace, which are given a certain territorial unity by the parish structure of the Italian national church.¹⁰ Numerous voluntary associations not only group together persons with like interests, but also provide a base from which leaders emerge to represent the interests of Italian Canadians vis-à-vis other associations, ethnic groups, and government authorities. These associations also organize the numerous activities which are the occasions, large and small, for persons of Italian descent to meet and mingle with each other.

Because it is composed to a very large extent of persons whose value system differs in certain significant respects from that of their neighbours of French or British origins, the community exerts a unique pressure on its members to conform to such values. For example, the overriding importance attached by Italian Canadians to the obligations of kinship is not shared by all members of Canadian society. Thus the failure of an Italian Canadian to meet the demands of the behaviour expected of him by his kin, gives him a bad name in his community but is of little importance outside it. Although the group is a large one, the face-to-face nature of the contacts among certain of its segments means that the sanctions of public opinion are particularly effective.

One of the most important instruments of social control within the community is gossip. In this respect Italian women play a leading part. Their gossip circles examine and criticize not only the behaviour of other women but also of men—those who hold the official positions of authority and leadership within the community. Excluded from holding formal positions of authority within the community, women, through their gossip, are able to exert pressure on those who do. In this way they enforce the group's norms of behaviour.¹¹

The Italian community is thus a whole in which a person is born and baptized, finds his spouse and is married, obtains work and companionship; where, if he is ill, he can be cared for in one of the three Italian hospitals, and where he can die. It has its own leaders, internal value system, and system of social control. The community obviously facilitates the accommodation of an immigrant to Canadian society but retards his absorption into it.

The Italian community is not a united whole: numerous divisions cut across it at various levels. Many regard this lack of unity as one of their most pressing problems. What are the bases for these divisions and conflicts? The social principles which segment the Italian Canadian community in Montreal are, in general, the same as those which divide persons in Italy into many conflicting and competing groups—family loyalty, generation rivalry, regional differences, geographic isolation, and religious and political differences. Individual families regard each other with suspicion if not hostility and members of different generations grow out of touch with each other, for they often belong to different socio-economic classes and frequently speak different languages. The differences in dialect and customs brought over from Italy act as obstacles to co-operation, as does the distance separating the Italian residential areas in Montreal. Religious differences further segment the community. Perhaps the most serious divisions are those between the many leaders and spokesmen who compete with each other for position, power and followers in the status and political systems peculiar to the Italian Canadian community.

A. Family

In the previous chapter, we pointed out the important role played by the Italian family* in generating loyalty and kinship obligations binding together persons of Italian descent, irrespective of their socio-economic class, place of residence, association membership or political allegiance. It was also observed that Italian Canadians, especially immigrants, hold a set of values which incorporate the belief that a person's overriding moral obligation is to assist his family, even if he does so at the expense of others. As most persons feel and act this way, non-related families regard each other with deep

*See pp. 9-12.

suspicion. It will readily be appreciated that the very strength of the bond between members of individual families will isolate them from other similar groups. While we have argued that the many overlapping networks of tightly united kinsmen do create a strong set of links which, at a much higher conceptual level, can be seen to give unity and structure to the community, at a much lower level they create many conflicts. Persons who compete with each other do not co-operate readily. Nor are persons who hold such values prepared to sacrifice family interests for community interests, however the community may be defined.

There is, therefore, competition and a good deal of hostility, jealousy and backbiting between individual families as well as between associations. The war provided an opportunity for many to wreak vengeance on their enemies, whom they turned in to the RCMP as Fascists and Axis sympathizers. Several old-timers told me that they had been arrested on information which could only have been supplied to the police by their closest neighbours, who were also the persons with whom they would be in fiercest competition.

Because one kinsman tends to support another close kinsman in his competition with a rival, networks are mobilized into factions. This introduces an important divisive principle in any association. When there is a difference of opinion rivals recruit support from among their own network of kinsmen. Associations which contain a number of related persons are thus fragile and divide easily. This is one of the reasons why there are so many Italian associations in Montreal. New associations are born out of conflict in old ones; other associations disappear as peacemakers patch up quarrels between rival leaders.

In carrying out our research in the Italian community, and especially during the extensive interviews we had with individual families, we often had the feeling that we were moving among islands of tightly structured kinship groups, each of which was seen by informants as an organic whole and within which the major part of their own lives was played out. This impression does not reflect the reality, of course, for when we began to trace the various links of the network we saw that overlapping ties bound group to group.¹

B. Differences in Outlook

There is always in every society and in every community a certain degree of tension between generations. In this respect, the conflict between generations in the Italian community in Montreal is no exception. Indeed, it is accentuated because differences between generations are related not only to difference in age, but also to differences in place of birth, education and, more fundamentally, to differences in values and world outlook.

Those born in Italy are never completely accepted by Canadian society as full members, nor are they usually willing to accept without reservations the values and way of life of their adopted country. This sets them apart not only from the rest of Canadian society but also from their own children born and educated in Canada. Those born in Canada see their parents' continuing commitment to relatives, Italian culture, and the

issues which are important to the Italian Canadian community as an involvement which, to a certain extent, impedes their more complete integration into Canadian society.

There is also a certain element of tension between those who arrived before the war, most of whom established themselves before 1920, and those who have come in increasing numbers since 1946. A few of the old-timers regard the newcomers as brash and aggressive, lacking in appreciation of the sacrifices which the earlier immigrants made and from which the newcomers are now benefiting. The newcomers often regard the older immigrants as lacking in ambition and governed by a set of values which no longer exist in Italy today. At the same time, they regard the older immigrants as superior and disinterested in their problems of adjustment to new surroundings.

The Canadian-born, for their part, sometimes express concern that newcomers may give all Italian Canadians a bad name. Very often the immigrants' manners, level of education, even standards of personal cleanliness are criticized by Canadians of French and British origins with whom Italians born in Canada are trying to establish contacts. To some extent, the tensions that exist between the three groups—old immigrants, those born in Canada, and the new postwar immigrants—arise from very different experiences in adapting themselves to life in Canada.

Those who immigrated to Canada before the war were pioneers. They were peasants from the poverty-stricken areas of southern Italy, who came to Canada "with their worldly possessions in a sack on their back." They were not welcomed by scores of relatives and fellow villagers already established in Canada. On the contrary, they often encountered active discrimination and hostility from the English-speaking and especially the French-speaking Canadians, with whom they competed for housing and work. Because there were fewer schools in Quebec at that time and because education was more expensive, many were unable to attend school and were forced to go to work at the age of 14 or 15 years. The poverty that in rural Italy had been somewhat softened by the presence of kinfolk and neighbours, was replaced in Canada by the squalor of urban tenements. Many immigrants were just beginning to find their feet when the depression forced them into unemployment, hardship and suffering. Many have recounted how they had to sell their houses or had mortgages foreclosed on them. On top of this, they had the traumatic experience of the war, during which they were regarded as enemies and many were interned. Theirs was a life of sacrifice in the true meaning of the word.

In contrast, most of those who have come since the war, have had a very different set of experiences. Their passage was often paid by loans from relatives already established in Montreal. To them the immigrants looked for shelter, guidance, protection and work immediately upon arrival. Most, especially those who arrived after 1955, came with more education, for by that time universal education was widespread in Italy. Moreover, they arrived in a booming economy and had little difficulty in finding work which, though often seasonal labour in the construction industry, permitted them to earn a substantial income for a good part of the year. Government unemployment benefits helped them over the lean months when work was slack. Many also came to occupations created by brothers, uncles or fellow townsmen who had established themselves before the war and were thus able to offer secure employment. Moreover, they did not encounter the hostility and discrimination from Canadians of French and British origins which had been

the lot of their predecessors before the war, for the Italian Canadian community had become a recognized part of the social scene of Montreal. Finally, newcomers were able to save in a way which had not been possible for those who came before the war.

Though most prewar immigrants claim they have nothing but admiration for the ambition, diligence, and saving ability of the newcomers, the impression they give belies this. The newcomers do not live up to the stereotype that the older ones have formed from their own experience as newly arrived immigrants: they are not necessarily depressed, dependent, and uneducated. They are more aggressive, articulate and better educated and are able to make their way ahead much more rapidly. While many newcomers regard the early immigrants as trailblazers who made the sacrifices which have enabled them to adjust so rapidly, a large proportion, nonetheless, look upon these earlier immigrants as old-fashioned, unenterprising, and too extravagant, for they have abandoned in part the peasant virtues of economy in favour of the acquisition of such status symbols as television sets and cars. The newcomers also resent what they regard as the patronizing attitude of those born in Canada who, they say, are reluctant to become involved in the problems of the new immigrants.

During our interviews, we asked each group its opinion of the others. These are summarized in Table 3.1 and many of the actual opinions are set out in Appendix A.* Of the old immigrants, 83 per cent had favourable opinions of the new immigrants, whereas only 71 per cent of those born in Canada did. In contrast, only 56 per cent of the new immigrants held favourable opinions of the prewar immigrants, and only 33 per cent looked upon the Canadian-born with favour. It should be noted, however, that 40 per cent of the newcomers refused to express an opinion or value judgement on the Canadian-born. Of these, 71 per cent considered that the latter had become Canadian and could therefore not be judged by the same standards as the postwar immigrants.

Table 3.1. Opinions of each other held by old and new immigrants and Canadian-born Italians

Opinion	Old of new	Canadian- born of new	New of old	New of Canadian-born
Favourable	83%	71 %	56%	33%
Unfavourable	17	12	22	27
No opinion	0	17	22	40
Total %	100	100	100	100
Number	12	17	163	162

Table 3.2 sets out the reasons for the unfavourable opinions of old immigrants and those born in Canada held by postwar immigrants. While only 7 per cent regarded the Canadian-born as lacking ambition, 66 per cent regarded them as pretentious, jealous persons who "knew it all." Regarding the prewar immigrants, 42 per cent felt they lacked ambition and did not take full advantage of their opportunities, while slightly less, 39 per cent, regarded them as pretentious and jealous.

*See pp.75-6.

Table 3.2. Summary of unfavourable opinions of Canadian-born and old immigrants held by new immigrants

Opinion	Canadian-born	Old immigrants
Lack ambition, do not maximize opportunities	7%	42%
Pretentious, jealous, know-it-all	66	39
Other	27	19
Total %	100	100
Number	44	36

These differing attitudes cause friction. Certain associations, such as the mutual benefit societies, cater mostly to the older generation; others, such as the Canadian-Italian Business and Professional Men’s Association, are composed mainly of those born in Canada. Yet others, such as the Sicilian Association and the Roman Catholic Association of Italian Workers, are made up primarily of newcomers. Within mixed associations the differences in outlook which have been outlined in this section provide points of friction, for the members form three strata or categories whose interests differ considerably.

C. Regional Differences

Regional differences are another important cause of segmentation within the Italian Canadian community. Italians have strong attachments to their own region and within that region to their town or village and home. The most noticeable cultural difference is the regional dialect. The Roman maintains, and with some justice, that he cannot understand the Sicilian dialect nor that of Bergamo. If the person from central Italy has difficulty understanding those from the north and the south, how much less can the man from the north understand the southerner when he speaks in dialect? Although most Italian immigrants now speak Italian and thus can converse with persons from other parts of Italy, the majority speak in dialect at home and with others from their region. The regional dialect becomes an in-group language, a symbolic system which unites certain segments of the Italian Canadian population against other like segments.

The relative strength of the immigrants from the different regions in Italy is set out in Table 3.3, which also indicates the proportion from each region who are presently in white-collar occupations. The proportions coming from the south, centre and north of Italy are 70 per cent, 16 per cent and 14 per cent respectively. While 89 per cent of the southerners are working in non-white-collar occupations, only 65 per cent of those from the north are.

The antagonism between persons from different regions can become quite marked. The northerner claims that the southerner is a “rube,” a “cafone,” an ignorant peasant with little imagination, who has a violent temper and is insanely jealous of his women. The southerner regards the northerner as supercilious and far too pleased with himself. Many simply shrug the northerners off by saying, “They don’t understand us.” The south

Table 3.3. Region of birth in Italy and proportion in white-collar occupations in Montreal

Region	White-collar	Non-white-collar	Total %	Total immigrants	
				Number	%
South Italy	11%	89%	100	119	70
Central Italy	7	93	100	28	16
North Italy	35	65	100	23	14
Total				170	100

certainly forms no united block, for each region within it has cultural variations and regards its neighbours with suspicion. One afternoon, for example, I wandered about talking to shopkeepers in the area around Dante Street. In the space of about an hour two *Campobassani* had told me that all Sicilians were a dishonest and dangerous lot and could not be trusted. A Sicilian grocer, on the other hand, told me that all *Campobassani* were dishonest, two-faced persons who were perfectly capable of turning you in to the boss on some trumped-up charge so that you could be fired, thus making a vacancy for a cousin or a brother!

This opposition between regions is often institutionalized. Groups of persons from the same region often tend to live near each other. There is a strong concentration of Sicilians in the southern part of Ville St. Michel; and many *Campobassani* live in Ville Émard and Notre Dame de Grâce. They settle there not because they are surrounded by other persons from their region, but because they wish to be near their relatives. But the final result is the same. Another way in which regional differences become institutionalized is through the associations. Of the approximately 60 associations, 15 are in fact regional associations. These are among the most active groups. They organize card parties and dances two or three times a year, and almost invariably a large annual banquet. Many also celebrate the patron saint of their village or region.

Regional differences also provide potential points of conflict and fission within associations and other groups. Rivals often recruit their support along regional lines, even in disputes arising out of issues which have nothing to do with regional loyalty. The secretaries of several non-regional associations deplored the fact that regional loyalties were so often a source of conflict within their associations. These loyalties virtually disappear in the second generation, though they do tend to linger on through the regional dialects which the Canadian-born often speak. But as newcomers form such a significant proportion of the total Italian Canadian population, regional differences are an important source of conflict and segmentation in the Italian community today. Sometimes they can cut quite deeply and lead to numerous misunderstandings. Two northern priests, for example, deplored the "backwardness" and "superstition" of their Sicilian parishioners, claiming that they are closed, narrow-minded and suspicious persons who are so afraid for their women that the female section of the Catholic Action in one parish was all but extinct. Fathers quite simply would not allow their daughters to walk to the parish hall unaccompanied. As most of the men were too tired to accompany the women at night, this meant that the girls did not get out to church activities.

D. Neighbourhood and Parish

In the previous chapter I stressed the unity and importance of the parish and neighbourhood, indicating how the ties generated through residence there helped to link people together. In the same way that the unity of the family acts to isolate individual families, so neighbourhoods and parishes lead to division and sometimes to competition within the Italian community. The sheer spatial distance fragments the community into many small, isolated units which are almost as remote from each other as separate villages scattered across the countryside. This dispersal militates against unity. Each little centre has its own series of activities, club houses and cafés which tend to draw the local residents to them. For example, the Casa d'Italia could never become a social centre for persons living in the south or north of Montreal. It takes half an hour by car to reach it from Ville St. Léonard or Montréal Nord and an hour from Ville Émard.

The problem of distance also makes it difficult to organize feasts and other celebrations which draw together all members of the community. The Sons of Italy organize an Italian Day in Belmont Park which is ostensibly a picnic and popular celebration for all members of the Italian community. But only 24 per cent of persons we interviewed had been there during the last few years; seven out of 10 did not know who organized it, and three out of 10 had never even heard of it. On the other hand, individual parish feasts, notably the annual *fiesta* of Sant'Antonio of Padua, who has become the patron saint of immigrants in North America, are affairs that are celebrated with great enthusiasm and with a keen sense of rivalry between the various neighbourhoods and parishes.

This parochial attachment, which is not necessarily based on differences originating in Italy, but rather upon the geographical isolation of Italian neighbourhoods, creates much the same sort of segmentation as it does in Italy. It militates against the ability of the Italian community in Montreal to present a united front to the outside world.

E. Religious Differences

Although 97 per cent of all Italian Canadians are Roman Catholic, the small minority who are not provide another point of segmentation in the community. Table 3.4 sets out the different religious denominations in some detail.

We interviewed several Protestants of Italian origin as well as a few of their pastors. The net impression was that Italian Protestants form a small group which is very much cut off from the main Italian community. As persons tend to marry within the same religion (*see* Appendix B) the kin networks of the two do not overlap to any appreciable extent. In the second place, their children attend English Protestant schools and grow up quite apart from their Roman Catholic peers of Italian descent. Finally, because they are outside the Roman Catholic Church, they are also outside the main stream of the organizational activities of the Italian community which are heavily dependent upon church organization and support. It is important to remember that there is a Protestant minority of Italian origin which is never heard from quite simply because the positions of authority within the Italian community are monopolized by Roman Catholics.

Table 3.4. Religious denominations of persons of Italian origin resident in Montreal

Anglican	0.35%
Baptist	0.08
Greek Orthodox	0.04
Jewish	0.11
Lutheran	0.09
Mennonite	0.00
Pentecostal	0.66
Presbyterian	0.31
Roman Catholic	97.30
Greek Catholic	0.09
United Church of Canada	0.54
Others	0.43
<hr/>	
Total %	100.00
Number	79,841

Source: Census of Canada, 1961; Catalogue 92-559.

F. Status and Class

It is not very helpful to try and apply the concepts of class to the Italian Canadian community. As we have indicated, there are many bases of segmentation and many attributes of status. Some, such as family connection, region of birth, dialect, and generation, are ascribed; others, including occupation, amount of property possessed, and other owned symbols of wealth, are achieved. There is another important attribute which is both ascribed and achieved, namely the personal honour and worth of a family. A reputation is in part inherited, for the strengths and weaknesses which affect the important matter of family honour are believed to be passed through the blood. But a reputation can be damaged or improved through individual action. In this way one's reputation and family honour are achieved. There is certainly a hierarchy of prestige which is reasonably well defined at the upper and lower levels, but the middle portion of the continuum is extremely fluid, as it must be with any group whose members move from the lower to the higher positions within one generation.

The point I wish to make here is that the Italian Canadian community in Montreal has a status system which is unique. By this I mean that a given individual who occupies a place within the Italian community and who, because he is also a member of Canadian society living in Montreal, occupies a position in Canadian society, will have two statuses—one as an Italian Canadian and the other as a member of greater Montreal society. These statuses are not interchangeable, for the overall system of prestige of which one forms a part may be very different from that of the other. An example is the executive secretary of one of the prominent Italian Canadian associations. Within the Italian community, he is regarded with a certain amount of respect not only because of the power he commands but also because of his occupation and his wide range of contacts. He is one of the important members of the Italian Canadian leadership element. But outside the Italian Canadian community the same person is seen as a "pushy" clerk (his

business card bears the legend "*Un homme d'affaires à connaître*"), of little social consequence. He is certainly not unique in this respect. It is because there is this difference of status according to the social system in which one chooses to operate that many Italian Canadians prefer to operate exclusively within the Italian Canadian community. In it they can achieve greater prestige.

Nonetheless at the upper end of this continuum of prestige and status there is a stratum that is beginning to develop certain characteristics which set it clearly apart. This is the wealthy élite of the community. There are a number of persons who are not only prominent in the Italian community, but are also among the leading doctors, lawyers, industrialists, contractors and businessmen of Montreal. They send their children to exclusive private schools, belong to the best golf clubs and live in Westmount, the Town of Mount Royal and Outremont. They move at will outside the Italian community into French- and English-speaking Canadian society. They continue, however, to play an important role in the Italian community because within this limited social field they occupy an even more important position than they do outside it. Many are also businessmen who draw an increasingly important proportion of their earnings from the growing Italian market.

G. Internal Political Divisions

Political divisions cut across the community at several levels. As already noted, much of the internal political life of the Italian community revolves around the associations. The leaders of these associations often use the rank and file as a political following in their competition with each other. We have already touched upon the controversy over the new plans for modernizing the Casa d'Italia. These plans were an outgrowth of a movement set afoot a few years ago to bring some semblance of unity into the many conflicting associations and groups which make up the Italian community. Both the Bishop and the Consul General have an interest in a unity which would produce a single spokesman who could represent the community in dealings with the Church and the government. It was thought that the Casa d'Italia would become a focal point, for it belongs, in a certain sense, to all Italian Canadians. But rival cliques and groups within the community jockeyed for position from which to attack the enterprise. As long as there is no unity, the name of one self-appointed contender for the position of leader of all Italian Canadians is as good as another.

Outside the Italian Canadian community political parties at the national and provincial levels provide banners behind which groups of Italians align themselves during election time, when they compete to secure the services and favours of rival candidates. These divisions were particularly deep during the late 1950s and early 1960s when there were several Italian Canadians on the Montreal Municipal Council representing opposing parties. We will touch upon this subject again in the following chapter.*

*See pp. 50-3.

H. Conclusion

The Italian community is composed of a complex of overlapping networks of kinsmen, friends, neighbours and workmates with its own value system and leadership. It is segmented by divisions based on "family-centredness", conflict between the generations, regionalism, neighbourhood, class, religion, and politics. Yet these very divisions underline the community's oneness. The fact that there is conflict indicates that the members of the group are in touch, share certain common values, and agree about which prizes are worth competing for. Monsignor Cimichella summed this up when I asked him if the extreme factionalism within the community did not create great problems. He said that at times it did, but he felt that it was a good thing, "for you could not build a whole without distinct blocks or pieces."

If we agree that the Italian community is a sociological reality which can be isolated, we must at the same time note that this community is in Montreal where it is in close contact with the two dominant ethnic groups—the French and British. The next two chapters will explore the nature of the symbiotic relationship between these communities.

The Italian community in Montreal is not an isolated whole. It is composed of individuals who live in daily and often intimate contact with the society of which they form such an important part. Education, mostly through English-language schools, is a vital factor in establishing and maintaining this contact. But the cultural orientation towards the English-speaking world is not necessarily maintained. Italians born in Canada by and large choose their friends and later their spouses from among the French-speaking population. These ties thus establish further strong links with the non-Italian segments of Canadian society. Beyond these personal ties, the church, voluntary associations and political parties form institutional links between large segments of the Italian Canadian community and other ethnic groups.

A. Education and Language

It is evident that the chief medium of communication and thus contact between the Italian community and the rest of Canadian society is language. The educational process by which young immigrants and those born in Canada acquire a formal knowledge of language is through the school system. But in Quebec, and especially in Montreal, education is a complex matter. There are English schools and French schools, Protestant ones and Roman Catholic ones. As most Italians are Roman Catholic, most send their children to schools run by the Roman Catholic School Board of Montreal. Immigrants, however, are faced with a choice as to which language they wish their children to be educated in. As Table 4.1 shows, three out of four Italian Canadians send their children to English schools. The proportion who do so has increased annually, having risen in the last 20 years from just over 50 per cent to 75 per cent.

What accounts for the popularity of English as opposed to French schools? This is a question which we asked many informants. Their answers were usually unequivocal. They told us that it was only natural for immigrants to send their children to English schools

Table 4.1. Pupils of Italian origin attending French-speaking and English-speaking Roman Catholic schools, various years

Year	English schools	French schools	Total number
1941-42	55%	45%	3,263
1950-51	51	49	3,633
1955-56	61	39	7,434
1960-61	70	30	13,800
1962-63	75	25	16,556

Source: Bureau de la Statistique, Commission des Écoles catholiques de Montréal.

because if they knew English it would be easier for them to get jobs. Moreover by knowing English they could more easily move to other parts of Canada, or to the United States for that matter, in their search for better jobs. One immigrant said: "We have left our friends and family and our country behind. We have come all the way to Canada in order to better ourselves and provide for the future of our children. It just simply wouldn't make sense for us to limit the range of jobs open to our children by educating them in French, for French is only spoken in the province of Quebec. English is the language of North America."

Table 4.2. Reasons why parents favour English-language education for their children†

English facilitates moving to other parts of Canada	31%
It is easier to get jobs with English	24
English must be learned at school, French can be picked up in the street	12
English is the most important language in North America	9
English school is nearer than the French one	7
Parent educated in English	1
Most relatives and friends speak English	1
English is the language of the most influential businessmen in Montreal	1
English makes it easier to become accepted as a Canadian	0
Other	14
Total %	100
Number	144

† 173 of the general sample had children; of this group, 144 or 83 per cent unequivocally favoured French or English. The rest had chosen or were planning to choose various combinations of French and English.

This point of view is clearly expressed in Table 4.2 which summarizes the reasons why parents favour an English education for their children. Fully two-thirds gave economic reasons for their choice of English: 31 per cent said that English facilitated moving to other parts of Canada; 24 per cent said that it was easier to get jobs with a knowledge of English; 9 per cent said English is the most important language of North America; and 1 per cent noted that English is the language of the most influential businessmen in Montreal. It is significant that none indicated that an English education makes it easier to become accepted as a Canadian. Another 12 per cent thought that English was more

difficult and consequently had to be learned in school, whereas French could be picked up in the street or from neighbours. Two per cent said that either they themselves had been educated in English or that most of their relatives and friends spoke English; 7 per cent simply noted that the English school was nearer than the French one.

Non-economic factors loom larger among the reasons advanced by parents who favour French education for their children. Only 15 per cent said they were learning French because it was the language of Quebec. Fifteen per cent felt that since French was more difficult than English it should be studied in school; 24 per cent noted that they themselves were educated in French or that most of their relatives and friends spoke French (Table 4.3). But 32 per cent said they chose French schools because they were nearer than English ones, and 6 per cent stated they thought the French schools were better than the English.

Table 4.3. Reasons why parents favour French-language education for their children

French is the language of Quebec	15%
French is more difficult to learn than English, therefore you must study it	15
Parent educated in French	9
Most relatives and friends speak French	15
French schools are nearer than English ones	32
The French schools are better than English ones	6
Other	8
Total %	100
Number	34

These reasons, of course, do not indicate why the proportion of persons sending their children to English schools is increasing. In brief, I suggest that this is because the prewar Italian immigrant was not given the same free choice as to language of schooling that the postwar immigrant has been given. Before the war, there were a number of factors which operated to restrict the immigrants' choice and to channel them into the French-language schools. To begin with, there is evidence that a certain amount of pressure was placed upon parents to send their children to French schools. Bayley¹ states that it was the policy of the Roman Catholic School Board automatically to assign Italian children to the French school section. In order to send their children to the "Irish" schools parents had to obtain special permission from the authorities. Bayley does indicate, however, that in order to avoid being deluged by applications the Board often turned a blind eye to the matter and allowed parents to register their children in the English schools. Bayley in fact notes that approximately 53 per cent of the children of Italian descent enrolled in the Roman Catholic schools were attending English schools. He also suggests that the proportion attending English schools will increase.²

However, Roman Catholic School Board officials interviewed during the course of the present study denied that the Board had ever directed the choice of any immigrant group. According to officials of both English and French sections there had always been a free choice. One official of the English section suggested that if pressure had in fact been applied on new immigrants to send their children to French schools, it had been applied

by their own priests. He pointed out that the Italian parishes, especially in the prewar period, were linked even more closely with the French Roman Catholic hierarchy than they are today.

Thus the degree of pressure placed upon parents to send their children to French schools (or to keep them out of the "Irish" schools) remains an open question. It is an indisputable fact, however, that a number of persons did change their religion from Roman Catholic to Protestant in order to be able to send their children to English-language schools run by the Protestant School Board. They did this because, for one reason or another they were not able to get their children into English-language Roman Catholic schools.³ One informant, for example, told us that he had become a Protestant in the late 1920s in order to send his children to a new Protestant school in the neighbourhood as there were no English Roman Catholic schools for many miles.

This lack of English-language Roman Catholic schools in the immediate vicinity of their homes, was another reason why parents sent their children to French schools. Today there is an English Roman Catholic school within reasonable distance of almost every neighbourhood, and certainly those neighbourhoods favoured by Italians. Yet another reason why a relatively high proportion of immigrants attended French schools in prewar days is that two schools under the aegis of the French section, Notre Dame de la Défense and St. Philippe Bénizzi, undertook some of their teaching in Italian. At least one started out as an English and Italian school: Vangilisti⁴ states that Notre Dame de la Défense School, founded in 1910, at first gave instruction only in English and Italian. For political reasons the trustees added French in 1912. For a time the school was trilingual. But when it came under the French section of the Roman Catholic School Commission Italian was dropped from all but the first two years. A large number of persons of Italian descent born in Montreal before the war attended these schools and thus had a predominantly French education.

Not a few Canadian-born persons of Italian descent who themselves were educated in French schools now send their children to English schools. Their example has an important effect upon school choice of new immigrants. Of the 28 persons in our sample who themselves were educated in Montreal, 14 went to English schools and 14 to French schools. Of the latter, only four are presently sending their own children to French schools, eight are sending their children to English schools, and two prefer a bilingual one. On the other hand, of the 14 who were educated in English schools, eight are sending their own children to English schools while only four are sending their children to French schools and two favour some sort of bilingual approach to education.

From the foregoing, it would appear that a number of factors operated to limit the freedom of prewar immigrants to give their children an English education. Since the war, these limitations have been removed and a free choice exists, with the result that an increasingly larger proportion are sending their children to English-language schools. At the moment, 81 per cent of the informants in our general sample who were born in Italy sent, are sending, or plan to send, their children to English schools. I suggest that the proportion of Italian Canadians attending English schools will continue to increase as will the relative importance to Italians of English as compared with French. The trend is discernible, not only in the choice of education, but also in the growing proportion of

persons of Italian descent who give English as their mother tongue. Although Italian Canadians who declared English or French as their mother tongue represented only 18 per cent of the total population of Italian descent—and the French speakers heavily outnumbered the English speakers—Table 4.4 shows that the number of English speakers increased by 2 per cent between 1951 and 1961.

Table 4.4. Population of Italian origin in Montreal of French or English mother tongue, 1951 and 1961

Mother tongue	1951	1961
French	70.5%	68.6%
English	29.5	31.4
Total %	100.0	100.0
Number	7,100	17,800

Sources: Census of Canada, 1951, Vol. II, Table 50; 1961, Catalogue 92-561.

The important factor to consider now is to what extent the choice of English as the language of education for children influences their cultural orientation. Do children attending English-language schools turn away from the French-speaking community and merge with the English-speaking group? Are we justified in assuming that because the Italian Canadian expresses a marked preference for English schools, he also expresses a marked preference for the English community and is therefore linked to it more closely than he is to the French-speaking community? One way of studying this problem is to examine the degree of intermarriage of Italian Canadians with the two dominant ethnic groups.

B. Marriage

The pro-English orientation of the Italian Canadian community with regard to education is not substantiated by an analysis of marriages between Italian Canadians and persons not of Italian descent. Although just over half those interviewed in the general sample wished their children to marry persons of Italian descent, 13 per cent of the immigrants and 76 per cent of the Canadian-born Italians married persons not of Italian descent. It is very clear that the Italian Canadian community of Montreal is far from being an endogamous group (*see* Tables 4.5 and 4.6). Moreover, the net preference that Italian Canadians express for French-speaking marriage partners indicates clearly that the apparent orientation of school children to the English-speaking community is not carried through in all social fields.

A closer look at the marriages contracted by Italian immigrants in 1951 and 1962 (*see* Table 4.5), shows that although the proportion of marriages between persons of Italian descent is very high, it is in fact declining, having dropped from 94 per cent in 1951 to 87

per cent in 1962. This decrease corresponds to an increase in marriages between persons of Italian and French origins from 3 per cent to 9 per cent during the same period. It is significant that this rise occurred in spite of a substantial increase in the number of eligible Italian partners coming into Montreal from Italy. During the two years under review the total number of marriages contracted by Italian immigrants with persons not of Italian descent rose from 6 per cent to 13 per cent.

Table 4.5. Marriages contracted by Italian immigrants, 1951 and 1962

Ethnic group of spouse†	1951	1962
Italian	94%	87%
French	3	9
English	1	1
Other	2	3
Total %	100	100
Number	249	1,240

Source: Compiled from data made available by the Montreal office of the Quebec Department of Health, and summarized in Appendix B.

†Determined by ethnic group of father.

The proportion of marriages within the Italian community is considerably lower among those born in Canada. As shown in Table 4.6, the proportion of marriages contracted by Canadian-born Italians with other persons of Italian descent declined from 41 per cent in 1951 to 24 per cent in 1962. During the same period there was a relative increase of 12 per cent in the number of marriages to Canadians of French origin. Marriages to Canadians of British origin rose by 4 per cent, and to other ethnic groups by 1 per cent. Fifty-nine per cent of Canadian-born Italians married persons from outside their own ethnic group in 1951 compared to 76 per cent in 1962.

Table 4.6. Marriages contracted by Canadian-born Italians, 1951 and 1962

Ethnic group of spouse	1951	1962
Italian	41%	24%
French	40	52
English	14	18
Other	5	6
Total %	100	100
Number	510	307

Source: See Table 4.5.

The increasing number of Italians marrying into other ethnic groups is certainly not a new trend. As shown in Table 4.7, the proportion of those marrying outside their ethnic group increased steadily up to 1951. After that date the impact of the new immigrants was

felt and the proportion of marriages between immigrants became numerically greater. As we have seen above, however, this gross increase hides the increase in the proportion of Italians, both immigrants and Canadian-born, who are marrying outside their own group.

Table 4.7. Proportion of Italian Canadians marrying outside own ethnic group, various years

	Total number of marriages	% marrying outside group
1915	171	5
1925	187	5
1935	234	16
1951	759	42
1962	1,547	26

Source: Figures for 1915, 1925 and 1935 are based on Bayley, "Immigrant Communities in Montreal," 64, 67; those for 1951 and 1962 in Appendix B.

Why do Italians marry outside their ethnic group? To begin with, the courtship pattern places many Italian men in contact with Canadian girls. While Italian girls are still very much restricted to the home and to going out with chaperons, many Italian young men go out dancing and to parties with Canadian girls. Although they meet a number of marriageable girls from the Italian community at the various Italian social gatherings, the most informal heterosexual social contacts and the freest exchange of ideas are with Canadian girls.

Not surprisingly more Italian men than women marry outside their ethnic group. Of the 162 Italian immigrants who married non-Italians in 1962, 79 per cent were men. But this picture changes somewhat in the second generation, for only 52 per cent of the 233 Italians born in Canada who married non-Italians were men (*see* Appendix B). A certain prestige is attached to acquiring a wife of French or British origin who possesses the whole range of sophistication and cultural traits which the immigrant himself is seeking to acquire. The immigrant girl, on the other hand, represents the traditional values, way of dress, speech and manners that the immigrant is seeking to shed, at least in part.

These reasons of course do not explain why an increasing proportion of Italian Canadians, both immigrants and Canadian-born, are finding their spouses outside their own ethnic group. This, I think, can largely be explained in terms of the degree of acceptance that the Italian Canadian community has achieved in Montreal. It is significant that the further back one goes in time, the more one finds that Italian Canadians married within their own group. As they established themselves in the trades and professions, the prestige of the community in Montreal society increased. An illustration of this is the speech which the president of the CIBPA made in November 1964 to compliment Bishop Cimichella on his elevation to the office of Bishop. He thanked Bishop Cimichella in the name of the entire Italian community for the prestige he had brought to it. Thus the standing of the community rises, not only in the eyes of outsiders, but also in the eyes of the members themselves. This increasing self-confidence is probably also a factor which helps to initiate social relations with other ethnic groups.

As discrimination decreased, so did hostility, and with the lowering of these barriers the social contact between Italians and other ethnic groups in Montreal became easier and more frequent. More intergroup marriages took place. These in turn helped break down the social distance between the ethnic communities. It is thus a cumulative process.

Yet in spite of the rising percentage of Italian children attending English schools and the demographic changes which have occurred in the Italian community between 1951 and 1962, the relative proportions of Canadian-born Italians marrying spouses of French and British origins have remained constant at precisely 68 per cent and 24 per cent respectively (*see* Table 4.8).

Table 4.8. Ethnic group of non-Italian spouses married to Canadian-born Italians

Ethnic group of spouse	1951	1962
French	68%	68%
English	24	24
Other	8	8
Total %	100	100
Number	303	233

Source: *See* Table 4.5.

Persons of Italian descent are seeking marriage partners from other ethnic groups in increasing numbers, but they are not seeking them from outside their own religious group. It would seem that religion rather than ethnicity is the more lasting principle of social identity—at least for marriage purposes. Though the total number of marriages of members of the Italian community doubled between 1951 and 1962, the number of marriages across religious lines remained constant at 4 per cent—that is, 33 out of 759 marriages in 1951 and 68 of 1547 marriages in 1962 (*see* Appendix B). Though we failed to ask the necessary questions on our survey, many of the informants with whom we discussed the preliminary findings expressed no surprise that Italians married more than twice as many French as British spouses. They pointed out that Italians were in closer contact with the French than the British group, and that the French were Roman Catholic. Several said that if Italian parents had to accept the inevitability of their children marrying outside the Italian community they would much prefer to have them marry Roman Catholics. The full force of the kin group, as well as the Church, would be brought to bear on the individual who tried to marry outside his religious group.

It can be seen from this very brief analysis of the complex field of marriage that the increasing degree of marriage between Italians and French- and English-speaking Canadians is breaking down the isolation of the group. This is a circular process, for as the isolation of the group breaks down, interethnic marriages will increase. The importance of kinship obligations for Italians knits them firmly to the ethnic group of their marriage partner. These ties will go on multiplying at an increasingly rapid rate.

The marriage choice of the generation at present in school, which is linguistically oriented to the English-speaking community, remains to be seen. Will the proportion of marriages to French-speaking Canadians continue to increase? This is an open question.

But it does seem likely that the cultural orientation absorbed at school, as well as the contacts they make with the families of classmates, will result in an increasing number of marriages with persons who have attended English schools, though not necessarily with persons of British stock.

C. Language, Friends and Workmates

The ability to speak a language, especially for immigrants, is an index of the type of interaction that is possible. It is also a reflection of the frequency of contact, for most immigrants learn French and English by experience. The average Italian is able to make himself understood in three languages but their relative importance depends upon his social surroundings. Generally, the immigrant uses Italian at home and to some extent at work. He also uses a good deal of French at work and with his non-Italian friends and acquaintances. He uses English less although its relative importance appears to be growing.

The knowledge that Italian Canadians have of French, English and Italian reflects these general statements. As indicated in Table 4.9, the ability to speak Italian well declines among those born in Canada as compared to the immigrants, yet 95 per cent were able to speak it—whether well, fair or slightly. Moreover, all could speak some French and English. However, 82 per cent of the Canadian-born spoke French well, while only 76 per cent could speak English well, and only 28 per cent spoke Italian well. This indicates that a considerable proportion of those born in Canada are trilingual.

Table 4.9. Ability to speak Italian, French, and English

Ability	Italian†		French		English	
	Immi- grant	Canadian- born	Immi- grant	Canadian- born	Immi- grant	Canadian- born
Good	75%	28%	13%	82%	16%	76%
Fair	22	28	32	12	17	24
Slight	3	39	42	6	44	0
Not at all	0	5	13	0	23	0
Total %	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number	173	21	171	17	171	17

† Several of our interviewers judged ability to speak Italian, not local dialects.

Immigrants obviously find it easier to speak French than English. Only 13 per cent spoke no French, whereas 23 per cent spoke no English. On the other hand, 16 per cent of the immigrants were able to speak English well, compared with 13 per cent who spoke French well. This can be explained by the extreme importance that Italians attach to English and the efforts they make to study it. As one immigrant remarked to me, “I use French with my friends, neighbours and many of the fellows at work. It is just something you pick up. But English is a tool which is related to my profession. [He was a

highly skilled mechanic in an engine assembly plant.] I receive my instruction from my foreman in English and I must read technical manuals in English. I must know it well if I am to get ahead.”

As we have already noted (*see* Table 2.8) more Italians work for English-speaking than for French-speaking employers—25 per cent and 16 per cent respectively; but more work alongside French- than English-speaking Canadians—31 per cent and 7 per cent respectively. This is reflected in Table 4.10 in a greater use of French than English at work by both immigrants and Canadian-born. While 62 per cent of all immigrants used French at work to a varying degree, only 47 per cent used English. French was even more favoured by those born in Canada, of whom all but 5 per cent used it at work; 32 per cent used no English at all.

Table 4.10. Use of French and English at work

Use	French		English	
	Immigrant	Canadian-born	Immigrant	Canadian-born
Exclusively	15%	21%	11%	5%
Some	47	74	36	63
None	38	5	53	32
Total %	100	100	100	100
Number	168	19	171	19

While a greater proportion of Canadian-born compared to immigrants use only French at work (21 per cent compared to 15 per cent), a higher proportion of the immigrants compared to Canadian-born use exclusively English at work (11 per cent as compared to 5 per cent). This suggests that the postwar immigrants are moving into new economic fields, a suggestion that is further borne out by a closer examination of the ethnic group to which the employers belong (*see* Table 4.11). While the proportion of Canadian-born Italians working for employers of French and British origins is the same (33 per cent), nearly twice as many immigrants work for British as for French employers (24 per cent as compared to 13 per cent).

Table 4.11. Ethnic group of employer or supervisor

Ethnic group	Immigrant	Canadian-born
Italian	33%	14%
French	13	33
English	24	33
Other	30	20
Total %	100	100
Number	169	21

The Italian Canadian comes into contact with members of other ethnic groups at his place of work. Many of these contacts develop into friendships. Such friendships provide varied and important links between the Italian Canadian community and other ethnic communities in Montreal. This is particularly true of the immigrants, for having left behind many close relatives in Italy, they do not have the extensive kin networks characteristic of those born in Canada. Thus, although the immigrant entertains fewer people at home than the Canadian-born Italian—in Italian peasant society the home is largely reserved for kinfolk—friends make up a comparatively more important segment of his social network. The varying degrees of contact that immigrant and non-immigrant Italians have with their close and distant relatives, with friends of Italian origin, and with non-Italian friends are summarized in Table 4.12. From this Table it will be seen that while 76 per cent of the Canadian-born saw their close relatives during the previous week, only 59 per cent of the immigrants did. Moreover, while those born in Canada saw their distant relatives as frequently as their friends of Italian descent, they saw their non-Italian friends less frequently. In contrast, immigrants saw a good deal more of their Italian and non-Italian friends than of their own distant relatives. Forty-one per cent of the immigrants and 58 per cent of those born in Canada had in fact exchanged visits with friends of non-Italian origin during the previous week. This indicates the number and intensity of the links that bind the Italian Canadian community to other ethnic groups in Montreal.

Table 4.12. Contact in home with relatives and friends during previous week

	Close relative	Distant relative	Italian friend	Non-Italian friend
Immigrant (N = 176)	59%	31%	58%	41%
Canadian-born (N = 21)	76	67	67	58

Many informants said that very often workmates with whom they were friendly would come by in the evening to chat or to go with them to a meeting or social gathering. While the guest was in their home he would as often as not receive a cup of espresso coffee or a beaker of homemade wine. Most contacts are of this type—not formal visits but the casual dropping-in, chatting and relaxed visiting that takes place between people who are on friendly terms with each other. The non-Italian friends are mostly French, as shown in Table 4.13. Canadians of French origin made up 78 per cent and 71 per cent respectively of the friends of immigrants and Canadian-born, and Canadians of British origin 16 per cent and 10 per cent respectively. The immigrants had a slightly higher proportion of French- and English-speaking friends than those born in Canada. This, I think, can be explained again by the expanding social horizons of the Italian Canadian community and the increasing degree to which members are accepted by other Canadians.

The mass media also serve to bring Italian Canadians into contact with the opinions and activities of the French- and English-speaking communities. As shown in Table

Table 4.13. Ethnic group of non-Italian friends last seen in home

Ethnic group	Immigrant	Canadian-born
French	78%	71%
English	16	10
Other	6	19
Total %	100	100
Number	85	21

4.14, 90 per cent of all immigrants read the Italian press regularly; some also read the French and English press. As expected, the number of Canadian-born who read the Italian press regularly declines sharply, although at 47 per cent it is still considerable. Seven out of 10 second-generation Italian Canadians read French and English papers regularly.

Table 4.14. Ethnic group of newspapers read regularly (at least one a week)

	Italian	French	English
Immigrant (N = 171)	90%	36%	22%
Canadian-born (N = 17)	47	71	71

It is probably through television that the Italian Canadian comes into the most direct and constant contact with French- and English-speaking society. All Italians interviewed were avid viewers and nine out of 10 owned their own set. In point of fact, television loomed so important that we often had difficulty hearing informants over its roar, for it was usually on from the beginning to the end of the interview. It is worth noting that the important French Canadian Saint Jean Baptiste parade occupies a much more important position in the Italian community than does the annual Italian Day at Belmont Park organized by the Sons of Italy. While 51 per cent of the immigrants and 41 per cent of those born in Canada had attended the Saint Jean Baptiste parade during the previous year, only 25 per cent and 6 per cent respectively had gone to the Italian Day celebration.

D. Contacts through Associations and the Church

We have noted that individuals are connected with the fabric of Canadian society outside their own ethnic community through friendship, marriage, neighbourhood, and education. In addition to these largely personal contacts there are certain institutionalized links between the Italian Canadian community and other ethnic groups in Montreal society. These are provided by voluntary associations and the church. Contacts made by the leaders, both as individuals and as representatives of organizations, develop further links which connect Italians to Canadians of other backgrounds. Through these contacts

Italian Canadian opinion becomes known. This is important, for virtually all Italian Canadian associations are closed groups; that is, their membership is recruited exclusively from persons of Italian descent. Thus within the associations there is not the contact and exchange of ideas among ethnic groups which occur at office, workshop or construction site where Italians work alongside non-Italians.

The contacts between Italian Canadian associations and other groups take place in a variety of ways. First of all, a number of associations present briefs to various government authorities.⁵ Other contacts are made between Italian and non-Italian associations. For example, Italian associations are sometimes invited to send representatives to special Greek, German or other ethnic group festivities. Yet others—very few to be sure—exchange cultural activities. The Friulani folklore association, *Furgolar Furlan*, is particularly active in this respect, having frequently been invited to perform its characteristic dances for other ethnic groups. On other occasions dance groups and bands from other associations have played at Italian dances. This is often done for reasons of economy; nonetheless, contact is established. Many Italian sports clubs meet their counterparts from French, British and other ethnic communities. Although these encounters are often fraught with rivalry, they do bring together persons from different ethnic groups. The frequency of contact between Italian and other organizations during the year in which we were conducting our interviews is shown in Table 4.15. Apart from contacts with other Italian associations, the greatest contact is with French-speaking societies: 68 per cent of the associations were in touch with French clubs at least once a year. In contrast, only 37 per cent were in touch with English-speaking associations; while even fewer, 33 per cent, had dealings with associations belonging to other ethnic groups. Thus while two out of every three Italian associations had a certain number of contacts with French organizations, only one out of three were in touch with associations belonging to other ethnic groups.

Table 4.15. Annual contacts between Italian organizations and other organizations

Contacts	Ethnic group of organizations contacted			
	Italian	French	English	Other
1 or 2 contacts	34%	35%	14%	20%
3-15 contacts	30	22	14	11
More than 15 contacts	18	11	9	2
No contacts	18	32	63	67
Total %	100	100	100	100
Number	44	46	44	45

Source: Survey conducted by the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism.

Even more than the associations, religion provides a strong bridge between the Italian Canadian community and other ethnic groups. The Italian ethnic church is part of the diocese of Montreal and control of the diocese is in the hands of French-speaking Canadians. As the diocese contains many ethnic groups, ethnic parishes represent a network of contacts stretching across the face of Montreal at many levels. The majority

of the parishes are French. Thus the Italian ethnic church, which, as we have seen, plays a vital role in the structure and organization of the Italian community, is effectively subject to the authority of a French hierarchy at the diocesan level. The leaders of the Italian national church are constantly in touch with the diocesan chancery, a fact which helps strengthen the tie between the Italian parishes and the Roman Catholic hierarchy in Montreal.

At the level of the parish, there is also contact between the Italian community and other ethnic communities. No church is exclusively an Italian church. All other Roman Catholics are welcome to use its facilities in the same way that Italians are free to go to mass and take communion in churches which may be run by other ethnic communities.

Italian feasts to celebrate patron saints provide gay and colourful occasions when Italian Canadians play host, so to speak, to persons of many ethnic groups. The streets during these festivals are often thronged with French-speaking neighbours who come to watch the bicycle races, the religious processions, fireworks, parades and song competitions which are part of the outdoor celebrations of the patron saints.

As noted already, religion also plays a very important part in linking the Italian community to Roman Catholics in other ethnic communities by establishing a barrier difficult to cross in seeking a marriage partner. Persons from different ethnic groups are brought together on a basis of equality. This applies to Roman Catholics as well as Protestants as may be seen in Appendix B.

E. Political Linkage

In previous sections we discussed the internal political structure of the Italian Canadian community. This is characterized by the jockeying for position of a number of self-appointed local leaders who are also important officers of Italian Canadian associations. These persons occupy roles which are created in, and are exclusive to, the Italian Canadian community. In addition, there are a number of important roles which are created outside the Italian community. These are related directly to the municipal, provincial and federal political structures. They are important for our consideration here, for the more Italians who fill them, the greater is the articulation of the Italian community with the rest of Canadian society.

Political roles exist which Italian Canadians can occupy at two levels: government administration and the political party. Increasing numbers of Italian Canadians are occupying positions at all levels in municipal, provincial and federal government services. These persons through their network of relatives and friends provide important links between the Italian community and the structure of government at the administrative level. Though this relationship is an informal one, it is important. More formal links between the Italian community and the political structure are provided through the parties. Increasing numbers of Italian Canadians are occupying important offices at various levels in the municipal, provincial and national political parties. They serve as canvassers, members of executive committees and, increasingly, as candidates and even as elected representatives.

In this section I am concerned primarily with political parties. After looking briefly at the relative importance of municipal, provincial and federal politics to persons of Italian descent, I shall examine more fully the relationship between the Italian community and politics at the three levels.

The attitude of most Italian Canadians towards politics at all three levels may be summed up very briefly. In general, most of our informants expressed little or no interest at all in political activity. There was slightly more interest in federal politics than in either municipal or provincial politics. These attitudes have been summed up in Table 4.16. It must be remembered, however, that this survey was conducted during a period of relative political calm in Montreal (May-June 1964). But if the majority showed little or no interest in politics, a minority of vocal and active Italians did take politics very seriously.

Table 4.16. Attitudes to municipal, provincial, and federal politics

Attitude	Municipal		Provincial		Federal	
	Immi-grant	Canadian-born	Immi-grant	Canadian-born	Immi-grant	Canadian-born
Very important	6%	19%	8%	23%	9%	35%
Fairly important	22	29	21	19	19	10
Not too important	14	19	13	29	13	20
Totally unimportant or no opinion	58	33	58	29	59	35
Total %	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number	176	21	173	21	173	100

The apparent apathy of the majority can be explained in part by the belief held by most Italians, whether in Italy or in Canada, that persons in authority are corrupt.⁶ Because there is corruption at all political levels, they believe their vote will make very little difference. They say that if they vote against somebody, his supporters will simply import voters from other areas. In fact, one informant said that the only reason he voted was to prevent someone else from using his name. He felt that if his name were used, he would prefer to use it himself. There are certainly grounds for this belief. During the referendum in Ville St. Michel on September 3, 1964 on the question as to whether or not the municipality should be annexed to the city of Montreal, large numbers of Italians, who as a group favoured annexation, were denied the right to vote by their rivals on the ground that they were not yet Canadian citizens. This surprised many, for their votes had been solicited and accepted gratefully in previous elections.⁷ In fact, 38 per cent (20 out of 53) of the immigrants we interviewed who had voted for candidates of Italian descent in municipal elections were not Canadian citizens!

In the past Italians have played an even more active part, not only on the fringe of municipal politics, but as candidates and councillors. At the time the survey was conducted there were two municipal councillors of Italian Canadian descent in the Montreal metropolitan area—Camil Martellani from Ville Émard, on the Montreal

Municipal Council, and Mario Barone from Saint Léonard de Port Maurice on the local municipal council.

Mario Barone arrived in Canada from Campobasso at the age of 19. He has become an immensely successful real estate developer and builder in the north of the city. In November 1963 he was elected to the local council in a by-election and was confirmed in office with a 150-vote majority in the municipal elections of November 1964. In this election he defeated a French Canadian pharmacist to become the only municipal councillor of Italian descent in the north of the city, and the first immigrant ever to have been elected to public office in Montreal. Barone estimates that about 90 per cent of the Italians living in the area voted for him. Ville St. Léonard is a newly created, rapidly growing suburban area in northeast Montreal. Although in the 1961 census it is listed as having a population of 4,900, by 1964 its population was said to have increased to around 15,000. Mario Barone indicated that it is now in the neighbourhood of 20,000, of whom an estimated 6,000 persons or 1,500 families are Italian.

To understand why people voted for Mario Barone, we must understand something of the role which he plays in that particular area. He has built somewhere in the neighbourhood of 300 buildings comprising approximately 500 residential units. Thus he has about 500 client families, most of whom owe him money. He speaks of "all my clients" and regards himself as their protector. As he has a wide range of contacts outside his particular community and has played an active part in the affairs of CIBPA for a number of years, it is not surprising that his clients, as well as other Italians, look to him as their patron and spokesman—and give him their votes. He spends a good deal of his time meeting constituents who come to him for advice and help. Those who ask him to intervene on tax matters, to obtain a building permit, to find jobs or to resolve local squabbles are not only Italian: they include Canadians of French origin as well as of other origins, especially Polish, a number of whom live in St. Léonard. Mario Barone is thus a key person who, because of the influential position he occupies in St. Léonard, has become the elected spokesman of the many new property owners of Italian descent. He predicts that in future even more Italians will sit on the local town council. It should even be possible to elect an Italian mayor.

Representation on the Montreal Municipal Council is another matter. It is more difficult for persons of Italian descent to occupy key roles in the mixed and rather open-ended neighbourhoods in the centre of Montreal, even though they make up a large percentage of the population in certain areas. This is one of the reasons why few Italians have been elected to the Montreal Municipal Council. Significantly, Camil Martellani, a 40-year-old Canadian-born paving contractor of Italian origin represents Ville Émard, a small municipal area cut off from the rest of Montreal by the Lachine Canal. In a sense, his role there is similar to Mario Barone's in the north: he is an important person in a small, bounded area.

Although Italians have been immigrating to Montreal in ever increasing numbers for the last 100 years, it was only in 1928 that the first Italian ran—unsuccessfully—as a candidate for municipal office. Other unsuccessful candidates of Italian descent presented themselves in 1930, 1934 and 1947. But it was not until 1950 that Alfredo Gagliardi, Canadian-born publisher and businessman, ran and was elected to the Montreal Municipal

Council. He was reelected again in 1954 along with another candidate of Italian descent; a third was defeated. In 1957, four persons of Italian descent ran but only Gagliardi was elected. From 1957 to 1960 he was an active member of the municipal Executive Council.

Shortly before the 1960 elections, Gagliardi organized a new political party, Association de la réforme municipale (Municipal Reform Association), to contest the election and oppose the reform party of Jean Drapeau, the incumbent mayor. A total of nine candidates of Italian descent stood for election on party slates. Gagliardi's ARM presented a list of 46 candidates, including three Italians. All save Gagliardi himself were defeated by Drapeau's party, which brought Camil Martellani to office. After 12 years in office, Gagliardi was defeated in 1962 along with four other candidates of Italian descent, thus ending an era when an Italian Canadian had played an extremely important part in Montreal municipal politics.

Barone, Gagliardi and Martellani were all important figures in the internal affairs of the Italian community before election to office. Barone had been active in the CIBPA since the middle of 1950; Gagliardi had been extremely active in the Sons of Italy since the end of the war. For a number of years before he ran as a candidate, he had also been canvasser, organiser, speech-maker and general contact man for the Union Nationale party. Martellani, also a member of CIBPA for several years, is respected as one of the more prosperous second-generation Italian Canadians in his neighbourhood. The election to office of all three reflects their success in the internal political system of the Italian community. Without the firm support of Italian voters, none would have been successful.

What is true at the municipal level, is also true at the provincial and national levels. Although no Italian Canadian candidate has yet been elected from the Montreal ridings, many are playing an increasingly active part in the local political party committees. In some they represent a sizable interest group. For example, four of the 15 members of the St. Michel Liberal party committee are Italian Canadians. There is also a Quebec Italian Canadian Liberal Party Club which communicates the problems of Italians in Montreal to the provincial federation of the party.⁸

In March 1965, the New Democratic Party announced that it was going to nominate a young Canadian-born Italian, Arturo Moretti, as its candidate in the Papineau electoral district in the next federal election. The 1961 census showed that approximately 17 per cent of the population in this riding was of Italian descent. Moreover it includes the Italian parish of N. S. della Consolata which contains the highest concentration of Italians in Montreal.*

It would thus appear that in future Italian Canadians will play an increasingly active part in political affairs. As most (89 per cent of our sample) feel strongly that it is important for Italians to be elected to represent the interests of Italian Canadians, many more will run as candidates and be elected to office. These will provide further strong institutional links between the Italian community and the political structure of municipality, province and nation.

*See map.

F. Conclusion

In this section we have seen how the Italian Canadian community in Montreal is tied to the rest of Montreal society. Education, language and marriage establish links of varying intensity, as do contacts with neighbours, friends and workmates. In addition to these personal links, the Italian parishes, the various clubs and associations, and the increasingly active part Italians are playing in political affairs provide institutional ties.

The Italian Canadian community lives in symbiotic contact with the rest of Canadian society. Moreover, many persons who hold prominent positions within the Italian community also occupy roles as French- or English-speaking Canadians. They devote a considerable portion of their time to the affairs of the Italian Canadian community, but they do not operate as Italians at all times. Although we have concentrated on their roles as Italians, persons like Alfredo Gagliardi and Camil Martellani spend the greater portion of their day as French-speaking Canadians. The linkage between the two communities is internalized by many persons who occupy roles in several social groups.

At various points in this chapter it has been shown how Italians establish ties with Canadians of French and British origins. These ties have been motivated by self-interest and have been personal and non-political. But Italian Canadians are now being asked with increasing insistence to choose one of the dominant ethnic groups for total political and cultural commitment.

As stressed in the previous chapter, the Italian Canadian community is in contact at various levels and in different ways with the two major ethnic groups of Montreal, the French and British. The complexity of the network of relations which exists between the Italian Canadian community and Canadians of French and British origins is largely one established through informal or personal choices. The choice of school, marriage partner, friends and workmates, is rarely put openly as a choice between French and British culture. Because of the political dispute between French- and English-speaking Canadians, the question of formal commitment is beginning to be put before Italian Canadians. This places them in a difficult position.

Most Italians have an ambivalent attitude towards Canadians of French and British origins. On the one hand, they look upon the British as cultural and economic ideal types and send their children to their schools. On the other hand, they accuse the French of discrimination and poor economic sense, though they choose them as neighbours, friends and spouses. Essentially, the Italian wishes to remain free from political commitments which may place in jeopardy his ability to gain the maximum benefit for himself and his family from each economic and social opportunity. Thus, fairly sympathetic to the idea of more power for the province of Quebec but openly critical of the idea of independence for the province, he is extremely reluctant to express himself publicly on these matters. If he is forced to take sides, his choice will be governed by the same pragmatism which led him or his parents to leave Italy and settle in Canada.

A. Cultural Stereotypes

The average Italian Canadian has mixed feelings about the Canadians of French and British origins with whom he is in contact. In general, more immigrants have a favourable opinion of the British than of the French. On the other hand, the French are slightly more popular with Canadian-born Italians than the British.

As shown in Table 5.1, 38 per cent of the immigrants hold favourable opinions of Canadians of French origin, and 36 per cent unfavourable ones. On the other hand, 60 per cent have favourable opinions of Canadians of British origin, while only 14 per cent hold unfavourable ones. Of the Canadian-born, 53 per cent hold favourable opinions of the French, while 24 per cent hold an opposite point of view. With regard to the British, 47 per cent of the Canadian-born regard them favourably while 12 per cent are unfavourable.

Table 5.1. Italian (immigrant and Canadian-born) opinion of Canadians of French and British origins

Opinion	Opinion of:			
	Canadians of French origin		Canadians of British origin	
	Immigrant	Canadian-born	Immigrant	Canadian-born
Favourable	38%	53%	60%	47%
Unfavourable	36	24	14	12
Indifferent or no opinion	26	23	26	41
Total %	100	100	100	100
Number	172	17	172	17

It is evident that Italians have a mixed attitude towards these two major ethnic groups. This becomes plainer if we examine some of the opinions expressed by our more articulate informants of their French and British neighbours and fellow workers. Many of these are set out in some detail in Appendix C* and summarized under rough headings in Table 5.2.

Table 5.2. Summary of Italian opinions of Canadians of French and British origins

Opinions	Canadians of French origin	Canadians of British origin
Friendly, helpful, hospitable, understanding	29%	36%
Reliable, serious, sincere, respectful, polite	2	8
Other favourable	9	14
Unfriendly, unhelpful, reserved, cold	4	6
Too superior, pretentious, jealous, boastful	10	5
Unreliable, poor workers, extravagant	6	0
Other unfavourable	14	3
No opinion: some good, some bad	26	28
Total %	100	100
Number	189	189

*See pp. 79-81.

From these opinions, certain stereotypes emerge. The French-speaking Canadian is often seen as a spendthrift, who wastes his money in the tavern and is “broke on Monday.” This is condemned by Italians, especially the immigrants, who make considerable sacrifices in order to save. Saving is regarded as a moral duty. Because the French Canadian does not save with the same fervour and is often content to remain a tenant all his life, he is regarded as an immoral wastrel, someone who does not place the interests of his family and the future of his children before his own pleasures. This condemnation becomes acute when French and Italians live side by side, as the French are often tenants of the Italians. For many Italians this is sufficient proof that the French are lazy spendthrifts. Many informants noted, on the other hand, that they had nothing in particular against the French, who seemed to be very much like themselves and were friendly and hospitable. For the majority, these virtues counterbalanced the poor economic sense the French appeared to display and, on the whole, Italians expressed a favourable opinion of them. The Canadian of British origin, on the other hand, was often seen as being respectful and polite, but reserved and distant. We see here the stereotype of the English gentleman. For most this reserve and apparent impartiality appeared as a virtue, but some regard the British as being too reserved and distant. They lack warmth and emotion, qualities which Italians prize.

These stereotypes are in part products of their own personal contact with Canadians of French and British origins. But they confirm stereotypes already held by the Italians before coming to Canada. The average Italian works *with* the French; he works *for* the British (see Table 2.8). The nature of his contacts and, therefore, the impression he forms of the two, are naturally very different. He is the socio-economic equal of the French, but the employee of the British. He is in competition with the Canadian of French origin, not only for jobs and women, but also for prestige; he is his social equal. The Canadian of British origin, on the other hand, is his social superior and the social superior of his rival, the French Canadian. The relations between employer and employee, between the British living in Westmount or Mount Royal and the Italian Canadian living in St. Henri or Ville Émard, are naturally reserved. There is great social distance between the two. The immigrant looks with sympathy upon the impartiality, the detachment, the polite reserve of the British in their dealings with him. His relations with the French are, on almost all points, the opposite. The Italian thus sets the British up as a model to emulate, at least in the economic sphere. This is extremely important, as the Italian came to Canada for economic reasons.

Table 5.3. Ethnic group of persons who discriminate most against Italian Canadians

Ethnic group	Immigrant	Canadian-born
French	82%	77%
British	9	23
Jewish	3	0
Italian Canadian	3	0
Other	3	0
Total %	100	100
Number	121	13

Thus many Italians see the difference between French and British as the difference between blue collar and white collar, between employee and employer. With the former, they have relations of equality and competition; with the latter relations of superordination and subordination characterized in general by reserve. It will also be obvious that the very social distance between Italian Canadians and Canadians of British origin which gives rise to this stereotype, also helps to maintain it in fact. On the other hand, because there is greater contact between French and Italian Canadians, there is also more opportunity for competition and rivalry as well as discrimination.

B. Discrimination

This close contact is the principal reason why 82 per cent of the immigrants and 77 per cent of the Canadian-born among the persons we interviewed indicated the French as those who discriminate most against them (*see* Table 5.3).

Table 5.4. Frequency of discrimination against Italian Canadians

Frequency	Immigrant	Canadian-born
Often	21%	11%
Once in a while	30	16
Formerly	6	26
Never	43	47
Total %	100	100
Number	176	19

Just how much discrimination is there against Italian Canadians? We asked our informants if they had ever felt discrimination—unfairness or mistreatment because they were of Italian descent. Approximately 50 per cent of the immigrants and 27 per cent of those born in Canada replied that they had felt discrimination, although most said it was only once in a while. Only 43 per cent of the immigrants and 47 per cent of those born in Canada reported they had never felt any discrimination.

Table 5.5. Types of persons who discriminate most frequently against Italian Canadians

Type	Immigrant	Canadian-born
Teachers	0%	25%
Neighbours	6	17
Bosses	21	17
Fellow workers	49	8
Casual acquaintances	15	8
Other	9	25
Total %	100	100
Number	101	12

Who discriminated against them? For 70 per cent of the immigrants those who discriminated were persons whom they met in their place of work—21 per cent were bosses and 49 per cent fellow workers. For Canadian-born Italians, persons practising discrimination against them were fairly evenly distributed among teachers, neighbours, bosses, fellow workers and casual acquaintances as well as others. Twenty-five per cent indicated they had experienced discrimination from their teachers and 17 per cent from their neighbours. Only 25 per cent indicated they had experienced discrimination in their place of work by bosses or fellow workers. These findings have been summarized in Table 5.5.

Finally, to get an idea of the effect that discrimination has on our informants, we asked them to what extent their lives had been thwarted or made unpleasant by people who discriminated against them because of their Italian descent. Three out of 10 immigrants and four out of 10 born in Canada replied that this discrimination bothered them not at all. On the other hand, 16 per cent of the immigrants and 27 per cent of those born in Canada complained that they were very much affected by the discrimination (see Table 5.6).

Table 5.6. Degree to which life is made unpleasant by discrimination

Degree	Immigrant	Canadian-born
Very much	16%	27%
Somewhat	41	17
A little bit	13	17
Not at all	30	39
Total %	100	100
Number	125	18

One thing our survey did not reveal was the relative intensity of this discrimination. A number of the prewar immigrants indicated that when they first arrived discrimination was severe. "The newcomers don't know what the word means," one said. Those who came after the war also reported that the degree of discrimination against them by Canadians of French origin was particularly intense from 1948 through 1955. Some told of fights they had with the French, others of groups of French youths who on weekends would come looking for "*les maudits Italiens*" on the streets around Jean Talon Boulevard between Saint Laurent and Papineau and, especially, in Jarry Park. They would ask an innocent question and if the accent of the respondent betrayed him as Italian they would beat him up. The reasons our informants gave for this discrimination were quite simply the following: "We are Italians. They don't like us because we work harder than they do and we save more. They are jealous." The French may harbour these feelings but this is not a matter we investigated systematically. The image of the Italian as seen by the French must, of course, be examined carefully in its own right. Nonetheless, from our casual conversations with Canadians of French origin who had had some contact with Italian immigrants, we learned that they considered Italians dirty and noisy. Many said they thought it disgusting the way Italians were willing to do even the most menial tasks,

and it was dishonest the way they accepted less pay than the French for the same work. A final complaint which, like several others, was held most strongly by women of French origin, was that Italian men have no respect for women. Several complained that they had been insulted, propositioned and even touched by Italian men as they walked alone through the Italian districts along Saint Laurent or Jean Talon Boulevards.

This intense hostility has now abated. Canadians of Italian and French origins live more peacefully side by side than they did just 10 to 15 years ago. If close contact between the two sometimes leads to rivalry, discrimination and disdain, it also, as we have seen, often leads to friendship and marriage.

C. Pressure for Cultural and Political Commitment

The Italian Canadian may have ambivalent attitudes towards the French and British, but he wishes above all else to be left alone. He does not wish to be forced into a public statement of why he chooses a French bride, or why he sends his children to an English school, or why he regards the British as gentlemen and the French as extravagant. Because he studies English and sends his children to study English, it does not mean that this language governs his complete social life. If language to the French Canadian is the symbol of his culture, its quintessence and the embodiment of his social and political status, for the Italian it is merely a socio-economic tool. He uses English to his boss, French to his workmates, Italian to his friends from other regions of Italy, and a local dialect to his closest kin and *paesani*.

Canadian spokesmen of French origin, however, regard the Italian Canadian interest in English as a total cultural and political commitment. This disturbs them. They believe that this large bloc of new Canadians is moving slowly but surely into the English-speaking community, thus threatening French culture and political aspirations.

This position was stated openly and forcefully by René Gauthier, former Director of the Service des Néo-Canadiens de la Commission des écoles catholiques de Montréal, when he declared at the banquet organized by the CIBPA for the presentation of scholarships to Italian Canadian students in September 1964: "Even though a good number of immigrants learn the two official languages, a very large number learn only one language, English. . . . We have the right to deplore this situation of fact Because of the particular situation and role of the province of Quebec, which has a French majority, if the immigrant has rights, he also has obligations to those who welcome him. Is not one of those obligations to learn properly the language of the majority, that is, French, because we are in Quebec?"¹

He went on to deplore the lack of interest among Italians in speaking French well. While admitting that there was a free choice as to which language children should be educated in, he urged that this should be French. He indicated that unless the Italians spoke French well, there could be no meaningful contact between themselves and French Canadians. He then drew their attention to the growing swing from French to English schools. The logical solution, according to M. Gauthier, was to have children go to bilingual schools where they could learn both English and French. He pointed out that

two schools, St. Philippe Bénizzi and Notre Dame de la Défense, had a long, impressive record of educating Italian children in both French and English. Although three years before the Roman Catholic School Board had instituted a campaign to increase the number of bilingual schools, the response had been extremely disappointing. The reaction of the Italian community had been apathetic. He deplored this.

Although he did not say so, Mr. Gauthier was referring in particular to the reception which the bilingual school proposed for the new Italian parish of the Madonna di Pompei had received from Italian parents. The highlights of the story are quite simple. Increasingly concerned with the Anglicization of Italian education (as well as that of other ethnic groups), the Quebec Department of Education in 1961 launched a campaign to establish bilingual schools for immigrants. Its *Programme d'études pour les Néo-Canadiens* presented a blueprint for bilingual schools. Pressure was thus placed on the new parish to apply for the establishment of a bilingual school. Several informants indicated that the Roman Catholic hierarchy was instrumental in this. The parish priest, who for years had worked in France, was certainly sympathetic to the idea. Though the new elementary school was to accommodate the overflow from the English-language St. Rita School, the new parish priest and the officials of the French section of the Roman Catholic School Board planned to establish a bilingual school. A long battle within the School Board took place. The outcome was that the new school was English and not bilingual. Local lay leaders of Madonna di Pompei, probably at the instigation of the parish priest, organized a group of parents (most of whom had not thought out the problem) to picket the Roman Catholic School Board on Sherbrooke Street as a protest.

Why had the move to establish a bilingual school been defeated? Several members of the French section of the School Board interviewed about the matter suggested two reasons. The first concerned the so-called "Irish" element within the School Board which stood to lose power if the new school growing out of the St. Rita School should come under the aegis of the French section—as it would if it were bilingual. The second reason they advanced was the lack of interest of most Italian parents concerned.

Members of the English section of the School Board gave a different picture. They pointed out that the School Board created new schools in response to pressure from parents and teachers to accommodate students who could not be housed in existing structures. This meant that new schools grew out of old schools. As the students to be accommodated in the new school were an overflow from an English school, it was logical that the school should be English. Secondly, Italian Canadian teachers in the English section were against the idea of a bilingual school. Eager to work in a school near their homes, they feared they would be unable to do so if they were required to teach partly in French, which most spoke considerably less well than English. They opposed the idea informally. In the third place, officials in the English section were not entirely sure of the ability of bilingual schools to teach both English and French properly. Finally, they pointed to the opposition of the parents to the idea of a bilingual school, which they said they had established through a survey.

The initial opposition of the parents to a bilingual school was confirmed to me by one of the lay leaders of the parish who had been very much involved with organizing the protest demonstration against the School Board's "imposition" of an English school. He

admitted that he had opposed the English school more out of principle than anything else. He resented the way in which it had been "thrust," as he said, "down our throats." He personally was very pleased now that the school was English. He felt that it was impossible for children to learn both French and English fluently, especially since they usually spoke Italian at home. This meant that they would have to carry three languages in their heads. His point to me was that Canada does not need half-doctors, half-lawyers or half-teachers. "She needs people who are thoroughly trained in their chosen profession. This applies to language and to the knowledge of language." This he felt was not possible if a person went to a bilingual school. "These children learn a little bit of two languages. Considering they also use a third language at home, it is too much to expect that they could learn to speak three properly." He then suggested that if I doubted this, I should listen to the French and English spoken by some of the leading members of the Italian community who had attended the bilingual schools of Notre Dame de la Défense and St. Philippe Bénizzi—"persons who claim to be able to speak French and English fluently." He claimed that 90 per cent of the other parents in the area thought as he did. They had seriously reflected on the matter.

The Italian coming here is not necessarily choosing either French or English, my informant stressed. Because he chooses a language of education, it does not necessarily mean that he opts for the culture represented by that language. My informant felt that if the Italian chose a particular language in which to work or associate with other people, it did not necessarily mean he was going to become a member of the group. He himself used English for work (and spoke it very well) but he passed his private life speaking Italian. He claimed that he was "Canadian Italian, that is, a member of a group that is 'apart, off on its own,' composed of people who are all neither French nor English, but Canadian Italian, and possibly more truly Canadian than either the French or the English in Montreal."

Bilingual school teachers themselves, said the students, virtually all of whom were children of Italian immigrants, were extremely enthusiastic about their English lessons, but paid only grudging attention to French. The teachers observed that there is great pressure at home for children to learn English. Their parents were primarily concerned with their progress in English. French was considered of secondary importance, with the result that the students' ability in this language suffered. Finally the teachers noted that there was great mobility out of the school. Parents kept their children in a bilingual school for the first few years after their arrival; later they placed them in a purely English-language high school.

A number of informants expressed the opinion that the bilingual schools were merely an attempt by the French section of the Roman Catholic School Board to make Italians into French-speaking Canadians and that the education given was not bilingual. There appears to be certain factual support for this statement. The *Programme d'études pour les Néo-Canadiens*, referred to above, indicates that in point of fact 15½ hours a week are spent on subjects taught in French and only 10½ on those taught in English. Moreover the subjects taught in French are strategic ones designed to bring the students within the French Canadian cultural sphere. These include religion, French, history and geography, and such miscellaneous subjects as art, current affairs, hygiene and civics. Only arithmetic

and English language are taught in English. In 1963 there were 1,057 students attending the four bilingual schools under the French section of the Roman Catholic School Board and 140 attending the one bilingual school under the English section. After the fourth year, however, the students in the latter school follow a curriculum entirely in English.

Our own survey did not confirm the opposition of Italian Canadians to bilingual schools. Of the 172 persons interviewed who had children, 56 per cent said that they would send, or would have sent, their own children to bilingual schools if there were more of them; only 14 per cent were opposed. The rest expressed no opinion.

The discrepancy between the favourable attitude of the survey respondents towards bilingual schools, and the decidedly unfavourable attitude of those parents who were actually faced with the choice in the Notre Dame de Pompei area, illustrates neatly one of the major shortcomings of research based exclusively upon surveys and opinion polls. What people say they like often has very little relation to what they actually do when confronted with the real situation. Most of our informants had never been faced with the choice between a bilingual and a unilingual school for their children. They lived in areas remote from existing bilingual schools. I suspect, however, that had it been possible to pose the question and then allow several weeks to elapse so that respondents could compare notes with their neighbours and seek information through their personal networks, the answers as shown in the survey results would have reflected the unfavourable opinion of bilingual schools expressed by persons who have actually been confronted with them.

In spite of pressure placed on him both by some of his leaders and by French Canadian authorities, the Italian Canadian, when actually faced with the choice, does not support bilingual schools. He prefers unilingual English schools, and is willing to defend his choice, once he has made it.

Among Canadians of French origin there is growing concern with the systematic refusal of the Italian Canadian community to commit itself politically or culturally to either the French- or the English-speaking community. In November 1963, René Lévesque, then Quebec Minister of Natural Resources, addressing the Association of Italo-Canadian Professional Men told them that French-speaking Canadians respected the cultural heritage of all Quebec citizens whose ethnic origin was other than French or British, but not their nationalism. He asked them if they were planning to form a third nation which, he pointed out, could only be artificial. There were many cultures in Canada, but only two nations. He pointed out that the French-speaking Canadians constituted 80 per cent of the population of Quebec and asked if this did or did not give them the right to self-determination. He went on to emphasize that separation from Canada would not be the end of the world and then pointed to Italy's liberal revolution during the *Risorgimento*.

His audience was stunned and angered by his forthrightness. One person shouted, expressing the opinion of many, that he feared a nationalistic and even independent Quebec in which new Canadians would be considered second-class citizens. "After all," he shouted, "we have come to Canada and not just to Quebec. We want to remain Canadians." He was given a round of applause by the audience.²

D. Non-Alignment as a Policy

The forthrightness of René Gauthier and René Lévesque indicates the growing concern of the thinking French-speaking Canadians over the failure of the Italian Canadian community to identify itself with the French population with whom it has a linguistic, religious and cultural affinity. Undeniably, in future, there is going to be growing pressure on the Italian Canadian community to commit itself. Failure to do so is, in the long run, bound to provoke a reaction, especially if the tension between French- and English-speaking Canadians increases. The Italian Canadian is sitting on the fence as far as the conflict between the two groups is concerned. He wishes to be left there so that he can get on with the business of making money.

One of the most prominent officials of the Canadian Italian Business and Professional Men's Association told me that when he had been president of the association, he had been hounded on many occasions by television interviewers who wanted to get the opinion of the Italian community on certain political issues of the day. He had studiously avoided being interviewed. The reason, as he put it to me, was that he had a shop. If he came out on the air either for or against French Canada's aspirations, he would be almost bound to antagonize somebody. This would mean that he would either lose customers or, possibly, his store window might be smashed. He was not prepared to take the risk. Moreover, he saw that while he, personally, felt one way, others in the association held different opinions. If the organization were to take an official position, it would split in two and thus weaken its effectiveness as spokesman for the Italian Canadian community. Thus it had nothing to gain but everything to lose by taking sides. This point of view was expressed to me by officers in other associations.

What is the opinion of individual Italian Canadians about the tension between the French- and English-speaking groups in Montreal? We asked our informants how they felt about the idea of more power for Quebec, provided it remained part of Canada. Twenty-three per cent (45 out of 196) expressed no opinion. Of those who did, 47 per cent of the immigrants thought it was a "good" or "very good" idea, and 53 per cent thought it a "poor" or "very bad" idea. The proportions were reversed for those born in Canada. The opinions are summarized in Table 5.7.

Table 5.7. Attitude to more power for Quebec provided it remains part of Canada

Attitude	Immigrants	Canadian-born
Very good idea	16%	35%
Good idea	31	20
Poor idea	22	30
Very bad idea	31	15
Total %	100	100
Number	131	20

But when asked what they thought of the idea of independence for Quebec, only 18 per cent of the immigrants and 26 per cent of those born in Canada were in favour. The

rest were opposed. These opinions, set out in Table 5.8, indicate that Italian Canadians do reflect on the dispute and have made up their minds regarding the relative merits of the two sides.

Table 5.8. Attitude to independence for Quebec

Attitude	Immigrant	Canadian-born
Very good idea	6%	21%
Good idea	12	5
Poor idea	39	42
Very bad idea	43	32
Total %	100	100
Number	142	19

Although 15 per cent of the immigrants and 25 per cent of the Canadian-born thought the French-speaking rather than the English-speaking group had more points in its favour (compared to 9 per cent and 10 per cent in favour of the English-speaking), 28 per cent of the immigrants thought both English- and French-speaking a bit right and a bit wrong, and 15 per cent thought both were wrong. However, 33 per cent of the immigrants and 10 per cent of those born in Canada asserted that the dispute between the French- and English-speaking groups was no concern of theirs (*see* Table 5.9).

Table 5.9. Opinion on French-English dispute

Opinion	Immigrant	Canadian-born
French are more right	15%	25%
English are more right	9	10
Both are a bit right and a bit wrong	28	20
Both are wrong	15	35
This is no concern of mine	33	10
Total %	100	100
Number	149	20

What position do individual Italians feel they should take as a community regarding the dispute between Canadians of French and British origins? Their replies came as no surprise. Eighty-nine per cent of the immigrants and 93 per cent of those born in Canada declared that Italians should remain neutral and take no position. Moreover 71 per cent of these said that taking a position would bring actual harm to the Italian community. The rest said the community should remain neutral because they felt that the dispute was of no real importance, and Italians should therefore not become involved in it. These opinions are set out in Table 5.10.

What action would Italian Canadians take if Quebec were to become independent? Only 31 per cent had no idea of what they would do. The rest had a very clear idea.

Table 5.10. Position Italian community should take regarding French-English dispute

Position	Immigrant	Canadian-born
Support the French	6%	7%
Support the English	5	0
Remain neutral	89	93
Total %	100	100
Number	151	14

Seventy per cent of the immigrants said they would stay on in Quebec and make the best of it, 21 per cent planned to move to another Canadian province, and 9 per cent said they would return to Italy. The opinions of those born in Canada were roughly the same. In fact, one of them, although he had never been to Italy, felt so strongly about the matter that he too said that he would move to Italy. These attitudes are set out in Table 5.11.

Table 5.11. Action if Quebec becomes independent

Action	Immigrant	Canadian-born
Move to another Canadian province	21%	15%
Return to Italy	9	8
Stay in Quebec and make best of it	70	77
Total %	100	100
Number	118	13

In the final analysis, the approach of Italian Canadians to this matter, as to everything else, is pragmatic. They are interested in the dispute only in so far as it affects themselves and are prepared to adjust their political point of view to coincide with their self-interest. They will avoid having to make this choice as long as they possibly can for their fundamental philosophy is that the longer they do not commit themselves, the more peaceful will be their lives and the better able they will be to advance their fortunes and those of their children.

It is legitimate to ask at this point how far persons of Italian descent in Montreal think of themselves as a separate group. Is there in fact any Italian Canadian "nationalism," to use René Lévesque's term? If Italian Canadians do not wish to be considered as belonging to either the French- or English-speaking communities, how do they wish to be considered? How are they considered by others?

To begin with, half (51 per cent) of the immigrants interviewed had become naturalized Canadian citizens; another 21 per cent intended to become Canadian citizens; only 16 per cent said they definitely did not plan to become Canadian; finally, a balance of 12 per cent had not yet decided. From this it is evident that three-fourths of the immigrants were, or planned to become, Canadian citizens. Naturalization is an important step, for it is a formal commitment to a new country. But whether or not they are citizens, they are members of the Italian Canadian community.

Is there a certain justification for René Lévesque’s statement that persons of Italian descent consider themselves a community apart, one that is neither a French-speaking nor English-speaking community? We tried to determine the extent to which persons of Italian descent saw themselves as belonging to a particular group. It was a difficult question to ask because it could be answered not solely in terms of ethnic criteria but also in terms of purely social ones. Whereas a person might be biologically of Italian descent, he might think of himself socially as a French- or English-speaking Canadian. Unfortunately, this distinction was not made systematically by our interviewers. In any event the replies to a series of questions relating to this point are summarized in Table 5.12. From this it appears that, in general terms, the categories in which Italian Canadians are placed by others coincide with the way they place themselves. That is, only 4 per cent of the immigrants were regarded by persons not of Italian descent as belonging to either the French- or English-speaking Canadian community. Even fewer immigrants (2 per cent) regarded themselves as being French- or English-speaking Canadians, while slightly more of those born in Canada (18 per cent) placed themselves in the French- or English-speaking Canadian community.

From this it is obvious that approximately 95 per cent of the immigrants and 82 per cent of those born in Canada consider themselves and are considered by their non-Italian neighbours as being something other than French- or English-speaking Canadians.

Table 5.12. Ethnic group in which Italians consider themselves placed by others and in which they place themselves

Ethnic group	Group in which placed by:			
	Non-Italians		Self	
	Immi- grant	Canadian- born	Immi- grant	Canadian- born
French-speaking Canadian	3%	18%	1%	6%
English-speaking Canadian	1	0	1	12
Italian or Italian Canadian	70	38	64	35
Just Canadian	19	44	31	47
Other	7	0	3	0
Total %	100	100	100	100
Number	153	16	169	17

In brief, then, Italians, even those born in Canada, see themselves in their own eyes and in the eyes of others, as a group apart. Obviously this sentiment is self-enforcing, for to the same extent as they feel themselves a group apart, they will continue to behave as a group apart. Actions deriving from these attitudes heighten their differences in the eyes of others as well as themselves. But their separateness from the two dominant ethnic groups is not necessarily one of “nationalism.” As noted above, approximately a third of the immigrants and almost half of those born in Canada regard themselves as “Canadians.” Their commitment is definitely to Canada. In point of fact, none of those born in Canada and only 20 per cent of the immigrants wanted to return permanently to Italy. The

Italians thus consider themselves as Canadians of Italian descent, just as there are Canadians of French and British descent. They do not agree with René Lévesque that there are only two nations and that they must commit themselves to one or the other. Their outlook is not provincial. They see themselves not just as citizens of French Canadian Quebec, but as Canadian citizens, as members of one ethnic group alongside scores of others: as part of the Canadian mosaic. Consequently, they resist the increasing pressure being placed on them to make a parochial choice in Quebec which may affect their standing in the country and their ability to better themselves economically.

This study has examined the nature of the contacts that persons of Italian descent in Montreal have with Canadians of French and British origins and their position with regard to the conflict of interests between the two dominant ethnic groups.

To do this it was necessary first to examine the origins and nature of the Italian community in Montreal. This community is composed of a complex network of overlapping ties based on kinship, work, neighbourhood and friendship.

The Italian national parishes give the community a certain territorial basis, and the host of voluntary associations bind together different segments and interest groups within the community. The community has its own system of social control and criteria for according prestige. There are also multiple divisions which cut across it at various levels. Many are similar to those which divide regions, towns and villages in Italy. Individual families compete with each other and there is tension between generations as well as between immigrants and Canadian-born persons of Italian descent. Regional and religious differences further segment the community, as does the competition for prestige and power between differing spokesmen and their followers.

The Italian community is not an isolated whole. Members are in individual contact with other Canadians, both French- and English-speaking. They are firmly tied to the English-speaking sector of Montréal society through the educational system, for three out of four send their children to English schools and the proportion is increasing annually. Italians regard English as an economic tool, a necessity which enables them and their children to establish and improve their position in Canadian society. But this apparent orientation in favour of the English-speaking community is not maintained in all social fields; Italians born in Canada by and large choose their friends and later their marriage partners from among Canadians of French origin, thus establishing strong and permanent ties with the other dominant ethnic group. Contacts at work forge other links with Canadians of French and British origins. The church and voluntary associations of the Italians also place them in contact with other segments and groups outside their own community. Finally, their growing political activity involves them in various social fields and with different ethnic groups.

If the interest of Italians in the English language appears to commit the group to the English sphere of interest, at the same time, marriage, friendship, religion and political involvement tie it closely to the French community. The Italians occupy roles in several ethnic groups and, indeed, there are individuals who move socially among the English, French and Italian communities, all in the course of a day. The majority, however, pass most of their time operating as Italians, for they live and work with Italians, and find most of their friends in that community.

Because of the political situation in the province of Quebec, increasing pressure is being brought to bear upon the Italians to opt clearly for one or other of the two dominant ethnic groups. But although Italian Canadians look upon Canadians of British origin as ideal types from an economic and, in a certain sense, social point of view, they feel a strong undercurrent of sympathy for French Canadian political aspirations in so far as the French community seeks to obtain more power for the province of Quebec. Italian Canadians at all levels are overwhelmingly opposed to the idea of the province separating from the rest of Canada. Most persons of Italian descent see themselves either as Italian Canadians or as simply Canadians without any ethnic label. They certainly do not consider themselves, nor do they aspire to be considered, as members of the French- or English-speaking community. They wish to remain free from political commitments which could place in jeopardy their ability to move ahead.

The Italian community thus emerges as a complex structure. It is composed of individuals whose degree of Italianness varies considerably, as does the amount of time they spend in the Italian community. At one extreme, there are the new immigrants who speak only Italian. Their relatives meet them, provide them with accommodation, and find jobs for them with other Italians. Many pass their entire time, except for excursions into the English and French marketplace, living as Italians. They form the nucleus of the Italian Canadian community. At the other extreme are persons of Italian descent born in Canada who spend most of their time as French-speaking Canadians, English-speaking Canadians or both. They enter the Italian community only on rare occasions—perhaps for a visit with some newly arrived relative from Italy, to attend the wedding of a friend or relative in an Italian church, or to participate in a banquet organized by an Italian association. These persons, who are peripheral members of the Italian community, occasionally gain important roles as its leaders. Their social identity in greater Montreal society is determined to a considerable extent by the relative size of the group forming the nucleus of the community. As long as there is a sizable and active group of persons whose time is passed largely in the Italian community, persons of Italian descent who are attached only marginally to the community tend to be classified as Italians by persons not of Italian descent, for their Italian surname acts as a social label.

There are also many persons of Italian descent who have moved completely outside the community and no longer live and work as Italian Canadians. All persons of Italian descent are not necessarily members of the Italian community. Nor is Italian descent a necessary attribute of all those who are members of the community. An important category of persons whose background is not Italian, but who are none the less members of the Italian community, are the non-Italian wives and husbands of persons of Italian descent. Many of these men and women spend most of their time living and working in the Italian Canadian community. Some even play an important part in organizing the

social events which help to provide the community with form and substance. For example, many of the wives of the CIBPA members who are grouped together in the CIBPA Ladies' Auxiliary are Canadians of French origin; a number are members of the executive, including several past presidents.

Many Italian Canadians thus have status in several different social systems.¹ The relative stress which the Italian Canadian gives to his status in any given social system is normally determined by the interest he derives from it. Thus many Canadian-born persons of Italian descent who during and immediately following the war had little, if anything, to do with the Italian community (many had almost forgotten how to speak Italian) found that the Italian status to which they could lay claim was an advantage in dealing with the rapidly expanding market provided by the new Italian immigrants. Consequently many who had all but moved out of the community returned to it, learned Italian, and now play an active part in its economic and political affairs. But the move did not eliminate their status in the French-speaking or English-speaking community, or in both. The Italian Canadian thus manipulates these statuses to derive the greatest possible benefit for himself and his family. He has a greater range of possibilities and economic, social and political choices open to him than French- or English-speaking Canadians who operate exclusively in one social system.

The Italian Canadian is thus in a strategic position. There is no indication at present of an attempt by the Italian Canadian community to mediate between the French- and English-speaking Canadian communities. But his position between the major blocs does allow the Italian Canadian, on an individual basis, to forge ahead rapidly in the economic field. He is not tied by cultural or political loyalties which might impede his drive to attain the material and social advantages for which he or his parents turned their backs on Italy. It seems likely that Italians will continue to resist the pressure being applied to them, and will avoid committing themselves to political support for either their French- or English-speaking neighbours. Any significant shift in the power relations between the two dominant ethnic groups will be assessed with pragmatic detachment. The Italian Canadian in general has not found in Canadian society any overriding values for which he is willing to sacrifice his moral obligation to strive for the greatest possible material and social benefits for himself and his family.

A. Of Prewar Immigrants

1. "They are not much good because they don't have the education; they think themselves gods descended from heaven; they think they know everything . . ."
2. "The old immigrants have made many sacrifices but of the majority, few have succeeded in obtaining a good situation."
3. "They like us all right; on the other hand, they wish to distinguish themselves. They wish more supremacy. They think that Italy is still in the same condition as when they emigrated."
4. "They are persons who have been able to organize themselves pretty well, but they still keep their old Italian mentality of prejudice, superstition and so on. . . ."
5. "The old immigrants worked hard, but they lacked ambition . . . they live today as people live in Italy."
6. "Only the jealous ones are envious of us. They're jealous people."
7. "They worked a great deal, but they could have derived more from their work if they had been more ambitious."
8. "I simply don't understand why they must still continue to work, even though old."
9. "They should help the Italians more, and not be so snobbish."
10. "We have got a very bad opinion of them because they have almost forgotten *la patria*, the mother country."
11. "They don't like us too much because we are trying to do more than they and we are more effective at it than they are."
12. "Egoists and envious of the new arrivals."
13. "They think less of the new immigrants."

*These lists give some of the unfavourable opinions expressed by our general sample and summarized in Table 3.2 (see p. 31). However, only a minority held these opinions (see Table 3.1).

B. Of Canadian-born Italians

1. "They are too Canadian and no longer know how to live in the Italian manner."
2. "They are not able to know Italy. They don't see life as we do."
3. "They have forgotten Italy."
4. "Persons too accustomed to English and French habits. Only their surname remains Italian. They have a different mentality from the new immigrants and are indifferent to their problems."
5. "We have a very, very bad opinion of them. They are the cause of the bad reputation of the Italian community."
6. "We don't find them very sympathetic. They're too Canadian."
7. "They think they know it all."
8. "They think they're supermen. They're haughty people who are ashamed to speak Italian with other Italians. They think themselves superior to others because they are accustomed to the country."
9. "The bosses of the country and looked upon unfavourably by others."
10. "Lazy persons who waste the money earned by their parents."
11. "Persons who have been able to adapt themselves and today have a good position thanks to their intelligence. They work as we do, but they save little, probably because they have become Canadian."
12. "They think they know everything, but in reality it's very little. They work very little and often save little. They're still Italians like us, only they do less heavy work because they are in their own land and have had the good fortune to go to school."

Table B.1. Marriages of persons of Italian origin in Montreal, 1951

Place of birth	Spouse of Italian origin	Italian-Italian			Italian-French			Italian-British			Italian-Other			Total
		R.C.	Prot.	Mixed T.	R.C.	Prot.	Mixed T.	R.C.	Prot.	Mixed T.	R.C.	Prot.	Mixed T.	
Both born in Canada	M	60	8	3	94	2	2	26	5	6	11	1	1	440
	F	60	8	3	103	1	2	19	9	6	5	2	3	
	Total	120	16	6	197	3	4	45	14	12	16	3	4	
Neither born here	M	82	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	174
	F	82	3	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	
	Total	164	6	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	1	-	1	
One spouse born here	M	14	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	145
	F	45	6	-	-	1	1	-	-	1	-	-	1	
	Sub Total	59	6	-	-	1	1	-	-	2	-	-	2	
Not born here	M	45	6	-	5	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	75
	F	14	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
	Sub Total	59	6	-	7	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	
Total	Total	118	12	-	7	-	1	-	-	2	3	-	5	759
		402	34	6	204	3	5	46	14	15	20	3	7	

Source: Quebec, Department of Health, Microfilm of marriage registrations for Montreal metropolitan area.

Table B.2. Marriages of persons of Italian origin in Montreal, 1962

Place of birth	Spouse of Italian origin	Italian-Italian		Italian-French		Italian-British		Italian-Other		Total
		R.C.	Prot. Mixed T.	R.C.	Prot. Mixed T.	R.C.	Prot. Mixed T.	R.C.	Prot. Mixed T.	
Both born in Canada	M	21	-	81	-	9	6	2	-	4
	F	21	-	66	1	8	5	3	-	3
	Total	42	-	147	1	17	11	5	-	260
Neither born here	M	518	5	1	-	1	-	12	-	16
	F	518	5	-	-	-	-	14	-	18
	Total	1036	10	1	-	1	-	26	-	1083
One spouse born here	M	11	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	6
	F	20	1	-	-	1	1	-	-	5
	Sub Total	31	-	-	-	1	1	1	-	11
Not born here	M	20	-	98	-	5	-	2	-	2
	F	11	-	9	-	-	-	3	-	5
	Sub Total	31	-	107	-	5	-	5	-	7
Total	Total	62	2	107	-	6	1	6	-	18
		1140	10	255	1	24	12	37	-	59
		2	1152	11	267	69	33	69	22	1547

Source: Quebec, Department of Health, Microfilm of marriage registrations for Montreal metropolitan area.

Italian opinions of Canadians of French and British origins expressed by the general sample are summarized in Tables 5.1 and 5.2 (*see* p. 56). Here we have listed some of the individual opinions expressed by more articulate informants. We first asked what they thought of Canadians of French origin; then a little later what they thought of Canadians of British origin. The numbers of each of the two sets of opinions correspond to each other. That is, opinion number 1 on French Canadians is by the same informant who gives opinion number 1 on English Canadians, and so on.

A. Italian Opinions of Canadians of French Origin

1. "They're good people; I have lived with them all my life. I find that we are much more appreciated now than we used to be"
2. "They are respectful people from whom I have never had any bitterness or offence."
3. "It seems to me that we are respected. Many people help me at work, and I have never seen any French who hate me in particular. They are good, and I am pleased if they want to defend their language."
4. "They are good people. It is a shame that they don't like Italians."
5. "Even if they do leave a little bit to be desired, for they live from day to day, I approve of them for their cultural renewal and their politics regarding the English group."
6. "Fine people up to the point that they don't do any harm to me and I don't do any harm to them."
7. "They are very fine persons but with tails of straw. Every time they turn they catch fire. They are like Italians. Many are very sensible, it depends on their cultural level—but they only know Canada. No one has taught them that there are also other countries. They have an inferiority complex which leads them to think of themselves as better than others. For this reason, they don't succeed in seeing themselves as

they are. I have only known them in the city, probably in the country they are different. They can't stomach that the immigrants are succeeding."

8. "They suffer from an inferiority complex towards the English."
9. "They are good people, simple, friendly, but just the same a little envious of us Italians."
10. "In the midst of all the mass there will be a percentage of good people; but the majority certainly think badly of us. They are envious, I don't know why . . . perhaps it's their education or something. . . but at work they are fanatics about their language. But they are not really bad. They could contribute much more to their country if they were able to understand that the importance does not lie in the language but in customs and social well-being."
11. "Their mentality is different from ours, but one can understand them and help them to overcome the inferiority complex which they have."
12. "They are good because they can stand that the Italians take away all their jobs while they remain unoccupied because of us."
13. "The French have different habits from ours . . . but too many can't stand the sight of us, probably because we like to work more than they do . . . and we have more initiative in business."
14. "All evil and badness that's thinkable. They are extremely vulgar. They have too many defects. They are ignorant and vulgar."
15. "The French Canadians are very unsympathetic because they think everything is theirs . . . they would gladly strangle us because we are such good workers."
16. "I find them very unpleasant at work . . . they live from day to day. Few of them can stomach us."
17. "They are jealous of Italians because they know that the Italians are superior."
18. "Very bad workers, bad fathers, mediocre friends, extremely well qualified in drinking and doing nothing. The French Canadians think of themselves as the bosses and too many try and impose their authority on us. . . they don't look kindly towards us. But when they are respected, they also know how to respect others."
19. "They are thirty years behind in culture and mentality."
20. "Without shame."
21. "Most French Canadians are nothing more than crummy snobs. So many detest us Italians as we are practically replacing them at work. . ."
22. "We are different. We have the same pay but we are able to buy ourselves houses. They are 'broke' on Monday."

B. Italian Opinions of Canadians of British Origin

1. "They are very conservative . . . very different from the French Canadians. The French Canadians are freer. As for me, I speak English, but I wouldn't like to stay in Ontario. Nothing but English all the time? No! Here I am used to things. Here I meet Polish, Italians, French; I like that. They are sociable and nice enough, but they live too much for themselves."

2. "It is difficult to judge them, but they give the impression that they think wholly of themselves."
3. "I'd rather see the French here than the English. The English are too bossy, that's what it is."
4. "They are frigid, and don't put themselves too much out for others."
5. "They are trying to keep themselves on top of the French and all the others."
6. "They are rather reserved. They are people who keep to themselves and mind their own business."
7. "They are English people but they are not Canadians. The second generation is a group which works hard and speaks little. They don't cry on their neighbours' shoulders. I have a sense of respect for their ability to get ahead in life. They've got a clan sense — they are united."
8. "More serious and more intelligent."
9. "Cordial and gentlemanly, even if they keep their distance. More sincere and honest than French Canadians."
10. "They are more affable and less jealous than the French."
11. "They are good people, but they are fanatics about their language."
12. "Excellent as far as their manners, kindness, sense of democracy and individual liberty."
13. "Good people but difficult to understand."
14. "I prefer the English a great deal to the French, if only because they know how to respect others and show themselves to be gentlemen."
15. "Honest, more rational and better qualified than the French."
16. "The English are more respectful and more understanding and they stick to the facts when they talk."
17. "The English also have their defects but at least they have more diplomacy in their dealings . . ."
18. "They have different customs but they respect others."
19. "Excellent at work and as friends."
20. "The English have a very special manner of behaving. That is, they are more courteous and magnanimous but are very sly (*furbî*)."
21. "Distinguished, cultural, well-mannered, kind with one defect: too cold."
22. "I think the English are better than the French, even if they behave towards us only in terms of money. They are always trying to get the best of us."
23. "Even the English have their negative side as far as we are concerned, but they are more human. . . . They are more courteous and they are eager to understand."
24. "They have a much wider social life. They go out more often."

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Preface

1. See Garigue and Firth, "Kinship Organisation of Italianates in London" and Gans, *The Urban Villagers*. (For further bibliographical information on this and other references, see Bibliography, pp. 83-4.)

Chapter I

1. Vangilisti, *Gli Italiani in Canada*, 3-109. A former parish priest of the important Italian national parish of Nostra Signora della Difesa, Father Vangilisti has collected some interesting facts about early Italians in Canada and has described the more recent history of the Italian parishes in Montreal. His account is a personal, but nonetheless valuable, document which traces the growing pains of the community.

2. These and subsequent figures were taken from *Annual Reports* of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration.

3. The figures on population movements within the Italian community were made available to me by the parish priests of the various Italian national parishes. The statistics therefore exclude data relating to persons of Italian descent living outside the area covered by Italian national parishes. These outsiders in 1961 numbered some 16,000 or roughly 16 per cent of the total. Thus the actual increase in the number of persons of Italian descent is somewhat larger than that given here. (See Table 1.3 where I project a total of 132,000 Italians.)

4. This section dealing with the growth of the Italian community before 1935 is based in part on the prewar study by Bayley, "The Social Structure of the Italian and Ukrainian Immigrant Communities in Montreal," 13-38.

5. Vangilisti, *Gli Italiani in Canada*, 172-89.

6. *Ibid.*, 176.

7. Sacchetti, "Integrazione dell'emigrato italiano in Nord America," 2 f.

8. Bayley ("Immigrant Communities in Montreal," 180-93) has some interesting sections on this period. His work provides a complementary study to the rather one-sided account of the fortunes of the Italian community as seen by Vangilisti.

9. *Ibid.*, 190.

Chapter II

1. The observations of the place and structure of the family in Italian society are derived largely from my own field work in Sicily during 1962 and 1963 (Boissevain, "Poverty and Politics in a Sicilian Agro-Town," and "Patronage in Sicily"). These largely substantiate the findings of other observers of the southern Italian social scene. (See Banfield, *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society*; Moss and Cappannari, "Patterns of Kinship"; Moss and Thomson, "The South Italian Family"; and Pitkin, "Land Tenure and Family Organization.")

2. "Some observations on Italian Immigrants in Toronto," 7.

3. Garigue and Firth, "Kinship Organisation of Italianates in London," 79.

4. Bayley, "Immigrant Communities in Montreal."

5. Bayley (*Ibid.*, 113 ff. and 180 ff.) and Garigue ("Associations of Persons of Italian Descent in Montreal") have examined Italian associations in Montreal in considerable detail, as has Craig ("Associations of Persons of Italian Origin") for Toronto. The Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism conducted a study into 46 Italian associations in Montreal at the same time as the study on which the present report is based. I have fortunately been able to draw on some of these findings during the preparation of this study.

6. Garigue, "Associations of Persons of Italian Descent in Montreal," 38.

7. *Ibid.*, 42.

8. Bayley, "Immigrant Communities in Montreal."

9. *La Tribuna*, Montreal, June 1965.

10. See Barnes, "Class and Committees in a Norwegian Island Parish."

11. Bayley ("Immigrant Communities in Montreal," 25, 101, 103 f.) remarks on this in respect of the Italian community in Montreal during the 1930s. Gans (*The Urban Villagers*, 85 f.) and Garigue and Firth ("Italianates in London," 80 f.) make much the same observations regarding persons of Italian descent they studied in Boston and London.

Chapter III

1. See Garigue and Firth ("Italianates in London," 87), who remark, "The self-contained character of the activities of the kin group is the element most noticeable among the majority of Italianates in London. This is especially marked when they form more than one household."

Chapter IV

1. Bayley, "Immigrant Communities in Montreal," 255.

2. *Ibid.*, 247 and 256 f.

3. Vangilisti, *Gli Italiani in Canada*, 256.

4. *Ibid.*, 221 f.

5. Eleven of the 45 associations (24 per cent) surveyed by the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism had presented briefs to the government during the past five years.

6. See Boissevain, "Poverty and Politics in a Sicilian Agro-Town," for an analysis of this attitude in Sicily. Gans in *The Urban Villagers* notes that second-generation Italians in Boston had much the same attitude towards politicians.

7. See *Métro-Express*, Montreal, September 10, 1964; and *La Tribuna*, October 7, 1964.

8. See the open letter published by the association's president, Bruno J. Paternas, in *Cittadino Canadese*, Montreal, October 10, 1964.

Chapter V

1. The original French is as follows: "Même si bon nombre d'immigrants apprennent les deux langues officielles, un trop grand nombre n'apprennent qu'une seule langue, l'anglais Nous avons le droit de déplorer cette situation de fait. . . . À cause de la situation particulière et du rôle que joue la province de Québec, à majorité française, si l'immigrant a des droits, il a aussi des devoirs envers ceux qui l'accueillent. Un de ces devoirs n'est-il pas d'apprendre convenablement la langue de la majorité en l'occurrence le français, puisque nous sommes au Québec?" From a typescript of the speech kindly furnished by M. Gauthier.

2. See *La Presse*, October 29, 1963; *Le Devoir*, October 30, 1963; and *La Tribuna*, November 3, 1963.

Chapter VI


1. Leach, *Political Systems of Highland Burma*.

METROPOLITAN MONTREAL BY 1961 CENSUS TRACTS

LEGEND

Italian Proportional
Population
1961


% of
population/tract



Italian Parishes & Missions

- 1: Madonna Del Carmine [1905]
 - 2: Madonna Della Difesa [1910]
 - 3: San Giovanni Bosco [1949]
 - 4: Nostra Signora Della Consolata [1953]
 - 5: Madonna Di Pompei [1961]
- A: Missione Italiana Dell'Ovest [1961]
B: Missione Italiana Dell'Est - Domenico Savio [1962]

- Parish boundary
- - - Municipal boundary
- - - Tract boundary



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Multicultural Societies and Federalism

Ronald E. Watts



Multicultural Societies
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Multicultural Societies and Federalism

Ronald L. Watts

Professor of Political Studies and
Dean of Arts and Science
Queen's University

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July, 1967

R. L. Watts

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A. Topic of Study

In many societies where the forces for integration and for separatism have been at odds with each other, the adoption of a federal political system as the solution has been a popular formula. It makes possible the large political and economic unit required to sustain genuine political independence and to facilitate rapid economic development while at the same time assuring the varied linguistic, racial and religious communities some autonomy. This study is concerned with an analysis of experience in other multicultural federations in order to see what light their experience may throw on similar Canadian problems.

B. The Relevance of Such a Study

There are a number of countries where a federal political system has been adopted particularly to meet the needs of a society with a multicultural character. Of the three classic federations which have been in operation for more than half a century—the United States of America, Switzerland and Australia—only Switzerland is fully relevant to this study since both the United States and Australia are essentially monocultural. In the latter two countries it was the continental expanse, the local economic interests, and a previous existence as distinct colonies which lay at the root of the adoption of a federal form of union. In Switzerland, however, one of the strongest continuing motives for the federal character of its political system has been the existence of German-, French- and Italian-speaking groups concentrated in different cantons.¹ Among the newer federations, Germany, like the United States and Australia, is fundamentally monolingual, although regional variations in religious and cultural outlooks had a bearing on the adoption of a federal system in West Germany in 1949, as evidenced by the inclusion within the fairly limited exclusive legislative authority of the states of such fields as education, culture and religious affairs. There are, however, a number of newer Asian and African federations, established within the Commonwealth since 1947, where the federal solution was adopted specifically to meet the needs of a society in which the linguistic and

cultural divisions were, if anything, far sharper than in Canada. Particularly significant among these experiments have been India, Pakistan, Malaya and later Malaysia, Nigeria, and Rhodesia and Nyasaland.²

India is the most dramatic example for, according to the 1951 census, it contains some 60 languages or dialects spoken by more than 100,000 persons each, and the Eighth Schedule to the Constitution specifies 14 languages as "the languages of India." Indeed, in India an attempt has been in process since 1947 to unite by means of a federal system a number of linguistic groups, 10 of which are each as large as the French-speaking population of Canada, and each of which speaks a language as different from the others as French is from English.³

In Pakistan, the separation of East and West Pakistan by a thousand miles has made provincial autonomy imperative. An equally strong pressure for provincial autonomy has been the sharp cleavage between West Pakistanis, speaking a variety of languages related to Urdu and largely Middle-Eastern in character, and East Pakistanis, Bengali-speaking and Southeast Asian in outlook.⁴ These cultural differences have been sharpened by the resentment of the Bengalis about the continued dominance of the western province in their political and economic life, and about being treated as "a colony" by the central government remotely located in the west.

Both in the original Federation of Malaya established in 1948 and the wider Federation of Malaysia created in 1963, the most significant political feature has been the communal character of the population.⁵ Since the language, religion and related social customs of the Malay, Chinese, Indian and indigenous Bornean communities within Malaysia are sharply distinct and often incompatible, communal tension has coloured the entire political scene. Each of the states contains a variety of races, but there are significant regional variations in the strengths of the different communities and these give the states their distinctiveness within the federal system. Of particular interest to Canadians was the attempt within a Malay-dominated and conservative Malaysia to accommodate the special local interests of Singapore with its overwhelmingly Chinese population, its distinct economic base, and its strongly radical outlook in politics. Because of these special interests Singapore was given substantially greater autonomy than the states on the Malayan mainland. This experiment of an "associated state" lasted only two years, however, before mounting tension led to the separation of Singapore again from the federation.

Nigeria too is a country marked by sharp linguistic and cultural diversity.⁶ Most of the north is dominated by the Hausa language, Muslim belief and law, and the highly organized emirates of the Fulani dynasties. In the south, where Christianity and Animism are the prevailing religions, the culturally-conscious Yoruba-speaking peoples predominate in the west and the rival Ibo peoples in the east. It was the growth after 1946 of the political consciousness of these ethnic groups, expressed in the rise of political parties with a distinctively regional focus, which led to the adoption of a federal system of government in Nigeria in 1954. For a decade Nigerian stability depended on an uneasy coalition of regional parties and its ability to overcome a series of crises rather than on the absence of political strife. When the 1963 census confirmed the permanence of Northern Nigeria's stranglehold on central politics, the willingness to compromise was destroyed, culminating in the destruction of the federal system in early 1966.

For a decade between 1953 and 1963 the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in Central Africa represented an attempt to reconcile the interests of determined white and black nationalism by means of a federal system.⁷ Unlike the other multicultural federations, however, this one did not represent a compromise between the two groups since the African nationalists opposed the union; it was, rather, a bargain between the white settlers and the British government with the latter considering itself the guardian of African interests. Nevertheless, this experiment, in many respects so different from Canada, is of some significance because the failure to achieve the intended multiracial cooperation stemmed from a mutual misunderstanding of the goal of "partnership" set forth in the preamble to the constitution. To the African, partnership to be genuine could mean only equal opportunity for all individuals throughout the federation. To the European settler, partnership meant cooperation between "the senior and junior partner," or between "the rider and his horse."⁸

It may be argued, and with some justice, that Canadian problems are unique and therefore that experience in these other federations is of little relevance to our problems. This is to some extent true of the federations in Europe. Switzerland, with a population of some five million and an area of 16,000 square miles, is relatively small and compact compared with the continental sweep of Canada. Germany, although containing religious diversities, is linguistically relatively homogeneous compared with Canada. The relevance of Asian and African federations seems, at first sight, even more remote. First, their societies are based on non-western cultures very different from the cultures of either English or French Canada. Second, the Asian and African federations are all economically underdeveloped and thus at a very different stage of economic development from Canada. Third, they vary greatly in population. Some encompass populations which range from double that of Canada, as in Nigeria, to over four times that of Canada in Pakistan, and twenty times that of Canada in India. At the other extreme, the electorate of the entire Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was smaller than that of the largest single riding in Canada, and even the widened Federation of Malaysia contained less than half of Canada's population.

These differences, however, should not be allowed to obscure the point that certain factors make the experience of these other federations peculiarly relevant to the study of bilingualism and biculturalism within the Canadian political system. To begin with, unlike Belgium, Finland or South Africa which are not political federations, or the U.S.S.R. which because of its monoparty system represents a peculiar federal system, the European federation of Switzerland, and the Asian and African federations of India, Pakistan, Malaysia, Nigeria, and Rhodesia and Nyasaland are each an example of the resort to a federal political solution specifically in order to accommodate the problems of a multilingual and multicultural society. Indeed, in each the multicultural character of the society was a major factor leading to the adoption of federal institutions. Consequently, most of these federations have wrestled with just the sorts of problems with which Canadians are concerned. These include not only problems of "recognized national languages," education in different languages, and the cultural impact of a federation-wide economy, but also the distinctively federal problems which arise from the attempt to accommodate the needs of a multicultural society by means of a federal political system. Among these issues are the relation of provincial autonomy to cultural distinctiveness, the

place of minorities and majorities within provinces, the impact of the federation-wide economy on provincial autonomy, cooperative and consultative relations between levels of government, and the institutions and processes by which the different linguistic and cultural groups may participate in the establishment of a consensus in central politics. There is already in India, for example, a considerable history of commissions, committees and studies concerned with just these problems.⁹

Two further points make the experience of the more recent Commonwealth federations of particular relevance to Canadians. First, most of the new federations have attempted to copy certain features of Canadian federalism and in a number of instances to improve upon the Canadian model. Statesmen founding the new federations have often commented on the special relevance to their situation of the Canadian experience because, unlike the United States or Australia, Canada was a multicultural federation. Much of the impact of the Canadian example upon the Asian federations has been indirect and results from the influence of the Canadian model upon the form and phraseology of the Government of India Act, 1935. This act in turn was the model with the most influence upon the members of the Constituent Assemblies of India and Pakistan and upon the members of the constitutional commissions and committees in Malaya. This indirect influence, coupled with a direct consideration of Canadian precedents and also difficulties, led in all three Asian federations to (1) the enumeration of state as well as central powers; (2) the constitutional assignment of relatively extensive powers to the central government; (3) special provisions regarding minority languages and education; (4) the inclusion of certain central checks or controls over state governments; (5) virtually unlimited central powers to implement treaties; (6) essentially unitary judicial systems.¹⁰ It also led to the appointment of state governors by the central governments in India and Pakistan and the inclusion in India and Malaya of some nominated members in the second chambers. The new federations in Africa have followed the Canadian model less closely and relied more on the examples of Australia and the United States, but even in the African federations the founding statesmen studied Canadian experience and took it into account. In view of this, it may be of considerable value in tackling our own problems to examine the operation of institutions patterned after those of Canada and also to see which innovations have been successful and which have not. Indeed, we may learn not only from the successes of these federations but also from their failures and difficulties. The latter may provide some guide to the pitfalls to be avoided.

The second reason why the new Commonwealth federations are of particular relevance for Canada is that only in these examples of multicultural federations do we find the combination of federal and parliamentary institutions which was first attempted in Canada. The non-parliamentary character of the Swiss and American executive branches of government is sufficiently significant in the politics of those two federations to make their experience in some important respects less relevant for Canada than that of the other Commonwealth federations. Patrick Gordon Walker has even gone so far as to argue that the adaptation of parliamentary institutions to federalism has produced what amounts to a new variant of political institutions radically different from other federal systems.¹¹ Traditionally, writers have contrasted federal and unitary systems taking the

United States and the United Kingdom as the norms of each.¹² In the American federal system the concept of limited sovereignty permeates the whole system, authority being divided not only between federal and state governments but also between the branches within each level of government. By contrast, the characteristic feature of the British unitary system is the concentration of all legal authority in the sovereign parliament and its cabinet. In Canada there has developed what amounts to a hybrid radically different from either the United States or the United Kingdom. The American notion of limited sovereignty has been applied in the division of authority between central and provincial governments, but within institutions of each level of government the British notion of the sovereign parliament and its executive has been applied. This means, for instance, that the central institutions designed for producing a federation-wide consensus operate in a manner vastly different from those in the United States or Switzerland. The significance of the new Commonwealth federations is that they provide the only examples outside Canada where the combination of federal and parliamentary institutions has been applied in a multilingual and multicultural society.

C. The Scope of This Study

This study will be concerned, therefore, particularly with an examination of other multicultural federations in the Commonwealth and of how they relate to the bilingual and bicultural character of Canadian federalism. Where appropriate for purposes of comparison, however, reference will be made to Swiss experience in order to point up the effect of a different form of federal institutions in a multicultural society, or to Australian and West Indian experience as examples of the operation of parliamentary federal institutions within a relatively monocultural society. The presentation throughout will be comparative, dealing by topic with the issues which face the Canadian federal system. To provide the background for this approach, an outline of the evolution and operation of the federal system in each of the new Commonwealth federations is provided separately in Appendix D.¹³

A. The Significance of the Concept

Before we can examine the manner in which federal political systems may accommodate the needs of a multilingual or multicultural society, a preliminary discussion about the concept of a federal political system is needed, both for the sake of clarity and to set out the framework for the analysis.

Such a preliminary clarification is especially necessary because the term “federal” has often been used loosely and imprecisely. Most people using the word have in mind a form of political association in which two or more states constitute a political union with a common government but in which the member states retain a measure of autonomy. Within this general definition the term federal has been used in a wide variety of more specific senses.¹ In one of the oldest meanings of the term, “federation” has been used as synonymous with “confederacy,” referring to the loose linking together by treaty of sovereign states for military, economic or diplomatic purposes. The confederacies of ancient Greece, the Swiss Confederation before 1848, the United States of America before 1787 and the German Empire 1871-1918 are examples of this form of political union, and this usage for the term federal is still current in Europe where the supranational cooperative agencies are often referred to as federal. Sometimes, at the other extreme, federal government is taken simply as being equivalent to decentralized government. For instance, the word federal has been applied in this way at one time or another to the political systems of Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Venezuela, Weimar Germany, the U.S.S.R., Yugoslavia and the French colonial federations, although in each case the central government exercised overriding authority. Given such a wide range of uses for the term, a preliminary analysis of the concept itself is clearly needed.

B. The Dualistic Concept of Federalism

Students of political institutions and constitutional lawyers, attempting to make the term federal more precise, have usually defined it as referring to a form of government

midway between the two extremes, distinguishing it from "confederacies" on the one hand and "decentralized unitary government" on the other. One of the clearest statements of this view is presented by K. C. Wheare.² Taking the United States Constitution of 1787 as his prototype, he defines the federal principle in this way: "By the federal principle I mean the method of dividing powers so that the general and regional governments are each, within a sphere, co-ordinate and independent."³ Federal government, for Wheare, means a form of government in which the general and regional governments within a country are *neither subordinate* to the other. This form is contrasted with confederacies in which the general government is subordinate to the regional governments, and unitary forms of government in which the regional governments are subordinate to the general government.

It is from this definition of the federal concept, as involving two coordinate levels of sovereignty within a single country, that the traditional theory of federalism, which I shall hereafter refer to as "dual federalism," was developed. From the concept of dual sovereignties—general and regional—existing side by side, each separate in watertight compartments and in its own sphere independent of the other, a number of implications about federal political systems have traditionally been taken to follow. If each level of government is independent within its own sphere, then each government must be limited to its own sphere. Each government must act directly on the people. There must be a demarcation of the authority of each government set forth in a supreme written constitution. An independent judiciary is necessary to interpret this constitution and umpire conflicts between governments. Any amendment to the federal aspects of the constitution must require the approval of both levels of government.

This dualistic concept of federalism has the advantage of clarity. It also appears to provide an apparently simple political solution for dealing with the problems of a society beset with sharp linguistic or cultural diversities. The notion of two coordinate levels of government, each independent of the other and confined to its own sphere, suggests that by adopting a federal system each linguistic group in its own province might be left free, without interference from the central government, to deal with matters of linguistic or cultural concern. At the same time all the groups would obtain the military, diplomatic and economic benefits of common action by a central government with responsibilities for these functions. That this notion of a federal system has been influential in some multicultural federations is clear from the frequency with which the dualistic definition of the federal principle supported by K. C. Wheare has been echoed in speeches in the constituent assemblies of India and Pakistan, the writings of Nigerian nationalists, and the reports of constitutional committees and commissions in Malaya, Central Africa and the West Indies.⁴

Nevertheless, this concept of federal government has a fatal flaw. In the older federations, as Wheare himself has had to concede,⁵ and also in the newer federations it has simply proved impracticable.

C. Interdependent Federalism

Developments in the American, Australian and Canadian federations during the twentieth century have given rise to a new concept of "cooperative federalism." In these

older federations the development of communications, the extension of federation-wide commerce, the development of an interdependent economy and the growth of national sentiment have resulted, especially in periods of war and of economic crises, in extensive intergovernmental administrative consultation and cooperation and at least partial financial dependence of state and provincial governments upon the central governments. Consequently, the notion of dual federalism—of separate central and provincial governments acting, with only minor exceptions, in distinct watertight compartments each independent of the others—has proved an inapplicable myth. In the words of J. A. Corry, “Under the heat and pressure generated by social and economic change in the twentieth century, the distinct strata of the older federalism have begun to melt and flow into one another.”⁶ The “layer cake” notion of federalism has had to be replaced by that of the “marble cake.” Interdependence and cooperation among the governments within these federations have in practice become characteristic features.

This trend was first recognized in the 1930s by American scholars who coined the term “cooperative federalism” to refer to it.⁷ It should be noted that, as used by these scholars, the term referred not only to the development of interaction and cooperation between the two levels of government, but also to the trend towards greater centralization resulting from the financial dependence of provincial governments upon central governments for assistance through conditional grants and joint-cost programmes. The connotations of the term as used more recently by Canadian politicians are different. In this latter use, cooperative federalism has referred to a devolution of responsibilities to the provinces, although implicit in this decentralization is the requirement for intergovernmental consultation and cooperation if such a devolution is to be effective.

Within recent years, scholars studying American federalism have further redefined the federal concept. The first scholars to write about cooperative federalism in the United States treated this development as a new trend of the mid-twentieth century. Recent writers, such as M. J. C. Vile⁸ and D. J. Elazar,⁹ however, have gone further in their rejection of the old dualistic definition of federalism. They have suggested that the traditional conception of federalism as requiring a sharp delineation of responsibilities between two independent sets of sovereignties never did fit the practice in the United States. Elazar argues that in the nineteenth century, as in the twentieth century, administrative cooperation and political interaction between federal and state governments were always dominant characteristics of the American federal system, despite formal legal pronouncements to the contrary. In the twentieth century, under modern economic and social conditions, these features of the American federal system have simply been further accentuated.

This idea of federalism I shall refer to as the concept of “interdependent federalism.” This view parts company with the notion of dual federalism on three points. First, it finds fault with the traditional definition as too legalistic. Those who accepted the concept of dual federalism concentrated their attention upon the constitutional structure and especially the legal division of authority, the pronouncements of the courts on this division, and the formal amendments to the constitution altering this division. Therefore, they paid insufficient attention to other important aspects such as administrative arrangements which inevitably required intergovernmental cooperation, the political

attitudes of citizens affecting the adoption of policies at both levels of government, and the role of political parties bridging the two tiers of political activity.

Second, the more recent view points up a logical error in the assumptions made by those who elaborated the concept of dual federalism. According to the earlier view, a federal system was defined as one in which neither level of government is subordinate to the other. It was assumed, then, that if one government is dependent on another, the former is subordinate. Consequently, the requirement was stipulated that each level of government must be independent of the other in its own sphere. As long as the dependence of one government upon another is one-sided, this presupposition is valid enough. But there is another possibility which was overlooked. If each level of government is dependent on the other—if both levels are interdependent—then dependence does not necessarily imply the subordination of one to the other. Independence is not, therefore, the only alternative to subordination; there may be mutual dependence or interdependence. In the latter case, where each level of government is to some degree dependent on the other, neither tier would be independent but neither would be subordinate. This, in fact, is the contemporary situation as it has evolved in most of the older federations. Provincial and state governments have become increasingly dependent upon the central governments for their finances, but central governments have had to rely more and more upon the administrative cooperation of provincial and state governments for the implementation of federation-wide policies. The activities of central governments have expanded dramatically, but so also have those of the provincial and state governments. This pattern of mutual dependence or interdependence between the two levels of government within a federal system has in practice been found necessary also in the newer multicultural federations.¹⁰ It should be emphasized that while the theories of dual federalism and interdependent federalism appear in some respects to present sharply contrasting positions, both are derived from the same fundamental idea. Both are based on the premise that within a federal system, the central and provincial governments should be coordinate in the sense that neither is subordinate to the other. The difference between the two versions is chiefly one of emphasis: dual federalism views the two sets of government primarily as equal rivals, interdependent federalism views them primarily as equal partners. At the root of both theories is the premise that in a federation, neither level of government is subordinate to the other.

A third point of difference is that, implicit in the concept of interdependent federalism, is the rejection of the view that the definition of a federal system can correspond to some single ideal type or model in terms of which all actual governments might be classified as "federal," "quasi-federal" or "non-federal." There is some value and interest in having a precise definition in terms of which institutions might be classified. This sort of precise classification is of less value, however, when we move away from the enterprise of stipulative definition or from constitutional law to the study of political and administrative practice and social attitudes. Politicians and nation-builders are little concerned with the niceties of theoretical distinctions and tend to be pragmatic in their approach to political problems. In practice, they have been not at all averse to the creation of "mixed solutions" or of "institutional hybrids." This is illustrated by the difficulty which upholders of the notion of dual federalism have had in finding pure

examples of such federations.¹¹ The danger is that such an approach may concentrate attention upon efforts at fruitless classification rather than upon the study of how these political systems actually operate and why they were instituted.¹² There is, in fact, not just one but a whole range of institutional arrangements by which the principle of coordinate governments within a federal system may be implemented. There may be variations in the number and relative size of provincial units, in the manner in which responsibilities are distributed among governments, in the scope of functions exercised by each level of government, in the degree and kinds of interdependence and interaction between governments, in the arrangements for protecting and adapting the distribution of functions among governments, and in the organization of the institutions designed to generate a consensus on matters of federation-wide concern. Moreover, new forms and adaptations are bound to result as statesmen in the old and new federations experiment with fresh ways of applying the federal idea in new or changing situations. Just as the combination of federal and parliamentary institutions established in Canada in 1867 represented a radically new version of federalism, so every federation has been an experiment.

To recapitulate, I am taking the federal concept to be the principle of political organization by which concurrent desires for territorial integration and diversity within a society are accommodated by the establishment of a single political system within which central and provincial governments possess coordinate authority such that neither level is legally or politically subordinate to the other. Other forms of political systems may recognize or express elements of unity or diversity, but make one level of government subordinate to the other. This statement modifies the traditional definition of federalism in three respects: first, political as well as legal relations between governments are relevant in determining coordinate status; second, governments may be dependent on each other, that is interdependent, so long as the dependence of one level of government on the other does not become so one-sided as to involve subordination; third, the federal principle as stated may be expressed by a whole range of institutional arrangements suitable to different conditions and is not limited to one pure model.

D. Federal Political Systems and Multicultural Societies

A significant advantage of the concept of interdependent federalism is that it gives a more comprehensive framework for the study of a federation as a *single political system*. The notions of dual federalism and cooperative federalism tended to encourage one-sided accounts of the operation of federal systems. Dual federalism, for instance, stresses the division of functions between the two levels of government. Taken by itself this can be misleading. By directing attention to the self-contained operation of each tier of government, it encourages one to neglect and even overlook the point that these governments operate within a single political system and that inevitably there are many points of contact and interpenetration between them. The notion of cooperative federalism, on the other hand, by focusing upon the elements of cooperative interaction between levels of government, encourages a neglect of the degree to which these

governments may rival each other and draws attention away from the importance within a federal system of the processes by which a consensus from among conflicting regional groups is arrived at in order to produce federation-wide policies. The picture of a single federal system composed of a variety of interdependent and interacting institutions enables us, however, to see in perspective the different ways in which the linguistic and cultural groups act, both as partners and as rivals in the political processes of a multicultural federation.

If we look, then, upon a federation as a single political system within which the various linguistic and cultural groups are at the same time both partners and rivals, the role of these groups can be better understood. Considered in this light, there are three fundamental aspects to the working of a federal political system. First, because the various groups cannot agree to be partners over the whole range of political action, a federal system involves a compromise in which those functions over which a general consensus can be reached are assigned to the central government while other functions over which the partners "agree to differ" are left as the responsibility of the provincial governments. Thus, the distribution of functions and responsibilities between levels of government is one fundamental aspect of any federal system.¹³ Second, since in practice the roles of partnership and of rivalry cannot be totally isolated from each other, the activities of the two levels of government inevitably interpenetrate. A study of intergovernmental relations, therefore, is not merely important, but a fundamental aspect of the study of any federal system.¹⁴ Third, a federal system represents above all a form of partnership and, therefore, an especially crucial aspect is the process through which the diverse linguistic and cultural groups participate in reaching a federation-wide consensus. Without effective machinery for generating this wider consensus, the partnership is likely to dissolve into a mere struggle between rivals.¹⁵

Implicit in this analysis is the premise that no federal political system can be properly understood unless it is related to the social forces which it attempts to express and channel. It has been said that, "The essential nature of federalism is to be sought for, not in the shadings of legal and constitutional terminology, but in the forces—economic, social, political, cultural—that have made the outward forms of federalism necessary."¹⁶ To anyone studying the multicultural federations, this statement will appear a truism. A study of the problems of multilingualism and multiculturalism within federal political systems must, therefore, look not only at the political system itself but also at the complex relationship between the total political system and its underlying society. The interests of various regional, linguistic and cultural groups represent the demand inputs which the federal system converts into policy as an output. The causal relationship between the society and the federal political system, however, is a complex and dynamic one. The distinctive pressures within the society force their expression upon the political institutions. But the political institutions, once created, will themselves shape and influence the pattern of society both by determining the channels through which social pressures may most easily flow, and by the feedback effect upon society of the policies which the political system generates. Moreover, this complex relation between a political system and its society is never static, but one of continual dynamic interaction producing over time changes in the balance of social and political forces.

The degree and type of diversity within societies varies from country to country and any given community will fit somewhere on a hypothetical spectrum of societies ranging from the highly integrated to the highly diversified.¹⁷ The more diversified the society, the greater is the need for providing some effective political means of articulating the diverse interests. Thus, a federal system, if it is to survive, will need to be able to accommodate the particular demands of the society on which it is based. The spectrum of societies will, therefore, require a spectrum of varying federal solutions, each adapted to the needs of its own society. Moreover, since the balance of forces within a federal society rarely remains constant but alters under the pressures of economic and social development, a federal political system must be flexible and able to adapt to changing social conditions and demands. In the next two chapters, therefore, we shall be concerned with an analysis of the relative significance of different social forces, and with the political units by which these have been expressed in multicultural federations.

A. Introduction

In the preceding chapter it was suggested that the study of multicultural federalism must involve an analysis of the relation between the federal political system and the society on which it rests. This chapter will be concerned, therefore, with an assessment of the significance of linguistic and cultural issues among the social demands which federal political systems attempt to accommodate. It should be added, right at the outset, that no attempt will be made in this chapter to present a complete sociological analysis of each of the multicultural federal societies. Instead, attention will be focused on significant features which these societies exhibit in common, insofar as these are relevant to present Canadian concerns.

B. Diversity of Language and Culture as a Motive for Provincial Autonomy

As in Canada, so in India, Pakistan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Central Africa and Switzerland, linguistic, racial and religious minorities that feared discrimination at the hands of numerical majorities but were unable alone to support effectively a genuine separate independence, have sought provincial autonomy within a federal political system as a way of preserving their own distinct identity and way of life. In each of these countries the multilingual and multicultural character of the society has frequently been cited by statesmen as the crucial characteristic making a federal political system necessary.

The assumption that it is the linguistic and cultural diversities which have been fundamental in these federations is not difficult to comprehend. Language barriers are certainly barriers to communication and understanding between different groups within a society. But the problem goes deeper than the mere question of communication. Language itself is fundamental to activities which are distinctively human.¹ It is through language that the individual fulfils his capacity for expression. It is through language that

man not only communicates but achieves communion with others. It is language which by its structure shapes the very way in which men order their thoughts coherently. It is language which makes possible social organization. Thus a common language is the expression of a community of interests among a group of people. It is not surprising, then, that any community which is governed through the medium of a language other than its own has usually felt itself to some extent disenfranchised, nor that this feeling has always been a potential focus for political agitation. Moreover, like skin-colour, language is an easily identifiable badge for those who wish to take issue with a different group, and thus it provides them with a rallying sign even for contests which are basically not those of language or race.

The significance of language as a basis of social activity is well illustrated by W. H. Morris-Jones in his analysis of the diversity on the Indian scene:

It is true that some of the big cities are cosmopolitan—in the sense that employment has attracted men from all parts of India: Madras much less than Delhi, Bombay or Calcutta. But it is striking to notice that, apart from the exigencies of work or business, few things cause the regional groups to mix. Outside office hours, the Bengali in business in Bombay, the Tamil in a government job at Delhi will meet almost invariably fellow Bengalis, fellow Tamils. At all-India conferences and gatherings, delegates when left to themselves quickly form regional groups—a little knot of Malayalees, a compact circle from Bihar. And, indeed, what could be more natural? It is, firstly and above all, a matter of language: a language other than one's own mother tongue has a dampening effect on social intercourse; Hindi (except in the regions where it is itself a mother tongue—that is, in the north-central zone) is not yet widely used except perhaps in the more ordinary transactions; English is still available to many but, except for very few, it is not really fun. With a language goes a way of speaking, a way of making jokes, a whole common world of allusions and references so necessary to easy and enjoyable intercourse. As in Europe, only a tiny few are “at home” in a language other than their own; a Gujarati girl married to a Punjabi will achieve this state—but such marriages between regions are rare. It is also a matter of a shared acquaintance with people and places and the possibility of communicating common memories of family and childhood. For the cultivated, it will be a matter of a common literary and musical heritage—though admittedly this is less important for some regions (Punjab, Gujarat perhaps) than for others. It is even a question of food—not unimportant where social intercourse is concerned. Even the European quickly learns to distinguish between the dishes of Kashmir and those of Madras, the cooking of Maharashtra and that of Bengal; the Indian's preference for his own region's food will often amount to a great distaste for that of others. Distinctive forms of dress (in part related to contrasting climates), festivals that have a peculiar regional significance, different codes of family and social behaviour, special attachment to regional heroes and episodes of the past—all this and much more goes to make vivid and profound the contrasts that exist between one part of India and another.²

The importance of language as a basis for the desire for provincial autonomy has been clearest in India, Pakistan, Nigeria and Switzerland, for in these countries regional loyalties appear to have been rooted in language. In India, for example, the pressure for linguistic regionalism expressed itself even in the days before independence when the Congress party found it necessary to base its own internal organization upon the regional linguistic groups rather than upon the existing provincial units. Since 1947 the explosive impact of language has been felt in the tension between the generally Hindi-speaking

peoples of the north and the Dravidian-speaking peoples of the south,³ and in the demands of regional linguistic groups for the reorganization of state boundaries in order that the states might represent homogeneous linguistic units. Indeed, the pressure for "linguistic states" mounted to such a degree that Prime Minister Nehru, after nearly a decade of resistance, was forced to accede reluctantly to the complete reorganization of state boundaries in 1956 in order to preserve the union.⁴ The political force of language was also apparent in the necessity to recognize in the constitution itself 13 different regional languages, each spoken by several millions, as "languages of India."⁵

In Pakistan, too, linguistic diversity has been a potent political force. Linguistic regionalism has been at the root of the continued demands of East Bengal for greater provincial autonomy and of its insistence upon the recognition of Bengali as an official language equal in status to Urdu. The growing dissatisfaction of the Bengalis with the failure of the central government to treat them equally expressed itself in the elections of 1954 when the total rejection by the Bengalis of the Muslim League shattered that party's national dominance. For a decade afterwards, party politics (when not prohibited by martial law) took on a distinctively regional character. The different languages spoken within West Pakistan have also been of some significance. These languages—especially Punjabi, Sindhi, Pushtu and Baluchi—provided the basis for the cultural differentiation within West Pakistan⁶ and for what resistance there was to the unification of the variety of western provinces and states into a single province in 1955. In this case, however, the need to counterbalance the Bengali-speaking majority in the east sufficiently undermined the separatism of the different linguistic groups within the west so that the multilingual province of West Pakistan has survived since its creation.

In Nigeria, where some 248 different languages are spoken, linguistic diversity has clearly been a major political force. The three major linguistic groups—the Hausa in the north, the Yoruba in the west, and the Ibo in the east—each represent the dominant ethnic group in one of the three original regional political units.⁷ Moreover, these three groups have together dominated the politics of the country. Not only did each group provide the core for one of the three major political parties—the Northern People's Congress (N.P.C.) based its strength on the Hausa north, the National Convention of Nigerian Citizens (N.C.N.C.) had its greatest strength in the Ibo east, and the Action Group was founded on the Yoruba west⁸—but it was the rivalry of these three politicized cultural groups, and especially the fear by each of domination by the others, which produced the tensions and strains within the Nigerian federal system. Furthermore, although each of these three ethnic groups was predominant within its own region, there were other significant linguistic minorities within each region,⁹ and from these minorities came considerable political pressure for their own separate ethnically homogeneous autonomous states.

In Switzerland, linguistic diversity has been a basic factor in the establishment and maintenance of the cantons as autonomous political units. It is significant that in every one of the cantons, one language group possesses a clear majority. Only in three cantons—Fribourg (65.7 per cent), Valais (65.0 per cent) and Grisons (56.2 per cent)—does the dominant linguistic group represent less than 77 per cent of the cantonal population.¹⁰ Moreover, although German is the predominant tongue spoken by 74.1 per

cent of the Swiss people, the Constitution of Switzerland has had to recognize German, French and Italian as official languages.¹¹

In the two other federations under comparison—Malaysia, and Rhodesia and Nyasaland—the basis for cultural regionalism was fundamentally racial rather than linguistic. In Malaysia, however, differences of language have reinforced differences of race. Thus differences in physical feature and skin-colour among the Malays, Chinese, Indians and indigenous Borneans have been accentuated by the fact that these different communal groups also speak different languages. The issue of whether or not Malay should become the sole official language has always been a politically controversial one. Moreover, although each of the states of Malaysia contains a variety of races, there are significant regional variations in the relative strength of the various communities. On the Malayan peninsula the major racial and linguistic groups are the Malays who constitute 49 per cent, the Chinese who form 37 per cent, and the Indians who make up 12 per cent. The Malays are overwhelmingly dominant in the rural northeast and northwest, while the three communal groups are in a mixture along the west coast where most of the Chinese and Indians are concentrated. It is not surprising that Malay nationalism in the form of Malay opposition to the scheme for a unitary union in 1946 and of communalist appeals by the Pan-Malayan Islamic party should have flourished most in the northern states. The exclusion of Singapore from the Federation of Malaya in 1948, the insistence by the Malays that the accession of Singapore to Malaysia be balanced by the concurrent addition of the Borneo states in 1963, the restricted citizenship status of Singapore citizens in the Federation of Malaysia, and the withdrawal of Singapore from the federation in 1965, were all related to Malay fears that Singapore, with its predominantly Chinese population, would upset the delicate racial balance in the peninsula. Furthermore, the extensive autonomy granted to the Borneo states of Sabah and Sarawak within Malaysia was a recognition of the racial and linguistic distinctiveness of their indigenous peoples. The significance of racial and cultural issues in Malaysian politics is illustrated by the Alliance pattern of its ruling political party which is an alliance of three communal parties in Malaya—the United Malays National Organization (U.M.N.O.), which is the senior partner, and the Malayan Chinese Association (M.C.A.) and Malayan Indian Congress (M.I.C.)—to which since 1963 a number of local Bornean parties have also been allied.

In Central Africa the fundamental racial differences were less closely related to linguistic ones, although they were reflected in fundamental differences in cultural outlook. The basic racial division was between the settlers and the indigenous Africans, and this division cut across all three territories within the federation. There were significant differences, however, in the degree to which the settlers had established themselves in each territory. The proportion of settlers varied from one in 16 in Southern Rhodesia to one in 52 in Northern Rhodesia and one in 588 in Nyasaland. As a result there were contrasting traditions in racial policy. In Southern Rhodesia the settlers had achieved *de facto* control while in the two protectorates the Colonial Office continued to maintain ostensibly a policy of the “paramountcy of native interests.” African opposition in the northern territories towards federation was largely provoked by the fear that it would mean the extension of settler control and racial policies. It was this anxiety which

led the British government to insist upon a federal rather than a unitary political system as the settlers had originally advocated. In addition to this basic racial division between settlers and Africans there was also the linguistic diversity of the different African groups themselves. Although English served as the lingua franca for them, the principal African groups in the three territories had substantially different dialects and customs. This not only hampered unity among the Africans of Central Africa but, when the federation broke up, ultimately resulted in the two distinct independent African states of Malawi and Zambia.

While language or race has provided the basis for cultural diversity in India, Pakistan, Nigeria, Switzerland, Malaysia and Central Africa, we must not underestimate the impact of other cultural factors upon political regionalism in these federations. As in Canada, religious differences have often reinforced linguistic ones. Moreover, in the newer federations of Asia and Africa the religious differences, such as those between Hindus and Muslims on the Indian subcontinent or between Muslims, Christians and Animists in Nigeria, have gone much deeper than those between different Christian denominations in Canada and Switzerland. The Hindu-Muslim conflict actually proved too sharp to be contained within an all-India federation as envisaged in 1935,¹² but the two successor states of India and Pakistan themselves each include large religious minorities. India after partition still contained the third largest Muslim population in the world. Muslims were a majority in the state of Jammu and Kashmir, and in Madras and Kerala in the south the Muslim League has remained an active political force. Another religious group, the Sikhs concentrated in Punjab, agitated continually for a separate Sikh state, until finally in 1966 the division of the state of Punjab was conceded by the Congress leadership. There is also a small Christian population which is somewhat scattered throughout India, but which is an influential minority in the politics of Kerala. In Pakistan the partition of 1947 left ten million Hindus among the forty-two million Bengalis in East Pakistan, and these Hindus, fearing the distrust of the West Pakistanis, have been among the strongest advocates of greater provincial autonomy for East Pakistan. In Nigeria, the acceptance of Muslim belief and law have united the Hausa, Fulani, Kanuri and Nupe ethnic groups within Northern Nigeria and have provided the basis for regional distinctiveness. At the same time, the demands of the Middle Belt tribes for their own separate state have been reinforced by their different religious views which are predominantly pagan. In the Western Region, many Yorubas are Muslim but unlike the northerners at least as many are Christian, while the inhabitants of the Eastern Region are either Christians or Animists. Similarly in Malaysia and Central Africa the cultural distinctiveness of the different racial groups has been reinforced by their distinct religions. In Malaysia, the Malays are Muslims; the Chinese are Buddhists, Confucianists, or Taoists; the Indians are Hindus or Muslims; and the various indigenous groups in the Borneo states are largely either Muslim or pagan. The settlers of Central Africa belonged to a variety of Christian churches, but the vast masses of the Africans were still non-Christian, many of them holding Animistic beliefs and half the population of Nyasaland were adherents to Islam. In all the foregoing federations, therefore, cultural diversities have represented more than merely linguistic or racial ones but have also been sharpened by differences in religious belief and outlook.

In Switzerland, religious diversities have been significant but religious divisions have cut across linguistic ones rather than reinforcing them. There is a parallel here to English Canada, which in terms of religious beliefs is far from homogeneous. This parallel does not extend to Quebec, however, where as in the newer multicultural federations, the distinctive cultural outlook is based not only on language but upon a single dominant religious faith. The 1950 census indicated that 58 per cent of the Swiss people were Protestants and 40 per cent were Roman Catholics. The cantons are almost evenly divided between those with a Protestant majority (11½ cantons) and those with a Roman Catholic majority (10½ cantons).¹³ Of the German-speaking cantons, eight and a half are Protestant and seven and a half are Roman Catholic. Of the French-speaking cantons three are Protestant and two are Roman Catholic, while the Italian-speaking canton of Ticino is Roman Catholic. Thus, similarities or differences of outlook based on religious belief tend often to undercut political divisions on purely linguistic lines. One should not underestimate the importance of these religious differences. Indeed, in Switzerland religious differences have been more significant politically than linguistic ones. An individual can learn to be bilingual, but to be biconfessional is not possible. Moreover, many of the historical crises of Switzerland have turned on religious issues, and the political party system has reflected their significance. Although, as in Canada, there has been a lessening of religious tensions in the twentieth century, religion remains a basis for political differences. The Catholic Conservatives for instance still maintain a strong standing in the German-speaking cantons of Uri, Schwyz, Obwalden, Nidwalden, Zug, St. Gallen, Appenzell-Inner Rhodes, Lucerne and Grisons, and in the French-speaking cantons of Fribourg and Valais.

In summary, it is clear that in the five recent multicultural federations of India, Pakistan, Malaysia, Nigeria, and Rhodesia and Nyasaland, cultural regionalism based on linguistic, racial and religious distinctiveness assumed the proportions of sub-nationalisms. These sub-nationalisms expressed themselves in agitation for regional political autonomy and in either the growth of primarily regional political parties as in Pakistan or Nigeria, or in internal organization along linguistic or communal lines of the dominant federal political party as in India or Malaysia. Switzerland was also marked by linguistic and religious diversity, but there religious diversities have to some extent cut across linguistic ones and provided a basis whereby ideologically oriented political parties might draw together different linguistic groups.

C. Other Motives for Political Autonomy

While it is clear that, as in Canada, cultural diversity has been politically significant in the federations under comparison, we must now consider the question whether in these federations there might be other even more fundamental motives underlying the desire for provincial autonomy. After all, the United States and Australia have found it desirable to establish and maintain federal political systems although they are not characterized by anything like the same degree of cultural diversity. It might be argued that more important than linguistic, racial or religious diversity as the source for demands for

regional autonomy and for tensions within federal systems are one or more of the following: (1) regional economic interests; (2) variations in the size and wealth of regional groups within a society; (3) clashes between the radical and conservative political outlooks of different regional groups; (4) regional differences in degrees of modernization. Each of these is a plausible explanation of some of the tensions affecting the Canadian federal system and, therefore, an examination of the extent to which they have been fundamental in other multicultural federations seems appropriate.

Although in most federations economic motives have been a prominent factor in the creation of the larger political unions, regional economic interests have also usually been among the major motives for regional autonomy or separatism, even in the ostensibly multicultural federations. Most of the new Asian and African federations, for instance, have attempted to unite territories with distinct economic interests. In India the concentration of industrial and commercial development in Bihar and Bengal, Bombay, and the Kaveri Valley, and the agricultural specialization of different regions have sharpened internal divisions. In Pakistan the two major areas of East and West Pakistan possess distinct economies based on different climates and products, and one of the major complaints of the Bengalis during the first decade and a half after 1947 was the concentration of economic development in the west. The tension between the different communal groups in Malaysia has been heavily influenced by regional economic differences. The northernmost states of the peninsula are characterized by a subsistence economy based on traditional Malay methods of rice-growing and fishing. The west coast plain is wealthier but depends upon an unstable mining and plantation economy dominated by the Chinese. Penang and Singapore derive their wealth from a mercantile economy for which customs barriers are a handicap. The Borneo states are largely agricultural. In Nigeria too, each of the ethnically distinct regions specializes in its own different agricultural products and exports. The three territories of Central Africa depended for their wealth on different products and derived their major governmental revenue from different sources. Even in Switzerland where the cantons were each much smaller units and therefore less able to think of themselves as full-fledged economic units, the growth of Zurich as the major industrial, commercial, and financial city has caused concern and there are significant differences in outlook between the urban and rural cantons.

The strength of regional economic interests is affected by a number of factors. First, even where the wider common market made possible by the larger political unit brings economic gains to the federation as a whole, this does not necessarily mean a gain for each of the units. A customs union may have not only "trade creation" but "trade diversion" effects, which act adversely on some territories within the federation. These regions would therefore be better off outside the federation unless equalization policies were adopted. Fears and complaints that federation has produced such effects and increased rather than reduced regional economic inequalities have been expressed elsewhere than in the Canadian Maritimes. Such issues have reinforced Bengali regionalism in Pakistan, northern separatism in Nigeria, and the secession movement in Nyasaland, just as earlier they contributed to separatist movements in Western Australia and the southern United States.

Second, in most of the multicultural federations the products of the regional economies have been essentially complementary with the result that the regions have stood to gain from increased interregional trade. Nevertheless these regional differences in product have at the same time often fostered strong regional attitudes. In Nigeria, for example, differences in products and therefore in problems of production, in types of exports, in sources of foreign capital, and in appropriate policies to promote economic development, resulted in the placing of many of the responsibilities for economic development in the hands of regional governments. It is not surprising then that western Canadians should be separated from Quebec not only by distance and by language but also by the different economic problems with which they are concerned.

The strength of economic regionalism has also depended upon the degree to which the economic map has corresponded to the political map. In East Pakistan, in the three original Nigerian regions, in Jamaica and in Quebec to a considerable extent, the economic unit has been closely related to the political one. In these examples pressure for relatively autonomous economic provinces has been further strengthened by their relative size which has enabled them to contemplate economic self-sufficiency. By contrast, economic factors have been less influential, although not insignificant, in the demands for state autonomy where economic regions have coincided less precisely with internal political boundaries, as in India and in the units within West Pakistan, or where the states have been small as in the mainland states of Malaya and in Switzerland.

Most of the multicultural federations have joined together territories with acute disparities in economic development and wealth, and these regional inequalities have invariably accentuated separatist pressures. The demand for active public development policies has invariably aggravated these regional pressures because different fiscal and monetary policies are likely to be appropriate for different stages of development and hence for different regions. The resulting pressures for regionalization of governmental development policies have not been unique to Quebec. They have been particularly strong within Nigeria and the culturally homogeneous West Indies.

In addition to these direct influences of economic factors upon demands for provincial autonomy, many separatist movements which have been ostensibly linguistic, racial or cultural in motivation have had strong economic undertones.¹⁴ The separatism of the Muslim middle class in northwest India before partition was directly related to the desire to protect itself from a larger and better educated Hindu group. The linguistic regionalism and Dravidian separatism which have dominated the Indian scene since independence have stemmed in large measure from the intensity of the struggle for jobs among the different linguistic and caste groups. In Pakistan between 1947 and 1958, the growing demands for provincial autonomy in East Bengal were generated by discontent with the economic policies of the central government which appeared to give all the spoils to the landlords and businessmen of West Pakistan.¹⁵ The Bengalis were especially incensed at the degree to which the civil service and the armed forces were primarily in the hands of West Pakistanis. The repeated insistence of Northern and Western Nigeria upon full regional autonomy, and their occasional threats of secession, owed a good deal to the ethnic and religious differences already outlined, but accentuating these was the migration of the aggressive Ibos to regions outside their own and the threat that they

would come to dominate the economy and the civil service.¹⁶ One Nigerian has gone so far as to describe this as the true origin of ethnic antagonism in Nigeria.¹⁷ In Malaya the three racial communities have been differentiated by sharply different economic roles, and therefore communal resentments have been closely related to economic ones. The Malays have resented the dominance of commerce by the energetic Chinese and it is not surprising that it is the economically backward northeastern states which have provided the core of Malay communalism. The Chinese, on the other hand, have resented the constitutionally guaranteed dominance of the Malays in the federal civil service. In Central Africa, too, the ostensibly racial division between the settlers and the indigenous Africans reflected sharp economic differences between the prosperity of the settlers of Southern Rhodesia and the copper belt, and the relative poverty of Nyasaland and the African areas of Northern Rhodesia. In all these instances cultural distinctiveness has helped to sharpen the sense of grievance and even alienation which has stemmed from economic discontent.

It would appear, then, that in many of these federations local economic interests and the desire to legitimize a number of local spoils systems have contributed strongly to the overtly linguistic, racial or cultural demands for provincial autonomy. There are signs that in Canada, too, ostensibly linguistic and cultural tensions have been strongly coloured by economic ones. Any political solution which is to accommodate these linguistic and cultural demands will need, therefore, to take account of the closely related economic factors.

Variations in the size and wealth of regional groups have also been a factor in interregional tensions and demands for provincial autonomy within federations. The distrust of Ontario by Quebec suggests that this may be a significant factor in the Canadian situation. The tendency of such disparities in the size and wealth of regional groups to accentuate interregional tensions is not necessarily founded on linguistic or cultural differences. One need only look at the distrust of Ontario by the other English-speaking provinces in Canada or at the West Indies Federation. The latter, although relatively homogeneous in linguistic or cultural terms, was racked and ultimately wrecked by the interterritorial tensions and disputes which had their root in the attempt to create a union in which Jamaica possessed 52 per cent of the population, 58 per cent of the area and 42 per cent of the revenue; Trinidad held a further 26 per cent of the population, 26 per cent of the area and 42 per cent of the revenue; and the remaining eight territories were left sharing 22 per cent of the population, 16 per cent of the area and 16 per cent of the wealth. The result was heated controversy over the suitable degree of territorial autonomy and over appropriate territorial representation in the central political institutions. The small islands distrusted the big islands and Jamaica in turn resented the degree to which its influence in the federation was reduced in order to accommodate the fears of the small islands.

Similar pressures have also been at work in the multicultural federations. Examples are: the resentment by the smaller states in India of the dominance of Uttar Pradesh with its population of over 60 million; the unification of the provinces and states of West Pakistan in order to counterbalance East Pakistan which held 55 per cent of the population; the southern fears in Nigeria of the political supremacy of Northern Nigeria

(with 55 per cent of the population and 79 per cent of the area) and the northern apprehension of economic exploitation by the wealthier southerners; and the resentment in Central Africa of the Africans in the northern protectorates at the dominant position of Southern Rhodesia as a component of the federal electorate.¹⁸ Even in Switzerland the growth of Zurich as an industrial and commercial centre has been felt to pose a threat to the balance among cantons. In each of these federations fears of domination by the larger provincial units have exacerbated differences in language and culture among the regions. In some cases this has been severe enough to produce demands that the largest units such as Uttar Pradesh or Northern Nigeria be split in order to reduce the ascendancy of one provincial unit or ethnic group within the federation.¹⁹ It is perhaps significant that among the new multicultural federations, the four that have proved most unstable—Pakistan, the West Indies, Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and Nigeria—have been those in which a single provincial unit held a majority of the federal electorate. Where a single cultural group has been in so strong a position politically or economically to consider itself able to insist completely upon its own way, the other cultural groups, insecure in their position, have tended to see their only defence in intransigence. By contrast, the relatively more balanced relation of regional groups in India and Malaya has induced a sense of interdependence which in turn has fostered a greater willingness to compromise. While in Canada no single province contains a majority of the federal electorate, the anxieties of the French-speaking people have certainly been accentuated by their minority position and by their impression that English-speaking Canada represents a monolithic political majority. Thus, many of the same pressures sharpening linguistic and cultural tensions operate, and any solution to the Canadian problem will have to take account not only of linguistic or cultural issues, but of the political means by which the position of majority and minority groups can be reconciled within a federal system.

Another important factor in the tensions between regional groups within a society may be differences between radical and conservative outlooks towards politics. This consideration is certainly relevant to a study of the Canadian situation. Until the mid-twentieth century Quebec with its emphasis on its traditions was considered to be more conservative in its political viewpoint than most of the rest of Canada. But since 1960, under the impact of the "quiet revolution," Quebec has become politically far more radical than the rest of conservative Canada, and it might be argued that it is this which lies at the root of current tensions.

An examination of the ostensibly multicultural new federations suggests that in many of them interregional tension which is overtly cultural has been closely related to differences of political outlook or ideology. Perhaps Malaysia and Nigeria present the most obvious examples. The reluctance of the Alliance party to admit Singapore to Malaysia in 1963 and the subsequent withdrawal of Singapore in 1965 were as much related to this as to racial factors. It is true that the Malay-dominated Alliance feared the effect of the added Chinese population upon the Malaysian racial balance, but at least as strong a force for discord was the clash between the inherent conservatism of the Alliance, including the commercial Chinese elements which supported it, and Lee Kuan Yew's extreme socialist People's Action party which governed Singapore. Never at any

time was a sense of political trust between these parties developed, and it was the P.A.P.'s decision to campaign actively in federal politics, not as a Chinese party but as a Malaysian socialist party, which provoked the withdrawal of Singapore. Similar tensions were powerful forces also in Nigeria and Pakistan. In Nigeria the southerners looked upon northern conservatism as a source of frustration and were fearful of what they considered to be the feudal outlook of the leaders who dominated the ruling Northern People's Congress. In East Pakistan before 1958 the Bengalis, generally more radical in their politics, resented the dominance of West Pakistani landlords and businessmen in central politics, while the latter groups were fearful that federal elections would result in a shift leftward in the politics of the country. It is significant that in Switzerland the main divisions between political parties are not linguistic but ideological or economic, the major parties being the Catholic Conservatives, the Radicals and the Socialists.²⁰

Nor can one assume that the more radical the political outlook the more likely it is to favour centralization. It is true that in many cases, notably in India and Nigeria, socialists have been the strongest advocates of centralization, basing their arguments on the view that the development of the economy can be controlled effectively only if the fiscal and monetary instruments of control are concentrated in the central government. But this view has not been universal among socialists. The West Indian socialists, for example, especially the Jamaicans, preferred to achieve welfare states on their own insular scale and were hostile to central economic powers of any kind, despite the fact that culturally the federation was relatively homogeneous. Moreover, experience has suggested that in practice a centralized uniform development policy is not always the most efficient way for encouraging development in a diversified economy and that there are some benefits to be gained from planning on a regional basis.

There is evidence to suggest then that the clash between radicalism (or socialism) and conservatism can, when these viewpoints are concentrated regionally, become on their own a source for interregional tension as in the West Indies, or can affect significantly relations between linguistic and cultural groups as in Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan or Switzerland.

Another factor which may lie at the base of interregional tension within a federal system is the contrast between regions in degree of modernization. In Canada, one of the features of the changing scene in Quebec has been the determination of its new elite to make up for the lag in modernization which the emphasis upon tradition, especially in education, had caused in that province until the mid-twentieth century, and to accelerate the process of modernization.

In the newer multicultural federations regional differences in degree of modernization have greatly accentuated regionalism. In these federations, modernization and the penetration of western ideas during the period of colonial rule were often very uneven. Regions where Britain had relied on indirect rule, such as the princely states of India and Pakistan, the former unfederated Malay States, Northern Nigeria, and the protectorates of Central Africa, have usually lagged behind the others. These regions, fearful of being dominated by the more modernized areas, have usually been strong proponents of regional autonomy. The predominantly Muslim regions, influenced by Muslim conservatism and educational backwardness, have nearly always been apprehensive of union with

more modernized territories. The northwest provinces of pre-partition India and Northern Nigeria illustrate this tendency. Differences on the scale of modernity have also reinforced racial differences in Malaysia and Central Africa, and linguistic differences within India and Pakistan. In such cases of uneven modernization, provincial autonomy has often been advocated as a way in which the less developed provinces, protected from exploitation or domination by the more developed provinces, might have a breathing space in which to accelerate their own development and so improve their position relative to the other provinces.

As noted in section B of this chapter, language and culture usually provide a particularly powerful focus for regional separatism. But it is clear from the analysis in this section that linguistic and cultural tensions are often closely connected to economic interests, variations in the size and wealth of different regional groups, clashes between radicalism and conservatism, and contrasts in degree of modernization. Indeed, sometimes these issues may be even more fundamental than linguistic or cultural ones but may masquerade as cultural issues in order to achieve added emotive effect. Because differences of language among groups are so easily identifiable and therefore provide a simple focus, the appeal to linguistic and cultural issues gives any movement for regional separatism an especially potent force. The significance of this analysis of experience in other multilingual or multicultural federations is that it suggests that the role of linguistic and cultural differences within the Canadian federal system cannot be understood in isolation from the other closely related factors considered in this chapter.

D. The Forces for Unity

So far in this chapter the analysis has been concentrated upon the motivating pressures for regional autonomy. No assessment of federal societies would be complete, however, if it neglected the forces which bring or hold together multilingual and multicultural societies within federal political systems. Unless there are motives for union sufficiently strong at least to balance those for regional separatism, no federation is likely to maintain its existence for long.

An examination of the factors which have led to the establishment or continued existence of other multicultural federations indicates that in spite of the demands for autonomy pressed on cultural grounds, other demands made upon the political system have worked towards political union. First, there are the benefits that have generally been thought to flow from the creation of the larger political unit. Among these have been the achievement or sustaining of genuine independence from imperial or foreign control and domination, the economic benefits from membership in the larger interdependent economic unit, the increased administrative efficiency flowing from economies of scale, effective military defence, greater international prestige and diplomatic influence. Other contributing factors have been the existence of geographical contiguity and linking communications; the presence of a sense of interregional community derived from historical association, some cultural ties or some similarity of political and social institutions; the activity of dynamic but conciliatory leadership; and in the colonial

federations the role of the imperial government in constitution-making.²¹ It is also clear that the relative importance of these different factors has varied with each federation, some factors being more influential in one federation and some in another, although most of them have been present to some degree in each federation.

Particularly important in most cases have been the economic expectations. Among the advantages of the larger political unit usually cited have been the free movement of goods and capital made possible by the larger free market and common monetary system, lower costs of production, regional specialization, diversification of exports, attraction of foreign investment, enhanced diplomatic bargaining power in international trade negotiations and increased credit-worthiness for public borrowing. Benefits for the provision of social services have also been claimed from standardization of services and economies of scale, from the greater opportunity to support administrative specialization, and from the more solid financial base on which the services may be supported and from which poorer regions may be assisted to meet minimum standards. It has also usually been assumed that the employment of active monetary and fiscal policies aimed at economic stabilization, forced saving, productive credit expansion and the direction of economic development would benefit from the wider and more diversified financial base and the increased availability of foreign investment. Thus, in most multicultural federations, even those in which there are internal economic differences among regions, demands for the provision of comparable social services and for economic improvement have provided a significant counter-pressure in favour of union.

Another feature which has helped in most multicultural federations to counter the full force of regional separatism has been the fact that regional interests of different types have rarely covered precisely the same span of territory. The geographical demarcation of cultural groups usually does not coincide precisely with the regional demarcation of economic, social, historical or even political interests.²² Thus, although for some purposes the delineation of other forms of regional grouping may coincide fairly precisely with cultural or linguistic distinctiveness and reinforce it, for many purposes regional economic, social or historical groupings may cut across cultural ones linking segments of different cultural groups together. In such cases the variety of regionalism itself has, paradoxically, contributed to the rejection of a separatism based solely on cultural homogeneity.

It is especially significant that where the various pressures for unity taken together have failed to balance persistent pressures for regional separatism as in Pakistan, Central Africa, Nigeria or even the culturally homogeneous West Indies, either disintegration or the resort to military rule in order to preserve the union has resulted. Ultimately, the preservation of any federal political system would seem to rest not simply on the reconciliation of distinctive regional outlooks but also upon providing a positive consensus to which the different linguistic and cultural groups are willing to commit themselves. Without such a positive focus any attempt merely to reconcile differences is likely only to delay, not prevent, political disintegration.

What complicates the picture is that the motives for union and separatism within a society rarely remain constant, particularly in societies undergoing rapid political and economic development. As a result the equilibrium between the motives for union and

separatism is constantly changing. The success of a federal political system is to be found in its ability to develop a dynamic equilibrium which adapts to the changing social demands made upon it. Acute strains and even civil war or disintegration have resulted when there have been constitutional inflexibility and the inability to respond to new demands in evolving circumstances, or when, under changing conditions, there was failure to counter the erosion of a minority's sense of security. Perhaps the most extreme example has been Nigeria, but such tendencies have also been apparent at different stages in the history of most multicultural federations. The achievement of a dynamic equilibrium between the forces for unity and regionalism would appear to depend, therefore, upon the development of a federal political framework which provides significant cultural minorities with an enduring sense of security for their distinctiveness, and which, at the same time, continues to generate a sense of community among all its diverse groups. Essential to this achievement is the maintenance of a delicate balance whereby the interests of no single provincial or cultural group dominate the political or economic processes. Experience suggests that such a balance is difficult to achieve and maintain and that, therefore, multicultural federations have been difficult countries to govern. But it is because they are difficult countries to govern that they have federal political systems.

A. The Significance of the Character of Provincial Units

A federal political system presupposes the existence of provincial governments as components of the federation. The analysis of the way in which federal institutions may accommodate the pressures for political diversity may begin appropriately, therefore, with a consideration of how the character of these provincial units affects the ability of the federal system to accommodate regional interests. In Canada after one hundred years of confederation we tend to take the present structure of provinces for granted. But in the creation and development of the newer multicultural federations controversies over the appropriate shape of provincial units have focused attention upon the ways in which the operation of federal systems may be affected by the character of their regional units. Since many of the existing territorial units were simply the arbitrary or accidental products of British colonial administration and bore little relation to linguistic, cultural or economic groupings within these societies, the possibility of redrawing provincial boundaries to coincide with cultural or other interests has been considered in most of the newer federations. In the process such questions as the effects of the number, relative size and internal cultural homogeneity of provinces have been much discussed.

The significance of these issues in the newer multicultural federations can be seen from the way in which nearly all of these federations have found it appropriate during their brief history to reshape their internal boundaries in order to improve the operation of their federal systems and especially to meet the demands of local cultural and economic groups. In India the states were completely reorganized on a linguistic basis in 1956 with further adjustments being made when bilingual Bombay state was divided into two unilingual states in 1960, when the creation of a separate Naga state was undertaken in 1962, and when the decision to split Punjab was made in 1966. In West Pakistan, separate regional units established in 1947—the three Governors' provinces, one Chief Commissioner's province, ten princely states, some frontier tribal areas and the federal capital area—were consolidated in 1955 into a single province counterbalancing the single

Bengali province of East Pakistan. In Malaya and Malaysia there has been little in the way of shifting state boundaries, but the exclusion of Singapore as a state in 1948 and again in 1965, and the invitation to the Borneo states to join the Malaysian federation in 1963, were related to preserving and adjusting the racial balance among the component states. Southern Nigerians blamed many of Nigeria's tensions on the overwhelming size of the north and argued that it should be split, while minorities in each of the regions sought their own separate autonomous states. Up until 1966 Northern Nigeria had successfully resisted any attempt to break it up, but had played a leading part in splitting the Western Region so that a new Mid-Western Region might be created in 1963. During the lifetime of the Central African federation no actual changes were made to its three territorial units, but on several occasions there were suggestions that Northern Rhodesia should be redefined so that the copper belt and the line of rail along which the settlers were concentrated might be amalgamated with Southern Rhodesia, while the remaining predominantly African areas of Northern Rhodesia might be linked with Nyasaland.

B. The Size and Number of Provinces

Among the new multicultural federations there have been striking contrasts in the area and population of their component regional units. Three of the federations have consisted of states or provinces of massive size. Eight of the 14 Indian states after the reorganization of 1956, the provinces of Pakistan after the consolidation of West Pakistan in 1955, and Northern Nigeria have each contained populations greater than the total federal population of Canada, Australia or Switzerland. At the other end of the scale, more than half of the Malaysian states, eight out of 10 of the West Indian territories, and all but two of the 22 Swiss cantons had individually a population of less than half that of either Montreal or Toronto. Experience in these multicultural federations suggests that the larger regional units have been better able to sustain effectively full governmental machinery, to minimize costly duplication of administration, to function themselves as economic units for the purpose of economic planning, and to discourage the provincial governments from usurping the functions of local government. Most of these advantages would appear to apply in Canada, at the very least to Ontario and Quebec. Especially relevant is the size of the latter province in the light of its desire to take a greater part in shaping its own economic development. Critics of the larger regional units in the newer multicultural federations have also pointed to their shortcomings and to the administrative and political advantages of smaller provincial units. First, the larger regional units are likely to be less homogeneous internally and many of the advocates of smaller provinces have aimed at regional units which might reduce the linguistic or cultural minorities within a province.* Second, the examples of the larger regional units of Nigeria, Pakistan, India and the West Indies asserting themselves at the expense of the central government, and the willingness of the Malayan states, the smaller Caribbean islands and the Swiss cantons to accept increasing central power, suggest that larger regional units are more likely to obstruct the effective exercise of central power or to contemplate a separate self-sufficient existence.

*For further discussion on the internal homogeneity of provinces, see section C of this chapter.

As we have already noted in the previous chapter, variations in the size of regions relative to each other within a federation have often helped to accentuate inter-regional tension.¹ The relative population of provinces has been important because it generally governs central voting strength. This issue, for instance, has been an explosive one in Nigeria, Pakistan and the West Indies.² The relative wealth of provinces is also significant because of its effect upon their ability to finance services comparable to those of other regions without greater dependence on central aid. Thus, where linguistic and cultural differences among provinces are accentuated by disparity in wealth and consequently social services, invariably some sort of financial adjustment and equalization has been necessary to minimize interregional tension.³

The number of component provinces within a federation is a factor which also affects the character of politics within the system. The notable feature of the newer federations is the tendency for fewer regional units, in contrast especially with the 50 states of the United States or the 22 cantons of Switzerland. India, for example, with a population more than double that of the United States, has only a third of the number of autonomous states. Nigeria and Pakistan, despite their immense populations (each considerably more than double that of Canada) have had four* and two regional units respectively. The political effect in these federations has been twofold. First, the position of the regional governments has in practice been much strengthened at the expense of central authority, and the pressures for regional separatism have been accelerated. Second, the struggle of regions for federal supremacy has been encouraged. Federal stability has been seriously undermined by the interregional fears of domination in Nigeria and by the determination of each of the two provinces in Pakistan not to be subordinate to the other. This suggests that, although Quebec may chafe at being only one among ten provinces, a stable solution to the political problems of Canadian bilingualism is not likely to be found simply in the creation of a biprovincial federal system.

In some of the newer federations, the solution advocated for adjusting the number of regional units, for reducing wide disparities in the size and wealth of provinces, or for reconciling differences in the size of linguistic or cultural groups spread across several provinces, has taken the form of proposals for a zonal structure in which a middle tier of government, grouping provinces into roughly equal zones, would be introduced between the tiers of central and provincial governments. Somewhat similar schemes have been advocated on occasion in Canada for the grouping together of the Maritime Provinces, or of the western provinces. Such a scheme is to some extent implicit also in the notion that the Canadian federal system should become a dual one in which all the English-speaking provinces would be grouped together in one zone with which French-speaking Quebec would have equal status. Such arrangements were suggested for pre-partition India by the Cabinet Mission of 1946, in the original proposals for West Indian federation in 1945-6, and in some of the proposals for Uganda's inclusion within an East African federation. In each of these cases, the notion of another tier of zonal government was rejected, however, because of the complexity involved. The experience of Pakistan is especially instructive. Prior to 1955 there were a number of proposals for grouping the linguistically varied provinces and states of West Pakistan together under a zonal government in order to

*This number was recently increased to 12. — Editor.

counterbalance the Bengali majority concentrated in East Pakistan. In the end it was decided that such an arrangement would be too complicated, and instead the various units of West Pakistan were simply amalgamated into a single multilingual province. Only in India has a zonal system been adopted. In 1956 at the time of the reorganization of state boundaries the states were grouped into five large zones, but the zonal councils are consultative intergovernmental bodies rather than a middle tier of government.⁴

A simpler scheme than that of a zonal structure within a federation is the concept of double federation. Such an arrangement was envisaged by the Government of India Act, 1935, was proposed for the West Indies by Jamaica in 1960, and was adopted in Malaysia in 1963. In these schemes one group of provinces belonged to a relatively centralized federation, while other large, wealthy or culturally distinctive units (such as Jamaica or Singapore) or states differing in constitutional status (such as the Indian princely states of 1935 or the Malaysian Borneo territories) were less closely tied to the central government and retained autonomy over a greater range of functions. This type of arrangement has sometimes been advocated as a compromise in Canada between the apparent willingness of English-speaking provinces to accept greater centralization and the contrasting insistence of Quebec upon greater autonomy.⁵ The extended use of the "opting out" formula would appear to point in this direction. Since such an arrangement is closely related to the way in which authority is distributed between levels of government, the experience in other multicultural federations where such schemes have been considered or adopted will be discussed more fully in Chapter V.

C. The Homogeneity of Provincial Units

The degree to which a federal political system may effectively meet the needs and interests of different linguistic and cultural groups is affected by the extent to which the provincial units themselves represent homogeneous groupings.

Although all federations have contained sectional groups—linguistic, economic or other—which were geographically localized, it has been rare for the concentration of these groups to coincide *precisely* with the provincial political units. To begin with, diversities are usually not regionally segregated so exactly that political boundaries could mark off completely homogeneous units. People do not arrange themselves like that. Just as in Canada not all French Canadians live in Quebec nor is Quebec totally French Canadian, so in other multicultural federations the regional units are never completely homogeneous and a single unit rarely marks off all the members of a linguistic or cultural group. This is clearly apparent from an examination of the tables in Appendix A. Even in India, Nigeria or Switzerland, where the regional units appear to be so distinctive linguistically, there are inevitable overlaps at the edges of the regional boundaries and there are cultural minorities in every regional unit. Indeed, in both India and Nigeria commissions examining possible revisions to internal political boundaries which might create homogeneous units concluded that it would be impossible to draw boundaries which did not leave at least some minorities within each regional unit.⁶ Thus, the extent to which social diversities are localized within provinces is a matter of degree. In such federations

as Canada, India, Pakistan, Nigeria and Switzerland each linguistic and cultural group has been concentrated to a relatively high degree, while in Malaya and Central Africa the racial divisions have been less precisely localized, although even in the latter there are significant regional variations in the concentration of the racial communities.

A second reason for the internal social heterogeneity of regional units in federations is that the geographical scope of linguistic, racial, religious, cultural, historical, economic and other interests may not coincide precisely with each other. For instance, the regional grouping of economic interests may not coincide with the distribution of cultural groups or, as we have already noted in Chapter III, religious groupings may cut across linguistic ones as they do in Switzerland. The situation where some diversities correspond fairly closely with the actual regional political units, while others correspond to groups of provinces and still others represent divisions within provinces, is not unique to Canada but typical of all federations. For instance, India may be looked at from several regional viewpoints. There is the fundamental division between the Indo-Aryan Hindi-speaking Ganges heartland in the north and the Dravidian peoples of the Deccan and coastal plains to the south; there are the five main economic regions represented by the zones into which the states have been grouped; there are the states themselves representing since 1956 the major linguistic regions; there are within the states important regional differences of caste, religion, economic interests and, in a few cases still, language. Similarly, within Pakistan there are not only the differences of language, tradition, culture and economy between the provinces of East and West Pakistan, but also within West Pakistan the distinctions of physical feature, language, social structure and custom which marked off the various political units which existed prior to their unification into a single province in 1955.

Malaysia, too, can only be understood in terms of several levels of regional differentiation. The racial and economic contrasts between the peninsula, Singapore and the Borneo states explain the special status which was given to Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak within the Malaysian federation. But on the peninsula itself there are historical, racial and economic contrasts between the predominantly Malay states in the north and the internally heterogeneous states on the west coast. Furthermore, each state itself has a distinctive historical identity, while within the states themselves the Malays live in their kampongs, the Chinese are concentrated primarily in the mines and the cities, and the Indians are located on the plantations. Regionalism in Nigeria is similarly complex. There is the basic distrust between north and south derived from differences of religion, social institutions, degree of modernization and relative size of population. Within the south there is the bitter Yoruba-Ibo rivalry expressed in tensions between the Western and Eastern Regions, while within each of the regional political units themselves there are minority groups which have been strong enough to agitate for their own separate political autonomy.

This analysis suggests a number of points which may be of significance to the understanding of Canadian problems. First, in all federations the regional distribution of interests has been complex. Simply to assume, therefore, that the provincial units are representative of all regional interests oversimplifies the picture in a misleading way. What is needed is an understanding of the way in which these different types and spans of regional interests interact with each other.

At the same time, however, it is worth emphasizing that since the provincial units are the most effective political means of expressing regionalism, a federal system is likely to be more successful if its provincial units reflect the most fundamental regional interests within that society. Otherwise there may be demands for the reorganization of provincial boundaries as have occurred in India, Pakistan and Nigeria. Experience in India and Nigeria would seem to suggest that the creation of essentially unilingual states has tended to reinforce regional loyalties by giving them linguistic solidarity, but this has at the same time reduced tensions over issues of language. Thus, on balance federal stability and unity have been enhanced. Both in India and Nigeria resistance, as long as it lasted, to the reorganization of regional units on linguistic lines provoked expressions of minority grievances, competition among political parties to exploit minority grievances, vigorous and sometimes unconstitutional agitation, and bitterness and national instability over the conflicting claims and counter-claims.

The particular form of federal institutions which is appropriate also is related to the degree to which provincial units are homogeneous and to the extent to which the territorial concentrations of cultural, economic and other regional interests coincide geographically with each other. These factors will certainly affect the strength of the pressures for provincial autonomy, and consequently the functions suitably performed by the different levels of government, the areas in which intergovernmental cooperation is necessary, and the character and role of political parties in representing different regional interests.

Finally, since in all federations some minorities within the regional units have been unavoidable, constitutional provisions specifically designed to protect and meet the needs of these intraregional minorities have usually been found desirable. Such provisions are considered in the next section.

D. Arrangements for Protecting Intraprovincial Minorities

A variety of arrangements for protecting minorities has been developed.⁷ To begin with, a list of justiciable fundamental rights for all citizens has usually been specified by the constitution.⁸ Since the motive for setting forth these rights was as much to protect minorities within provinces as to protect provincial majorities against federal majorities, the constitutions in the newer multicultural federations have made these rights binding upon provincial as well as federal governments. Among the fundamental rights specified have been not only personal liberty, freedom of assembly and association, and equality before the law, but also the general guarantee of certain religious, educational and cultural rights.⁹ In most cases there was a recognition, too, that the grievances of linguistic, religious or cultural minorities are usually tied closely to economic discrimination, for the constitutions specifically prohibit discrimination against cultural minorities in employment for the public services.¹⁰ The Minorities Commission in Nigeria came to the conclusion that, so long as constitutional government was maintained, the general fundamental rights listed in the constitution would probably provide sufficient protection for intraregional minorities,¹¹ but in most of the other multicultural federations further safeguards have been created.

In India and Malaysia, the constitutions have included, in addition to a list of general fundamental rights, special guarantees to specified linguistic or other groups which are in a minority in some states. These provisions correspond to some extent to sections 93 and 133 of the British North America Act, 1867, but they are far more extensive in scope.

In India there are special guarantees for linguistic minorities, for the Anglo-Indians, and for the scheduled castes and tribes. The articles relating to the intrastate linguistic minorities deal with the use of minority languages for official purposes, for the redress of grievances and for education. For instance, if the Union government is satisfied that a substantial proportion of a state's population desires the use of any language spoken by them to be recognized by that state, the Union government is empowered to direct that such a language be officially recognized throughout the whole or any part of the state.¹² Every person is entitled under the constitution to submit a representation for the redress of any grievance to any officer or authority of the central or a state government in any of the languages used in the Union or in that respective state.¹³ Furthermore, as amended in 1956, the constitution requires that every state and local authority within a state must provide adequate facilities for instruction in the mother tongue at the primary stage of education to children belonging to minority groups.¹⁴ Moreover, the Union government is empowered to issue to any state directions it considers necessary or proper for securing the provision of such facilities, and there is provision for a special officer for linguistic minorities, appointed by the central government.¹⁵ It is his duty to investigate all matters pertaining to the safeguards for linguistic minorities under the constitution and to report to the Union government. His reports are laid before Parliament and the governments of the states concerned.

The Indian constitution also provides some guarantees for a specified period to the Anglo-Indians who were given special consideration with regard to appointments in certain public services and special education grants.¹⁶ In addition, there are provisions to protect certain backward classes, the "Scheduled Castes" and the "Scheduled Tribes."¹⁷ Special consideration for employment in the public services is guaranteed to members of the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes.¹⁸ There is no time limit for this preferential treatment, but it appears to be assumed that it will continue until these groups make sufficient educational and economic progress to reach equality with the rest of Indian society. A special officer for the scheduled castes and tribes is also appointed by the Union government to report on the operation of the safeguards protecting the representation of the scheduled castes in state legislatures, their claims to representation in the public services and their fundamental rights.¹⁹ This special officer is now assisted by ten assistant regional commissioners and he reports annually to the Union government. The constitution also provided for the appointment of two commissions by the central government, one to investigate and report on the administration of scheduled areas and the welfare of scheduled tribes, and the other to investigate the conditions of socially and economically backward classes and to make recommendations as to the steps that should be taken by the Union or any state to remove their difficulties.²⁰ The Backward Classes Commission reported in 1955 but the Union government found it difficult to accept its recommendations because the Commission had not found objective tests and criteria for classifying socially and educationally backward classes. The Union

government went ahead itself, however, to make surveys for determining criteria for the purpose, and the report provided by the Registrar General of India now supplies the basis for determining which groups require governmental help for their progress.

The Malayan and Malaysian constitutions have also included special guarantees for certain specified groups within the states. The Malayan constitution of 1957 contained explicit arrangements on behalf of the Malays for the reservation of land, for quotas for permits, and for quotas for employment in the public services within the states.²¹ These guarantees were designed to protect the Malays who, because of their relative educational and economic backwardness, might otherwise have suffered in competition with the other racial groups, even in those states where they formed the majority. These provisions were continued in the Malaysian Federation, and were also extended to "natives" in the Borneo states of the wider federation.²² At the same time additional safeguards for the variety of indigenous peoples in these Borneo states were provided centring on the continued use of native languages and the protection of the Muslim religion and education.²³

The existence of minorities within provinces has also often affected the organization of provincial governments. In a number of cases special provision has been made for representation in provincial legislatures. In India places have been reserved in the state legislatures for members of the scheduled castes and tribes and for Anglo-Indians.²⁴ In Pakistan places have been reserved for women members.²⁵ When Nigeria first established a federal system, arrangements were made for the representation of "special interests or communities" in the regional legislatures, but these were continued after independence in Northern Nigeria only.²⁶ When the provinces of West Pakistan were united into a single culturally heterogeneous province, the fears among smaller groups of domination by Punjabis led to the constitutional requirement that Punjab, although containing a majority of the population within the united province, be limited to no more than two-fifths of the membership in the provincial assembly.²⁷

In most federations provision has also been made for the use in state legislatures of minority languages or, where in the interests of minorities, of English. When the states of India were reorganized on linguistic lines in 1956 special arrangements were made for some of those states which remained fundamentally bilingual or multilingual. Regional committees were established within the state legislatures of Andhra Pradesh and Punjab and separate regional development boards were created within the state of Bombay.²⁸ Somewhat similar arrangements were made in Western Nigeria on behalf of the ethnic minorities in the Mid-Western area. A special Ministry of Mid-West Affairs and an advisory Mid-West Council were established in Western Nigeria in 1957.²⁹ The Northern and Eastern Regions of Nigeria were themselves internally subdivided into provinces for administrative purposes also to allay the fears of minorities.³⁰ In most federations, as already mentioned, there have been constitutional provisions designed to ensure opportunities for minorities within regional services, but only in the two northern territories of the Central African federation was it considered desirable to specify the representation of electoral minorities or special groups on provincial executive councils.³¹ Elsewhere this was left to convention. The separation of intraprovincial minorities

or special groups into separate electorates has also been avoided except in Central Africa and Pakistan.³²

It is significant that not infrequently in multicultural federations the central government has been assigned by the constitution a special responsibility as the guardian of minorities against oppression by provincial governments. For example, in the cases of the scheduled areas, tribes and castes in both India and Pakistan and the aborigines in Malaya, the central government was given direct responsibility or power to give directions to state governments regarding these minorities.³³ In India, as we have noted, the Union government has also been given power to direct state governments concerning the recognition within states of minority languages, the use within states of minority languages for education, and the establishment within states of regional legislative committees and development boards, and provision has been made for a special officer reporting to the central government on the operation of minority safeguards within the states.³⁴ In Pakistan, the authority to specify whether there were to be joint or separate electorates for provincial elections was left under the 1956 constitution to the National Assembly to decide after consulting the provincial legislatures.³⁵ The Malayan constitution specified that changes in the reservation of land for Malays required not only a special majority in the state assembly but approval by special majorities in the central parliament.³⁶ In Central Africa, it was the United Kingdom government rather than the central government which was assigned the function of protector of territorial political minorities against discrimination by territorial governments.³⁷ In many of these federations, provincial majorities have been reluctant to see their autonomy reduced in these various ways but the intraprovincial minorities have pressed for these checks upon provincial autonomy because of their fear that otherwise the guarantees to them might remain ineffective.

In some multicultural federations, intergovernmental advisory bodies, usually with representation from both the central and the provincial governments concerned, have been established to promote the interests of certain intraprovincial or interprovincial minorities. This, for instance, was one of the functions envisaged for the Indian zonal councils and the Southern Zonal Council has had some notable success in handling the mainly educational problems of linguistic minorities where these have overlapped state boundaries.³⁸ The Councils for Minority Areas in Western and Eastern Nigeria and the Niger Development Board were primarily intended to promote the interests of intraregional minorities.³⁹ The anxieties of Nigerian minorities over the potential misuse by regional majorities of their control of the police led to a unique arrangement under which a single federal police force with regional contingents was normally administered by a Police Council composed of central and regional ministers.⁴⁰

It would appear, then, that in most multicultural federations a variety of special devices has been considered necessary to protect intraprovincial minorities and that many of these safeguards have required an interpenetration of the functions of provincial and central governments.

A. The Distribution of Legislative and Executive Authority

A definitive characteristic of a federal political system is the distribution of authority within the system between coordinate central and provincial governments. Many interesting questions arise out of this aspect of federal government and much of the scholarly writing on federalism has tended to concentrate upon it. In this study, however, no attempt will be made to examine every facet of the assignment of functions to the different levels of government but, rather, attention will be focused only on those which are related to the multicultural character of a federation. At the same time, it must be noted that no consideration of the cultural significance of the distribution of authority between levels of government would be of value if it were carried out in isolation from the related issues discussed in Chapter III (where it was noted that culturally sensitive issues may be closely related to issues of economics, relative modernization and fears of political domination).

It has often been suggested that the chief merit of a federal political system in a multicultural society is that it makes possible a compromise whereby all matters of military and economic interest can be concentrated in the hands of the central government, while those matters of linguistic and cultural significance can be left to the provincial governments to be managed as each regional cultural group prefers. Indeed, Professor Smiley has suggested that this was the essential character of the Canadian confederation settlement of 1867.¹ According to this view, the settlement of 1867 was a compromise which aimed at making possible the aggressive economic development of the British North American economy by entrusting to the Dominion government the authority necessary for military defence and economic development, but which at the same time aimed at avoiding political tensions by leaving to the provinces jurisdiction over those classes of subjects in which legislation would have a direct influence on cultural matters. Whether or not this was the basis of the 1867 settlement, it is evident from recent political developments in Quebec that underlying the present dissatisfaction

in that province is the recognition that the growing interregional character of the Canadian economy threatens to undermine the French Canadian cultural distinctiveness of that province. The insistence of French-speaking Quebec upon its own extensive economic and financial powers grows out of this realization and represents a challenge to the notion that powers over the economy should be concentrated in the central government. What light, then, if any, does the experience of other multicultural federations shed on this fundamental issue?

Although some of the statesmen in other multicultural federations have thought along the lines attributed by Professor Smiley to the founders of the Canadian confederation, in most of these other federations the founding statesmen have found themselves forced to realize that a simple compromise between economic centralization and cultural provincialization is no longer a realistic possibility in the conditions of the twentieth century.

Two major pressures have shaped the distribution of authority among governments in the newer multicultural federations. First, there has been in each of these federations a deep-rooted anxiety among regional linguistic or cultural groups that national fiscal and economic policies aiming at the rapid development of an integrated economy would undermine the cultural distinctiveness of the diverse regional groups. Reinforcing this concern has been the desire to ensure that the economy would develop in such a way that members of the regional linguistic or cultural groups would have opportunities for employment in culturally congenial conditions. In its cruder form this feeling has expressed itself in the desire of each regional linguistic or cultural group for its own local spoils system.²

These culturally coloured motives for provincial responsibility in the field of economic policy have usually been reinforced by more direct economic considerations. It is true that in the newer federations the emphasis upon the need for rapid economic growth guided by active governmental development policies and controls has provided a strong incentive for placing economic powers under central direction where, according to the prevailing belief, they would be most effective. But there have been economic counter-pressures too. Particularly influential have been the conflicts of economic interest between provinces specializing in different products, between provinces dependent on exports and those dependent on home products, between wealthy and relatively dependent provinces, and between provinces which would benefit from different fiscal and tariff policies.³ Moreover, there has in recent years been a growing realization that centralized economic planning may be less efficient than was assumed in the first flush of Keynesian enthusiasm, and that there is a need for regional development policies which are more responsive to local economic conditions. A problem which has further complicated the assignment of governmental authority over economic affairs has been the recognition that although certain aspects are clearly of federation-wide significance and others are of special regional interest, these aspects are closely interconnected in such a way that they cannot be isolated from each other. For example, it has in practice proved virtually impossible to draw a simple line between trade and commerce which is interstate and that which is solely of intrastate significance.

The result of these circumstances has been the rejection in the newer federations of the notion that functions can be divided into two watertight compartments, the one dealing with military and economic matters to be allocated to the central government, and the other dealing with purely cultural or local economic matters to be allocated to the provincial governments. The unavoidable interdependence of central and provincial governments has been reflected in the way in which responsibility over many areas, and particularly over economic affairs, has been shared between levels of government rather than being assigned exclusively to one or the other. Appendix B, which provides in tabular form a comparative analysis of the distribution of authority in a number of federations, indicates that primary responsibility over economic matters has usually been given to the central government.⁴ At the same time, as an expression of both cultural and economic pluralism, important economic functions have also usually been allotted to the provincial governments. The precise balance in the distribution of authority among governments has varied, of course, in different federations to meet the particular needs of each society. India, Pakistan and Malaysia have put the most emphasis upon making possible a leading role for the central government in economic planning and in formulating fiscal and monetary policies. The Nigerian and Central African federations placed less but still substantial economic powers in central hands. The West Indies Federation, culturally far more homogeneous than any of these federations, chose, however, to place planning and economic development primarily on an island basis. Despite this range of variation, the significant feature which all these federations had in common was that in none of them was the control of economic policy concentrated solely in one level of government.

In most of the multicultural federations the central governments have been assigned relatively broad exclusive or concurrent authority over trade, commerce, industry, labour, communications, sources of energy, science, industrial research and statistics. At the same time, provincial governments have usually been given control not only over most aspects of such culturally sensitive areas as civil and personal law and education but also exclusive or concurrent authority over such matters as agriculture, land, local industries, intraprovincial trade and commerce, utilities and often labour. All of these are areas which are of particular significance in developing economies. Moreover, in most cases the provision of social services has been left largely in provincial hands.⁵ The potential advantages of centralized social services—economies of scale, uniformity of standards and the fiscal ability of central governments to support costly services—have been outweighed by the compelling arguments for making the provinces responsible for these services. These arguments include the personal nature of the services, the need to adapt them to local circumstances and problems, and their close relation to other aspects of local administration. Thus generally, at least primary and secondary education, medicine and health, and most aspects of social security and social welfare services have been made provincial responsibilities. In most of these federations the net effect of the distribution of legislative and executive authority has been to place in the hands of the central governments the major levers for promoting economic development, but at the same time, to place such extensive economic powers in the hands of the provincial governments that the central governments have had to rely heavily upon the provincial governments

for the full implementation of development programmes. Consequently the role of the central government has often become primarily that of coordinating provincial action.

The relatively extensive roles which the provincial governments have come to play in most other multicultural federations is illustrated in Appendix C, Table C.1. If provincial expenditure is taken as a percentage of the combined central and provincial public expenditure we find that only in Malaya among the newer federations has the expenditure of the regional units of government as a proportion of total public expenditure been smaller than that of the Canadian provinces. It might be possible to attribute the relatively higher concentration of central public expenditure in Canada to the needs of a more advanced complex economy, but a comparison with the equally advanced federation of Australia suggests that this is not the only explanation. It is significant that only since 1961 has the proportional expenditure of the Canadian provinces exceeded that of the states in the culturally homogeneous federation of Australia. Indeed, the present situation in Canada reflects a decade of financial devolution and still represents a relatively high degree of centralization compared with other multicultural federations. Provincial expenditure as a percentage of total federal and provincial expenditure in Canada was a mere 29 per cent in 1956-7, 35 per cent in 1959-60, 37 per cent in 1960-1 (the same as Australia in that year), and 41 per cent in 1962-3.⁶

Because of the difficulty of dividing economic functions into neatly separate and independent compartments, most of the newer federations have had to devise a variety of arrangements designed to facilitate consultation and cooperation between central and provincial governments. Often these have taken the form of a procedure requiring one level of government to consult or even obtain the consent of the other level of government before action is taken. Sometimes the procedure has been specified in the constitution itself and sometimes it has been established pragmatically as political pressures made such conventions necessary. The Malaysian constitution contains the most provisions of this kind, although virtually all the newer federal constitutions have included some areas where intergovernmental consultation or consent was required. For example, this sort of solution has been applied as a way of enabling central governments to implement treaties and agreements on subjects normally within provincial competence. Thus, the 1956 constitution of Pakistan and the 1957 constitution of Malaya required the consultation of the regional governments affected in such cases, while the constitutions of Rhodesia and Nyasaland and of Nigeria went still further, requiring the consent of regional governments insofar as the implementation of treaties and international agreements affected normally regional subjects.⁷

There are many other examples in the newer federations of required consultation or consent among governments, and the constitution of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland even included a general stipulation that "the Governments of the Federation and of the Territories shall, in so far as is practicable, consult together on all matters which are of common interest and concern."⁸ In those cases where the consent of the other level of government is required before a government acts, the interests of the other governments involved are safeguarded, but there is the danger that there may be serious delays and inflexibility if the governments find agreement difficult. This has sometimes

been the case in Malaya.⁹ The requirement of consultation but not necessarily consent is a less rigid arrangement. It ensures that the interests of other governments will at least be considered without at the same time running the risk that action will be prevented. On the other hand, this arrangement does not provide as strong a protection for the other governments involved. Most federations, therefore, have found it convenient to use both procedures. Consultation is required in some areas and consent in certain others which are more vital to the interests of the provincial governments.

There have been other ways, too, in which the sharing of governmental control over certain functions has been arranged. By contrast with Canada, in nearly all the newer federal constitutions there are lengthy lists of concurrent powers, touching on a wide range of subjects.¹⁰ This has provided a means by which central governments could in these matters exert a general and ultimate control while leaving provincial governments to fill in the details. Usually there have also been extensive provisions enabling the delegation of legislative or executive authority by either level of government to the other.¹¹

A characteristic feature of the newer multicultural federations, therefore, has been an interlocking responsibility of both governments over a wide range of functions including many economic matters. In this situation extensive cooperative interaction between governments has been an unavoidable necessity. The machinery devised to facilitate this intergovernmental cooperation is analysed further in Chapter VI.

B. The Allocation of Financial Resources

Questions of federal finance may at first sight seem far removed from those of bilingualism and biculturalism within a federal system, but they are in fact a crucial element in the picture. This is illustrated by the extent to which the demands of the Quebec government for reform within the Canadian federal system have focused upon the issue of fiscal arrangements. There are three reasons for the importance of this issue. First, legislative or executive autonomy for the provinces is likely to prove illusory if the provincial governments are dependent upon the discretion of the central government for financial assistance. Thus a centralized financial system may threaten to undermine the provincial political and cultural distinctiveness which the federal structure was intended to protect.

Second, the control of revenue and expenditure is now widely assumed to be a vital instrument for the active public control of the economy by fiscal and monetary policy. The locus of power over the economy is therefore closely related to the allocation of taxing and other financial powers. Federal finance is thus no longer simply a question of whether or not the revenues assigned to each level of government are adequate to their legislative and executive functions, but has taken on added significance as a major factor in the control and guidance of the economy. If the management of the economy within a multicultural federation is to be organized in such a way as to be efficient economically and yet at the same time enable the expression of regional cultural distinctiveness, then the relative roles of

the central and provincial governments in the control of revenue and expenditure lie close to the heart of the problem.

Third, one of the factors accentuating tensions between different linguistic or cultural groups within a federation has often been the existence of differentials in the range and quality of publicly provided amenities available in different provinces. The result has often been pressure for a redistribution of financial resources within a federation in order to ensure that no linguistic or cultural majority in a province will feel that its services are of a significantly lower standard than those of other groups in the federation.

In dealing with these financial questions the newer multicultural federations have mainly followed the Australian rather than the Canadian model. This pattern has been based upon treating the question in terms of three variable components: (1) the allocation of expenditure, (2) the assignment of powers to levy and collect revenue, (3) the use of substantial transfers of revenue from one level of government to the other.

In the allocation of fields of expenditure, both political and economic considerations have led to a relatively high degree of decentralization, as already noted in the first section of this chapter. This reflects the strength of political and cultural regional interests in these federations. This decentralization has been reinforced further by economic arguments that in the social services, agriculture and even in development projects, efficiency and adaptation to varied local circumstances can often be best achieved through local administration. Consequently, as Table C.1 in Appendix C shows, provincial expenditure as a proportion of combined federal-provincial expenditure has been relatively high in the newer multicultural federations as compared to Canada.

In the assignment of powers to levy and collect taxes and other revenues, however, the newer federations have tended to stress the role of the central government. As shown in Table C.1, Appendix C, only in India among the multicultural federations is central revenue (before intergovernmental transfers) a smaller proportion of combined central-provincial revenues than in Canada.¹² The major revenue sources, direct and indirect, have been assigned to the central government.¹³ Important considerations have been efficient levying and collection, minimizing double taxation, avoiding barriers to interprovincial trade, strengthening the creditworthiness of the federation, and enabling an integrated active fiscal policy both to encourage domestic and foreign investment and to maintain stability against inflationary pressures. Most of the major indirect taxes, such as import and export taxes, excise duties and sales taxes, have been placed normally under central control, although some exceptions with regard to specific products have been made where particular circumstances favoured provincial responsibility. The levy and collection of corporation and personal income taxes have also usually been assigned to the central government, although in Nigeria the latter was placed in regional hands because its collection was closely related to local administration. Thus, in the newer multicultural federations most of the taxing instruments for implementing economic policy have been placed firmly in the hands of the central government.

The provincial governments have had to rely on taxes with a distinctly local base, such as those on land, duties on entertainment, licences, and upon non-tax sources of revenue such as profits from commercial operations and public utilities. Furthermore, the power of provincial governments to raise loans has usually been restricted. Because the control of credit is an essential element in limiting inflation and maintaining employment, and because of the necessity to protect the credit-worthiness of the federation as a whole, the authority to raise foreign loans has nearly always been placed exclusively in central hands or has at least required central approval.

The net effect of these contrasting trends—decentralization of expenditure and centralization of revenue—has been the need to resort to very substantial inter-governmental financial transfers in order to bring into balance the revenues and the expensive functions of the provincial governments. This contrasts with the trend in Canada in recent years to devolve the taxing powers themselves upon the provinces. The relative size of intergovernmental transfers and their pattern in different federations is presented in Table C.2 in Appendix C.

Several features are noteworthy about the arrangements for fiscal adjustment in the newer multicultural federations. The first is that, in order to save the principle of provincial financial autonomy, the major portion of the transfers from the central to the provincial governments has normally taken the form of provisions in the constitution guaranteeing unconditional grants or shares of central tax receipts. The principle of “fiscal responsibility,” that governments which have the pleasant job of spending money should have the unpleasant job of raising it, has been given little weight on the grounds that taxes are significant these days not merely as sources of revenue but even more as an aspect of fiscal policies with wider economic implications. The crucial factor in the widespread use of unconditional transfers has been the strength of the political and cultural pressures insisting upon provincial autonomy. Extensive reliance upon conditional grants to augment provincial current revenues has almost always been rejected because it would undermine provincial autonomy and give the central government a measure of control over the provincial governments.¹⁴ Thus, in none of the newer multicultural federations have conditional grants-in-aid formed anything like as large a proportion of current provincial revenues as they have in Canada over the last two decades.

These unconditional transfers in the newer federations have taken one of two forms. Often they have simply been unconditional grants. This form has the advantage that the fixed amounts give the provincial governments a basis upon which to plan for the future and to exercise responsibility in keeping expenditure within income. In most cases the unconditional grants entail the disadvantage that they are likely to require regular adjustment and renegotiation, although formulae for the escalation of such grants have been used in some cases. More popular in the new federations has been the constitutional guarantee to the provinces of a specified percentage of the proceeds from certain taxes levied and collected by the central government. This may, as in Nigeria, even involve grouping together a number of central taxes to form a distributable pool from which certain proportions are

distributed to the regional governments. The advantage of this form of unconditional transfer is that provincial revenue is elastic, expanding with central revenue since the provinces are guaranteed a percentage of central tax proceeds. At the same time provincial governments are given a direct interest in encouraging the growth of the activities on which these taxes depend for their yield.

The fiscal transfers in the newer multicultural federations have been used not only to match the provincial revenues to the provincial responsibilities for expenditure, but also to reduce disparities in the capacity of the less fortunate provinces to provide services and social amenities. The principle of derivation—the distribution of transfers among provinces in direct proportion to the provincial contribution to central taxes—has been applied in a few cases because of the pressure of wealthier regions, especially in Nigeria before 1958, but generally its use has been restricted. In most of the multicultural federations an attempt has been made in the allocation of financial transfers to compensate for the unequal impact of the federation on certain provinces, to minimize differences in the per capita revenue of provinces, and to meet the special needs of less wealthy provinces. Because accurate data on provincial fiscal capacity has usually been difficult to obtain, the most common formula for the distribution of unconditional transfers to provinces has been on a per capita basis, this being adjusted sometimes to take specific account of other special factors.

The attempt to diminish economic differentials between provinces has often affected not only the financial transfers from central to provincial governments but also general economic policy. Regional cultural groups have sometimes demanded not only an equalization of the services available in different provinces but also the expenditure of development funds with the conscious aim of producing equality of provincial per capita wealth. Often such pressures have been resisted because economists insisted that such expenditures would result in less productive employment of limited capital resources, but in practice concessions have usually had to be made to such political pressures. In Pakistan, for example, Bengali resentment at the concentration of capital investment in West Pakistan, where it would be more productive economically, became sufficiently serious that President Ayub's government had to direct an increasing proportion of Pakistan's capital investment to East Pakistan in the interests of political stability. Indeed, it became necessary to include a provision in the new 1962 constitution expressly stipulating: "A primary object of the [National Economic] Council in formulating the Plans . . . shall be to ensure that disparities between the Provinces and between different areas within a Province, in relation to income *per capita*, are removed and that the resources of Pakistan (including resources in foreign exchange) are used and allocated in such a manner as to achieve that object in the shortest possible time. . . ." ¹⁵ This policy has become a cardinal point of economic planning in Pakistan in recent years, and it is by no means insignificant that during this period there has been some decline in the strength of East Pakistani separatism.

Since the allocation of financial resources in the newer multicultural federations has been based on unconditional transfers of substantial proportions, institutions

have had to be created to make these arrangements adaptable to changing needs and circumstances. In nearly all of these federations standing machinery for review and adjustment has been established, as a rule modelled on the Australian precedents of the Grants Commission and the Loan Council. The nature of these institutions made necessary by the financial interdependence of central and provincial governments will be analysed in Chapter VI.

It is interesting to note that most of the newer multicultural federations have chosen to follow the example of Australia rather than that of Canada. Canadians, despite the recommendations of the Rowell-Sirois Commission in 1940, have proved reluctant to take that path.¹⁶ Canada has not established comparable permanent standing machinery for the review and coordination of federal finance, nor has it adopted a system involving mainly central revenue collection and the unconditional distribution of these revenues to the different governments on the basis of a constitutionally guaranteed but flexible formula. Instead, the problems of federal finance have been left to be solved by *ad hoc* negotiations between the governments involved, a process which has often proved acrimonious. The pattern that has grown out of these negotiations has been one in which certain tax fields have been shared through the passage of uniform legislation with a single collection system being delegated to one level of government or the other. While this approach avoids some of the duplication in the administration of joint tax fields experienced in the United States, the recent trend in Canada toward greater occupancy of the personal income tax field by the provincial governments has left the central government with a less flexible revenue system for the employment of counter-cyclical fiscal policy techniques than those of most other Commonwealth federations. The need for inter-governmental cooperation in fiscal policy and for institutions to facilitate this is, therefore, all the greater in Canada now.

C. Variations within a Federation in the Distribution of Functions

Some Canadians have suggested that the only distribution of powers and privileges between the two levels of government that will satisfy the current demands of centralist English-speaking Canadians and decentralist French-speaking Canadians is one which will provide for a different sharing of these powers and privileges between Quebec and Ottawa than that which prevails between the federal administration and the other provinces.¹⁷ Such an arrangement would not be unique for in some of the other multicultural federations the general scheme for the distribution of legislative and executive authority between central and provincial governments has not been applied uniformly to all provinces.

In a number of instances where certain regional groups have been particularly jealous of their autonomy, the scope of their provincial autonomy has been made more extensive than under the general pattern for the distribution of functions. One of the first examples was the scheme in the Government of India Act, 1935, whereby the acceding princely states would have transferred responsibility to the central legislature only for those subjects specifically mentioned in their Instruments of Accession.¹⁸ This

portion of the federal structure envisaged in the 1935 Act never had an opportunity to go into effect, but a similar arrangement did govern the acceding princely states under the interim constitutions of India and Pakistan in 1947. The arrangement did not last long, however. Such variations in the distribution of authority were attacked in the Indian Constituent Assembly on the grounds that, "So long as the disparity exists, the Centre's authority over All-India matters may lose its efficacy. For power is no power if it cannot be exercised in all cases and in all places."¹⁹ Under pressure, the rulers of the princely states signed progressively wider instruments of accession, until under the Indian constitution of 1950, the central and concurrent authority applied virtually uniformly to all states except the state of Jammu and Kashmir.²⁰ A few minor transitional differences continued to distinguish the former princely states, but these differences were removed in 1956.²¹ The state of Jammu and Kashmir, however, retained a special status because of the controversy over its accession. It was hoped that by giving the state greater autonomy its inhabitants might be more easily reconciled to membership in the Union. The list of exclusive central powers specified in the constitution applied to Jammu and Kashmir, but for this state, unlike the other states, central authority did not extend to matters on the concurrent list and the residual authority remained with the state rather than the central government.²² But Indian nationalists were never reconciled to this as a permanent arrangement, and late in 1964 the special status of the state of Jammu and Kashmir was reduced although not ended, provoking considerable resentment within the state.

In India there have been three other examples of states with special status. When Nagaland, which had been torn by a terrorist secession movement, was finally made a full-fledged state, the application of certain central laws in that state was made dependent upon approval by the state legislature.²³ A somewhat different arrangement was that which concerned the small sub-Himalayan dependencies of Sikkim and Bhutan, which were protectorates on a treaty basis and therefore remained formally outside the framework of the federation. This last sort of arrangement would appear to be inapplicable to Quebec, however, since its relation to the rest of Canada is not so peripheral.

Pakistan, shortly after independence, consisted of several categories of regional units—four Governor's provinces, one Chief Commissioner's province, a Federal territory, a number of separate acceded states, one union of acceded states and some frontier tribal areas. But as in India, the general trend was towards the reduction of variations in the scope of central and regional powers. The unification of the various types of units in West Pakistan into a single province in 1955 virtually achieved this although the specified Tribal Areas and Azad Kashmir²⁴ continued to remain under greater central direction.

In independent Nigeria the autonomy of the regions was uniform, but in Rhodesia and Nyasaland there were some variations among the territorial units. The desire of the settlers for centralization, especially in Southern Rhodesia, and African apprehensions of central control, especially in the two northern territories, led to an unusual feature in the distribution of powers in that federation—the division of certain subjects on racial lines. Education and agriculture, which in most other federations were provincial subjects, were divided so that European education and,

except in Nyasaland, European agriculture were central responsibilities, while African education and agriculture were territorial matters.²⁵ Because most of the settlers were concentrated in Southern Rhodesia this meant that the major portion of the federal government's attention was devoted to that territory. Moreover, since the standard of services provided by the central government for Europeans was higher than that provided by the territorial governments for Africans, the Africans were given the impression that federation was for the benefit primarily of Southern Rhodesia and especially its settlers. This arrangement so discredited the federal union among Africans in the northern territories that the Monckton Commission concluded in 1960 that the federation could only survive if African support was won by "a less racial approach to the problem of the division of powers."²⁶

From the examples already examined it would appear that where the distribution of authority between levels of government within a federation has not been uniform it has often fostered rather than reduced tension. On the one hand, nationalists have pressed for more uniformity, as in India and Pakistan, because they wished to avoid the complexities of varied jurisdiction and because they feared that the central government would be hampered in the exercise of its own normal powers. On the other hand, those regional groups which have possessed greater autonomy, as in Kashmir or the northern territories of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, have to some extent felt themselves alienated from the central government which had more extensive responsibilities in other regional units. The dangers of such a scheme were recognized during the West Indian review of the federal constitution. When the Jamaican Government advocated a special confederal arrangement for itself, giving it greater legislative autonomy than the other islands, the constitutional conference of 1961 decided against such a scheme, preferring instead to increase the general level of territorial autonomy.

The most significant example of this problem has been Malaysia. When the entry of Singapore and the Borneo states into the widened Federation of Malaysia was being negotiated, special exceptions were conceded to these states in the application of the existing Malayan distribution of legislative authority.²⁷ Because of Singapore's special labour and education problems it was agreed that Singapore should retain control over these matters and also over a number of other matters which in the Malayan states still fell under central legislative authority. In the Borneo states, certain central functions, mainly those concerned with native laws and customs, local commerce and communications, and shipping and fisheries, were placed under exclusive state or concurrent authority, while others, such as immigration and development planning, remained central responsibilities but required the approval of the Borneo states before they applied there. Furthermore, as a transitional arrangement some other central functions were delegated to the Borneo states in order not to disrupt existing administrative arrangements. Thus, one of the most significant features of the Malaysian Federation has been the marked variance in the relation of different states to the central government. The states of the previous Federation of Malaya continued as before, but the new acceding states enjoyed considerably more legislative, executive and financial autonomy, and their special interests were more fully safeguarded under the constitution. This arrangement has not

been a total success. It is true that so far it has worked reasonably well in the two Borneo states of Sabah and Sarawak. The fact that they are separated from the other states by some 500 miles of sea has made it less difficult to treat them differently from the states on the peninsula in economic matters. In the case of Singapore, however, the greater autonomy of that state did not resolve the problem satisfactorily. On the one hand, because Singapore's economy was closely related to that of the peninsula, it proved impossible to isolate it from central policies. On the other hand, because of Singapore's greater autonomy, it was considered appropriate to reduce its proportionate representation in the central legislature and to restrict the federal franchise of Singapore citizens outside Singapore.²⁸ The result was a sense of alienation from the central government among residents of Singapore, and this feeling was reinforced by the refusal of the federal Alliance party to admit the People's Action party, ruling in Singapore, to a partnership in the governing of the federation. The consequent resentment in Singapore, and the annoyance of the Alliance party at the P.A.P. when it did not confine its political activities to Singapore, resulted in mounting tension which culminated in the complete separation of Singapore only two years after it joined the federation.

What are the lessons here for Canada? The first point is that a federation in which certain provinces are given a much greater degree of autonomy than the other provinces is possible. Those who would argue that it is inconsistent with the principle of federalism are clearly wrong, as examples show. Moreover, as experience in the newer multicultural federations has made abundantly clear, the most effective federal systems, such as India, have been those in which the constitutional balance has reflected fairly accurately the balance of political forces within the society. Where a centralized federal structure has failed to give regional interests adequate expression, as in Central Africa or Pakistan during the first decade, or where the federation has been too decentralized to provide any significant benefits from the union as in the West Indies, the federations have experienced serious difficulties or have disintegrated. It is extremely important, therefore, that the distribution of functions among governments within a federal system should express effectively the different demands of the regional groups within the system.

At the same time, the actual experience of multicultural federations with marked variations in the degree of provincial autonomy, suggests that in practice few such examples have worked happily. It is certainly clear from Malaysian experience that unless the arrangement is devised in such a manner as to avoid a feeling in the more autonomous provinces that they are merely second-class members of the federation, the scheme is likely to lead ultimately to secession as in Singapore. A similar situation occurred in the northern territories of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. If variations within a federation in the distribution of authority between levels of government are unavoidable in order to reflect sharply varying degrees of political regionalism in different provinces, such an arrangement is likely to remain stable only if the machinery for intergovernmental cooperation and the institutions of central government are carefully designed to ensure that the more autonomous groups still feel themselves to have an integral part in the operation of the federal system.

A. Interdependence within Federal Systems

It is already clear from the analysis in the preceding chapters that the newer multicultural federations have been characterized by an interpenetration of the activities of their central and provincial governments. The notion of a strictly dual polity of two tiers of government operating independently of each other has in practice proved both impossible and undesirable. This being the case, the newer multicultural federations have found it useful to establish a variety of commissions and councils specifically designed to facilitate intergovernmental consultation and cooperation. In Canada there has been some resistance to such a trend for fear that it might encroach upon the sovereignty of Parliament and the provincial legislatures, but in the newer federations the importance of intergovernmental cooperation in making a federal system effective has been recognized as even more important. Some of these intergovernmental institutions have actually been specified in the constitutions, but many of them have been established simply by agreement as the need arose. Broadly speaking, these institutions may be divided into five categories according to the type of intergovernmental relations they deal with: those concerned respectively with financial relations, with economic policy, with other specific areas of common concern, with national cohesion, and with constitutional disputes. Because, as we have already noted in earlier chapters, provincial cultural distinctiveness is related to financial, economic and other issues, each of these categories of intergovernmental institutions will be examined.

B. Intergovernmental Financial Institutions

Most of the newer multicultural federations have found it convenient to establish commissions or councils to review and adjust the distribution of financial resources at periodic intervals, and to coordinate public borrowing. In this respect these federations

have been heavily influenced by the examples of the Australian Grants Commission and the Australian Loan Council.

In nearly every one of the newer federations there has been provision for some sort of review of the allocation of tax revenues and grants. Most often these questions have been turned over to an independent expert advisory commission which considers the evidence impartially and arrives at an agreed recommendation. This has been the pattern in India where the constitution provides for the appointment every five years of a Finance Commission responsible for making recommendations concerning the distribution of the tax revenues shared by the Union and the states, the principles determining grants-in-aid, and any other matters referred to it in the interests of sound finance.¹ The constitution of Rhodesia and Nyasaland provided for a similar review at five-year intervals by an independent commission.² In Malaysia, quinquennial reviews for central financial relations with the Borneo states and biennial reviews for Singapore were specified. Reference to an independent assessor was to be made only if the governments involved were unable to reach agreement, but in such a case the assessor's judgment was to be binding.³ Advisory fiscal review commissions similar to those in India and Rhodesia and Nyasaland were appointed in Pakistan in 1952 and in Nigeria in 1947, 1950, 1953, 1957 and 1964, but these were *ad hoc* rather than regular commissions.⁴ Because adjustments to the distribution of financial resources may affect critically the balance of power between central and provincial governments, the success of the commissions has depended upon their ability to establish a reputation for impartiality. The ability of the commissions to win the confidence of regional politicians was particularly important in India and Pakistan because there the appointment of the commissions and the implementation of their recommendations rested solely with the central governments. Confidence in the independence of the fiscal review commissions was essential also in Nigeria and in Rhodesia and Nyasaland, for although regional interests were safeguarded by the requirement of regional consent to any modification in the constitutional provisions regarding financial transfers, adjustments would be impossible unless the recommendations of the fiscal commissions received support from both levels of government. To date, it would appear that the tradition of impartiality and independence has been established by the fiscal review commissions in all these federations, for in practice their recommendations have almost always been accepted with little or no change.

In Pakistan since 1956 and in Malaya, the function of fiscal review was assigned to intergovernmental councils composed of ministers representing the central and provincial governments.⁵ In these instances decisions have been arrived at more by bargaining than by impartial examination. In both countries the provincial representatives carried considerable weight for together they outnumbered those of the central government. The governments retain the final power of decision since both the Malayan National Finance Council and the National Finance Commission of Pakistan are only advisory in their authority.⁶

The new federations have also established institutions to facilitate the coordination of public borrowing because the control of credit is an important element in the curbing of inflation and the maintenance of employment, because irresponsible borrowing by one province may affect detrimentally the credit-worthiness of other provinces and of the

central government, and because a single or coordinated program of public borrowing is likely to obtain more favourable terms on the international market. In Pakistan and Malaya where intergovernmental councils composed of central and provincial ministers already existed for reviewing the tax and grant structure, these same councils were used to coordinate the exercise by governments of their borrowing powers. Rhodesia and Nyasaland and Nigeria, where independent advisory commissions were used to carry out fiscal reviews, followed instead the Australian example of establishing a separate Loans Council, composed of one representative from each government, to coordinate central and regional public borrowing.⁷ The Central African Loan Council, like its Australian model, actually controlled central and territorial borrowing, but this was limited to foreign loans. The Nigerian Loans Advisory Board was only advisory but extended its recommendations to internal as well as external loans. In India, states were not permitted to raise external loans and therefore no coordinating body was considered necessary, but some questions concerning Union loans to the states have been referred to the second Finance Commission.

In some federations provision has been made for special institutions to settle certain kinds of central-provincial financial disputes which are not appropriate for supreme court jurisdiction. For example, all three Asian federations, and Rhodesia and Nyasaland provided for special tribunals for adjudicating disputes between governments over costs incurred by delegated administration.⁸ Similar tribunals were also allowed for in order to settle disputes between governments over "unreasonable" central restrictions on external borrowing by provinces in Pakistan (1956-8), over payments for land in Malaya, and over the use and control of interstate rivers and river valleys in India.⁹

C. Intergovernmental Institutions for Coordinating Economic Policy

Among the most important of the intergovernmental institutions established in the newer federations have been those concerned with planning and coordinating economic and social development. These have been especially important because of the way in which the relative economic development of different regions may affect cultural sensitivities and because of the way in which responsibility for economic affairs has usually been distributed between both levels of government.

Examples of major intergovernmental councils concerned with coordinating economic policies and development planning have been the National Development Council in India, the National Economic Council in Pakistan, the National Finance Council and the National Land Council in Malaya and Malaysia, the National Economic Council in Nigeria, and the Inter-Territorial Planning Group in Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

In India and Pakistan the central government has played a strong role in the process of economic planning, both because of provincial dependence upon central grants and loans for capital projects and because a planning commission or board of the central government has collated the plans of the various provinces, drafted the national plans and advised on their implementation. Nevertheless, in both countries the supreme body responsible for laying down the guidelines for the economic plans and for supervising their implementa-

tion has been a council composed of central and provincial premiers or cabinet ministers—the National Development Council in India and the National Economic Council in Pakistan. In addition to coordination of policy by these councils, development planning has involved virtually continuous consultation between various central and provincial departments in the implementation of plans. The significance of the resulting interaction between governments is summarized in Morris-Jones' assessment of Indian economic planning: "The upshot as regards plan formulation seems to be a convincing form of co-operative federalism—so long as we understand that phrase to include hard competitive bargaining. This is indeed the character of Indian federalism throughout. Whereas the emphasis in the Constitution is on demarcation, that of practical relations is on co-operative bargaining."¹⁰

In Malaya, the central government has also played a major role in economic and social planning because there, more than in any of the other multicultural federations, legislative and executive authority over economic matters was concentrated in the central government. Nevertheless, the central government in Malaya and now Malaysia has been required to consult the National Finance Council, composed of central and state representatives, before putting development plans into operation.¹¹ There has also been a separate Land Council, composed of central and state ministers, to formulate a national policy for land utilization which would be binding on central and state governments, and to advise on national development plans.¹² In addition, a Rural and Industrial Development Authority, also composed of central and state representatives, has been created to stimulate and organize economic and social development projects, especially in rural areas.

In Nigeria the National Economic Council, composed of representatives of all governments within the federation, was formed in 1955 as a forum for the discussion of economic matters and for fostering cooperation between governments. Its effectiveness was enhanced by the addition of a Joint Economic Planning Committee in 1959. An agreed single federal-regional six-year development programme was published in 1962. A number of other intergovernmental bodies concerned with related matters have also been established, notably the National Council of Natural Resources and the Niger Development Board.

The officials' conference of 1951 preceding the formation of the Central African federation had recommended a development commission of central and territorial representatives, with a central planning staff, but these proposals were never implemented. An inter-Territorial Development Planning Group was appointed, however, to consider the 1957-61 development plans of all the governments and it did play a role in coordinating the presentation of these plans. Otherwise, the machinery for inter-governmental consultation on economic planning was less adequate than in the other newer federations.

These examples indicate that in the newer multicultural federations both levels of government have participated in the formulation of basic economic policy. Because provincial cultural interests are affected by economic policy and because federal and local economic questions cannot be isolated from each other, it has been found necessary to give provinces a role in the process of economic planning. The advantage of these

intergovernmental councils has been that they have enabled central and provincial governments to work together in developing positive policies which aim at protecting provincial interests without sacrificing federal progress.

D. Intergovernmental Institutions for Other Specific Matters

In addition to the intergovernmental institutions designed to facilitate the adjustment of financial relations and the coordination of general economic policy, there have been a multitude of other intergovernmental councils, commissions and boards intended to make possible consultation and cooperation between central and provincial governments on specific activities of mutual concern. To cite only some of the examples, there have been the river boards, the Central Council of Health, the Inter-State Transport Commission and the Drugs Consultative Committee in India; the provincial advisory boards for the central Posts and Telegraph Department and the National Council of Social Welfare in Pakistan; the National Council for Local Government in Malaya; the Tariff Advisory Board in Malaysia; the Police Council, the National Council on Establishments, the minority area advisory councils, the Joint Consultative Committee on Education, the Central Bank Advisory Committee, the Marketing Board and the statutory boards of certain central corporations¹³ in Nigeria; the intergovernmental committees on labour, agriculture, marketing, education and specific development projects, and certain territorial and central statutory boards containing representatives of the other level of government in Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

Apart from such standing machinery for consultation between governments, in most of the newer federations there have been a wide variety of *ad hoc* conferences, composed of central and regional representatives, for the discussion of both general and specialized subjects. For example, in India there have been periodic meetings of state governors, of state chief ministers, of finance ministers, or of other state and central ministers or officials. Such intergovernmental conferences have been a favourite device in the other new federations also. The characteristic temper of these federations was exemplified in the instinctive response of the Indian Union government to the Chinese invasion of 1962. It established an intergovernmental National Defence Council to advise the central government on military affairs and on the mobilization of public participation in national defence.¹⁴ It is clear that since the neat separation of central and provincial functions has been impossible, most federal systems have come to rely on a wide range of institutions facilitating consultation and cooperation between governments.

E. Intergovernmental Institutions for Federal Cohesion

In the newer multicultural federations, with their sharp linguistic, racial, religious and other cleavages, statesmen have often been fearful that a federal system might encourage increased separatism by marking off the different cultural groups into distinct provincial units. These statesmen have striven to create standing machinery for general consultation among governments in order to foster federal cohesion.

Such institutions have been created in several federations, but India has done the most in this line. Especially interesting has been the Indian attempt in recent years to counter separatism. In November 1960, one of the subjects that was discussed at a Conference of Education Ministers was the distressing frequency with which disruptive tendencies were making themselves felt in the country. The conference was concerned about the threat posed to national cohesion by the growing strength of linguistic regionalism, and stressed the importance of the role of education in counteracting the divisive trends and in fostering unity. As a consequence, a Committee on Emotional Integration, consisting of twelve distinguished Indian leaders in education and politics, was set up in May 1961. Soon afterwards, in August 1961, a States Chief Ministers' Conference on National Integration was held at which resolutions were agreed upon in favour of a common script for all Indian languages, the establishment of new all-India civil services, and the prohibition of any secessionist demands.¹⁵ This was followed by a National Integration Conference, composed of Union cabinet ministers, chief ministers of the states, party leaders and other prominent men, held at the end of September 1961. This conference discussed measures to promote national integration, safeguard the interests of linguistic minorities and plan the national coordination of education. Among the principles agreed to were instruction in the mother tongue at the stages of primary and secondary education, acceptance of the three-language formula (Hindi, English and the regional language) for each region, encouragement of students to study outside their home states, an emphasis in the educational system and the textbooks of each state upon the basic unity of the country, a code of conduct for political parties discouraging them from playing upon and aggravating linguistic and religious differences, and the diminishing of regional inequalities in economic development.¹⁶ As an outcome of this conference a permanent intergovernmental body, the National Integration Council, was established to review and make recommendations on these matters. The membership of this council includes the Union Prime Minister and Home Minister, the chief ministers of all the states, leaders of political parties in Parliament, the commissioners for minority groups, and representatives of higher education and research. This body set to work in 1962 and soon stimulated a campaign to foster national cohesion. The campaign included the elaboration of a press code, the creation of new all-India civil services, the organization of a National Integration Week, and the taking of a national integration pledge by school children and citizens.

In the meantime, in 1962 the report of the Committee on Emotional Integration Committee also appeared.¹⁷ The committee assessed the existing situation in the following terms:

What has dragged the problem of Indian languages down to the arena of acrimonious debate is the attempt, by certain people, to make language a cloak for their ambitious designs in other fields, notably politics and employment. That language is the expression of a people's culture goes without saying, but when it is made a slogan it begins to give shelter to hypocrisy and exaggeration, as most slogans do. The fear, real or fancied, that if a language does not receive prominence, those speaking it will be denied opportunities of employment and political influence, is hardly ever expressed. It is generally mixed with other matters, some of which are of very minor importance. The riots which broke out in Assam a couple of years ago are a case in point.

If people from one part of India elect to take up their residence elsewhere, it is in their own interest to identify themselves with their new neighbours. One of the most potent methods of doing so is to learn the local language and try to speak it properly. At the same time, one can understand the desire of linguistic minorities to have opportunities provided for their children to learn in their mother tongue. The principle of providing such opportunities has already been accepted by the State governments, but its implementation may meet with some difficulty in the initial stages.

The committee went on to recommend measures designed to ensure that in the first five classes of primary school the child would not be burdened compulsorily with more than one language. The child would study either the mother tongue or the regional language, but if a school wished to start the study of another language at this stage it would be free to do so. In classes V to VIII the child would be introduced to two "link-languages," Hindi and English, thus bringing into operation the three-language formula. The committee approved of the use of the regional language as a medium of instruction in colleges and universities in order to remove the gulf between the masses of the people and the intellectual elite, but also emphasized the importance of the link-languages as essential for mobility and intercommunication between different parts of the country. These were necessary both for national unity and in order to speed the programmes for economic development and industrialization.

The zonal councils in India were another intergovernmental device intended to counter linguistic separatism and to foster interstate cohesion. In the constitution, as adopted in 1950, provision had been made for an interstate council in order to facilitate consultation and cooperation among state governments, but such a council was not activated.¹⁸ Instead, zonal councils were created by the States Reorganization Act, 1956.¹⁹ The Indian states were grouped into five zones, each with its own council, composed of the Union Home Minister and the chief minister and two ministers from each state in the zone. The councils were intended to provide a forum for closer consultation among the group of states and between the states and the central government on matters of common interest. Their work has been concerned primarily with questions connected with economic planning, but the councils have also discussed interstate problems related to border disputes, linguistic minorities, official state languages, food distribution, irrigation waters and police reserves. The zonal councils are deliberative and advisory bodies only and therefore in no way diminish the legislative and executive authority of the Union and state governments. When the issue of fostering national cohesion came to the fore in 1961, a Committee of Zonal Councils for National Integration was also established to discuss problems of common interest in all the zones.

From these examples, it is evident that since 1960 there has been considerable concern in India to establish a wide range of institutions specifically aiming at cohesion among the different linguistic and cultural groups within the federation. The full impact of these devices is hard to gauge, for soon afterwards the Chinese invasions of the northern frontiers in October 1962 added an enormous impetus which produced an almost unprecedented integration of the Indian nation, and more recently the brief war with Pakistan has further contributed to national cohesion.

None of the other new multicultural federations has gone to anything like the lengths to which India did in establishing institutions designed to foster federal cohesion. The 1956 constitution of Pakistan did provide for an Inter-Provincial Council to facilitate consultation among provinces,²⁰ but the 1962 constitution omitted this provision, since with only two provinces there seemed little need for such formal machinery. In Malaya, during the operation of the Federation of Malaya Agreement, 1948, the Conference of Federation Executives, consisting of the central ministers, the chief ministers of the states and the resident commissioners of the settlements, met before every meeting of the federal Legislative Council in order to consider prospective central legislation and policy. Under the 1957 constitution it was provided that the Conference of Rulers,²¹ joined by the central prime minister and the state chief ministers, might deliberate on questions of national policy.²²

F. Institutions for Settling Constitutional Disputes

No matter how precise or complete the constitutional distribution of authority between central and provincial governments may be, the ambiguity of language, overlapping jurisdiction and the occurrence of unforeseen problems are bound to provoke disputes about the terms of a federal constitution. Consequently, in most federal systems some independent agency or institution, usually a supreme court, has been considered necessary to act as an umpire for settling constitutional disputes.

Most multicultural federations have, like Canada, assigned this role of interpreting the constitution to supreme judicial bodies. There are some exceptions, however. In Switzerland the federal legislature is in effect the final interpreter of the constitution. The courts may declare cantonal laws void if they conflict with the federal constitution, but laws passed by the Federal Assembly are treated as valid.²³ There are limits upon the Federal Assembly, however, insofar as most laws are subject to challenge by a referendum.²⁴ Among the new multicultural federations only Pakistan since 1962 and Malaya between 1948 and 1957 have not assigned the role of arbiter in constitutional disputes between governments to a supreme judicial body. The Pakistan constitution of 1962 stipulated that in the case of intergovernmental disputes the Supreme Court might "pronounce declaratory judgments only" and added elsewhere that "the responsibility of deciding whether a legislature has power under this Constitution to make a law is that of the legislature itself."²⁵ In the Federation of Malaya the function of interpreting the Federation Agreement was vested prior to 1957 in *ad hoc* interpretation tribunals.²⁶ These tribunals consisted of three members: the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court as chairman, and two other members who were either judges of the Supreme Court or possessed the qualifications for such judges, one being appointed by the High Commissioner and the other by the rulers of the Malay states. The appointments were made as the occasion arose. The 1957 constitutional commission rejected this general arrangement in favour of relying upon the Supreme Court for several reasons. First, the states could not maintain their autonomy unless they were able to challenge in the courts as *ultra vires* both legislative and executive acts of the central government. Second, the

insertion of a list of fundamental liberties in the constitution required the establishment of a legal procedure for challenging breaches of these rights. Third, there were advantages in being able to obtain rapid decisions on constitutional questions. The 1957 Malayan constitution, therefore, placed the responsibility of constitutional interpretation in the hands of the Supreme Court, and in the widened Federation of Malaysia the Federal Court performs this role.

In India, Malaysia, Nigeria, Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and prior to 1958 in Pakistan, the role of constitutional umpire was assigned to a supreme court, as had been the case earlier in the United States, Australia and Canada. In the newer multicultural federations the supreme courts have generally been assigned extensive original and appellate jurisdiction. Intergovernmental disputes, with the exception of certain financial disputes sometimes assigned to special tribunals, as mentioned in section A of this chapter, have normally been placed under the original jurisdiction of the supreme courts which have been given ultimate authority to interpret the constitution and to pronounce on the constitutional validity of any central or provincial laws. Where fundamental liberties and special minority rights specified in the constitution impose limits on central and provincial governments, the supreme court has usually also been made the protector of these, either through its original or its appellate jurisdiction. In addition to tasks of constitutional interpretation, the supreme courts have usually been given a wide appellate jurisdiction over civil cases of high value, in certain criminal cases, and where the court permits, by special leave. Since in these new federations the law declared by a supreme court is binding on other courts within the federation, this appellate jurisdiction has made the supreme courts an important force for political cohesion through their capacity to promote a uniformity in legal interpretation.

Given the major role of a supreme court as the constitutional umpire within the federal system, its impartiality becomes essential. Thus the composition of the supreme judicial body and the manner of appointment and dismissal of its members become significant. In Canada, some French Canadian writers have been concerned about the composition of the Supreme Court and have argued that the two major cultural groups should be equally represented.²⁷ In the newer multicultural federations, however, despite their cultural cleavages, the regional or cultural composition of supreme courts has not been a particularly controversial issue. It is true that the supreme courts of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, of Nigeria (between 1958 and 1963) and of Malaysia have included the chief justices of the regional high courts as *ex officio* members of the supreme court, but this arrangement was motivated largely by the need to provide the supreme court with a sufficiently large panel from which to draw. In Nigeria there was also a regional element in the composition of the Supreme Court since each of four justices was appointed by the central government after consulting a different regional premier. But with these exceptions, the newer federal constitutions have contained no stipulations about the regional or cultural composition of the supreme courts.²⁸ Instead, primary attention has been focused upon ensuring as far as possible the independence of the courts and this has been reflected in the procedures specified for the appointment or removal of judges.

In the five newer multicultural federations the central cabinet has been given the last word in the appointment of supreme court judges but, except in Rhodesia and

Nyasaland, the central executive has been required by the constitution to consult certain bodies before making the appointments. In India, Pakistan and Malaysia, the executive is required to consult the Chief Justice (titled Lord President in Malaysia) about appointments of other members of the Supreme Court (called Federal Court in Malaysia). The central executive is also required in Malaysia to consult the Conference of Rulers about all Federal Court appointments, in India to consult other Supreme Court justices and the Chief Justices of the state High Courts regarding the appointment of a Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and in Nigeria to consult a different regional premier for each of four justices.

To ensure the independence of these supreme courts, all the new federal constitutions have included provisions to the effect that judges might be removed only "on grounds of misbehaviour or of infirmity of body or of mind." A special procedure for removal has also usually been specified. Under the constitutions of India, Pakistan (1956), Nigeria (1963), and Rhodesia and Nyasaland, removal required an address of the central legislature, passed by special majorities (except in Rhodesia and Nyasaland). In Pakistan since 1962, removal follows an inquiry by a Supreme Judicial Council, and in Malaysia it follows investigation by a special tribunal. Other provisions, also designed to enhance the independence of supreme court judges, have often been included in the constitutions. As a rule the constitution has contained provisions to ensure that the salaries and terms of office of judges might not be varied to their disadvantage after appointment. The Asian federations have also restricted discussion in the legislatures about the conduct of judges. Furthermore, the constitutions of India and of Pakistan (1956) also included provisions disqualifying justices from subsequently practising in the courts or accepting certain appointments.²⁹ The intention here was to discourage judicial decisions from being influenced by the hope of future advantage.

On the whole, in the newer multicultural federations there appear to be few signs of dissatisfaction with the impartiality which the supreme courts have displayed in performing their function as guardians of the guarantees embodied in the federal constitutions. In achieving acceptance as independent arbiters, the supreme courts have been helped not only by the constitutional provisions but by traditions of the bar and bench safeguarding the integrity and independence of the judges in these countries.

A. The Role of Central Institutions

One essential feature of any federal system is the autonomy of provincial governments making possible regional distinctiveness, but an equally important feature is the development of a sense of community among the different regional groups. A federation involves not only diversity on some viewpoints but also common agreement on at least *some* matters. No matter how much a federal system allows for differences of regional viewpoint, the federal solution is ultimately bound to fail unless it is able to develop at the same time a positive consensus among the different groups within the federation. The ability to generate such a consensus depends largely on the central institutions. The form of these institutions, the processes by which federal decisions are reached, and the participation of the different regional and cultural groups in arriving at these decisions all affect the extent to which a sense of community can be developed. In this chapter, five aspects affecting the ability to generate a federal consensus will be examined—the central legislature, the central executive, the central civil service, the capital city and the political parties.

B. The Central Legislature

In most of the newer multicultural federations the issue of regional representation in the central legislature has been a particularly controversial one. This is not surprising. In most of these federations the system of cabinet responsibility to parliament has prevailed and, therefore, control of the legislature has been the key to control of central power. Controversies over the organization of the central legislature have usually turned on two major issues. The first of these has been the problem of the appropriate regional composition of the central legislature. Smaller provinces have invariably opposed the principle of representation according to population, and have proposed weightage to favour smaller provinces or even provincial equality in order to prevent perpetual

domination by the larger provinces. The larger provinces have usually been equally insistent that they should have their "fair share" of power, often citing not only the principle of representation by population but also the financial support they have been required to give to the smaller and poorer provinces. The second issue provoking controversy has been the method of election to the central legislature. Since the control of central power was what was at stake, it has sometimes been argued that members of the central legislature should be indirectly elected by the provincial legislatures rather than chosen by direct popular election. These suggestions have arisen in part from the desire of provincial leaders to retain some control over central politics. These claims have been met by equally strong counter-arguments that such a scheme would be "undemocratic."

Out of the attempts in the newer federations to resolve these two issues has come a fairly common general pattern of organization for the central legislatures. A bicameral legislature was adopted in each of the newer independent federations, except in Pakistan and Rhodesia and Nyasaland, where unicameral legislatures were established. The appeal of the bicameral solution lay in the compromise it made possible between the conflicting viewpoints. A bicameral legislature permits the application of different principles of regional composition and method of election in the two central legislative houses. Thus, in India, Malaysia and Nigeria the popular chamber is on the whole directly elected, and regional representation, with some minor exceptions, is based on population. In the second chambers, states are either equally represented, as in Malaysia and Nigeria, or state representation is weighted to favour smaller states, as in India, and in all three federations members of the second chamber are indirectly elected, being chosen by the state legislatures.

The exceptions to this general pattern in Pakistan and Rhodesia and Nyasaland were largely due to special circumstances. The first Pakistan Constituent Assembly had struggled with a variety of complicated bicameral schemes, all of which caused heated disputes over the regional composition and relative powers of the two chambers.¹ Different arrangements for a balance of regional representation were advanced and in one of the schemes the executive would have been made responsible to both chambers. However, when the unification of West Pakistan in 1955 reduced the large variety of provinces and states within the federation to just two provinces, the second Constituent Assembly decided upon equal representation of the two provinces in the National Assembly, and rejected a second chamber as superfluous.² The 1962 constitution continued this general arrangement.³ The solution adopted in Pakistan, if applied to Canada, would require the unification of all the English-speaking provinces into one single province, giving that province and Quebec equal representation in the central legislature. Such a solution would be unlikely to be acceptable in Canada, however, not only because of the already strong historical sense of identity of the provinces, but also because Quebec represents only 29 per cent of the total Canadian population, while the two provinces of Pakistan were fairly well balanced with 55 per cent of the population in East Pakistan and 45 per cent of the population in West Pakistan.

Nor does the example of Rhodesia and Nyasaland offer any better precedent. The establishment of a unicameral central legislature there was essentially a transitional

arrangement and the constitution expressly provided for the creation later of a second chamber.⁴ Moreover, in view of the continued controversies over representation in the Federal Assembly of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, this example serves as a poor advertisement for the adoption of a unicameral legislature in Canada.

But the establishment of a bicameral central legislature along the general lines adopted in India, Malaysia and Nigeria does not solve all the problems either. In each of these federations, adherence to the principle that the cabinet should be responsible to the popularly elected house led to the creation of second chambers which were relatively weaker in constitutional power than their respective popular chambers. The lower house has had substantially greater power through being given ultimate predominance in cases of ordinary legislation, through the control of finances and through the responsibility of the cabinet to it. For instance, ordinary central legislation in these federations may be introduced in either house and normally requires passage in both, but in cases of deadlock between the two the first chamber has always been given power to override the other, either simply by later repassage or by outnumbering the members of the other chamber in a joint sitting. The initiation of money bills has been restricted to the popular chamber, and the second chamber may as a rule play only an advisory role. Ultimately the cabinet has always been responsible only to the popular house, although the second chamber has usually been represented in the cabinet, and in most of the newer federations all cabinet ministers may be questioned in the upper house even when they are not members of it.

The second chambers have, nevertheless, served as guardians of provincial and minority interests. In the case of constitutional amendment, they have had equal constitutional powers with the popular chambers because such amendments have normally required the approval of the second chamber voting as a separate house. Furthermore, these second chambers, except the Nigerian Senate, have gained some stability and independence by being unaffected by the dissolution of the popular house. The Indian and Malaysian second chambers were "permanent bodies," a third of the former being elected every two years and half of the latter every three years. Furthermore, because of the manner of election to the second chamber, these chambers have been a more genuine forum for the presentation of regional viewpoints than has the Canadian Senate. In India, election of the second chamber is by state legislatures using proportional representation by means of the single transferable vote; in Nigeria, appointment is by regional governments subject in each case to the affirmative vote at a joint sitting of the legislative houses of that region; and in Malaysia, election is by the state legislative assemblies by simple majority ballot, any assembly member being free to make nominations. The Indian, Malaysian and Nigerian second chambers, in addition to the state representatives, have also reserved some places for members nominated either for their eminence or to represent special minority interests. In India these members constitute less than 10 per cent of the total membership of the chamber, but in Malaysia they make up over 40 per cent of the Senate. But although the second chambers in these newer multicultural federations represent regional and minority viewpoints better than the Canadian Senate, the fact remains that in each case it is the popular chamber which, because of the cabinet system of government, remains predominant.

None of these second chambers has had anything like the power, constitutional or political, of the Senate in the American federal system; but the major role of the Senate in the United States is related to the separation of the executive from the legislature. The fact that the central executive in Switzerland also has a fixed term rather than being responsible to the popular chamber, helps to explain why the Swiss Council of States has been more effective than the second chambers in any of the Commonwealth federations. In Switzerland the cantons are equally represented in the Council of States, the method of election being determined by the canton.⁵ In some cantons councillors are directly elected; in other cantons they are elected by the cantonal legislature. The effect of the composition of the council is to ensure that the two minority interests—the Roman Catholic and the non-German speaking areas—have a permanent majority in the Council of States if they vote together.⁶ In practice, however, party divisions to some extent cut across this dividing line. Moreover, the effectiveness of other institutions for safeguarding constitutional rights, especially the referendum, has made the Council of States a less significant body than the American Senate.

In the newer Commonwealth federations, the relative weakness of the second chamber in relation to the popular chamber has meant that regional groups have sometimes disputed the notion that the popular house should represent regions strictly according to population. In India and Nigeria the principle of strict representation by population was incorporated, but in the latter federation it provoked a series of constitutional crises when the census results of 1962-3 made it clear that the Northern Region would in effect be guaranteed a permanent majority in the House of Representatives. In Malaysia, representation in the House of Representatives has been based roughly on population but rural areas are heavily favoured. Moreover, Sabah and Sarawak are consciously over-represented, in part because this was necessary to induce them to join, while Singapore was considerably under-represented ostensibly because of the wider range of subjects over which the state possessed autonomous control.⁷ The effect, however, was to give Singapore the feeling that it was not fully accepted as a member of the federation, and this contributed to the strains which culminated in the secession of Singapore in 1965.

The lesson for Canada in the experience of other multicultural federations would seem to be that there is no simple solution. The regional representativeness of the Canadian Senate might be improved if its members, instead of being nominated by the central government, were indirectly elected by the provincial legislatures. This might provide another channel of intercommunication between the two levels of government. The West German Bundesrat, composed of delegates from the states, usually members of state cabinets, performs this function particularly well. But as long as the system of cabinet government is maintained, the real seat of central power will lie in the House of Commons. This means that the main responsibility for accommodating regional cultural viewpoints within a general consensus must lie with the political parties. In the United States and Switzerland, the balanced institutions of the bicameral legislature provide the framework for this task; but in federations where power, legislative and executive, is mainly concentrated in a single chamber, it is primarily within the political parties working in that chamber that the reconciliation of regional viewpoints in the formulation

of a federal consensus must take place. The political parties, therefore, bear a much heavier responsibility for this task in parliamentary federations than in the United States or Switzerland.

C. The Central Executive

As we have already noted in the previous section, not all federations have considered a parliamentary cabinet as the appropriate form of executive for a federal system. Both the United States and multicultural Switzerland have fixed-term executives, the former an elected presidency and the latter a collegial Federal Council of seven members chosen for four-year terms by the central legislature.⁸ Among the newer multicultural federations only Pakistan has chosen a fixed executive, adopting in 1962 a presidential form modelled in some respects on the American one.⁹ It is in the other multicultural federations in the Commonwealth, then, that the closest parallels to the role of the cabinet in the Canadian Parliament are to be found.

The major point of interest here is the extent to which the parliamentary cabinet is able to be responsive to the interests of regional cultural minorities and to provide a focus for reaching a federal consensus. Because the executive is so important in modern government, there have been pressures for an adequate and balanced representation of provincial interests in the cabinets of all the newer federations. Similar considerations led to the stipulation in the Swiss constitution that no more than one member of the seven-man Federal Council should be chosen from the same canton,¹⁰ but the demands have been even stronger in the newer multicultural federations, both because the executive plays a more powerful role in the cabinet system than in the Swiss executive committee, and because of the inherently weaker position of the second chamber as a guardian of minority interests when the cabinet is responsible to the other chamber. But although the pressures for a regional basis to representation in the cabinets have been extremely powerful, invariably it has been found necessary to leave the regional composition of the cabinet to convention in order not to restrict the principle of cabinet responsibility to the legislature. Nowhere, therefore, are there any constitutional stipulations about regional representation in the parliamentary cabinet.

In practice, an attempt has been made in the formation of cabinets in every one of the newer multicultural federations to represent all the major provinces or groups of provinces, and to balance the representation of major areas. In addition, the central cabinet has usually been constructed to give some representation to significant minorities within provinces. The Indian cabinet, for instance, has always included members from the major provinces and all the zones, but it has also consistently contained a Muslim, a member of the scheduled castes, a Sikh, and on some occasions a Jain or a Christian as well. In Pakistan, after the unification of West Pakistan, the two provinces were fairly equally represented in the cabinet. In 1947 the cabinet had included a Hindu, but after his defection no Hindus were appointed until 1955 when the convention quickly developed that the East Bengal representation in the cabinet should include a Hindu. In Malaya the importance of racial balance in the cabinet has been clear. From 1958 to

1963, the usual composition of the cabinet was nine Malays, three Chinese and one Indian. Significantly, cabinet representation for Perak and Selangor, where the Chinese and Indian communities are particularly strong, has been quite consistently divided between the Malayan Chinese Association and the Malayan Indian Congress in the former state, and between the M.C.A. and the United Malays National Organization in the latter state. In Nigeria, not only have each of the regions been represented in the central cabinet but so also have the minority areas within each region. Indeed, in 1960, 10 of the 12 provinces within the Northern Region were separately represented in the central cabinet.¹¹ In Rhodesia and Nyasaland, too, each territorial unit was represented in the central cabinet, and in 1958 for the first time an African was made a parliamentary secretary. It would appear unlikely then that Canada can afford to dispense with the practice of paying considerable attention to the provincial and minority representation in its central cabinets. Indeed, the extent to which the central government is able to win the support of provincial and intraprovincial linguistic and cultural groups will depend to some extent not only on the presence within the cabinet of representatives of these groups but also upon the quality of these representatives. Here again, because of the nature of the parliamentary system, the ability to bring forth such men will depend on the extent to which the political parties are able to accommodate these groups among the many interests of the party aggregation.

A word of warning is necessary in stressing the importance of provincial and minority representation. If majority groups become seriously under-represented, this too may lead to disaster. Indeed, under-representation in the federal cabinet and legislature was one of the main factors provoking Jamaica's dissatisfaction and eventual secession from the West Indies Federation. Jamaica, with over half the West Indian population, never held more than two of the 11 seats in the federal executive and 17 (38 per cent) of the 45 seats in the House of Representatives. Even in the multicultural federations of India, Pakistan, Malaysia and Nigeria, where care has been taken to give regional and cultural minorities representation in the central cabinet, it has always been necessary to give those provinces with the most populous electorates a predominant position. The issue, therefore, is one of achieving a delicate balance.

Although the adoption of parliamentary executives in most of the newer multicultural federations has made the post of head of state largely a nominal one, nevertheless, some importance has been attached to the position as one which might provide a focus for federal unity. Three of these federations, India in 1950, Pakistan in 1956 (and until 1958) and Nigeria in 1963, while retaining cabinet government decided to adopt a republican form in order to emphasize their independence.¹² The governors-general were replaced by elected presidents. Direct popular election was rejected, however, because of the expense that would be involved and because of the desire to emphasize the ministerial character of the government. In India, to give the president some independence from Parliament, it was decided that the president should be elected by an electoral college composed of both Houses of Parliament and the elected members of the state legislative assemblies, the votes being weighted by a formula giving the Union and state legislators parity and making the voting strength of each state legislator proportionate to the population he represents. Election by a similar electoral college was envisaged in the 1956

constitution of Pakistan, but the first election was left to the Constituent Assembly alone. In Nigeria a somewhat simpler procedure was adopted, the electoral college consisting of all members of both central Houses. This favoured the smaller regions to some extent because of the equal representation of regions in the Senate, and the importance of the smaller regions was further enhanced by the requirement of a two-thirds majority on the final ballot.

Just as Canada appears to be on the verge of a convention that the governor-general should be alternately an English- and French-speaking Canadian, so the new multicultural federations have given attention to similar considerations in the choice of ceremonial heads of state. In India the first president was a northerner and the vice-president a southerner. When the first president retired he was succeeded by the former vice-president, thus initiating what may become a convention of rotating the presidency between men from the north and the south. Significantly, the second vice-president, who subsequently became the third president, was a Muslim northerner. In Nigeria, when Nnamdi Azikiwe, a southerner, was elected the first president at a time when the prime minister was a northerner, public attention was consciously drawn to the fact that the two most prestigious central posts had been divided between a northerner and a southerner. Something of the same sort of convention developed in Pakistan until the suspension of the constitution in 1958. One of the two senior offices of prime minister or governor-general (or president after 1956) usually went to an East Pakistani and the other to a West Pakistani. But the instability of cabinets in Pakistan, which resulted in seven prime ministers and four governors-general and presidents in the period 1947-58, made the convention of dividing the two posts regionally an awkward one to maintain when changes of ministry were so frequent. It would appear, however, that every multicultural federation has felt the need to attract the loyalty of minorities by making the senior ceremonial post open to members of each of the major regional or cultural groups within the federation.¹³

D. The Central Civil Service

Because of the expanding role of governments in contemporary society, the organization and regional composition of the central civil service may have an enormous impact on the ability of the central institutions to generate a sense of common purpose. In the first place, it has frequently been argued that the government and its administrative services are more likely to be sympathetic and responsive to the needs and interests of the minorities as well as the majority, if the central civil service includes within its membership a healthy proportion from the varied linguistic and cultural groups within the federation. Second, as we have already noted in Chapters III and IV, in many cases tensions between linguistic and cultural groups have often had at their root frustration at the lack of opportunity to participate in the public services. Given the opportunity to serve as full partners in the administration of the country, linguistic or cultural minorities are far more likely to develop a sense of commitment to the federal union.

But while the representation of the different cultural groups in the central public service is in principle clearly desirable, in practice the solution has rarely proved simple. There are two reasons for this. First, the principle of representation of cultural groups in the civil service may conflict with the principle that appointments and advancement should be based on merit. Within the last century the notion has become widely accepted that efficient administration depends upon appointing the ablest and best qualified men. But this criterion will not necessarily produce a service which is regionally or culturally balanced. Indeed, the problem is complicated by the fact that usually, as noted in Chapter III, different linguistic and cultural groups are characterized also by differences in degree of modernization. Consequently, in most multicultural federations certain linguistic or cultural groups have been handicapped by some features of their educational and social systems and have therefore suffered in the competition for civil service positions. In such a setting, the central services have often been reluctant to appoint men with qualifications inferior to those of other candidates, while those candidates from the less advanced cultural groups who have been rejected have then interpreted this as discrimination against their group. Thus, there is a difficult balance to be drawn between, on the one hand, emphasizing efficiency, and on the other, providing all the major regional and cultural groups with a sense of participation.

A second difficulty is the complexity in internal communications which arises within a single public service composed of different linguistic groups. If, in the interests of simplicity, most administration is to be carried on in the language of the majority, civil servants from the other linguistic groups are not likely to find the atmosphere congenial and will be discouraged from seeking a career in that service. On the other hand, if administration is carried on in two or more languages, the process of communication becomes greatly complicated. It also tends to put the premium upon linguistic skills rather than administrative skills. This is the dilemma which has faced all multilingual federations, just as it is facing Canada. This second aspect will be dealt with separately, however, in the next chapter as part of the question of the choice of official languages. In this section attention will be focused on the composition and structure of the central public services.

In India, the candidates from some states have consistently failed for years to compete successfully in the competitions for the all-India public service. This pattern has been the result of differences in educational, social and economic standards among the variety of linguistic groups. Indeed, this situation was itself a factor in the demand soon after independence for the reorganization of states on linguistic lines in order that each linguistic group might at least have a favoured position for employment within its own state public service.¹⁴ The Indian constitution itself contains a number of provisions intended to ensure equality of opportunity in public services and to guarantee special consideration to certain groups which might otherwise be neglected.¹⁵ First of all, an article is included among the justiciable fundamental rights to the effect that "there shall be equal opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State." This article goes on to prohibit specifically discrimination in employment in the public service on "grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, descent, place of birth, residence" and at the same time permits "the reservation of appointments

or posts in favour of any backward class of citizens which, in the opinion of the State, is not adequately represented in the services under the State.”¹⁶ In addition to this general provision, special guarantees are provided to the members of certain groups which might otherwise have difficulty obtaining positions. The members of the scheduled castes and tribes are guaranteed special consideration in appointments to the public service and the members of the Anglo-Indian community have had reserved a specified proportion of posts in certain services. Furthermore, the Special Officer for the Scheduled Castes and Tribes is required to report to the central government on the working of these guarantees. Thus a conscious effort has been made to temper the policy of selection by examination and promotion on merit by introducing some considerations favouring handicapped minorities.¹⁷

In Pakistan, during the first decade, one of the strongest factors behind the movement for greater autonomy for East Bengal was the feeling of Bengalis that the civil service and the armed forces were primarily in the hands of West Pakistanis.¹⁸ For instance, complaints were made in 1956 that of 776 positions in the superior civil service 734 were held by West Pakistanis and only 42 by Bengalis in spite of the fact that the latter represented over half the federal population.¹⁹ The impact of Bengali dissatisfaction with this situation appears in the 1962 constitution. Among the 21 “Principles of Policy” set forth, no less than five are related in some way to the question of opportunity in the public service.²⁰ In addition to statements concerning equality of opportunity to enter the public service, a goal is specifically pronounced that “parity between the Provinces in all spheres of the Central Government should, as nearly as is practicable, be achieved,”²¹ and there is also a provision for the maintenance of regional quotas for recruitment to public services.²² Thus in Pakistan, even more than in India, attention to the provincial and linguistic composition of the central services has proved necessary in order to reduce internal tensions. In practice, it will take some time before the Bengalis can make up for the small number appointed from their province in the early years after independence, but there is now at least a commitment to provide them with parity. There are some parallels here to the position of the French Canadians, although it should be noted that in Pakistan the Bengalis actually do form at least half of the federal population and based their claim to parity on their numerical strength as well as upon their cultural distinctiveness.

An unusual feature in both India and Pakistan has been the existence of integrated all-India and all-Pakistan services which serve both central and provincial governments. Such services had been a feature of India under British rule and were carried over by the two federations after independence. These services include the Indian Administrative Service (I.A.S.) and the Indian Police Service (I.P.S.),²³ and the Civil Service of Pakistan (C.S.P.) and the Police Service of Pakistan (P.S.P.). The recruitment and general pattern of these services are under the control of the central governments, but officers may be posted to either the central or the provincial governments, and the posting and promotion of an officer while serving in a province come within the power of the provincial government. These have been the elite services and in practice their members have occupied the highest positions in both the central and state administrations. In India these services have been organized in state cadres, each entrant being allocated to a

particular cadre but, in the interests of furthering integration and seeking impartiality from local influences, about half of each state's cadre is composed of entrants from outside the state. The all-Pakistan services were initially more centralized, however, but because rapid transfers tended to give the impression that these civil servants were not really interested in the province in which they served, President Ayub insisted on a policy designed to associate these civil servants with the provinces in which they serve for a longer period. The joint services have existed in both India and Pakistan in addition to the separate central and provincial civil services. They have been recruited on a federation-wide basis, with common qualifications and a uniform scale of pay, and their members have occupied the strategic posts in both central and provincial governments. As such they have been important instruments for federal cohesion. Indeed, one writer speaking of India has commented, "Above all, the all-India services have come increasingly to be seen as a great force for national integration, in many respects more reliable for this purpose than the all-India political parties."²⁴ Another writer has said of Pakistan, "In a country plagued with political instability and extreme demands for Provincial autonomy, the Civil Service of Pakistan has played both a stabilizing and unifying role."²⁵ Although the traditions of Canadian federalism would appear to make the creation of such a service unlikely, federal cohesion in Canada might well benefit from an elite joint higher civil service in which the members would be bilingual and might serve at both federal and provincial levels.

In Malaya and now Malaysia, racial representation in the civil service has always been a critical issue. Under British rule the indigenous Malays were generally favoured in the civil service and came to dominate it while the more industrious Chinese concentrated on commerce and industry. With the coming of independence, the Malays, as a group less advanced educationally than the Chinese, feared that they would lose their own favoured position as the indigenous race to the more aggressive and advanced immigrant Chinese, while the Chinese and Indians resented the special treatment accorded to the Malays which seemed to rank non-Malays as second-class citizens. The issue was an explosive one and a delicate but fragile balance was worked out. The constitution includes among the fundamental liberties a specific article on equality of all citizens before the law, and prohibits discrimination on religious, racial or regional grounds in employment for any public service.²⁶ This is reinforced by a further article requiring impartial treatment in the terms and conditions of employment for any federal civil servant.²⁷ But, in addition to these general statements, specific provision has been made "to safeguard the special position of the Malays" by the reservation for the Malays of a "reasonable" proportion of places in the civil service, and provision has also been made for similar quotas for the natives of the Borneo states.²⁸ In practice the Chinese and Indians have been entering the civil service in ever increasing numbers, but the bureaucratic elite is still primarily Malay in composition, and the constitutionally sanctioned recruitment quota of four Malays to each non-Malay ensures that the federal civil service will retain its predominantly Malay character indefinitely.²⁹ Thus, the position of the Malays and the natives of Borneo is protected while they try to close the gap in modernization which exists between them and the other groups, but because the quotas are so restrictive upon the Chinese and Indians these groups continue to feel some frustration.

In Nigeria, too, uneven educational development has been a complicating factor. At the time when the federal system was first established in 1954, most educated Nigerians came from the south and, therefore, the lower ranks in the civil service throughout the country had up to that time been manned primarily by southerners. Indeed, one of the strongest motives behind the northern insistence upon the conversion of the unitary system into a federal system with full regional autonomy, was the fear that when independence was achieved and the expatriate senior civil servants left, southerners would step into their shoes. Although the adoption of a federal system ensured the "northernization" of the Northern Region civil service, there still remained the problem of regional balance within the central civil service. As in the other multicultural federations, a provision was specifically included among the fundamental rights prohibiting discrimination against any "particular community, tribe, place of origin, religion or political opinion," but some qualifications to the application of this article in cases of appointment to the public service weakened its force.³⁰ Although the constitutional provisions on this issue were less complete than in the Asian federations, in practice, because of the strength of political feeling on this issue and also because the country had insufficient graduates to fill its needs, a considerable number of able northerners, among whom it was difficult to find graduates, were simply promoted from the lower ranks to the upper echelons of the federal administration. Also by custom, a tendency developed after 1954 whereby the federal field administration was left in the hands of citizens of the region concerned.³¹ This arrangement has had the advantage that the field officers, familiar with the local people and their language, have avoided alienating the local people towards the central government. Generally, following the establishment of the federation, considerations of regional balance within the central civil service were extremely influential in Nigeria.

In Rhodesia and Nyasaland, the settler domination of the political system was reflected in the predominance of settlers in the central civil service and particularly the higher posts. The constitution did establish a special body, the African Affairs Board, with special powers to reserve for consideration by the British Government any bill which in the opinion of the Board was a "differentiating measure."³² Thus, any legislation or order might be set aside if it subjected Africans to disadvantageous conditions, restrictions or disabilities to which Europeans were not also subjected. But this proved a weak safeguard when the British Government refused to block the Constitution Amendment Bill, 1957, and the Electoral Bill, 1958, after these bills were referred to it by the Board.³³ Moreover, although the Board was empowered to make representations on any matter within the executive authority of the central government, there was little it could do since the main reason for the settler predominance in the higher civil service was the lack of similar opportunities for education among the Africans. It was hardly surprising, therefore, that the Africans of the Central African federation developed little sense of loyalty to a government whose senior civil servants were predominantly European.

Experience in these other multicultural federations would seem to suggest that in the interests of federal cohesion a compromise in the staffing of the central public service must be struck between the principles of merit and balanced regional and cultural

representation. The latter criterion is necessary if minority groups are to feel a sense of genuine partnership in the administration of the country. The means to achieving this would seem to be twofold. In the long run it may be achieved by assisting educational systems which lag behind. In this manner there might be a reduction in regional differences in ability to succeed in the competition for posts. Such a programme must be carefully designed, however, to ensure that the modernization of an educational system does not itself undermine the distinctive regional culture to which it is related. In the meantime, since educational systems cannot be revised quickly and easily, and since inevitably some cultural groups will be at a disadvantage with others in competing for posts, most federations have found certain constitutional guarantees necessary, both in the form of a general fundamental right to freedom from discrimination and also in the form of guarantees and even quotas for special groups.

E. Federal Capital Cities

Within multicultural federations the position and character of the federal capital city has often been a source of considerable controversy. Three issues have especially provoked debate—first the location of the capital, second the assignment of responsibility for the administration of the capital, and third the extent to which the capital truly represents the multicultural character of the federation.

A number of considerations have generally been considered relevant to the siting of the capital city. It should not be too remote in location from any of the major regional centres of population. It should be adequately served by communications to all parts of the federation. It should have available adequate services and facilities for the activities which are usually required in a capital city. Where a new capital is chosen, the cost of its establishment and development should be reasonable.³⁴

One of the questions facing new federations has been whether to establish the federal capital in a new city or to use an existing city as a base. Often regional rivalry and the need to dissociate the capital from any particular state or province have made a new federal capital necessary. Among federations in the Commonwealth, examples have been the creation of Canberra in Australia, the transfer of the capital of India from Calcutta to Delhi in 1912, the setting up in Pakistan of a new capital called Islamabad near Rawalpindi. At the formation of the West Indies Federation and the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, the setting up of new capitals was seen as a development likely to be required in the future but to be postponed at the beginning. In each the constitution therefore gave to the central legislature express power to set up a new capital. In other federations, however, savings in cost and the ready availability of services have encouraged the choice of a well-developed city or even an existing provincial capital. Examples have been the choice of Lagos in Nigeria, Kuala Lumpur in Malaya and, initially, Karachi in Pakistan. For similar reasons, Salisbury in Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and Port-of-Spain in the West Indies were chosen as temporary federal capitals until more permanent ones could be established. In the case of Malaya, when Kuala Lumpur, the capital of the state of Selangor, was chosen as the federal capital, it was intended that eventually the state capital would be moved to a different location at Klang.

In many of these federations, as in Canada, resentment has often been felt in those provinces relatively remote from the capital because of their lack of influence in national politics. Examples have been the feelings of southern Indians towards Delhi, East Bengalis towards Karachi, Northern Nigerians towards Lagos, Jamaicans towards Port-of-Spain and Nyasalanders towards Salisbury. In Pakistan some attempts have been made to reduce such resentment by establishing a subsidiary federal capital. The 1956 constitution provided for meetings of the National Assembly and the Supreme Court to rotate between Karachi, the federal capital, and Dacca in East Pakistan. The 1962 constitution went a step further. Two federal capitals were established, one in the west, Islamabad, serving as the seat of the central government for its diplomatic and administrative activities, and the other in the east, Dacca, becoming the seat of the National Assembly. Arrangements for subsidiary capitals were also advocated in Central Africa and in India but never implemented, although in India the president does rotate his residence between the north and the south during each year. A bicultural Canada might consider following Pakistan's example by officially establishing separate "English-speaking" and "French-speaking" capitals. In a sense, the use of Montreal as a headquarters for some federal departments or agencies is a step in this direction. Nevertheless, the administrative complications created by dual capitals suggest that a more appropriate alternative would be to take the existing capital city of Ottawa as the base for a single bilingual and bicultural federal capital, since it is relatively well served by facilities and communications already developed there, and is situated on the border between Ontario and Quebec. If Hull were incorporated in the federal capital district, the federal capital might then really straddle the boundary between Ontario and Quebec.

In most federations the relative roles assigned to the central and provincial governments in the administration of the federal capital have also been a source of controversy.³⁵ Indeed, even in such recent federations as India, Pakistan and Nigeria, frequent adjustments have had to be made in the status and jurisdiction over the federal capital cities.³⁶ Provincial jealousy and the desire to develop the federal capital as a genuine focus for national unity have usually induced demands that the capital be freed from the influence of the government of the state or province in which it is located. On the other hand, where there have been close ethnic and economic ties with the adjoining region or province, as in Lagos and Karachi, for instance, attempts at separation of the capital city from that province have aroused considerable resistance. Generally one of two patterns has been followed. In Australia, India, Nigeria and Pakistan between 1948-55, the federal capital was separated as a distinct centrally administered federal territory with its own local municipal government. Under this arrangement in India (after 1956) and Nigeria, citizens in the federal capital were given control of their own local affairs, but all other jurisdiction was placed in the hands of the federal government. The authority exercised elsewhere by the middle tier of government, the states or provincial governments, was thus placed in the hands of the federal government. Pakistan after 1962, Malaya, Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and the West Indies followed a second pattern. Federal capitals were not separated from the provinces in which they were located. Provincial laws applied in these capitals, although the central government was given special extensive legislative and administrative powers with respect to them.³⁷ In Malaya, the West Indies, and

Rhodesia and Nyasaland, this policy was related to the selection as federal capitals of cities which had previously been capitals of the state or territory in which they stood. This made their separation from the state especially awkward. Canada, of course, originally adopted the second of these patterns, but since Ottawa is not the capital of Ontario its detachment as a federally administered state would be less awkward.

In addition to the site of the federal capital and the assignment of authority over the administration of the capital, emphasis has been put, in most of the new multicultural federations, on the extent to which the federal capital city might serve as an inspiring focus for federal unity.³⁸ In the first place, not only should its buildings be dignified, well related and well built, but if the capital is to fulfil its function, it must be a pleasant place in which to live and work. People from all the provinces must feel at home there and must not be subject to constant irritations and frustrations. Moreover, if it is to serve its purpose fully, the capital should be something more than a place where legislators, administrators and diplomats live and work; it should be representative of all that is best in the political and social life of the federation and a place which stimulates the growth of the wider ideas on which development of the country depends. Its outlook as far as possible should be multicultural and not provincial, for persons who work in or visit the capital should be able to find there a society which is congenial to them.

An extreme example of the unfortunate effects of a capital which fails to fulfil these requirements was Salisbury in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. A major factor causing the dissatisfaction and suspicion of the Africans in the northern territories of the Federation was the siting of the federal capital in Salisbury where the prevailing practices of racial discrimination meant that Africans who came to the capital found most of the amenities of the city denied to them. In other federations, similar irritants have helped to provoke regional resentment. Examples are the feelings of the northern Nigerians towards Lagos, not simply because of its remoteness from the North but also because northerners have not felt at home there and have even experienced outright hostility. It is the desire to avoid such difficulties that has in many of the new federations led to the creation of a new and separate federal capital under the direct jurisdiction of the federal government.

Experience in other multicultural federations suggests that if Canada aspires to being a genuinely bilingual and bicultural federation, then there are dangers inherent in the existence of a capital which is not itself bilingual and bicultural. A federal capital must serve both as a focal symbol of the federation and also as a place where people from each of the major linguistic and cultural groups may find the cultural atmosphere congenial to their own heritage. As far as site is concerned, it would seem unrealistic to abandon the already developed facilities of Ottawa, but the city might be given a more bicultural atmosphere if the federal capital area were enlarged to include the Hull area. Moreover, if the dual cities were separated from their respective provinces and placed under more direct federal administration, this might facilitate a growth in the bilingual character of the city, and make easier the provision of French language schools and education for children of the French-speaking officials and public, thus removing the cause of some of the existing French Canadian resentment at the "English" character of the federal capital. If the local residents of the present city of Ottawa were to be persuaded to accept such a

scheme, however, it would be essential not to deprive them of their federal franchise or of a measure of autonomous municipal administration.

F. Political Parties

It has already been suggested in sections B and C of this chapter, that in those federations where a parliamentary executive has been adopted, as in Canada, the major responsibility for generating a consensus among the diverse linguistic and cultural groups falls upon the political parties. It is true that in other federations political parties play a fundamental role in aggregating the varied internal interests but, in such federations as the United States and Switzerland, the separation of powers between different central institutions provides a framework of checks and balances which requires the majority to take account of minority viewpoints. In the parliamentary system, however, all central power is concentrated in the majority which commands both the legislature and the executive. It is within the parties themselves, therefore, that minority viewpoints must make an impression if they are to have any impact on central policy at all. Apart from the desire to capture the majority of seats in the popular house, there is little in the parliamentary framework of the institutions that forces politicians to look for compromises.

The importance of the political parties as the major instrument for generating a federal consensus is vividly illustrated by the experience of the other multicultural federations which have also adopted a parliamentary cabinet system. Two of the federations have been notably and, in the eyes of some commentators surprisingly, stable and successful. The first is India. The second is Malaya, or Malaysia as it has been since 1963. What has distinguished these two federations from the others has been the pattern of their political parties. The Indian National Congress and the Alliance party of Malaya and Malaysia have each dominated the politics of their respective federations, and have provided a focus for federal political unity, because they have consciously set out to accommodate under a comprehensive umbrella all the varied interests of the different linguistic and racial groups in these federations. By contrast, the newer federations which have suffered military take-overs (Pakistan and Nigeria) or disintegration (Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and the West Indies) were all marked by political parties which were primarily regional rather than federal in outlook, or which deliberately failed to accommodate the desires of significant minority groups.

For example, in Pakistan until 1954, the highly centralized Muslim League dominated both the central and the provincial governments. But this party focused most of the economic development on West Pakistan and neglected East Bengal to such a degree that one member of the second Constituent Assembly declared, "East Bengal is bleeding from the wounds inflicted by the Muslim League coterie."³⁹ The result was the complete rejection of the Muslim League by East Bengal in the 1954 elections⁴⁰ and the demand for widely extended provincial autonomy. From this time on, different parties came to dominate the eastern and western provinces, and central politics became a sequence of shifting factions and unstable coalitions. This was accompanied by growing provincialism.

Finally, in 1958 party strife had reached such a state that the army stepped in and removed the politicians from the scene, replacing them by the administrative paternalism of the army and the civil service in partnership. It is noteworthy that later, when the Constitution Commission of 1961 examined the reasons for the failure of constitutional government in Pakistan, the Commission put the blame, not on the federal structure which it considered satisfactory, but squarely on the "lack of leadership resulting in lack of well-organized and disciplined parties."⁴¹ It was this conclusion which motivated the arrangement in the 1962 constitution for a presidential executive which would not be dependent for its stability upon the legislature or political parties.

Nigerian politics were dominated by regional political parties right from the beginning of the federal system. Until 1962 there were three major political parties, the Northern People's Congress (N.P.C.), the National Convention of Nigerian Citizens (N.C.N.C.)⁴², and the Action Group (A.G.), each based primarily on a single region. Each of these controlled the government in its own region and, in spite of attempts by both the N.C.N.C. and the A.G. to become national parties, electoral trends up to 1962 showed an increasingly regional solidarity in the voting support for Nigerian political parties. The regional character of the parties was further emphasized by the fact that until 1959 the national leaders of all three parties preferred to remain as regional premiers, leaving central politics to their lieutenants, and even after 1959 this remained the situation in the N.P.C. and after a brief interlude also in the N.C.N.C. Thus, the central government rested on a coalition of regional parties: a coalition of all three between 1957 and 1959, and a coalition of the N.P.C. and the N.C.N.C. between 1959 and 1964. The balance of regional parties was upset in 1962, however, by the split within the Action Group, arising out of differences between the national leader, Obafemi Awolowo, and the Western Region Premier, S. L. Akintola. The resulting emergency within the Western Region, the formation of the new Mid-Western Region and the controversy over the 1962 and 1963 census results completed the destruction of the balance. Where before, each party had found it necessary to compromise in order to participate in federal policy-making, parties became increasingly intransigent. The N.P.C., as a result of the increasingly regional solidarity of voting in the Northern Region which held a majority of seats in the House of Representatives, found that it could dominate central politics without depending so much on the other regional partners. At the same time its coalition partner, the N.C.N.C., became alarmed at the prospect of permanent northern dominance. In the manoeuvring preceding the federal elections in 1964 a realignment of parties took place, the N.C.N.C. allying itself with the Action Group, and the N.P.C. turning to Akintola's new Nigerian National Democratic party. Party advantage rather than the attempt to create a federal consensus became the predominant motive, and the lengths to which the N.P.C. and N.N.D.P. went in rigging elections during 1964-5 in order to retain power became a source of increasing unrest, until early in 1966 constitutional government was terminated.

In Rhodesia and Nyasaland the difficulty was not in the regional character of the political parties. Between 1954 and 1960 the United Federal party and its territorial affiliates dominated all governments at both levels. The party was solidly supported by settlers who dominated the electorate in all three territories, but the fatal flaw lay in the failure of this party to appeal to the African populace. Consequently, when the territorial

franchise was extended in Nyasaland by the British Government, the result was the overwhelming victory in the 1961 Nyasaland elections of the Malawi Congress party, committed to secession. Soon afterwards Northern Rhodesia also had its own African government for the first time, and thereupon insisted upon also seceding from the federation. Thus, the United Federal party, despite its earlier electoral triumphs, failed in the major task of bringing the Africans into the federal partnership and so laid the seeds for the disintegration of the federation.

The dangers inherent in the failure to develop at least one party which aggregates the major groups within the federation is illustrated by the disintegration of the West Indies Federation. By comparison with the others this federation was relatively homogeneous, culturally. Moreover, the Federal Labour party which held central power was affiliated to parties controlling the governments of Jamaica, Trinidad, Barbados and most of the smaller islands. But this was largely a façade. The F.L.P. and its opposition, the Democratic Labour party, each represented little more than electoral alliances. The principal leaders of the island parties on the whole preferred to hold the fort at home, sending a "second team" to contest the central seats. The F.L.P. was further weakened by the clash of personalities among the major central and island leaders of the party which was expressed in repeated public clashes. In this atmosphere the F.L.P. generated little warmth in support of the federal system which lasted a mere five years.

To these examples must be contrasted the Indian National Congress party and the Malaysian Alliance party. The linguistic and cultural divisions of India are no less deep than those of the other federations. But over the years, especially during the days when it was the focus for the movement for independence, the Congress party learned the importance of reconciling regional and cultural differences in the interests of unity. Since independence it has continued to emphasize this aspect of its role, with the result that it has been the governing party in central politics for two decades, and over that period has also controlled most of the state governments. This general preponderance of the Congress party at both levels of government has been a powerful force for harmony in central-state relations in India. It is significant that intergovernmental friction has been much sharper in the few instances where opposition or coalition ministries have been formed in the states.⁴³ The success of the Congress party has rested on a mixture of centralization and decentralization in its organization and policy-making. As a legacy of the integrated independence movement, the state Congress committees have been accustomed much more than Canadian parties to look for guidance and to take directions from the central Congress committees. At the same time a new and influential group of political leaders deeply rooted in their regions has been emerging in the states, and the focus of power and influence within the Congress has in recent years shifted considerably from the central organization to those in the states. This is illustrated by the way the chief ministers in the states have come to play an extremely important role in the decisions of the party.⁴⁴

Like the Congress, it was during the movement for independence that the Malayan Alliance party learned the importance of reconciling racial groups in the interests of unity. This party was formed from three clearly racial parties the United Malays National Organization (U.M.N.O.), the Malayan Chinese Association (M.C.A.) and the

Malayan Indian Congress (M.I.C.) -originally allied solely to contest elections. The Alliance was so successful in the 1955 central and state elections, when it won 51 of the 52 central seats and formed the government in each of the states, that the formula was continued. At times during the succeeding years there were signs of internal strains between the different racial groups within the party, but on each occasion it managed to arrive at a compromise which kept it together. In the next central and state elections in 1959 the Alliance once again emerged as the dominant party in central politics and won power in all but two of the state governments. As in India the dominance of one party in both levels of government appears to have contributed to harmony in intergovernmental relations, for what friction there has been between governments has occurred mostly in the northeastern states where the Pan-Malayan Islamic party controlled the state governments. Within the wider Malaysian federation, the Alliance pattern has been extended to encompass coalitions of the major local parties in the Borneo states. The increased Alliance central majority as a result of the 1964 general election shows the continued ability of the party to coalesce the variety of communities in the federation. It is highly significant that the one occasion when the Alliance pattern was not extended and the People's Action party of Singapore was not brought into a partnership in federal decision-making, the result was considerable political and racial tension and ultimately the separation of Singapore.

These examples make it abundantly clear that an enormous responsibility rests on the political parties of Canada as the main instruments upon which the federation must depend for the development of federal cohesion and consensus. No constitutional provisions by themselves can ensure that the political parties will achieve this. Agreement, as in India,⁴⁵ by political parties upon a code of conduct eschewing activity which would exploit and aggravate linguistic, religious and cultural differences might help, but ultimately success will depend on the ability and conscious effort of the Canadian political parties to reconcile internal diversities and to achieve a federal consensus.

The extent to which the Canadian political parties will succeed in this task will depend on the quality of their leadership. The success of the Indian National Congress and the Malaysian Alliance have been in no small measure due to the combination of diplomacy and positive leadership shown by such men as Jawaharlal Nehru and Tunku Abdul Rahman. Vigorous leadership by itself is not enough; tact and diplomacy are essential where different cultural groups must be reconciled, as the failures of Roy Welensky in Central Africa and Grantley Adams in the West Indies make abundantly clear. But mere diplomacy by itself is insufficient, too, for a positive leadership is needed to draw the loyalty of different groups within a federation. In Nigeria, Prime Minister Abubakar Tafawa Balewa's exceptional diplomatic skill in keeping coalition governments together in the end proved insufficient. If the Canadian political parties are to succeed in their task of creating and maintaining federal cohesion, they will require leadership that is both diplomatic and dynamic.

A. Official Languages

In most federations composed of diverse linguistic communities, the question whether there should be a single or two or more official languages has arisen. Linguistic minorities have usually pressed for the recognition of their languages as official federal languages because of anxiety that otherwise they would be handicapped in participating in federal affairs. Opposing them, centralists have generally stressed the importance of a single national language, not only to facilitate interregional communication and administration but also to provide a focus for unity. These conflicting points of view have frequently clashed sharply and, because language can affect access to federal jobs and power, the issue has invariably been an explosive one.

It should be noted at the outset that two features distinguish the situation in most of the newer multicultural federations from that in Canada. First, in most of these federations, notably India, Pakistan, Malaysia and Nigeria, there have been more than two major linguistic groups.¹ Thus, in India there are some 10 linguistic groups each at least as populous and as distinctive as the French Canadians in Canada. In Pakistan, the major linguistic division is between the Bengalis and the West Pakistanis, but the latter province itself contains a variety of linguistic groups speaking Punjabi, Sindhi, Pushtu, Baluchi and Urdu. In Malaysia, there are the three main races of the peninsula—the Malays, the Chinese and the Indians—each speaking their own languages, and a variety of other linguistic groups in the Borneo states. The Nigerian scene has been dominated by the three main linguistic groups—the Hausa, the Yoruba and the Ibo—while other linguistic groups make up another 37 per cent of the federal population. Thus, in these federations the issue has normally been one of multilingualism rather than of bilingualism. In a sense this is also true of Switzerland, although it is worth noting that only 5 per cent of the Swiss population speaks neither German nor French as a mother tongue while 13 per cent of Canadians consider neither English nor French their mother tongue.² In those federations where there are more than two major linguistic groups, the issue of official

language becomes complicated by the fact that few statesmen or civil servants, let alone citizens, can be expected to become fluent in all the languages of the different linguistic groups within a federation. In such situations the usual policy seems to have been to recognize the languages of the main linguistic groups within a federation, but to select one or two link-languages as the ones to be used for purposes of central government and interprovincial communication. Thus, each citizen would be expected to become bilingual, learning his own regional language and the link-language (or trilingual where there are two link-languages as in India). In general form this is the pattern adopted in India where Hindi and English are the link-languages, in Pakistan where Urdu, Bengali and for an interim period English are the link-languages, in Malaysia where Malay and for an interim period English are the link-languages, and in Nigeria where English is the link-language.

A second factor distinguishing the newer multicultural federations from Canada is the position of English. Although in none of them is English the mother tongue of a large or distinctive regional group, the English language did serve during the colonial period as the *lingua franca* within most of these countries, even among the elite of the nationalist movements. This has led to clashes between those who would prefer to retain English as an official link-language and those who would prefer to select the language of the largest regional group. The advocates of English point out that the choice of one indigenous language would give a special advantage to one linguistic group in the competition for central posts and power. But advocates for the selection of an indigenous national language have usually argued that it would better symbolize the federation's cultural independence, and also that it would serve as a means to better communication between the educated elite and the non-English-speaking masses. Thus, in the newer multicultural federations it has been the linguistic minorities which have agitated for the retention of English as an official language, and the major linguistic groups which have pressed for the adoption of their own language as the official federal language.

In the three Asian federations, the question of national language has proved extremely controversial and a serious threat to federal unity. The situation in Pakistan perhaps has approximated most closely that in Canada since the major issue has been whether Urdu should be the single national language or Bengali should be a second national language. One commentator on politics in Pakistan has even said that, "This single issue aroused more heated feelings than any other."³ Prior to partition, Urdu had been widely regarded as the principal language of Muslim India. Bengali, by contrast, was the language of a single province and, moreover, was suspect elsewhere in Pakistan because of its links with Hindu Bengal. The Bengalis cherished their language, however, and feared that if Urdu were the only official language they would be at a disadvantage in obtaining positions in the central public services and in influencing federal affairs. What further annoyed the Bengalis was that, since East Bengal contained a majority of the population of Pakistan, the Bengalis felt entitled to the recognition of their language as an official federal one. When Pakistan was created, Jinnah began by insisting bluntly that, in the interests of national unity, Urdu would be the only official language of Pakistan. When the Interim Report of the Basic Principles Committee reiterated this principle, there was such a storm of protest that when the committee next reported to the Constituent Assembly no

mention of any official language was made. The bitter struggle continued and the committee's 1954 report retreated further, recommending the recognition of both Urdu and Bengali, although it did suggest that "the State should take all measures for the development and growth of a common language."⁴ Even this latter goal was abandoned by the 1956 constitution, which recognized both Urdu and Bengali as "State languages," and also provided for the continued use of English for official purposes for an interim period of 20 years.⁵ The 1962 constitution maintained this arrangement, but added the qualification that after 10 years a commission should be appointed to report on the replacement of English for official purposes.⁶ Thus, Pakistan is now committed to official bilingualism for all federal purposes. This policy, conceded under persistent pressure, has helped to allay Bengali anxieties and appears to have reduced internal tensions.

In India the problem has been complicated by the large number of regional languages. Clearly there was a need for some common linguistic medium for federal affairs and for communication between linguistic groups since statesmen and citizens could not be expected to be fluent in all 14 languages recognized by the constitution. English had served as the *lingua franca* of the westernizing elite which led the movement for independence, but there was a strong desire to replace it by an indigenous language which would not only avoid the colonial stigma but could also provide a basis for a national cultural revival. Furthermore, only one per cent of the population was literate in English, while Hindi, spoken by 42 per cent of the population, appeared to be the logical choice. But the Dravidian-speaking middle classes in the south, which were more at home in English, feared that their opportunities to participate in central affairs would be handicapped if English were replaced by Hindi. Consequently, there was a lengthy and heated debate in the Constituent Assembly over the official language provisions. The compromise eventually embodied in the constitution recognized the 13 major regional languages and Sanskrit as "languages of India" with equal status, selected Hindi as the official language for all-India purposes, provided that English would continue as an official language for 15 years in order to accommodate the southerners, and specified the establishment of official language commissions to advise on progress in the use of Hindi.⁷

Tension over the issue continued to smoulder, and when the first Official Language Commission reported in favour of replacing English by Hindi, the discontent and anxieties of the non-Hindi speakers flared into the open.⁸ Southern critics bitterly opposed these recommendations, and there were widespread instances of popular demonstrations and the obliteration of Hindi signs in the south. Faced with this fierce expression of opinion, the Congress party retreated, agreeing at its 1958 annual session to a compromise in which the Hindi zealots were to be satisfied by the formal change to Hindi as an official language in 1965, but the non-Hindi groups were to be placated by the continued use of English for official purposes after 1965. Procrastination in implementing this formula provoked growing discontent, however, and when in April 1963 the Official Languages Bill was finally introduced, the Indian Parliament witnessed some of the wildest scenes in its history. Nevertheless, the bill was eventually passed. It provided for the continued use of English for official purposes without a time limit, but also provided for a committee of Parliament in 1975 to review and consult the states about the progress of the acceptance of Hindi as a single official language. Thus, India

has for the time being committed itself to the three-language formula whereby trilingualism is the goal for each citizen, the three languages being the two link-languages of Hindi and English, and the third language being the regional language of the person concerned. For all-India purposes—for the central government or communication between states—Hindi and English operate as official languages, while each state may select its own regional language or languages for official purposes.

In Malaya and Malaysia, language has been one of the issues on which the most extreme positions have been taken. The Malays have insisted upon Malay as the official language since it is indigenous to the peninsula, and they have opposed English because it would favour the immigrant races. Many of the Chinese and Indian citizens of the federation, however, have had little opportunity to learn to speak Malay fluently, and they would clearly be handicapped if Malay were to become the sole federal language. The 1957 constitution incorporated a compromise whereby, in addition to Malay as a "national language," English would continue to be used for an interim period of 10 years, with the central Parliament deciding whether English should then be abandoned.⁹ Following independence the Malayan central government continued to reiterate its determination to make Malay the country's sole official language by 1967, the first occasion on which this would be permitted by the constitution. When the federation was widened into Malaysia, however, a concession was made to the newly acceding states, guaranteeing that in these states English would continue to be used for a period of at least 10 years after they joined the federation.¹⁰

In Nigeria, the official language issue has caused less political tension. The most widely spoken indigenous language, Hausa, was spoken by only 28 per cent of the federal population and, therefore, its adoption as the official federal language was never a serious possibility. Instead, English, which was already widely accepted among the educated classes as a *lingua franca*, was prescribed as the single official federal language.¹¹

In Rhodesia and Nyasaland the same choice was made.¹² It is true that in Central Africa, as in Nigeria, English was the *lingua franca* of the educated classes, but in this case English was also the mother tongue of the dominant racial minority and this helped further to reinforce the impression that it was the settlers who were the chief beneficiaries of the federal system.

What lessons does the experience of these federations provide for Canada? First of all, it is clear that in most cases where the language of major regional linguistic groups has been denied recognition as a federal language, tension and bitterness have resulted. In many federations, therefore, two languages have been recognized as official for all central and interregional purposes. The examples are Hindi and English in India, Urdu and Bengali in Pakistan,¹³ Malay and, for an interim period, English in Malaya and Malaysia. Switzerland has even gone so far as to recognize three official languages on a permanent basis.¹⁴ In federations where there are more than two or three major languages, sometimes two classes of language have been recognized. Thus in India, Hindi and English are official languages for the central government, but 14 languages are recognized as languages of India. The Swiss Confederation deems three languages as official but recognizes four as the national languages of Switzerland.¹⁵ Such a solution might be appropriate in Canada for the linguistic groups which speak neither English nor French.

In India, Pakistan and Malaysia there was provision for the continued use of English as a second or third official language for a transitional period until the minority linguistic groups could learn the official indigenous language, with a variety of commissions being established to make recommendations as the change-over progressed. Similar interim arrangements for a third language might be useful in a few cases in Canada to bridge the gap until the time when the official languages chosen are widely enough spoken not to handicap seriously any particular minority group.

B. Constitutional Guarantees

In addition to the recognition of official federal languages most multicultural federations have included guarantees to linguistic minorities about the use of their languages and the establishment of schools in which these languages might be learned.¹⁶ Many of these provisions were designed to protect intraprovincial minorities from the majorities within the provinces and, therefore, have already been described in Chapter IV, section D of this study. In the case of provincial majorities, detailed safeguards of this nature were considered less necessary, since most matters of linguistic significance, including control over primary and secondary education, were usually placed in the hands of the autonomous provincial governments.¹⁷ The main guarantees required by provincial majorities, then, concerned freedom from discrimination in the opportunity to participate in federal affairs and the central public services.¹⁸ In India, Malaysia and Nigeria the justiciable fundamental rights which guaranteed freedom from discrimination on racial, linguistic, religious or regional grounds applied equally to central and provincial governments. This was also true of the "Principles of Law-Making and of Policy" in the 1962 constitution of Pakistan. Similarly, the guarantees to specific linguistic or racial groups, or to certain backward classes, have usually applied equally to central and to provincial governments.¹⁹ Thus, in these federations the position of cultural minorities has been protected by constitutional safeguards which, when breached, came under the jurisdiction of the courts.

Such guarantees of individual rights against racial, religious or regional discrimination, and of collective rights to linguistic and educational distinctiveness for specified linguistic and cultural minorities, have contributed to the allaying of minority fears in these multicultural federations. But ultimately the reconciliation of linguistic diversities in a cohesive federation has depended on the spirit of toleration and compromise shown by the majority groups. This has been perhaps the strongest factor in the relative success of such multicultural federations as Switzerland, India, Malaysia, and for a time Nigeria, and it was the decline or absence of such a spirit which lay at the root of the disintegration of the Central African and West Indian federations, and the resort to military rule in Pakistan and Nigeria. This suggests a serious warning to English-speaking Canadians who would insist upon the right of the majority always to have its way. Indeed, the essential point about a federal system is that federalism itself is a denial of simple majority-rule democracy and represents instead what might be called a balanced democracy in which the position of minorities is strengthened by balancing majorities in different levels of government against each other.

A federal system is best understood if it is related to the social forces which it attempts to express and channel. In analysing the experience of other multicultural federations to see what light their experience may throw on Canadian problems, this study has, therefore, viewed each federation as a single interdependent political system set in the context of the demands placed upon that system by its society and the responses of that system to these demands.

Especially relevant for Canada has been the experience of other multicultural federations in the Commonwealth. In these countries the federal solution was adopted specifically to meet the needs of multicultural societies and, like Canada, they have attempted to combine federal and parliamentary political institutions. While Switzerland has not followed the same parliamentary pattern, its experience is also significant because, unlike the United States and Australia, one of the strongest continuing motives for the federal character of the Swiss political system has been its multicultural society. As in Canada, so in India, Pakistan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and Switzerland, cultural regionalism based on linguistic, racial or religious distinctiveness has assumed the proportion of sub-nationalisms which have provided a major motive for the demands for provincial autonomy. In some of these federations linguistic regionalism and religious regionalism have reinforced each other but in others, most notably Switzerland, religious groupings have cut across linguistic communities thus weakening the force of linguistic regionalism. In most federations the strength of linguistic regionalism has also been affected by regional economic interests, variations in the size and wealth of the regional groups, clashes between the political radicalism and conservatism of different cultural groups, and differences in degrees of modernization. Any resolution of linguistic and cultural tensions has, therefore, required attention to these related factors. Ultimately the preservation of multicultural federal systems has rested not simply on reconciling the different cultural groups but also upon generating a common consensus to which the different linguistic and cultural groups were willing to commit themselves.

The character of the provincial units composing a federal system has affected the way in which federations have accommodated regional interests. Larger provinces have generally

been more assertive at the expense of the central government, and disparities in the size and wealth of provinces have tended especially to exacerbate interprovincial tensions. Federations composed of only two or three provinces have been particularly prone to instability. Zonal pyramids within a federal system have sometimes been proposed but have usually been rejected as too complex. Generally, federal systems have been most successful where the provincial units have reflected, or have been reorganized to reflect, as far as possible, the most fundamental regional interests within the society. In practice, however, the existence of some minorities within provincial units has been unavoidable, and therefore most federations have established a wide variety of devices to protect these minorities. These arrangements have included the guarantee of individual rights, the guarantee to specified cultural minorities of collective rights regarding language, education and the provincial public services, and special provisions regarding representation in the provincial legislatures. Frequently the central government has been assigned a special role as the guardian of intraprovincial minorities. Sometimes intergovernmental councils have been established to promote the interests of interprovincial minorities.

In the distribution of legislative and executive authority it has been found in most federations that a simple compromise between economic centralization and cultural provincialization is no longer a realistic possibility. The characteristic feature of the newer multicultural federations has been an interlocking responsibility of both levels of government over a wide range of functions including many economic matters. Federal financial relations have usually been a central issue in internal tensions because financial resources define the limits of what provincial governments may do for their own cultural groups. By comparison with Canada, the general trend in the newer multicultural federations has been towards more decentralized expenditure, justified on cultural and economic grounds, combined with more centralized control of taxing powers. Provincial autonomy has been maintained by substantial unconditional transfers. Usually the constitution has not only guaranteed such transfers but has provided for their adjustment at periodic intervals by intergovernmental councils or commissions. At the same time the equalization of provincial financial resources has invariably proved to be an essential element in minimizing grievances among regional cultural groups.

Where there have been contrasts in the strength of provincial pressures for autonomy within a federation, some countries have experimented with giving certain provinces more autonomy than others. Most of these experiments have, in practice, fostered rather than reduced tension. Consequently, in these federations there has usually followed either an attempt to reduce differences among provinces in their degree of autonomy, or the eventual secession of the more autonomous units. Thus, where certain provinces are given greater autonomy than others, experience indicates that special care is needed to ensure that the more autonomous provinces continue to feel an integral part of the federation.

Because of the interpenetration of the activities of central and provincial governments which has been necessary in order that provinces might have sufficient economic powers to preserve their cultural distinctiveness, most federations have found it desirable to establish a variety of intergovernmental institutions. For instance, there have usually been

finance commissions and councils to adjust the allocation of resources and to coordinate public borrowing, and there have been councils with representatives of both levels of government to coordinate general economic policies and development. Furthermore, in most federations there has been a variety of commissions, councils, boards, agencies and conferences, each concerned with specific areas of common interest to both levels of government. In some federations, councils and conferences have been established for general intergovernmental consultation and specifically to consider ways of fostering federal cohesion. This variety of intergovernmental institutions has in most federations placed an increasing emphasis on negotiations between governments within the federation. Nevertheless, independent tribunals, usually supreme courts, have been found to be essential in order to settle disputes between levels of government over their constitutional authority.

An essential feature of federal systems has been the creation of central institutions capable of generating a genuine consensus among the diverse cultural groups within the federation. Bicameral central legislatures in which senators have usually been appointed by the provincial governments have helped to bring regional cultural interests to bear upon central legislation, and a balanced representation of regional linguistic and cultural groups in the central cabinet has nearly always been found necessary. But ultimately, where there has been a parliamentary cabinet system, the most important factor for federal cohesion has been the ability of the political parties themselves to aggregate the diverse cultural groups. Another important factor in developing a sense of commitment to federal unity has been the organization of the central civil service in such a manner that a balanced regional representation is achieved. In many cases this has required special allowances for those cultural groups which, because of their educational systems, may be handicapped in the competition for public employment. Most federations have also striven for a federal capital city which could serve as a focal symbol of the federation, and would be a place where people from all the major linguistic and cultural groups would find the cultural atmosphere congenial rather than alien.

In most federations composed of diverse linguistic communities, controversy has arisen over whether there should be a single or two or more official languages. In those federations where the language of major regional groups has been denied recognition as a federal language, bitterness and tension has been the result. Consequently, in many federations two or even three official languages have been recognized for central and interprovincial purposes. In some federations, in addition to official languages, some other languages have been recognized as "languages of the federation." Besides the recognition of official languages, most multicultural federations have provided constitutional guarantees of justiciable individual rights against linguistic, racial, religious or regional discrimination, and also constitutional guarantees of collective rights to specified minorities. These have been directed as much at protecting intraprovincial minorities as at protecting provincial majorities and have, therefore, been applied to limit provincial as well as central governments. But while constitutional guarantees have helped to allay minority fears, the success of multicultural federations has ultimately been related directly to the extent to which the majorities within the federations have been willing to show a spirit of toleration and compromise.

Table A.1. Canada and provinces: Percentage distribution of the population by mother tongue

Province or territory	English	French	Other
Canada	58.5	28.1	13.4
Newfoundland	98.6	0.7	0.7
Prince Edward Island	91.4	7.6	1.0
Nova Scotia	92.3	5.4	2.3
New Brunswick	63.3	35.2	1.5
Quebec	13.3	81.2	5.5
Ontario	77.5	6.8	15.7
Manitoba	63.4	6.6	30.0
Saskatchewan	69.0	3.9	27.1
Alberta	72.2	3.2	24.6
British Columbia	80.9	1.6	17.5
Yukon	74.3	3.0	22.7
Northwest Territories	35.6	4.3	60.1

Source: Census of Canada, 1961, Catalogue 92-549, Vol. I, Part 2.

Table A.2. Switzerland and cantons: Percentage distribution of the population by mother tongue

Canton	German	French	Italian	Romanche	Other
Switzerland	74.1	20.6	4.0	1.1	0.2
Zurich	93.4	2.1	3.2	0.4	0.9
Berne	83.0	15.0	1.5	0.1	0.4
Lucerne	97.0	1.0	1.6	0.2	0.2
Uri	96.8	0.4	2.5	0.3	0.0
Schwyz	97.4	0.4	1.7	0.3	0.2
Obwalden	98.0	0.5	1.1	0.1	0.3
Nidwalden	97.6	0.6	1.5	0.2	0.1
Glarus	93.6	0.6	5.2	0.4	0.2
Zug	94.5	1.1	3.6	0.3	0.5
Fribourg	32.9	65.7	0.9	0.1	0.4
Solothurn	95.5	2.2	2.0	0.1	0.2
Basle	95.1	2.0	2.5	0.1	0.3
Basle (town)	92.0	4.3	2.7	0.2	0.8
Schaffhausen	96.1	0.9	2.6	0.2	0.2
Appenzell					
Outer Rhodes	97.5	0.4	1.5	0.2	0.4
Appenzell					
Inner Rhodes	99.1	0.1	0.6	0.1	0.1
St. Gallen	96.9	0.5	2.0	0.4	0.2
Grisons	56.2	0.7	13.2	29.2	0.7
Aargau	96.8	1.0	1.8	0.2	0.2
Thurgau	96.4	0.5	2.7	0.2	0.2
Ticino	9.1	1.4	88.8	0.2	0.5
Vaud	11.1	84.5	2.9	0.1	1.4
Valais	33.2	65.0	1.6	0.0	0.2
Neuchâtel	11.8	84.6	3.1	0.1	0.4
Geneva	13.6	77.6	5.3	0.1	3.4

Source: *Annuaire statistique de la Suisse*, 1953, 37.

Table A.3. India: Population by mother tongue

Language	No. people speaking '000,000	Percentage of total population	States of which principal languages	
			Single	Dual
Assamese	4.99	1.39	—	Assam
Bengali	25.12	7.03	W. Bengal	—
Gujarati	16.31	4.57	Gujarat	—
Hindi	149.94	42.01	Bihar,	Punjab
Urdu			Madhya Pradesh,	
Hindustani			Uttar Pradesh	
Punjabi			—	
			—	Jammu & Kashmir
			—	—
			—	Punjab,
				Rajasthan
Kannada	14.47	4.05	Mysore	—
Kashmiri	n/a*	n/a*	—	Jammu & Kashmir
Malayalam	13.38	3.69	Kerala	—
Marathi	17.05	7.57	Maharashtra	—
Oriya	13.15	3.68	Orissa	—
Tamil	26.55	7.4	Madras	—
Telegu	33.00	9.24	Andhra Pradesh	—
Other languages	32.91	9.22	—	—

Source: *Report of the Official Language Commission, 1956* (New Delhi, 1957), 27-8.

*Figures do not include Jammu and Kashmir where no census was taken in 1951.

Table A.4. Pakistan: Percentage distribution of population by language

Province or territory	Bengali	Baluchi	Punjabi	Pushtu	Sindhi	Urdu	Other
Pakistan	56.0	1.5	29.0	4.9	5.9	7.3	2.4
East Pakistan	98.0	—	.02	—	.02	1.1	2.0
West Pakistan							
Baluchistan	—	27.0	14.0	47.0	9.2	13.0	4.9
Baluchistan States Union	—	56.0	.3	.5	32.0	1.7	1.4
Karachi	.5	9.2	9.5	3.7	17.0	68.0	11.9
N-W Frontier Province	.03	.01	42.0	75.0	0.1	5.6	1.4
N-W Frontier Regions	—	—	4.0	85.0	—	2.2	2.0
Punjab	.02	.03	96.0	.3	0.2	16.0	3.7
Bahawalpur	—	—	97.0	.3	0.5	13.0	3.0
Sind	.02	11.0	3.4	0.4	79.0	14.0	1.9
Khairpur	.01	3.6	4.4	0.2	92.0	5.0	.9

Source: Census of Pakistan, 1951 (Karachi), Table 7A. Under each language this table includes persons speaking a language as a mother tongue and as an additional language.

Table A.5. Malaya: Percentage distribution of population by race

States	Malay*	Chinese	Indian ⁺	Other
Malaya	49.46	38.40	10.81	1.33
Former F.M.S.				
Perak	37.80	46.60	14.70	0.90
Selangor	26.35	51.03	20.43	2.19
Negri Sembilan	41.30	42.74	14.23	1.73
Pahang	54.27	38.90	5.89	0.94
Former U.M.S.				
Johore	43.84	48.06	7.46	0.64
Kedah	68.01	20.91	9.26	1.82
Kelantan	92.05	5.11	1.10	1.74
Trengganu	91.98	7.02	0.78	0.22
Perlis	78.29	16.72	2.39	2.60
Former Settlements				
Penang	30.54	55.42	12.81	1.26
Malacca	50.27	40.17	8.24	1.32

Source: Malaya, *A Report on the 1947 Census of Population*, 40-1.

*Includes immigrants from Indonesia.

⁺Includes Indians, Pakistanis and Ceylonese.

Table A.6. Malaysia: Percentage distribution of population by race

State	Malay*	Chinese	Indian ⁺	Other
Malaysia (excl. Singapore)	43.4	35.6	9.8	11.2
Malaysia (incl. Singapore)	38.5	42.1	9.7	9.7
Malaya	49.1	37.2	11.7	2.0
Sabah (N. Borneo)	5.7	23.1	0.7	70.5
Sarawak	17.9	30.8	0.3	51.0
Singapore	13.6	75.4	9.0	2.0

Sources: 1957 *Population Census of the Federation of Malaya, Reports*, nos. 1 and 14 (Kuala Lumpur, n.d.); Colony of North Borneo, *Report on the Census of Population, 1960* (Kuching, 1962); Colony of Sarawak, *Report on the Census of Population, 1960* (Kuching, 1962); 1957 *Census of Population, Singapore, Preliminary Release*, no. 7 (Singapore, 1959).

*Includes immigrants from Indonesia.

⁺Includes Indians, Pakistanis and Ceylonese.

Table A.7. Nigeria: Percentage of population by principal ethnic groups

Region or territory	Hausa-Fulani	Ibo	Yoruba	Edo	Other
Nigeria	28.1	17.9	16.6	1.5	35.9
Eastern Region	0.2	68.2	0.2	0.1	31.3
Mid-Western Region	0.3	17.7	0.3	28.1	53.6
Northern Region	50.6	1.0	3.2	0.1	45.1
Western Region	1.0	1.8	94.7	0.5	2.0
Lagos	1.5	11.9	73.4	2.1	11.1

Sources: *Population Census of the Eastern Region of Nigeria, 1953, Bulletin*, no. 1 (Lagos, 1954), 18-19; *Population Census of the Northern Region of Nigeria, 1952* (Lagos, 1952-3); *Population Census of the Western Region of Nigeria, 1952* (Lagos, 1953-4).

Table A.8. Rhodesia and Nyasaland: Percentage distribution of population by race

Territory	Population (1959)			Electorate (1959)		
	African	European	Other	African	European	Other
Federation	95.8	3.7	0.5	7.4	88.4	4.2
N. Rhodesia	96.5	3.1	0.4	19.3	73.6	7.1
Nyasaland	99.2	0.3	0.5	1.2	80.1	18.7
S. Rhodesia	92.0	7.5	0.5	3.2	94.3	2.5

Source: Cmnd. 1149/1960, Advisory Commission on the Review of the Constitution of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, *Report* (London, 1960), App. VI, 11, 326-8.

The distribution of legislative authority expressly mentioned in the constitutions or necessarily implied from them is indicated in Table B.1 by the letters F (Federal), C (Concurrent) and R (Regional). If a subject is not mentioned in the constitution, either because the power to legislate for it is intentionally assigned to the authority exercising residuary power or because it is not applicable in that federation, the space in the table has been left blank; the assignment of the residuary power is, however, shown in the first line of the table. Where a federal power is more restricted than would be implied by the letter F alone, it is shown as FR to indicate that some aspects of the power are regional, or that regional consent is required for the exercise of federal authority in that field. Fr indicates federal powers which can only be exercised after consulting regional governments but do not require their consent. The content and allocation of some subjects, particularly external affairs, defence, law and procedure, machinery of government, parliamentary privilege and emoluments, taxes and loans, and trade are often more complex than might appear from the table, and reference must be made to the constitutions themselves for details.

It should be noted that in some federations, the distribution of legislative authority does not apply equally to all autonomous regional governments. In India, some items on the Union list and the whole of the concurrent list do not apply to the state of Jammu and Kashmir, but no notation of these items has been made in the table. For Rhodesia and Nyasaland, F* signifies federal in Southern Rhodesia only, and C* represents concurrent in Northern Rhodesia only (after 1956). Under the Malaysia constitution (1963), certain exceptions applied solely to the new states of Sabah, Sarawak or Singapore. Items marked F+ or C+ are those which, in some of these Malaysian states, came wholly or partially under state control or required state consent for the exercise of federal authority. Items marked F^X became wholly or partially concurrent in the case of some of these same states.

Source for this table is R. L. Watts, *New Federations: Experiments in the Commonwealth* (Oxford, 1966), 363-6. The table is reproduced by permission of the Clarendon Press, Oxford.

Table B.1. Distribution of legislative authority between central and regional legislatures in various federations

	Canada	Australia	India	Pakistan 1958	Pakistan 1962	Malaysia	Nigeria	Rhodesia & Nyasaland	West Indies
Residuary power	F	R	F	R	R	R	R	R	R
Whether regional powers are listed	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No
External affairs		C	F	F	F	F	F	F	
Treaty implementation	FR	C	F	Fr	F	Fr	FR	FR	FC
Citizenship and aliens	F	C	F	F	F	F+	F	FC	C
Immigration: into federation	C	C	F	F	F	F+	F	FC	F
Immigration: into regions between regions			F	C		C+	C	C	C
Defence	F	FC	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
Police		C	R	R	R	F	FrR	FCR	
Public order			R	R	F	C			
Prisons	FR		R	R	F	F	C	C	C
Preventive detention			C	FR	FR	F			
Law and procedure									
Civil	FR	C	C	C		FR	CR	CR	C
Personal	FR	C	C	C		Fx+R	FR		CR
Criminal	F		C	C		F			C
Constitution and organization of courts	R		FR	FCR	FR	F+	FR	FCR	FR
Machinery of government									
Public services and pensions	FR	FR	FR	FR	FR	F+	FR	FR	FR
Elections: Federal			F	Fr	F	F	F	F	FR
Regional			FR	Fr	F	Fx			
Finance									
Foreign exchange			F	F	F	F	F	F	F
Currency and coinage	F	FC	F	F	F	F	F	F	C
Foreign loans	FR	C	F	FR	FC	F	FR	FR	FC

Table B. 1. (cont'd)

	Canada	Australia	India	Pakistan 1958	Pakistan 1962	Malaysia	Nigeria	Rhodesia & Nyasaland	West Indies
Internal loans	FR								
Public debt	F	C	FR	FR	FR	F ^x	FR	FR	FC
Audit			F	F	F	F	F	FR	FC
Taxes:									
Customs	F	F	F	F	F	F+	F	FR	CR
Excise	F	F	FR	FR	F	F+	F	FR	CR
Corporation	FR	C	F	F	F	F	F	FR	C
Personal income	FR	C	FR	FR	FR	F	FR	FR	CF
Sales	FR	C	FR	FR	F	F+	FR	FR	
Other taxes	FR	C	FCR	FR	FR	F+	FR	FR	RC
Banking	F	CR	F	FC	FR	F ^x	F	FC	C
Cheques and bills of exchange	F	C	F	F	F	F	F	F	C
Stock exchanges			F	FC	FR	F			
Money lending			R	R	FR	F ^x			
Trade, commerce and industry									
External trade	F	C	F	F	F	F ^x	FR	F	C
Interregional trade	F	C	F	F	F	F ^x	FR	C	C
Intraregional trade	R		RC	R		F ^x	FR	FR	
Corporations and companies	FR	CR	FR	FCR	FR	F+	FR	FR	C
Insurance			F	FC	FR	F ^x	FR	FR	C
Patents, trade marks, copyright	F	C	F	F	F	F	F	F	C
Weights and measures	F	C	FR	FR	F	F	F	F	C
Industries			FCR	FR	FR	F ^x	C	C	C
Mines and oilfields			FR	FCR	FR	F	F		
Factories			C	R		F+			
Price control			C	C		F ^x		F	
Cooperative societies			R	R		F		CR	

Table B. 1. (cont'd)

	Canada	Australia	India	Pakistan 1958	Pakistan 1962	Malaysia	Nigeria	Rhodesia & Nyasaland	West Indies
Planning			C	C	F	F+r C		C	
Economic and social									
Town and country									
Shipping and navigation									
Maritime	F		F	FR	FR	F ^x	F	F	C
Inland waterways	FR		FRC	R		F ^x R	FR	F	
Ports			FC	FR	FR	F+r ^x	FR	F	
Fishing	F	CR	FR	FR	FR	F ^x R			CR
Communications and transport									
Roads and bridges			FR	R		FR	FR	FC	
Railways	FR	C	F	FR	R	F+	F	F	
Air			F	F	F	F	F	F	C
Regulation of traffic						F+r ^x	CR	C	
Carriage of passengers and goods			F			F ^x			
Mechanical vehicles			C	R		F			
Posts and telecommunications	FR	FC	F	Ft	F	F	F	F	C
Broadcasting and television			F	F	F	F	FR	C	C
Utilities									
Water			FR	R		F ^x R	FC	FR	
Electricity			C	R		F ^x +	CR	C	
Gas			R	R	F	F+	CR		
Nuclear energy			F	R	F		F	F	C
Education									
Elementary and secondary	R		R	R		F+	FC	FR	F
University	R		FR	R		F+		F	
Teacher training	R		R	R		F+			

Table B.1. (cont'd)

	Canada	Australia	India	Pakistan 1958	Pakistan 1962	Malaysia	Nigeria	Rhodesia & Nyasaland	West Indies
Libraries			FR	FR	FR	F+			FR
Museums			FR	FR	FR	F+	F		FR
Archaeology and monuments			FCR	CR	FR	F+	C	FR	
Scholarships	R	C	R	R		C+			C
Medicine and health									
Hospitals and clinics	R		R	R		F+x		C	
Lunacy	R		C	R		F+x			
Poisons and drugs			FC	CR		F+x	CR		
Liquor			R	R		F			
Public health and sanitation			R	R		C		C	
Labour and social services									
Trade unions			C	C		F+	C		C
Industrial disputes		CR	C	C		F+	C		C
Unemployment relief			R	R		F+			
Workmen's compensation	F		C	C		F+			
Social security		C	C	C		F+		F	
Social welfare services		C	C	C		C			
Charities			C	R		Fx			
Women and children						C		C	
Vagrancy			C	R		C			
Land									
Tenure	R		R	R		CR			
Prospecting			FR	R		R			
Compulsory acquisition		C	C	R		R			C
Transfer	R		CR	R		R			
Reservations	F		F	F	F	RF			

Table B. 1. (cont'd)

	Canada	Australia	India	Pakistan 1958	Pakistan 1962	Malaysia	Nigeria	Rhodesia & Nyasaland	West Indies
Agriculture	C		RC	R		R		F*C*R	
Forestry			R	R		R			
Agricultural pests and diseases			RC	R		F ^x		F*C*R	
Agricultural loans			R	R		R		F*C*R	
Animal husbandry			R	R		C		FR	
Drainage and irrigation			FR	R		C		F*C*R	
Soil erosion									
Local government	R		R	R		F+R			
Fire brigades						R			
Burial and cremation grounds			R	R		R		F*C*R	
Pounds and cattle trespass			R	R		R			
Markets and fairs			R	R		R			
Miscellaneous									
Survey			F	F	F	F+	C	C	C
Census	F	C	F	F	F	F	C	C	C
Statistics	F	C	C	FRC	FR	F	C	C	
Meteorology		C	F	F	F	F	F	F	
Aborigines	F		FR	FR	FR	F+	C	FR	
Professions			C	R		F ^x			
Holidays						FR		C	
Newspapers and printing			C	C		F ^x			
Licensing of films			F	R		F ^x R			
Entertainment and sports			R	R		C	C	FR	
Wild animals and national parks			R	R		F			
Lotteries			F	R		F			
Betting and gambling			R	R		F ^x	C	C	F
Research			FCR	FCR	FR				

Table C.1. Comparison of central and provincial current revenues and expenditures

Federation	Year	Percentages of total public revenues*			Provincial expenditure as % of central plus provincial expenditures
		Central revenue (before transfers)	Provincial revenue (before transfers)	Intergov't transfers	
Malaya	1959	89	11	7	17
U.S.A.	1959-60	79	21	5	26
Australia	1960-61	80	20	17	37
Canada	1960-61	75	25	12	37
Canada	1962-63	68	32	12	41
R. & N.	1958-59	70	30	14	43
Pakistan	1962-63	69	31	19	49
Nigeria	1959-60	84	16	37	54
India	1960-61	60	40	20	58
W. Indies	1959-60	1	99	2+	97

*Combined central and provincial revenues, excluding municipal revenues.

†Mandatory levy on territories for transfer to federal government.

Sources: See under Table C.2.

Table C.2. Comparison of composition of provincial current revenues

Federation	Year	Percentages of total provincial revenues				
		Independent revenue	Share of central taxes	Unconditional grants	Conditional grants	Total transfers
Canada	1960-61	67	16	2	15	33
Canada	1962-63	73	5	2	20	27
Australia	1963-64	61	—	36	3*	39*
India	1960-61	65	19	5	11	35
Pakistan	1962-63	51	34	1	14	49
Malaya	1960	59	2	34	5	41
Nigeria	1959-60	28	72	—	0.2	72
R. & N.	1959-60	65	28	—	7+	35
W. Indies	1959-60	98	—	—	2	2

*Excludes specific purpose capital grants equivalent to 10% of state current revenues.

+Reimbursement for intergovernmental services.

Sources for Tables C.1 and C.2: Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, *Historical Survey: Financial Statistics of Governments in Canada, 1952-62*, Catalogue No. 68-503 (Ottawa, 1960), Tables 1, 2 and 17; Annual Budget Statements, Finance Commission Reports, Statistical Abstracts and Year books for other federations. For more detailed tables on material in Tables C.1 and C.2 see R. L. Watts, *New Federations: Experiments in the Commonwealth* (Oxford, 1966), 367-75.

I. The Union of India

When the confusion and disunity of eighteenth century India provided the opportunity for conquest by the British, the continent was divided from the outset into two groups of areas under different forms of government: British India comprising a number of provinces under direct British administration, and the Indian states which, by treaty or usage, were broadly speaking autonomous regarding their internal affairs but which accepted the suzerainty of the Crown and its control of their external relations.¹

The part of India under direct rule was divided by the East India Company into three presidencies, Calcutta, Madras and Bombay, each being until 1833 virtually autonomous. In 1833, however, the Governor-General and Council of Bengal were made the supreme authority in India, being vested with complete control in all matters legislative, administrative and financial, and the system remained unchanged when, in 1858, the administration of British India passed from the East India Company to the Crown. The concentration of authority at the centre continued to be a cardinal feature of British India until 1919. The Indian Councils Act, 1861, however, restored some legislative power to the Councils in the presidencies, and the subsequent history of British India was one of the gradual devolution of power to the provinces, as administrators realized the danger of losing contact with their Indian subjects.² Under the Government of India Act, 1919, although provincial autonomy was still limited, provincial governments were freed to a large extent from central control, thus laying the foundations for future federation.

Meanwhile in the Indian states, the parts of India controlled through indirect rule, the loyalty of the princes generally during the mutiny had demonstrated their value, and subsequent British policy aimed at the preservation of these princely states except in cases of flagrant misgovernment. The states were kept outside the scope of parliamentary legislation applying to the British Indian provinces, and relations with the states were carried on through a special Political Department directly responsible to the governor-general. The 562 princely states, varying in size from Hyderabad with an area of 82,313

square miles to some 202 states of less than 10 square miles, together composed two-fifths of the area and a quarter of the population of continental India. They did not form a block of contiguous territory but were scattered over every portion of the map of India, and about the only factor common to all these heterogeneous units was their relationship to the British Crown, the paramountcy relationship of the Crown resting both on treaties and on usage and sufferance.

The Government of India Act, 1935, the product of an elaborate and complex process of preparation, "finally broke up the unitary system under which British India had hitherto been administered . . . [and] committed India to a federal form of government."³ A federal structure was seen at this time as the solution to a number of problems facing India. First, the independence of British India and the Indian states in terms of communications and economics made desirable some political unity, but this required yoking together in one structure the princes, with their autocratic regimes and jealous of their sovereignty, and the Congress, entrenching itself in the British provinces and hostile to the princes as undemocratic and anti-national. Federation suggested a way of bringing together the two Indias in a common constitutional system, thus providing a meeting point for the two earlier British policies. Second, since the increasing communal antagonism evident after 1919 was attributed to the Congress emphasis on monolithic unity and centralization and to Muslim fears of Hindu predominance, a federal structure suggested a means of accommodating Muslim anxieties within a united India. Third, the defects and complexities of dyarchy experienced in the provincial governments pointed to the desirability of full responsible government in the provinces, and this required provincial autonomy. Finally, British distrust of the Congress, which had become quasi-revolutionary in character, made attractive the prospect of a central legislature in which the nominated representatives of the princes would provide a counterbalancing conservative bloc.

The Government of India Act, 1935, in many respects set the major outlines of the federal system adopted after independence. The 1935 Act provided for an all-India federation consisting of eleven Governor's provinces and of such states as acceded to the federation by individual instruments of accession.⁴ While the division of legislative, administrative and financial powers between the central and provincial governments was spelled out in precise detail in the Act, the powers of the federating states were left to be determined by the instruments of accession. The division of legislative powers between the central and provincial governments was laid out in three exhaustive lists of federal, provincial and concurrent powers; residual powers were to be assigned by the governor-general acting at his discretion; the financial provisions drew a distinction between powers of taxation and sources of revenue, the tax jurisdiction of the central government being wider than the revenues it might keep; the power of amendment was reserved to the British Parliament, but flexibility was intended in the right given to the provinces to delegate their powers to the central government and in the emergency powers assigned to the central government; a Federal Court was established, although appeals to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council were left possible; a bicameral central legislature was provided for, and the central executive was to be based on the principle of dyarchy, giving the governor-general considerable authority. The provinces

were invested "for the first time with a separate legal personality" and moved forward from dyarchy to almost completely responsible government. Some safeguards, bitterly attacked by the Indian nationalists, were placed, however, in the hands of the governors, and the scope of provincial autonomy was also limited by some constitutional provisions concerning legislative, administrative and financial relations between the central and provincial governments, and by those concerning emergencies. Thus Coupland described it as "a federation with, so to speak, a unitary bias: it is more akin to the Canadian federation than to that of Australia or the United States."⁵

In spite of lengthy negotiations right up to 1939, the princes, deterred by the undisguised hostility and large-scale agitation of the Congress in the states after 1937, proved reluctant to give up their sovereignty. As late as 1939, the required number of states had not acceded and, as a result, the part of the Act dealing with the central government never came into force. The sections dealing with provincial government, however, went into effect in 1937 following provincial elections in the winter, six provinces having Congress ministries, four non-Congress ministries, and one a coalition. The Niemeyer Award, providing for unconditional grants to the provinces, removed fears of central interference.⁶ In practice, provincial autonomy appeared to be a success, resort to the safeguards being rarely necessary until 1939.⁷

The pattern of provincial responsible government suffered a setback in November 1939 when all the Congress provincial ministries resigned at the request of the Congress central executive over India's participation in the war. As a result, in these provinces the governors were forced to assume comprehensive powers, in most cases for the duration of the war. Under the improved immediate postwar conditions, however, it proved possible to hold fresh elections and by 1946, constitutional government with popular ministries had been restored in all the provinces.

Indian politics after 1937 were characterized by an intensification in communal antagonism and strife and by the solidification of Muslim support for the Muslim League. When the Congress in 1937, seeing its electoral victory as an opportunity to strengthen its position as the sole and exclusive embodiment of Indian nationalism, refused cooperation with the Muslim League, Jinnah and the League became convinced that the only alternative to Hindu domination was for the Muslims to separate themselves and form a state of their own. The League abandoned its policy of trying to cooperate with the Congress and in the famous Lahore Resolution of 1940 took up the demand for partition and the creation of a separate Muslim state. Confronted with the prospect that they would be a permanent minority in a Hindu raj, Muslims in large numbers swarmed to support the Muslim League with a new solidarity. As a result, in the 1946 elections fought on the issue of Pakistan, the League captured every seat reserved for the Muslims.⁸

During the period 1942-7, there were numerous efforts to resolve the political deadlock, and because of its direct bearing on the solution of the communal problem, central-provincial relations became a focal issue. The Muslims, strong in certain provinces, feared the overwhelming Hindu majority in the central government and therefore demanded that the central government should be limited in scope and power. The Congress, genuinely believing in the unity of India, and conscious of its own strength, pressed for a strong central government. Various schemes were advanced to reconcile

these points of view but failed to receive general agreement. The Draft Declaration advanced by the Cripps Mission in 1942 proposed a postwar constituent assembly of provincial representatives to create a union constitution but included the right of any province to secede. The following year, the unofficial *Report on the Constitutional Problem in India* by Reginald Coupland suggested a three-tier federation in which the largely autonomous provinces would be grouped into four economic regions based on the main river basins, two regions being predominantly Hindu and two predominantly Muslim, the four regions being brought together by an "Agency Centre," described as "something between a federation and a confederation."⁹ The Rajagopalachari formula of 1944 accepted the principle of a Pakistan, subject to a plebiscite of all the inhabitants of the Muslim-majority areas, but in discussions on it Gandhi and Jinnah failed to come to agreement on several issues. In 1945 a Conciliation Committee under Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru proposed a weak central government with the minimum necessary powers but with no right of secession. Even the Viceroy's attempt at the Simla Conference of 1945 to reconstitute the Viceroy's Executive Council with Indian members failed due to Congress and League disagreement over the right of nominating Muslim members. The Cabinet Mission Plan of 1946 rejected partition as impracticable and proposed a three-tier federation. The central government's powers were to be limited to foreign affairs, defence, communications and the finances necessary for these; the provinces were to be free to form groups, each group being free to determine the range of its powers and to frame the constitutions of its provinces.¹⁰ The Congress accepted the plan, but by interpreting it in a way repudiated by its authors destroyed the basis of compromise. As a result the Muslim League, although it joined the interim government, rejected the long-term proposals and refused to attend the Constituent Assembly.

In the spring of 1947, Lord Mountbatten, the new viceroy, decided, as a result of negotiations, that partition was unavoidable and that the transfer of power should be concluded as rapidly as possible to prevent a further deterioration in the communal hostility. The statement of June 3 proposed that the decision to partition the country and the provinces should be made by the people themselves through the legislatures or by referendum. By the end of July the legislatures of Bengal, Punjab and Sind, a meeting of the tribal representatives in Baluchistan, and the voters in referenda in Sylhet and the North-West Frontier Province had decided upon partition. The Indian Independence Act, 1947, then provided for the establishment of two independent dominions on August 15, 1947.¹¹

The Indian Independence Act, 1947, assigned to the Constituent Assemblies of India and Pakistan sovereign constitution-making authority unfettered by limitations of any kind, and at the same time provided that the Government of India Act, 1935, should serve in the meantime as an interim constitution in each of the two dominions, the Constituent Assemblies acting as the central legislatures.

Thus the federal scheme of the 1935 Act provided the basic framework for the constitution of India until 1950 when the Constituent Assembly had completed its work. The federal features of the 1935 Act were virtually unchanged, the only major modifications being the removal of the special powers and responsibilities of the governor-general and the governors, thus converting them into purely constitutional heads of their respective governments.¹²

The deliberations of the Indian Constituent Assembly lasted from December 1946 to December 1949.¹³ At its early sessions, when there was still some possibility of Muslim cooperation, the Assembly favoured assigning considerable power, including residuary power, to the autonomous units.¹⁴ After the decision to partition the country, the Union Powers Committee presented a revised report which, although it rejected a unitary constitution as "a retrograde step," concluded, in view of the threat of insecurity and disintegration, that "the soundest framework for our constitution is a federation with a strong centre."¹⁵ It went on to suggest a scheme clearly modelled on the Government of India Act of 1935. After the Assembly had considered the general outlines of the future federal structure, as recommended by the Union Powers, Union Constitution and Provincial Constitution Committees, a Drafting Committee chaired by Dr. B. K. Ambedkar prepared a draft constitution which was the subject of extensive discussion in the country and in the Assembly. Although the debates in the Assembly were characterized by considerable differences among delegates over the division of powers between the central and state governments, the well-organized leadership of the Congress party defeated the major efforts to amend the draft and it was adopted substantially intact, becoming operative January 26, 1950.

A major task which faced the new Dominion of India in 1947 was the integration of the Indian states which had hitherto been ruled by Britain only indirectly.¹⁶ The Indian Independence Act terminated the paramountcy of the Crown over the states and left them legally independent of both India and Pakistan. But since, without the cooperation of the states scattered among the Indian provinces, India could not achieve political stability or full economic development, there was a pressing need to bring the states into an organic unity with the new dominion. A States Department under Sardar Patel was formed, and between 1947 and 1950 he transformed the map of India.

The first need was to fill the void caused by the lapse of British paramountcy over the states, and therefore the rulers were urged to sign instruments of accession transferring to the Government of India control over defence, external affairs and communications, but otherwise leaving the states autonomous. As a result of a combination of persuasion, cajolery, bribery and the lack of sufficient military power on the part of the princes to enforce their claim to independence, the accession of all but Junagadh, Hyderabad, Kashmir and those acceding to Pakistan was achieved prior to the formal transfer of power on August 15, 1947.

During the next three years, the integration of the states into viable units, the democratization and modernization of their administrations, and their subordination to the central government constitutionally and financially were carried out simultaneously. The creation of viable units comparable with the provinces in size and resources was achieved (1) by merging 216 of the smaller states with adjacent provinces of former British India, (2) by consolidating 61 states into seven centrally administered areas, and (3) by integrating 275 states into five States Unions which, with the only three states to retain their original form, Mysore, Hyderabad and Kashmir, became the eight "Part B" states under the 1950 constitution. Democratization took the form of a transfer of power to the people of the states wherever possible and the pensioning off of the rulers. In the process of consolidating states into the new States Unions, new instruments of accession were negotiated extending the jurisdiction of the central government to all subjects on the

federal and concurrent lists of the Government of India Act, 1935, and financial agreements based on the recommendations of the States Finances Enquiry Committee completed the task of making the states and provinces equal in their rights and obligations.

Special difficulties arose in the integration of Junagadh and Hyderabad, but as a result of the intervention of the Indian Army, the former was eventually merged in the Saurashtra States Union and the latter acceded to the Indian Union and adopted its constitution as a state of India. The accession to India of the Hindu Maharaja of Kashmir with a predominantly Muslim population was followed by a military struggle with Pakistan which ended with the ceasefire of January, 1949. As a result, although Kashmir was listed in the 1950 constitution as a Part B state, it retained a special limited relation to central authority.¹⁷ In 1954 the Constituent Assembly of Kashmir declared that the accession of the state to the Indian Union was final and irrevocable and the state constitution adopted late in 1956 stated that "the State of Jammu and Kashmir is and shall be an integral part of India," thus taking one stage further the integration of the state into the Union.¹⁸

The Indian constitution of 1950 consisting of 395 articles and eight schedules is probably the longest constitutional document in the world. The great variety of regional and social differences, the relative inexperience in self-government, and the need to provide for emergencies, induced the framers of the constitution to make it explicit on matters of detail. The federal features of the new constitution follow closely, indeed might be described as an adaptation of those of the Government of India Act of 1935.

The Indian Union exhibits the usual major features of a federation—a dual polity, a distribution of powers between the national and state governments, a written constitution and a supreme court. The salient federal features of the constitution are as follows:

- 1) The existence, until their reorganization in 1956, of four categories of states and territories, each group with a different status and relationship to the central government;
- 2) The enumeration of Union, state and concurrent powers in three exhaustive lists, with the resulting limited residuary power vested in the central government;
- 3) A detailed definition of legislative, administrative and financial relations between the national and state governments, with an emphasis on the interrelation of the two levels of government and provisions for flexibility and adaptability;
- 4) The assignment of different degrees of rigidity to different parts of the constitution, most parts requiring a special majority vote in the central parliament and some of the federal features requiring the ratification of the Parts A and B states;
- 5) The assignment to the Supreme Court of the role of interpreter of the constitution;
- 6) The creation of a bicameral central legislature but without equal representation for the states in the indirectly elected second chamber;
- 7) The establishment of responsible parliamentary executives in the central and state governments;
- 8) The inclusion of a list of fundamental rights and a set of directive principles.

The framers of the constitution were particularly concerned about the strength of the disintegrating and disruptive tendencies and therefore aimed at a strong central

government. As a result, wide powers were given to the central government in the extensive federal and concurrent lists, in the implementation of treaties, in certain controls over administration in the states, in the levying of taxes, in controls over public borrowing and in the power to create new states or alter state boundaries.¹⁹ In addition, the Supreme Court and state High Courts were integrated into a single judiciary, a common all-India civil service for important posts in both Union and State governments was created, and a singular uniform citizenship for the whole of India was stipulated. The name itself, "the Indian Union", was deliberately chosen to emphasize the "indestructible" character of the new republic.²⁰ In emergencies, even more sweeping powers were given to the central government to exercise overriding legislative and executive authority. Indeed, the scheme was designed to work as a federal system in normal times but to be convertible to a unitary system in cases of war or other emergencies.²¹

In the post-independence period, the most serious centrifugal tendency has been the popular demand for the reorganization of states on a linguistic basis.²² The movement for linguistic states existed long before independence, but was obscured by the strength of Hindu-Muslim communal antagonism. It arose from the fact that the provincial boundaries in British India were mainly the result of historical accident and administrative convenience, bearing little correspondence to the distribution of the major linguistic groups. As early as 1920, the Congress had accepted the linguistic redistribution of provinces as a clear objective and had adopted the principle for the purposes of its own organization. With the new responsibilities after independence, the Congress leadership, fearing that linguistic divisions might have a disintegrating effect on the fragile Union, steadily resisted the application of the linguistic principle. In this they were supported by the Dar Commission Report, 1948, and the J.V.P. Committee Report, 1949, which emphasized the initial priority of unity and economic development.²³ As a result, the state boundaries recognized in the constitution of 1950 were based on those inherited from the British administration and on the results of the hasty integration of the princes' states for purposes of administrative convenience.

But in spite of the decisions of the Constituent Assembly, the movement for linguistic states gained ground after 1950. With the completion of the integration of the princes' states and the decline of Hindu-Muslim tension due to partition, attention internally became focused upon linguistic tensions within the multilingual states and, due to the choice of Hindi as the national language, upon the fears of the non-Hindi south of northern domination. In the 1952 elections, the skilful exploitation by the Communists of the Telegu demand for an Andhra state and the fast unto death of Shri Potti Sriramulu over the issue, led Nehru to surrender and agree in 1952 to the formation of a linguistic Andhra state. This led inevitably to the demand for a wider consideration of a general reorganization of state boundaries, and a commission to examine the question was appointed in 1953. The States Reorganization Commission reporting in 1955 recommended a redrawing of state boundaries along lines more or less in keeping with many of the linguistically based demands, although other considerations were also taken into account.²⁴ Negotiations between the central government, state governments and communities concerned led to modifications to the commission's proposals, and the modified plan following linguistic boundaries even closer was enacted in 1956.²⁵ As a

result there was a substantial simplification and reduction in the number of constituent units in the federation, the existing 29 states and territories in four categories becoming 14 states of equal status and five centrally administered territories.²⁶ The desire of the Congress leaders to counteract the centrifugal forces inherent in the movement for linguistic states, led them to establish at the same time five interstate zonal councils, the zones representing economic regions. The councils, composed of ministers and other representatives from the groups of contiguous states, meeting under the chairmanship of the central government Home Minister, are advisory in function and mainly concerned with securing better economic coordination within each zone.²⁷ The councils have also considered such regional problems as border disputes, official state and national languages, food distribution and police reserves. Indeed, the Southern Zonal Council, the most effective of the five councils, has achieved some notable successes in handling the educational problems of linguistic minorities.

The reorganization of 1956 left as multilingual states Bombay, Punjab and Assam, and in each of these the issue of linguistic provincialism remained alive. Subsequently, under continued pressure, the experiment of a bilingual state in Bombay was abandoned in 1960, when it was divided into the two basically unilingual states of Gujarat and Maharashtra, the creation of a separate Naga state was set in motion in 1962, and in 1966 the Congress leadership conceded the principle of the partition of Punjab state.

The reorganization of states did not exhaust the importance of language as a political issue in India. The reorganization of states provided political bases for the major regional languages, but the question of the choice of an all-India language was also a source of controversy. The constitution in 1950 distinguished between fourteen specified "languages of India" and the "official language" for all-India purposes. The choice of the latter provoked one of the most bitter debates in the Constituent Assembly. The choice was between Hindi, the language spoken by the largest number of Indians (42 per cent) but not by a majority,²⁸ and English, spoken in all parts of India but only by the educated elite representing slightly over one per cent of the total population. The opposition to Hindi came most strongly from the non-Hindi areas and particularly the Dravidian language groups of South India who felt they would be placed at a disadvantage. On the other hand, to select English was to place a barrier between the educated elite and the masses and furthermore to retain a vestige of colonialism. The compromise arrived at in the Constituent Assembly and embodied in the constitution was the choice of Hindi as the official language for all-India purposes together with the continued use of English over a transitional period of 15 years. When the Official Language Commission of 1956²⁹ (provided for in the constitution) reported in favour of proceeding with the replacement of English by Hindi, the issue once more became a centre of fierce controversy as the long-smouldering fears of the non-Hindi speakers burst forth. In 1958, as required by the constitution, a special committee of Parliament reviewed the commission's report and endorsed the commission's views but expressed concern over too hurried a switch to Hindi.³⁰ The threat at the Congress Party annual session in 1958 of a split within the party led finally to a compromise solution whereby, in order to satisfy the Hindi enthusiasts, Hindi would still "formally" become the official language in 1965, but, in order to placate the non-Hindi areas, English would remain for

an indefinite period as an associate official language. Nevertheless, the issue remained very much alive. Although a Presidential Order in 1960 made official the retreat from strict switchover in 1965, the counter-persuasions of the Hindi advocates and the pressure of the Chinese war induced the Union Government to postpone the legal enactment of the associate status of English. When at last in April 1963, the Official Language Bill was introduced, the Indian Parliament witnessed some of the rowdiest scenes in its history. Following a lengthy debate and amendments stipulating that the state governments should be consulted when the issue is reviewed in 1975, the bill was finally passed establishing two official languages as a practical fact in India.

The operation of the Indian federal system since 1950 has shown the simultaneous development of strong centralizing and decentralizing tendencies. On the one hand, the authority of the central government has been strengthened by the dedication to economic and social planning, the predominance of the Congress party under Nehru's leadership, the willingness to invoke central emergency powers and the military threats of China and Pakistan. On the other hand, the central government has been dependent upon the states for a large part of its administration, and regional linguistic feeling has been strong enough to force a nation-wide reorganization of state boundaries and a postponement of the imposition of a single common official language. Furthermore, since Nehru's death there has been a notable shift in the balance of power within the Congress party itself, apparent in the growing influence of state leaders in the making of major decisions. The 1967 elections indicated a significant weakening in the previous dominance of the Congress party in the formation of state governments. The effect of the two conflicting and highly dynamic forces of integration and regionalism has been to intensify the federal aspects of the Indian constitution during the first two decades of its operation.

II. The Republic of Pakistan

It was the events of 1937-47, revealing to the Muslims that the end of British rule could not be long delayed and that it might be followed by a Hindu raj able to claim the sanction of an electoral majority, that turned the Indian Muslims to a separate Pakistan as a practical objective. The Muslim League had already been in existence since 1906, and the idea of a separate Muslim state had been suggested by Muhammad Iqbal in 1930, but it was not until 1940 at its Lahore meeting that the League adopted the Pakistan Resolution, declaring officially for the first time the goal of a separate Muslim state. The League converted itself into an agency with mass influence and the subsequent history of the movement has been described as "... one of increasing momentum toward a single, fixed goal. Unity was made easier to preserve, since fear spurred from behind and a glorious vision beckoned from ahead. No other loyalty to person or principle was to be allowed to stand in the way of Pakistan."³¹ When in the postwar elections the League carried almost all the provincial Muslim seats except the North-West Frontier Province and took every Muslim seat in the central assembly, its claim to speak for the large majority of Muslims could no longer be denied. The subsequent failure of the Cabinet

Mission in 1946 to provide a stable compromise between the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League made it clear that partition was the only solution.

The new state of Pakistan which came into existence August 15, 1947, presented its leaders with an almost impossible task in trying to make it work. It was perhaps unique in consisting of two large fragments severed from the structure of old India and separated by a thousand miles of hostile territory. Moreover, Pakistan was born in chaos for partition was marked by widespread riots, massacres, looting and arson. Because India inherited all the major centres of government and commerce, a whole structure of government had to be improvised in Pakistan and the economic structure had to be completely rebuilt. To all these difficulties was added the severe internal economic burden caused by the flood of refugees and the external danger of hostilities with India, particularly over Kashmir.

The Indian Independence Act, 1947, provided that the Government of India Act, 1935, should become, with certain adaptations, the working interim constitution of Pakistan until the Constituent Assembly had provided a new constitution.³² Originally this arrangement was expected to last only a few years, but in fact the government of Pakistan was carried on under this interim constitution for nearly a decade, until March, 1956. Thus, from the beginning, Pakistan was established constitutionally as "The Federation of Pakistan."³³

As originally established Pakistan consisted of a complex array of units. In the east wing there was the single province of East Bengal with 55.4 per cent of the total Pakistani population. In the west wing there were three Governor's provinces, West Punjab, Sind and North-West Frontier Province, together constituting three-quarters of the population in western Pakistan, and one Chief Commissioner's province, two acceded princes' states, and eight further acceded states grouped into the Baluchistan States Union and the North-West Frontier Agencies.³⁴ The ceasefire line ending the hostilities with India over Kashmir, left the main centres of population in Indian hands, but a narrow thinly populated strip in the northwest, known as Azad Kashmir, was retained by Pakistan. The system of government in the different components of Pakistan at the time of its formation ranged from complete autocracy in some of the princely states to full representative government in the Governor's provinces.

Under the interim constitution, the indirectly elected Constituent Assembly, a body of never more than 80 members, acted also as the unicameral central legislature of the new dominion. Due to the original expectation that its duration would be short, there was no ban on membership in two legislatures, and therefore the central assembly included provincial and state ministers among its members. Although the Indian Independence Act of 1947 terminated the special discretionary powers of the governor-general, Jinnah, as the first governor-general with his authority as Quaid-i-Azam, the founder of the state, towered over all other political leaders and ministers who willingly served as his lieutenants. With Jinnah's death in 1948, the political situation came more closely to resemble cabinet government, when Liaquat Ali Khan, clearly the leading statesman of the country, chose to remain prime minister, but following his death in 1951 the succeeding governors-general regained the initiative.

The distribution of powers between the central and unit governments was determined in the case of the acceding states by the instruments of accession and in the case of the provinces by the three lists of federal, provincial and concurrent powers in the Government of India Act, 1935. The extensive federal and concurrent legislative lists gave the central government widespread authority, and the provisions regarding administrative relations with the provincial governments were heavily weighted in its favour. Moreover, during the period the interim constitution was in operation, the central assembly freely used its exclusive power of constitutional amendment to add to its legislative powers. The original scheme of the 1935 Act gave the major sources of revenue to the central government, but provided that the whole or part of the proceeds of central taxes should be shared with the provincial governments. After the establishment of Pakistan, central requirements for funds were so great, particularly in the field of defence, that the original distribution was changed further in favour of the central government.³⁵ In 1952, in view of the improved position of the central government with its surplus and the financial hardship of the provinces, it was decided, following Sir Jeremy Raisman's inquiry into the question, to revert to a position more closely resembling the original scheme of the Government of India Act, 1935.³⁶

Although the interim constitution possessed the usual features of a federal constitution—central and regional governments, the division of powers in a written constitution and a Federal Court to interpret the constitution—in many respects the central government was in a position to dominate the provincial governments. The central government not only possessed emergency powers in cases of threats to security,³⁷ but its emergency power to take over provincial administration if the normal constitutional machinery broke down was reinserted and exercised on a number of occasions.³⁸ The central legislature, in its capacity as Constituent Assembly, was in a position to amend the interim constitution by a simple majority and this power was frequently used, thus leaving provincial governments at its mercy.³⁹ The central power to appoint and dismiss provincial governors was used as a source of central control over provincial governments, through the prerogative power of a governor to depose a cabinet. The Public and Representative Offices (Disqualification) Act (PRODA), which gave the governor-general or governors discretionary power to refer to the courts charges of misconduct in public office, was intended as a weapon against corruption but served also as a political weapon against provincial ministers.⁴⁰ Until its decline in 1954, the party organization of the Muslim League, whereby the central offices closely supervised the provincial branches, provided a form of central control over provincial governments. Following the arrangements existing before 1947, Pakistan also retained, within a nominally federal structure, a single higher civil service and a higher police service common to all levels of government, but with recruitment and the general pattern of these services being under central control. Thus, while the interim constitution retained the federal form, these central powers and their frequent use made its operation far removed from the traditional definition of the federal principle.

The concentration of power in Karachi and its neglect of East Bengal in favour of the western provinces became a source of growing East Bengali resentment. The result was that in the 1954 provincial elections, a United Front, held together by a common desire

for autonomy for East Bengal and a shared determination to defeat the League, virtually annihilated the Muslim League in that province.⁴¹ Although the central government tried to cope with this situation by suspending the provincial government for a period, from this time on, Bengali demands for greater provincial autonomy were to prove a major element in Pakistani politics.

The task of reaching agreement on a permanent constitution proved to be a protracted one.⁴² Although the Constituent Assembly agreed in 1949 in its Objectives Resolution on Aims and Objects that Pakistan should be "a Federation wherein the units will be autonomous,"⁴³ the interim report of its Basic Principles Committee in 1950 caused such a storm of criticism in East Bengal that its consideration was postponed. When the committee presented its revised report in 1952 it had an equally unfavourable reception, this time led by the Punjabis, with the result that its consideration was again deferred. In 1954 the report of the committee with further modifications was finally passed by the Assembly. Just at this point, however, when the Assembly, expecting to be presented with the finished product of the Drafting Committee at its next meeting, seemed to be on the verge of completing its work, the Constituent Assembly was dismissed by the Governor-General on the grounds that it had lost the confidence of the people.

Four major issues were the sources of controversy and delay in constitution-making during the life of the first Constituent Assembly. A crucial issue was that of provincial representation in the central legislature. The problem arose because East Bengal, possessing a larger population than all the other provinces combined, felt entitled to representation according to population, while the other provinces feared that this would result in perpetual domination by East Bengal. Different bicameral schemes were advanced successively in each of the reports of the Basic Principles Committee in an attempt to find an acceptable compromise, culminating in the "Mohammed Ali Formula" giving the two wings of Pakistan parity at joint sittings. There was also considerable controversy over the degree of centralization. While the Basic Principles Committee and the Constituent Assembly favoured giving the central government strong powers on the model of the Government of India Act, 1935, this provoked a strong reaction in East Bengal, where neglect by the central government under the interim constitution and remoteness from Karachi resulted in the overwhelming success of the United Front demanding provincial autonomy in the 1954 elections. The national language issue was also a source of dispute. While Bengali was spoken by 56 per cent of the population, the national leaders insisted that Urdu, the traditional language of Muslim India and widely understood in West Pakistan, should be the single national language as a focus for unity, thus adding to the Bengali sense of grievance. After the 1954 elections, the demand for Bengali as a second national language could no longer be ignored and the Assembly reached a compromise recognizing both Urdu and Bengali.⁴⁴ Finally, although there was fairly general agreement that Pakistan should be based on Islamic principles, differences developed between the westernized political leaders, who thought in terms of Islamic principles applied to modern democratic institutions, and the ulama, the professional men of religion, who wished to reproduce the institutions of the early caliphate.

As a result of the judgments of the Federal Court, ruling upon the Governor-General's dismissal of the first Constituent Assembly, a second Assembly was set up in 1955.

Before turning to constitution-making it performed two other major tasks.⁴⁵ The first 49 sittings of the new Assembly were devoted to the revalidation of those statutes which became null and void as a result of the legal disputes that followed the dissolution of the first Assembly. Its second task was the unification of West Pakistan. Under the interim constitution West Pakistan, with a population less than that of East Bengal, had consisted of a complex array of units. Although there had been some suggestions of the advantages of administrative rationalization by the unification of West Pakistan into a single unit, these proposals had not been taken seriously during the life of the first Assembly because of the cultural and linguistic differences within the area. After the dismissal of the Constituent Assembly, the central government, intent on providing a counterbalance to diminish the power of the single large eastern province, announced its decision to merge West Pakistan into a single province. When the attempt to do this by executive decrees was frustrated by the Federal Court, the government insisted that the second Constituent Assembly pass its proposals before turning to constitution-making. After heated and bitter debate the Establishment of West Pakistan Act, 1955, was passed, merging the former western provinces and states into a single province, resulting in "an unusual federal system, with only two provinces balancing each other in a state of precarious equilibrium."⁴⁶ Controversy over the unification of West Pakistan did not end with the 1955 Act. Various groups advocated the redivision of the province, and in 1957 the West Pakistan Assembly actually passed a bill recommending the dissolution of the single western unit. The central government, however, refused to act on this recommendation.

Once West Pakistan was unified, the second Constituent Assembly turned to constructing the constitution and, by the end of February 1956, had completed this task. Its proposals bore a close resemblance to those adopted by the first Constituent Assembly before its dismissal, except that Pakistan now was a federation composed of two provinces, provincial powers were slightly increased, and a simpler unicameral legislature replaced the complicated bicameral scheme approved in 1954.

The greater part of the new constitution consisted of provisions similar to those of the interim constitution. Indeed, many terms and even clauses were carried over.⁴⁷ There were, of course, some modifications, some as a result of experience since partition and some modelled on the features introduced in the Indian constitution. In the constitution, which went into effect March 23, 1956, the central government still retained wide legislative powers, but provincial powers were enhanced by additions to the provincial list and by the assignment of residual powers.⁴⁸ Specific constitutional provision was now made for a number of intergovernmental institutions, including the National Finance Commission and the National Economic Council composed of central and provincial government representatives.⁴⁹ To central emergency powers existing previously were also added special central powers in cases of financial emergency. A rigid amendment process was adopted, most provisions requiring a special majority in the central legislature and some requiring ratification by the provinces affected. The central legislature continued to be unicameral but was to be increased in size from 80 to 310 members who were now to be directly elected. However, until elections could take place the Constituent Assembly was to continue as the central legislature. Although the question of communal electorates was left open in the constitution, it was soon decided to abandon separate electorates. The principle of cabinet responsibility to the legislature was now specifically stated and

the governor-general was replaced by an elected president. Lists of fundamental rights and directive principles were included, and in addition the constitution was given an Islamic flavour.⁵⁰

Although the constitution expressly stated that "Pakistan shall be a Federal Republic,"⁵¹ and there was a greater decentralization in the division of powers than under the interim constitution, the central government continued to possess some of its previous powers enabling it to dominate the provincial governments. In addition to extensive legislative and financial predominance, it retained emergency powers enabling it to suspend the federal character of the constitution.⁵² The power to appoint governors continued to be used as a means for controlling and influencing provincial governments. The executive power to give directions to provinces on certain matters,⁵³ control over the joint All-Pakistan Services common to the central and provincial governments,⁵⁴ and the power of refusing assent to some classes of provincial legislation remained.⁵⁵ These represented departures from the traditional interpretation of the federal principle and to such a degree that Callard was forced to conclude that "Pakistan is not in reality a federal state."⁵⁶

The adoption of the constitution did not result in any lessening of the political strife and instability which had characterized government under the interim constitution.⁵⁷ This instability was chiefly due to the lack of any majority party after the disintegration of the Muslim League. The party manoeuvrings, making voting support in the National Assembly uncertain, enabled President Mirza to retain substantial authority and influence both in politics and the administration during this period.

In October 1958, with the country's economic condition rapidly deteriorating, bureaucratic corruption and black marketing and profiteering becoming rampant, instability in governments at both central and provincial levels chronic, growing defiance of central authority and the prospect of politics in East Pakistan turning to radical extremes, the army leaders decided that the existing constitutional machinery was not capable of working in Pakistan. At the request of the army, President Mirza issued a proclamation declaring: "The Constitution which was brought into being on March 23, 1956, after so many tribulations, is unworkable. It is so full of dangerous compromises that Pakistan will soon disintegrate internally if the inherent malaise is not removed."⁵⁸ Under the proclamation the constitution was abrogated, the central and provincial governments dismissed, the national and provincial assemblies dissolved, all political parties dissolved, and martial law proclaimed throughout the country, effective power passing to the army under the leadership of Ayub Khan, the Commander-in-Chief, who was appointed Chief Martial Law Administrator. The army met little opposition in establishing itself in power, even the courts being quick to grant their approval. Within three weeks General Ayub had ousted Mirza and assumed the office of president while continuing to act as his own prime minister. Although, for purposes of administration, Pakistan was divided into three areas, East Pakistan, West Pakistan and Karachi, the structure of government became highly centralized, the powers of ministers and martial law administrators being derived from the president in whose name the administration of the entire country was run.

Soon after taking over power, President Ayub had announced that, when the initial vital problems had been met, the government would turn to the question of a suitable constitution. He expressed a preference for a presidential system because of its stability and for strong central government as "a natural reaction to the separatist tendencies to which the federal principle had given rise."⁵⁹ During 1959 a system of "basic democracies" was instituted. This consisted of a pyramid of four tiers of councils within each province, each council consisting partly of elected and partly of nominated or official members. The elected members of the higher councils were indirectly elected by the lower councils. The mixture of indirectly elected and appointed members on these councils clearly aimed at a controlled democracy. In February 1960, a Constitutional Commission was set up to examine the reasons for the failure of the 1956 constitution and to submit proposals for a new national constitution suitable to the particular conditions of Pakistan and aiming particularly at "the consolidation of national unity; and a firm and stable system of government."⁶⁰ Thirteen years after independence Pakistan was still seeking a permanent solution to the need for a constitution that would unite its diverse elements.

In 1962 a new national constitution was put into force. This constitution expressly set out to establish "a form of federation with the Provinces enjoying such autonomy as is consistent with the unity and interest of Pakistan as a whole."⁶¹ One radical development under this new constitution was the separation of the executive from the legislature and the assertion of the primacy of the former. The 1961 Constitution Commission had recommended a federal system similar to that which had existed before 1958,⁶² but the new constitution, as eventually promulgated, differed from that of 1956 in significant ways. There was a greater devolution of legislative and executive authority and, in practice, of revenues assigned to the provinces, but at the same time central controls over the provincial governments were increased. The governors, now active rather than nominal heads of the provincial executives, were appointed and dismissed by the president and subject to his directions. Conflicts between a provincial governor and his legislative assembly were resolved by reference to the National Assembly. Moreover, the National Assembly might legislate within normally provincial fields if in the "national interest of Pakistan in relation to (a) the security of Pakistan, including the economic and financial stability of Pakistan; (b) planning or co-ordination; or (c) the achievement of uniformity in respect of any matter."⁶³ Despite, or rather because of, these unitary tendencies, separatism remained a potent force in East Pakistan. Although the Bengalis achieved some major economic and financial concessions from the central government, there was still considerable resentment at the continued dominance of the western wing in their political and economic life. Progress was made, but the consolidation of unity within Pakistan still remained an immense task.

III. The Federations of Malaya and Malaysia

In the fifteenth century the Malacca Empire established political control over most of the Malayan peninsula and large areas of Sumatra. The next three centuries, however, saw the slow and sporadic disintegration of this empire as the Portuguese and Dutch

successively captured Malacca itself, but failed to effect direct control over the rest of the peninsula.

The history of the British connection with Malaya began with the establishment of three British trading settlements, Penang, Singapore and Malacca, the latter being finally ceded by the Dutch in 1824. In 1867 the settlements were severed from the administration of India and transferred to the Colonial Office as a Crown Colony. These settlements served both as strategically important naval bases commanding the Strait of Malacca and the shipping lanes to the Orient and as primary bases for commercial expansion and development of the hinterland. As the inland areas developed commercially the settlements became their natural maritime outlets, Singapore quickly becoming the greatest *entrepôt* port in southeast Asia.

Initially, the East India Company, and after it the Colonial Office, was interested primarily in trade, and it was their policy not to undertake conquest or interference in the affairs of the native states if this was avoidable. However, after 1873, because of the semi-anarchy and chronic misrule in the states, the British government, largely in response to the demands by trading groups in the settlements, reversed its policy. The result was treaties between 1874 and 1889 with Perak, Selangor, Pahang and Negri Sembilan, whereby the rulers of these states received British protection in exchange for British "residents" whose advice was to be accepted in all matters except those concerning Malay custom and the Mohammadan religion. Although the Colonial Office insisted that the residents were to act only as advisers, they quickly became the *de facto* wielders of power.

The desirability of greater administrative uniformity and the demands of commercial, mining and agricultural interests for integrated transportation and communications facilities led Sir Frank Swettenham to persuade the rulers to form a nominal federation of the four states, known as the Federated Malay States in 1895.⁶⁴ As a result, by 1909 virtually all the executive power formerly exercised by the residents in the states had been centralized in the hands of a Federal Secretariat under the British Resident-General.

Throughout its history, 1895-1941, the Federated Malay States was troubled by controversy over the degree of centralization desirable. This problem was focused on three issues: (1) the conflict of interests between alien capitalism favouring centralized administration as an aid to commercial development, and the state governments representing, and intent on preserving, Malay authority and prestige; (2) the rivalry between the High Commissioner, normally resident in Singapore, and his deputy in the F.M.S., the Resident-General and later the Chief Secretary, over the concentration of power in the hands of the deputy; (3) and the desire to encourage the unfederated Malay states, also under British protection, to join the federation, but the reluctance of their rulers to do so because of the sweeping powers of the Resident-General. As a result, British policy in the F.M.S. vacillated between centralization and decentralization. Until 1932 the general trend was to greater centralization in spite of efforts in 1909 and 1927 to reduce the concentration of power in the central bureaucracy.⁶⁵ Following intense controversy over the issue in the early 1930s, the Colonial Office adopted proposals to achieve a considerable measure of decentralization, involving the transfer of certain departments to the states, the abolition of the office of chief secretary and reduction in

the authority of department heads. The result was the display of new initiative in the state governments, freed from the stringent control of over-centralized government.

In addition to the Federated Malay States, five other Malay states, Johore, Kelantan, Trengganu, Kedah and Perlis, later came under British protection between 1909 and 1930.⁶⁶ Witnessing the effect of the resident system and the federation upon the sovereignty of their colleagues in the F.M.S., the sultans of the unfederated states took considerable pains to maintain their independence. In these states the British officers assigned to each ruler were styled "advisers" rather than "residents" and indirect rule was more of a reality. A feature common to these unfederated states was their insistence on independence from any form of inter-Malayan federation and their emphasis on internal self-development.

In December 1941 the Japanese invaded Malaya and quickly overran the whole peninsula and Singapore. The Japanese caused little change in the administrative structure of the settlements and the states, although in 1943 the elective principle was introduced to the Malays for the first time. For a while, an attempt was made to combine Malaya and Sumatra under a single administration centred in Singapore, the ethnic, linguistic and economic ties between the peoples of the two areas being stressed, but by 1944 the plan was abandoned. The net effect of the Japanese occupation was a disillusionment with British power, a general stirring of Malay political consciousness, increased communal antipathy because of the unequal treatment of the Malays, Indians and Chinese by the Japanese and the improvement of the Communist party organization operating through its guerrilla forces.

During the war, the Colonial Office devoted considerable attention to the political future of Malaya after its liberation. Considering the cumbersome nature of prewar Malayan administration in which there were 10 legislatures in a country scarcely larger than England, the planners decided that "efficiency and democratic progress alike demand therefore that the system of government should be simplified and reformed."⁶⁷ The result was a scheme involving a *volte-face* from the policy of decentralization adopted in 1933. It was decided to create a Malayan Union embracing the nine Malay states and the two British settlements of Penang and Malacca, only Singapore being left separate as an island colony.

When Malaya was regained in 1945, the Colonial Office proceeded as planned. In a whirlwind tour at the end of 1945, Sir Harold MacMichael secured in secrecy from the nine sultans a transfer of their complete rights of legal sovereignty to the British Crown.⁶⁸ Then, without further consultation in Malaya, the British government put into effect its scheme for a Malayan Union, whereby practically all power would be concentrated in a central government, each state would have a State Council with such authority as the Union Legislative Council delegated to it, the sultans would retain their thrones but with little political power, and Union citizenship would be given to all claiming Malaya as their homeland without discrimination of race and creed.⁶⁹ The result was Malay indignation over MacMichael's blunt methods in compelling the sultans to sign the agreements, the arbitrary imposition of the scheme without consultation of Malay opinion, the deprivation of the rulers' historic legal sovereignty and, most of all, the provision for citizenship giving equal rights to Chinese and Indians and thus depriving the

native Malays of the privileged status they had previously occupied under British rule. The most effective protest came from the United Malay National Organization (U.M.N.O.) which carried on a vigorous agitation, pushing forward the moderate sultans and rousing the hostility of the peasants against the new policy. The Malay cause was further strengthened by the failure of the Chinese to attempt to defend a policy which was to their advantage. In the face of the Malay opposition and threats of a mass non-cooperative movement, the British government bowed to the storm. It agreed to drop the Union proposals and to consult representative Malay, Chinese and Indian leaders to explore the possibility of a new settlement.

The result of these negotiations was the Federation of Malaya Agreement, 1948, which established by agreement of the rulers of the states and the British government a federation under the protection of Great Britain.⁷⁰ The new federal constitution was in fact almost as unitary as that of the Malayan Union, but Malay support was bought by the British agreement to recognize the political identity of the Malay states, by a highly restrictive citizenship law which excluded about half the Chinese and Indians, and by safeguards for the special position of the Malays.

The federation created consisted of two types of units: the nine Malay states under their rulers and each with state executive and legislative councils, and the two settlements of Malacca and Penang, each with settlement councils, in which the chief executive officers were resident commissioners acting in the name of the high commissioner.

Central institutions of government were also established. The Executive Council, headed by a high commissioner, at first consisted of a majority of officials but with some unofficial members, but in 1951 a "quasi-ministerial" system was adopted and in 1956 the council was further amended to operate more as a cabinet with a chief minister. Initially the Legislative Council was composed of a majority of nominated unofficial members including representatives of the state and settlement councils, the racial communities, and various economic and professional groups. In 1955 the principle of election was introduced, the Legislative Council being given a majority of elected members. Under the 1948 Agreement, there was also a Conference of Rulers, composed of the rulers of the nine Malay states attended by their Malay advisers, which performed some of the functions of a second chamber as a focus for state views upon central legislation and policy, and some of the functions of a premiers' conference by bringing together the heads of the state governments.⁷¹

In the division of powers, the Agreement gave "very wide powers to the central authorities who could, if they so desired, legislate against the wishes of the State Governments on almost all questions other than those touching Muslim religion and Malay custom."⁷² Indeed, what devolution of power there was chiefly took the form of a compulsory delegation to the states of executive authority over central laws on certain subjects. The central government was given powerful controls over the state and settlement governments through the special powers of the high commissioner to give them directions, through the central control of state budgets, and through a centralized civil service under the control of the high commissioner. As a result, the 1948 constitution was aptly described as "a loose and ill-defined hybrid somewhere between unitary government and federation."⁷³ In practice, however, the federation was less

centralized.⁷⁴ In large areas potential central legislative power was left unexercised, the bulk of administration being left to the states. In addition, the central government never introduced a major change of policy or legislation without first obtaining the agreement of all the state governments concerned, and intergovernment consultation was a characteristic feature of Malayan federal government, 1948-56. In 1956, a revision of the financial allocation improved the financial autonomy of the states, further strengthening their position.⁷⁵

A special characteristic of the 1948 Agreement was that, although a Supreme Court was established, the task of constitutional interpretation was assigned to a special Interpretation Tribunal.⁷⁶ The amendment of the constitution was normally by federal ordinance or in certain cases by proclamation of the high commissioner, but in each case the approval of the rulers or the state and settlement councils was also required.⁷⁷

The 1948 Federation of Malaya Agreement remained in effect until 1957. Politics in Malaya during this period were characterized by the Communist emergency, the progressive advance towards self-government and the growth of political parties. In early 1948 the Malayan Communist party made an abrupt change in policy from labour agitation to armed revolt, and as a result, the need to combat terrorism and guerrilla warfare provided a strong impetus for centralized administration. This decade also saw a progressive advance towards self-government with the introduction of the principle of responsibility in the central executive and the principle of elected representation in the central legislature. These advances encouraged the development of political parties, which, because of the existence of the Malay-based U.M.N.O. with policies favouring the Malays, took the form of communal parties, the Malayan Chinese Association among the Chinese and the Malayan Indian Union among the Indians. When Dato Onn bin Ja'afar, recognizing the need for intercommunal unity if independence and self-rule were to be possible, attempted to found a new multiracial Independence of Malaya party, the result was an opposing alliance between the major communal parties. The Alliance was so successful that in the 1955 federal elections it swept 51 of the 52 elected seats in the Federal Legislative Council, largely as a result of its superior organization and its campaign cry of *merdeka* (freedom).

At the constitutional conference in London in 1956, the Alliance's "Merdeka Mission" obtained agreement that independence should be proclaimed in 1957 and that a constitutional commission should be appointed to review the existing constitution and to draft suggestions for a new federal constitution for Malaya at independence.⁷⁸ The recommendations of the Reid Commission were on the whole accepted and incorporated in the new constitution, although at the insistence of the U.M.N.O. the constitution was on some points made more conservative and favourable to the Malays.⁷⁹

The Federation of Malaya Agreement, 1957, like its predecessor, concentrated legislative, executive and financial power in the central government, for the only exclusive state legislative powers of any significance were land, agriculture, forestry and local government.⁸⁰ The previous arrangement, whereby in many matters legislative power was conferred on the central government but executive power on the states, was rejected as "impractical," and exhaustive federal, state and concurrent lists were now incorporated, with legislative and executive authority generally, though not always, going together. The

predominance of the central government was assured by the sweeping central power to act even in the exclusive state sphere in order to implement treaties,⁸¹ to promote uniformity of state laws,⁸² to implement national economic development programs⁸³ and in cases of emergency.⁸⁴ Flexibility and intergovernment cooperation were aimed at in the provisions enabling delegation of legislative and executive powers⁸⁵ and in the considerable number of intergovernmental councils established by the constitution.⁸⁶ Both central predominance and flexibility were also enhanced by the constitutional amendment procedure, which, although normally requiring special majorities in the central legislature, in only a few cases requires ratification by the state legislatures or the Conference of Rulers.⁸⁷

Under the new constitution, the settlements, Penang and Malacca, were severed from the British Crown and became states equal in rank to the other states in the federation, although headed by governors rather than hereditary rulers. The federation itself was now headed by a monarch, chosen for a five-year term by the Conference of Rulers from amongst themselves on the basis of seniority. The central parliament became truly bicameral with the addition of a senate composed partly of nominated members and partly of senators elected by the state legislatures. The Conference of Rulers continued to operate. Its functions included the election of the monarch, giving or withholding assent to certain laws, advising the monarch on some appointments and, in company with the central prime minister and state chief ministers, deliberating questions of national policy.⁸⁸

The separate Interpretation Tribunal was abandoned, the courts being given authority to interpret the constitution and the Supreme Court exclusive jurisdiction in any intergovernment disputes. The scope of judicial authority was also enhanced by the inclusion in the constitution of a set of fundamental liberties.

The new constitution of the Federation of Malaya went into effect with the commencement of independence on August 31, 1957.⁸⁹ In the early years of its operation, the continued dominance of the Alliance was the major factor for political stability. The federal and state elections of 1959 swept the Alliance back into power with large majorities, except in the northeastern states of Kelantan and Trengganu where the victories of the Pan-Malayan Islamic party suggested a tendency to Malay communalism. On the other hand, in areas where the Chinese vote was dominant, the Alliance gained a majority of seats, and the Socialist Front, also a recognizably intercommunal party, was the most successful opposition. The dominance of the Alliance, both at federal and state levels, provided an impetus for centralization as did the continued "state of emergency" which was finally terminated in mid-1960. The tendency towards the further concentration of central power was illustrated by the first major constitutional amendment in 1960 which enhanced the central power of preventive detention, set up a national council on local government, and placed the appointment of Supreme Court judges solely in the hands of the central cabinet.

An issue which faced the Federation of Malaya in its early years of independence was the question of its relation to Singapore. In the plan for the Malayan Union, 1946, Singapore was expressly excluded because of its different economic interests as an *entrepôt* trade centre based on free trade, because its predominantly Chinese population would, if included in Malaya, give the Chinese a majority over the Malays, and because of

Britain's special strategic interests in Singapore. As a result, in spite of the considerable economic interdependence between the island and the peninsula, Singapore was constituted a separate Crown Colony in 1946 and remained outside the Federation of Malaya formed in 1948. Singapore underwent its own political development with major constitutional advances in 1948, 1955 and finally 1959 when it received internal self-government as the state of Singapore. The Singapore leaders, recognizing the inability of Singapore to achieve full independence on its own, were strongly in favour of association with the federation and discussed the issue with the Malayan government several times. Malayan leaders were generally more reluctant, fearing that the addition of a million or more factious Chinese would upset the delicate racial balance in the federation.⁹⁰ As conservatives, the Malayan leaders also distrusted the socialist government and the strong Communist elements in Singapore. But Singapore continued to press for union until, in 1961, Lee Kuan Yew persuaded Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman to agree to plans for a merger of Malaya and Singapore to take place in 1963.⁹¹ The Malayan change of heart was largely prompted by concern that, unless taken under the protective custody of the federation, Singapore might be taken over by Communists and then used as a base for subverting the federation. In order to offset Malay fears of Chinese preponderance within the federation, Tunku Abdul Rahman at the same time began negotiations with the British government for the inclusion of its Borneo territories within a widened Federation of Malaysia.⁹² The Sultan of little Brunei, anxious about the future disposal of his oil revenues and about his personal status, decided against acceding, but in the two larger Borneo territories of North Borneo and Sarawak, political parties supporting Malaysia secured large majorities in elections which were subsequently endorsed by a United Nations mission. Finally, in September 1963, the Federation of Malaysia was established by joining Singapore, Sarawak and Sabah (North Borneo) to the states of Malaya.

In form, the 1957 constitution was retained, with modifications being made to it by the Malaysia Act, 1963, but in effect the changes were so substantial as to establish a new federal structure. A notable feature was the marked variation in the relation of different states to the central government. The status of the Malayan states remained unchanged, but the new states were granted considerably more legislative, executive and financial autonomy, and their special interests were more fully safeguarded under the constitution. Created in the face of Indonesian hostility, the new federation found itself immediately under political and economic strains resulting from the need to defend itself. Moreover, the unwillingness of the Alliance party to allow Lee Kuan Yew a partnership in federal decision-making and the desire of the People's Action party to play a role in federal politics rather than confining its activities to Singapore led to a challenge by the P.A.P. against Malay political predominance. The result was mounting tension which was relieved only when Singapore left the federation in 1965.

IV. The Federation of Nigeria

As a unit of government, Nigeria has been described as "an artificial creation . . . perhaps the most artificial of the many administrative units created in the course of the

European occupation of Africa.”⁹³ Prior to British rule there was no Nigerian unity. Northern Nigeria, where Islam provided a transtribal bond, historically belonged to the western Sudan and was economically oriented toward Tripoli and Egypt. Southern Nigeria, on the other hand, isolated from the impact of Islam by the dense and inhospitable tropical rain forest and by the tsetse fly, had for long been part of the Atlantic world, linked to it by the activities of the slave traders and the missionaries. Moreover, within the distinct regions of north and south, there were a multitude of political, ethnic and tribal groups. In the north, the Muslim Hausa, Fulani and Nupe, and most of the smaller “pagan tribes” of the middle belt were organized into a large number of semi-independent emirates governed by a Fulani aristocracy, but the Muslim Kanuri of Bornu and the non-Muslim Tiv south of the Benue River remained unconquered by the Fulani. The south was even more fragmented. In the southwest there existed the sizable Yoruba and Edo kingdoms while in the southeast there were the small semi-autonomous communities of the Ibo, Ibibio and Ijaw-speaking peoples, as well as other politically more splintered tribes. Thus, a leading Nigerian nationalist wrote little more than a decade ago, “Nigeria is not a nation. It is a mere geographical expression. There are no Nigerians in the same sense as there are ‘English,’ ‘Welsh,’ or ‘French.’ The word ‘Nigerian’ is merely a distinctive appellation to distinguish those who live within the boundaries of Nigeria from those who do not.”⁹⁴

It was on this situation that British rule “was imposed like a great steel grid over the amorphous cellular tissue of tribal Africa.”⁹⁵ During the nineteenth century the British penetrated into the hinterland unevenly and gradually from three uncoordinated bases—Lagos which was annexed as a colony in 1861, Old Calabar where a Foreign Office consul was located after 1849 and Lokoja, the base of the trading companies which were amalgamated in 1886 to form the Royal Niger Company with a monopoly of trade in the Niger Basin. By 1900 these had developed into three separate territories under British rule: the Colony of Lagos, the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria and the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria.⁹⁶ The next two decades saw the administrative unification of Nigeria. In 1906 the Colony and the Southern Protectorate were united, and in 1914 the Colony and the two Protectorates were amalgamated and ostensibly became a single political unit called the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria, with its capital at Lagos and with Sir Frederick Lugard as its governor. An advisory “Nigerian Council” representing the whole area was also established at this time, but in 1922 a new constitution established a Legislative Council which lasted until 1946, with amendments in 1928 and 1941 making some concessions to the principle of election. In the meantime, at the end of the 1914-18 war, the adjacent German Cameroons had been placed under British mandate by the League of Nations, and in 1923 provision was made for the administration of the Southern Cameroons as part of the Southern Provinces and of the Northern Cameroons as part of the adjacent Northern Provinces of Nigeria. Thus, as a political entity, Nigeria was a British imperial creation.

But, while common British rule and the creation of internal peace and order made free movement and commerce possible and contributed to Nigerian unity, the form and character of the British administrative superstructure sowed the seeds of later regionalism. Even after the amalgamation of Nigeria under a common governor in 1914, the north and

south were administered by two virtually distinct bureaucracies, the governor being virtually "the only bond of political unity."⁹⁷ Moreover, while the policy of indirect rule through traditional authorities was applied in the north, constitutional development in this direction proved less appropriate in the south, and the Legislative Council, its legislative jurisdiction limited to the south, represented a policy of importing European political institutions. In addition to the division between north and south both in administration and in policy, divisions were maintained within Southern Nigeria, and Lagos retained its unique legal status as a colony until 1951. In the interests of administrative convenience, the southern provinces were divided in 1939 into two groups, the western and eastern, with the Niger River as the boundary. Describing the Nigerian situation in 1945, Governor Richards wrote, "At present no unity exists, nor does the constitution encourage its growth."⁹⁸

By 1945, the increasingly vigorous criticism of the existing constitutional arrangements by African groups outside the Legislative Council made clear the need for reform. The problem facing British officialdom was that of reconciling the demand of the educated southerners that the Legislative Council should be expanded into a parliamentary system of government, acting as the central government for the whole of Nigeria, with the policy in the north whereby the native authority system had been developed as the primary unit of African self-government. Views within the Colonial Office differed on the solution. Some, mainly British officials in the north, favoured progressively wider powers for the emirates until they became self-governing. Others leaned towards a radical decentralization within Nigeria in which the three groups of provinces would be separate federations held together by a weak central superstructure, thus creating a three-tier structure similar to the cabinet mission proposals for India in 1946. Still others such as Sir Bernard Bourdillon, Governor of Nigeria, 1935-43, and Lord Hailey, saw the future in the promotion of political unity by a unitary structure including the north.

In 1945, Sir Arthur Richards, the Governor, strongly influenced by Bourdillon's views, submitted proposals which led to a new constitution.⁹⁹ Its stated objectives were: "... to promote the unity of Nigeria; to provide adequately within the unity for the diverse elements which make up the country; and to secure greater participation by Africans in the discussion of their own affairs."¹⁰⁰ Under the "Richards Constitution" which went into effect in 1946, the sovereign powers of the Legislative and Executive Councils were extended to cover the whole of Nigeria.¹⁰¹ At the same time Regional Councils, chiefly electoral colleges and otherwise advisory in function, were created for each of the groups of provinces to serve as a link between the new national government and the local native authorities. Although, in view of the advisory nature of the Regional Councils, the character of the new constitution was fundamentally unitary, it set the mould within which the federal structure subsequently grew. On the one hand, it established a central legislature for the whole of Nigeria for the first time, a step towards Nigerian unity. On the other hand, by assuming that the former groups of northern, eastern and western provinces corresponded to the ethnic and cultural diversities of Nigeria, it established the three regions, each actually ethnically heterogeneous, as the fundamental political units within Nigeria.

The unitary nature of the Richards Constitution was intended to promote Nigerian unity, but in practice it sharpened interregional fears and hostilities, for each group feared the concentration of power in the central government as a potential instrument for domination by another region. Northern demands for autonomy and intensified Yoruba-Ibo rivalry were the result. Thus, the operation of the Richards Constitution was characterized by the regionalization of Nigerian nationalism and by the appearance of political parties such as the Northern Peoples' Congress and the Action Group, primarily motivated by the desire to defend their own regional ethnic interests.

When the British government agreed that the constitution should be revised after a series of stage-by-stage conferences, beginning at the local level and culminating in a general conference at Ibadan in 1950, attention became focused on the issues of regional representation in the central government, the devolution of power to the regions, and the correspondence of regional boundaries to ethnic distribution.¹⁰² The "Macpherson Constitution" of 1951, which resulted from these consultations,¹⁰³ retained the existing three regions as the political units within Nigeria, the only change being the inclusion of Lagos in the Western Region, and certain legislative, executive and taxing powers were now conferred on the regional legislatures and provision was made for the first time for Regional Executive Councils.

Although this constitution has been described as "the decision to convert Nigeria into a Federation,"¹⁰⁴ the constitution still remained, in the traditional terminology, ostensibly unitary. Regional powers, for instance, were not exclusive but subordinate to the general authority of the central government. The single public service responsible to the governor remained, as did the single judiciary and the centralized marketing boards. Furthermore, the governor's discretionary reserved powers strengthened the unitary character of the constitution. On the other hand, there were some quasi-confederal features. Except for its *ex officio* and special members, the central House of Representatives was elected indirectly, members being chosen by the regional legislatures from among their own numbers. The Central Council of Ministers was also in a sense indirectly elected, for although the four ministers from each region had to be members of the House of Representatives, nominations to the Council were subject to approval by the regional legislatures, making ministers to all intents and purposes prisoners of their regional governments. With different parties in power in the different regions, a cohesive Council was impossible, and in practice it was little more than a committee of the regions.

Unfortunately, this unique blend of unitary and confederal features suffered the defects of both with the benefits of neither. The central concentration of sovereignty and the subordination of the regional governments continued to excite regional fears; while the lack of cohesiveness in the central legislature and executive, both in effect consisting of delegates from the regional legislatures, soon resulted in political deadlock in the central government. These difficulties came to a climax in the tragic riots of 1953 and the resultant northern threats of secession.

The solution worked out at the London Conference of 1953 and put into effect the next year, was the adoption of an orthodox federal constitution.¹⁰⁵ In spite of other differences amongst them, all the Nigerian delegations at the conference agreed upon the desirability of regional autonomy.¹⁰⁶ The new constitution made possible a considerable

measure of regional autonomy, without sacrificing the major benefits of unity. Moreover, the federal structure enabled a solution of the problem causing the greatest hostility between the north and the south—the issue of self-government which had been at the base of northern fears and southern frustrations. The federal constitution made possible, within a united Nigeria, the early grants of self-government to the two southern regions that were clamouring for it, while postponing northern and federal self-government to a later date in order to allay northern anxieties. Thus the constitutional agreements of 1953 represented “an ingenious compromise of what had been regarded as intractable positions” and, in view of the marked growth of amity and cooperation among the regional leaders after 1954, one could justifiably say, “the idea of a united Nigeria was the real victor.”¹⁰⁷

The Nigerian constitution of 1954 was based on orthodox federal principles. There was an explicit division of legislative, executive and financial powers; the central government was allocated limited and specified powers by the exclusive and concurrent lists, while the regional governments were also given power over matters on the concurrent list and exclusive power over all unlisted residual matters. Thus the new constitution involved a recognition of regional autonomy by a genuine constitutional division of powers rather than by devolution from the sovereign central government as had previously been the case. The principle of a dual polity was also extended in the new provisions for separate regional public services, regional judiciaries, regional marketing boards, and regional governors in place of lieutenant-governors. There was also a Federal Supreme Court with exclusive jurisdiction to act as an impartial tribunal in inter-government disputes over their constitutional powers. The power of amending the constitution was left in the hands of the British government, thus making the constitution independent of both levels of government.

The central legislature, the House of Representatives, remained unicameral but ceased to consist of delegates from the regional legislatures. Dual membership of central and regional legislatures was abolished, central legislators being elected directly in the south, and indirectly by special electoral colleges distinct from the regional legislature in the north. The issue of regional representation in the central legislature had for some time been a controversial issue because the population of the Northern Region was greater than that of the other two combined. A bicameral central legislature was considered, but finally a unicameral one in which the Northern Region was restricted to half the seats was agreed upon. The confederal features of the central Council of Ministers were removed—regional governors were no longer members, and ministers were appointed by the governor-general without reference to the regional legislatures. The constitution did, however, explicitly provide for equal representation of the regions on the Council, appointments to be made by the governor-general either on the recommendation of the leader of the party with an overall majority or, if this was lacking, on the recommendations of the leaders in the House of Representatives of the majority party in the House from each region.¹⁰⁸

The basic regional structure of 1946 and 1951 was continued, because of resistance by the Northern Peoples' Congress to any change in northern boundaries. Thus there was no departure from the earlier assumption that these represented the fundamental social

diversities of Nigeria. Some changes were made, however. Lagos, against bitter Action Group opposition, was separated from the Western Region and, as the capital, made a federal territory. The Southern Cameroons, because of its special status as a United Nations Trust territory, was set apart from the Eastern Region as a separate unit but without full regional autonomy.

In operation, the constitution, by granting regional autonomy, helped to reduce interregional fears and tensions and strengthened the central government by removing its constitutional dependence upon the regional governments. The weakness of the central executive was by no means cured, however, for the special "federal" provisions for the Council of Ministers, coupled with the regional distribution of political parties in the House of Representatives, meant that a homogeneous Council was impossible to obtain.¹⁰⁹ This weakness was accentuated by the preference of the major national party leaders for positions of responsibility as regional premiers.¹¹⁰ Thus, the central government tended to be ineffective and despised—the cat's paw and scapegoat of the regional leaders.

Following a series of constitutional conferences in 1957 and 1958 a considerable number of amendments were made to the constitution, but these did not alter the fundamentally federal structure of the 1954 constitution.¹¹¹ Among the early amendments was the grant of internal self-government to the Eastern and Western Regions in 1957 and to the Northern Region in 1959, together with consequent changes in the regional constitutions concerning the relative powers and roles of the governors, executives and legislatures. Alterations were also made to the institutions of central government. In 1957, the office of federal prime minister, with power to nominate his own cabinet, was established. Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, as leader of the largest party in the House of Representatives, became the first federal prime minister, and formed a coalition "national government" of all three major parties which lasted until the elections in 1959. The abandoning of previous arrangements for the Council of Ministers and the adoption of more orthodox cabinet government did a great deal to strengthen the central government. The central legislature was also modified by the agreement to add a senate at the dissolution of the existing House of Representatives in 1959. Thereafter, seats in the lower house were allotted according to population, thus giving the Northern Region a clear majority. Regions were given equal representation in the new second chamber, the senators being appointed by the regional governments. Some adjustments to the legislative lists were also agreed upon at the constitutional conferences, but the balance in the distribution of powers was not fundamentally altered. A complete overhaul of revenue allocation, which had been the source of much acrimony, was also undertaken. The principle of derivation as the basis for revenue transfers to the regions was abandoned in favour of a scheme increasing independent regional revenues and providing for transfers from a distributable pool on a formula taking into account factors such as needs, population and balanced national development.¹¹²

At these constitutional conferences, the prospect of federal independence in 1960 raised a number of contentious issues which were indicative of the continued distrust and fear existing among the diverse groups within Nigeria. A major issue was the demand, arising from the fears of minorities within existing heterogeneous regions, for the splitting

of these regions in order to create new ethnic states. A special commission appointed to consider the problem stressed the difficulties involved in setting up new states which would be viable and ethnically homogeneous, and suggested the adoption of other safeguards instead to allay minority fears.¹¹³ When the Colonial Secretary warned that splitting the regions would inevitably delay federal independence, the Nigerian leaders deferred the creation of new states until after independence.¹¹⁴ Another example of the continued prevalence of minority fears was the length of time spent at the 1958 conference in working out the details of the fundamental rights to be included in the constitution.¹¹⁵ There was also a prolonged controversy over the control of the police force, for minorities within the regions feared regional control of the police as an instrument of domination, while the regional majorities themselves feared central control. The solution was a compromise by which the police was preserved as a unified force but administered by an intergovernment Police Council, subject to ultimate control resting with the central government.¹¹⁶ The problem of a procedure for constitutional amendment was also considered at these conferences, and agreement was reached on an extremely rigid process under which large sections of the constitution would be specially entrenched, normally requiring a majority of two-thirds of the members of each central legislative House and the concurrence of two of the three regions. The prospect of Nigerian independence also provoked a hesitancy in the Southern Cameroons about its continued membership in the federation. Because of their special status as trusteeship territories, both the Northern and Southern Cameroons were given the chance to indicate their choice in plebiscites. In February, 1961, the Northern Cameroons voted to remain a part of the Northern Region of Nigeria, but the Southern Cameroons chose by a large majority to join the Cameroons Republic instead.

Late in 1959, federal elections were held and again no single party gained a majority. The three major parties each gained a majority of the seats in their home regions although the N.C.N.C. gained considerable support in the Western Region and the Action Group made some inroads in each of the other regions.¹¹⁷ The N.P.C., with all its members from the north, once again emerged as the largest single party and, in coalition with the N.C.N.C. formed a government under the continued leadership of Abubakar Tafawa Balewa. One of the most significant features of this election was the movement of Nnamdi Azikiwe and Obafemi Awolowo, leaders of two of the three major parties, from regional politics to the central arena, indicating the increased prestige of the central government with independence impending.

On October 1, 1960, the federation achieved independence and a new constitution went into effect.¹¹⁸ Although a new document, the independence constitution made little change in the basic federal structure. The main modifications from the previous constitution, as already amended 1954-60, were in the removal of most of the governor-general's discretionary powers, and in the addition, as agreed at the earlier constitutional conferences, of an amendment procedure and of central emergency powers "to ensure the safety of the nation against internal and external threats."¹¹⁹ A further constitutional change came in 1963 with the adoption of a new republican constitution. The governor-general was replaced by a president as nominal head of the executive, appeals to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council were abolished, the procedure for

the appointment of judges was changed, and a variety of other minor adjustments were made. Although the same federal framework was retained and much of the wording remained unchanged, the conversion to a republic was made the occasion for adopting a completely new constitution.¹²⁰

Until 1966, the Nigerian federal system exhibited a remarkable degree of apparent stability, but this stability represented an ability to overcome successive nearly fatal crises rather than the absence of political strife. For instance, throughout the dozen years of its existence, there were persistent demands for the alteration of the existing regional units. Two pressures were at work. The three original regions had each contained significant ethnic minorities—the non-Muslim Middle Belt in the north, the non-Yoruba midwest, and the non-Ibo peoples of the Calabar, Rivers and Ogoja provinces in the east—and these groups demanded that the existing regions be splintered to form ethnically homogeneous “natural” states. Added to these pressures was the anxiety of southerners as a group at the preponderant size of the Northern Region possessing more than half of the federal population and area. Southern leaders, therefore, regularly argued that northern hegemony within the federal system could be avoided only if the Northern Region were split. Most of these pressures were resisted, but in 1963 a new Mid-Western Region was carved out of the Western Region.¹²¹

Another continual source of bitter controversy was the issue of regional representation in the central legislature and cabinet. The issue was a crucial one because the population of the Northern Region was greater than that of the others combined, and because the political parties, especially the Northern Peoples’ Congress, were chiefly regional in their bases of support. In 1954 a unicameral legislature had been established in which the Northern Region was limited to half the seats, but in 1959 this was replaced by a bicameral legislature in which the House of Representatives was based on representation according to population, and the Senate was based on equal representation for the regional units. This compromise was based on the assumption that the less advanced North would have a temporary advantage during which it might reduce its relative backwardness, but that in the long run the faster growing southern populations would eliminate the absolute majority held initially by the northerners. Controversy did not abate, however, for when the 1962-3 census confirmed that the automatic northern majority in the House of Representatives would be permanent rather than temporary as the southerners had expected, a series of heated disputes erupted. These almost led to the disintegration of the federation at the time of the federal election crisis in 1964-5 and remained a festering sore thereafter.

The distribution of finances among governments, and especially the application of the principle of derivation in the assignment of transfers of revenue to the regions, was a subject of acrimony also. It was found necessary to appoint no less than three fiscal commissions in the ten years before independence, and a further review was initiated after independence.

The use in 1962 by the central government of its emergency powers was not only a source of controversy but in the final analysis irrevocably destroyed the balance of political forces which had provided stability for a decade. In 1962, when an internal dispute in the Action Group created a constitutional crisis in the Western Region, the

central coalition of the N.P.C.-N.C.N.C. took the opportunity to exercise the emergency powers and to impose central administration in that region for seven months. This action, followed by the corruption investigations and treason trials, seriously weakened the Action Group, both as the federal opposition to the N.P.C.-N.C.N.C. coalition and as the dominant party in the Western Region. This reduced the need of the N.P.C. to rely on the N.C.N.C. as an ally and reinforced the dominant position of the northern-based party in federal politics. At the federal elections late in 1964 the N.P.C. was able to abandon the coalition with the N.C.N.C. and to take as its ally the Nigerian National Democratic party in the west. But the lengths to which this new coalition went in rigging the federal election in 1964 and the Western Regional election late in 1965 became a source of increasing unrest which culminated in the military coup of January 1966 and the end of the constitutional regime.

Throughout the life of the federation, regionalism had been an especially potent force, accentuated by the intensity of regional loyalties, by the bargaining power of regional governments due to the small number of regions and their large size, and by the regional basis of the political parties and of the governing elite. After a decade of relative success, the breakdown in the machinery for generating an interregional consensus led to the failure of the federal system.

But while federalism failed, military rule proved even less capable of resolving interregional tensions. The army itself, breaking into ethnic factions, quickly lost its cohesion and by mid-1967 Nigeria was on the brink of civil war.

V. The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland

In the mid-nineteenth century Central Africa was practically unknown to Europeans except for a handful of explorers. In what is now known as Southern Rhodesia the Matabele, under Lobengula, were dominant, frequently raiding the less warlike Mashona tribes to the east. North of the Zambesi River the Barotse tribe exercised a wide and little disputed authority. In Nyasaland the Zulu Angoni were subduing the indigenous tribes in the northeast and warring with the Yao tribe in the south.

The development of British influence in the three territories, while linked by certain common features, was in the main carried out separately. Southern Rhodesia was developed through the efforts of Rhodes' British South Africa Company, but in 1923 as a result of the demands of the settlers, it was annexed to the Crown as a Crown Colony and the settlers were granted responsible government. Northern Rhodesia also came under British influence through the activities of the same company, but here the process was more peaceful and settlement and development more gradual. In 1924 the administration of Northern Rhodesia was transferred to the Crown, but because of the scanty settler population it remained a protectorate and officials dominated the Legislative Council until 1945. Nyasaland came under British influence in a different way, largely as a result of missionary efforts. In 1891, in order to facilitate the pacification of the area, a British protectorate was proclaimed. The early economic development was largely under the auspices of the African Lakes Company in which the British South Africa Company early

acquired a controlling interest, but European settlement was even slower than in Northern Rhodesia.

From 1915 on, the amalgamation of the Rhodesias was suggested on various occasions. In 1915 the British South Africa Company, which administered both territories, proposed uniting the Rhodesias for the sake of economy, but the Southern Rhodesian settlers rejected the scheme, fearing that union with the undeveloped and predominantly black north would prove an economic liability and delay their own achievement of self-government. Beginning in the 1920s, however, a number of factors began to change the outlook of the Southern Rhodesians. The discovery of the Northern Rhodesian copper belt and the subsequent mushrooming of its wealth and settler population made it economically valuable and a potential bulwark of settler government. At the same time, the victory of General Hertzog's Afrikaner nationalist party in the South African elections of 1924 produced a sharp reaction among the predominantly English-speaking settlers of Southern Rhodesia. The possibility of uniting with South Africa, rejected in the referendum of 1922, became even more unpopular, increasing interest northwards. The growth of anti-imperialist sentiment in Britain and the policy of "paramountcy" of native interest, first enunciated for Kenya by the Duke of Devonshire in 1923, created a feeling of insecurity among the settlers about their future, and further encouraged settler solidarity between the Rhodesias.

In 1927 the appointment of the Hilton Young Commission on Closer Union of the Dependencies of East and Central Africa provoked the settlers of Northern Rhodesia, who preferred union with the white south, to approach the Southern Rhodesian government concerning possible terms of union. The delegates, Captain Murray and Mr. Strike, received terms extremely favourable to Northern Rhodesia. The presentation of these views to the commission succeeded in neutralizing the possibility of recommendations for any union of Northern Rhodesia with East Africa. The commission, however, did not recommend any immediate union of the Rhodesias, federal or unitary, because of their different native policies and different stages of constitutional progress.^{1 2 2}

The movement for amalgamation gained strength in the Rhodesias during the 1930s. It was spurred by the publication in 1930 of Lord Passfield's *Memorandum on Native Policy*, in which he reaffirmed the application of the British policy of paramountcy of African native interest to Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and to East Africa.^{1 2 3} The alarmed Northern Rhodesian settlers looked even more eagerly to union with self-governing Southern Rhodesia as an opportunity to free themselves from the Colonial Office and its native policies. Requests for a conference on amalgamation were, however, rejected by Lord Passfield. This only provoked further support for union, but the sole concession was the institution of a Central African Governors' Conference, intended to achieve greater administrative coordination. In 1936, a conference of delegates from the Northern and Southern Rhodesia legislatures met and adopted a resolution in favour of the early amalgamation of the two territories. The British government again rejected the proposal but later set up a Royal Commission to enquire into the feasibility and desirability of closer cooperation between the three British Central African territories. The Bledisloe Report pointed to common economic, social and political problems making closer cooperation desirable. As an ultimate objective it favoured amalgamation rather

than federation, because of the greater administrative efficiency of the former type of union. The commission, nevertheless, considered amalgamation unsuitable for the time being because of the marked difference in the native policies, constitutional status and economic development of the three territories, because the settler population was as yet unready either in numbers or in experience to govern the vast area, and because African opposition in the two northern protectorates displayed a "striking unanimity."¹²⁴

The Bledisloe Commission had, however, recommended an interterritorial council and in 1945 the Central African Council was established. Consisting of four members from each of the three territories, including the heads of their governments, the Council was a purely consultative and advisory body and was concerned chiefly with economic affairs and the operation of common services.

The establishment of the Central African Council did not subdue the hopes of the settlers for amalgamation. Indeed, with the signs of growing African political advance to the north, especially in West Africa, and the triumph of Dr. Malan's nationalist party to the south, the need for Central African solidarity appeared urgent. Led by Premier Godfrey Huggins of Southern Rhodesia and Roy Welensky, the leading unofficial member in the Northern Rhodesia legislature, the settlers continued to press for a union of the three territories. When Colonel Oliver Stanley, the Opposition spokesman on colonial affairs, advised Welensky that the British Conservative party would consider amalgamation out of the question, but might support federation, Welensky convinced Huggins and later the major advocates of amalgamation that they should change their goal to federation of the three Central African territories.¹²⁵ A conference of settlers was then held at Victoria Falls in 1949. Although it achieved little specific agreement, it did demonstrate the width of settler support and, because of the absence of African representatives, did arouse African suspicions of the scheme. Next, the Southern Rhodesian government brought pressure to bear by announcing its intention to withdraw from the Central African Council because of its inadequacies as a merely consultative body without executive powers.

Late in 1950, Mr. Griffiths, then Colonial Secretary, accepted Huggins' suggestion that a conference of officials be called to make a "purely exploratory" investigation of the question of closer association. This concession was largely the result of the Colonial Office's new realistic assessment of the situation in Northern Rhodesia in which the initiative had passed to the local officials and the unofficial members of the legislature. The conference rejected a loose league as impractical and amalgamation, despite its simplicity and efficiency, as having little chance of acceptance.¹²⁶ The solution it suggested was a compromise on federal lines whereby the different native policies and different constitutional status of the protectorates might be preserved within a unified structure.¹²⁷ To allay African fears a special independent African Affairs Board and a Minister for African Interests were also recommended.¹²⁸ The report was followed by a conference, this time composed of delegates of the three territorial and the British governments, held at Victoria Falls. The African representatives from the two northern territories became the centre of controversy when they made clear their apprehensions about being closely associated with Southern Rhodesia.¹²⁹ Although the final an-

nouncement of the conference stressed features meant to allay African fears and suspicions, African objections continued.

Although Griffiths had insisted that African consent was essential to any scheme of federation, the British elections of 1951 resulted in a Conservative government with a different emphasis. Concerned lest the Southern Rhodesian electorate reject federation, the new British government decided that, in spite of African opposition, the unification of the three territories was urgent if Southern Rhodesia was to be won to federation, a policy of racial partnership and freedom from South African influence.

A conference was held therefore in 1952, and although it was boycotted by the African representatives from the protectorates, it proceeded to produce a Draft Federal Scheme.¹³⁰ It proposed a federation of the two Rhodesias and Nyasaland, the two northern territories retaining their status as protectorates. The legislative powers open to the central government were increased considerably over those recommended by the officials' conference in 1951, although residual powers, including matters most closely concerning the daily lives of the Africans, were left to the territorial governments. The other major differences from the officials' scheme were the assignment to the central parliament of the power to fix the federal franchise, and the weakening of the constitutional safeguards for African rights by abandoning the idea of a Minister for African Interests and by reducing the status and authority of the African Affairs Board. The membership of the central legislature provoked considerable discussion because of the problem of balancing both its racial and territorial composition. The solution arrived at followed, with a few modifications, the recommendations of the officials' report. In the unicameral Federal Assembly the settlers were to control a majority of seats from each territory and three-quarters of the total membership (sufficient to pass constitutional amendments), but Southern Rhodesia, with 74 per cent of the federal settler population, was to be limited to 17 of the total 35 seats.

A final constitutional conference met in London in 1953.¹³¹ Once again the African representatives refused to participate. Thus the federal solution finally arrived at was in no way a compromise between the white settlers and the Africans, but rather a bargain between the settlers and the British government. The conference decided upon revisions to the earlier Draft Federal Scheme in the light of the reports of the Judicial, Fiscal and Civil Service Commissions, and further additions were made to the functions of the central government. Most important, in the face of settler pressure, the African Affairs Board was now converted from an independent commission into a standing committee of the Federal Assembly.

The federal scheme was then approved by referendum in Southern Rhodesia, by the Legislative Councils of the two protectorates and by the British Parliament. Huggins' efforts in the referendum campaign to assure the settlers that their security would not be endangered by federation further increased the African suspicion of it as a device to delay their advancement. Despite the continued opposition of the Africans of the northern territories and of the British Labour and Liberal parties, the British Government pressed through the Rhodesia and Nyasaland Federation Act of 1953.¹³² Convinced of the value

of federation in facilitating economic development, racial partnership and the creation of a viable nation as the buffer between black Africa to the north and white Africa to the south, and believing that once federation was experienced the Africans would realize its value, the British Government considered it urgent to take this last opportunity to include Southern Rhodesia in the federation before it turned to a demand for its own separate dominion status.

The constitution of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland went into effect in September 1953.¹³³ The rationale of the division of powers was that matters primarily of interest to the settlers, especially economic affairs, were assigned to the central government while those primarily of interest to the Africans were left in the hands of the territorial governments. A distinctive feature, therefore, was the splitting of some subjects such as education and agriculture on purely racial grounds.¹³⁴ A precise and complete division of powers on racial lines was impracticable, however, and in fact many of the fields allotted to the federal government were multiracial in scope. During the negotiations preceding federation, the settlers had continually pressed for increases in the central exclusive and concurrent powers, with the result that in the constitution as adopted central authority was extensive, including control of external affairs, the armed forces, the economy, communications, key development services and the major sources of revenue.

The constitution included such orthodox federal features as a federal public service distinct from the territorial public services, a Federal Supreme Court with exclusive jurisdiction to decide intergovernmental legal disputes and powers to interpret the constitution, and a rigid procedure for constitutional amendment. The actual normal amendment procedure was unusual, however, in that it was the British government which acted on behalf of the territories in ratifying amendments.¹³⁵ During the ten years, any alterations to the division of powers, however, required the prior consent of the territorial legislatures.

A unicameral Federal Assembly was created along the lines agreed upon in 1952. About a quarter of its members were Africans or represented African interests in the territories, and this was considered a major concession by the Southern Rhodesians. On the other hand, the Southern Rhodesian settlers who constituted 7 per cent of the population of that single territory had, under the existing franchise, control over 17 of the 35 central legislators, thus fostering the distrust of the Africans in the northern territories. Moreover, the power to fix the franchise was assigned to the Federal Assembly and it was the use made of this authority by the settlers in 1957-8 that resulted in so much controversy.

The constitution did, however, include many features intended to ease African anxieties. Among these were the specific enunciation in the preamble of "partnership" as a goal of federation, the continuance of protectorate status for Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, the requirement of the assent of the British government to constitutional amendments, the prohibition against the central government acquiring land for settling immigrants, the prohibition against the denial of employment in the public service solely on the grounds of race,¹³⁶ and establishment of a special standing committee of the

Federal Assembly, the African Affairs Board, with authority to request that legislation of a "differentiating" nature be reserved for assent by the British government.¹³⁷

In the first federal elections Sir Godfrey Huggins' Federal party won a sweeping victory, gaining 24 of the 26 ordinary seats for elected members. First under Huggins and then after 1956 under Welensky as prime ministers, this party continued to dominate central politics, for in 1958 it again triumphed in the federal elections, securing 44 of the 53 "elected" seats, with the support of the predominantly white electorate.¹³⁸

The federation had been imposed despite the protests of the majority of the articulate Africans in the hope that, once experienced, its benefits would be recognized by the Africans. In the early years after its formation there were some signs that federation was indeed resulting in positive achievements. The first seven years saw "a remarkable, if perhaps uneven, economic advance."¹³⁹ Some critics have argued that federation itself was not responsible for this economic expansion, and that the economic benefits of this advance were not equitably distributed among the territories,¹⁴⁰ but the Monckton Commission was sufficiently impressed to consider this the main advantage and achievement of federation.¹⁴¹ There were also some advances in the lowering of the colour bar in land apportionment, industrial employment, the government services, social services and public amenities. But while the settlers considered these major concessions, the meagre nature of the measures and the strength of settler opposition to them did much to undo their value in winning the confidence of the Africans.¹⁴²

Despite these positive achievements the federation failed to accomplish what the British government had expected, for instead of advancing peacefully towards a maturing racial partnership, it produced deteriorating race relations, discontent, disturbances, and instability. The federal government, dependent on a predominantly white electorate, was unable to concentrate on conciliating the Africans, for it had to protect its own right flank against those, such as the supporters of the Dominion party, who charged it with jeopardizing white supremacy. As a result, the failure to take any "significant and well publicized steps to demonstrate the reality of racial partnership as the basis of Federation,"¹⁴³ the lack of adequate African representation in the central government, the dominant role of Southern Rhodesia (apparent in the majority it held in the central cabinet, in the choice of Salisbury as the federal capital, and the choice of the Kariba site for the major hydroelectric development), the efforts of the settler-dominated central government to expand its authority and to influence the negotiations for the revision of territorial constitutions, the relative slowness of African political advance in the territories and the increased flood of European immigration, all served to confirm the fears of the Africans that federation was a barrier rather than a means to their political advancement. Thus, the Monckton Commission reported that "the opposition to Federation which . . . was strong at the time that Federation was introduced has gathered further strength by the African disappointment in the manner of its operation."¹⁴⁴ The hope that white altruism and black patience would jointly make a success of federation proved illusory.

The turning point came when developments occurred during 1957-9 which turned the sullen suspicions of the northern Africans about the true purpose of federation into a hardened certainty. The settler demand for an early end to "Whitehall control" and for

the grant of dominion status, and the British promise to consider this at the 1960 review of the constitution, the passage of the Constitution Amendment Act, 1957, and the Electoral Act, 1958, which were ruled "differentiating measures" by the African Affairs Board but approved by the British Government,¹⁴⁵ the federal intervention on the side of illiberality in the territorial constitution-making in Northern Rhodesia and the rejection of Todd as premier in Southern Rhodesia because he was "ultra-liberal," all induced Africans to believe the worst. Federation was exposed in their eyes as a device for settler control, and the African Affairs Board and the British government's reserved powers shown to be ineffective safeguards.

Federation was now fully discredited among the Africans of the protectorates, and the anger, bitterness and frustration of the African nationalists were focused upon federation. Throughout 1958 tension mounted in the three territories. In Nyasaland, the Congress party had reached a stage in which it felt there was no constitutional way in which to make its views effective and with the return of Dr. Hastings Banda was showing a new militancy. The situation deteriorated so rapidly that in February and March, 1959, emergencies were declared in Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, the Zambia Congress was declared illegal in Northern Rhodesia, African leaders were arrested, and in Nyasaland a "police state" was imposed with the aid of federal troops.¹⁴⁶ The fears of the Nyasaland Africans that federation would enable white Southern Rhodesian troops to impose settler rule had come true, and the baton charges, the bloodshed, the burning of houses, the searching of villages, the collective fines and the confiscation of implements did not make the people of Nyasaland like the federation any better.

Although not immediately apparent, after the emergency the position of the British government began to shift towards an acceptance of the need to revise the federal structure considerably, in spite of settler opposition. In 1959 an advisory commission under Lord Monckton, composed of nominees of the territorial, federal and British governments was set up to make recommendations for the constitutional review conference due to be held late in 1960.¹⁴⁷ The commission pointed to the economic advantages and achievements of federation but in the light of a widespread, sincere, and "almost pathological" dislike of federation among the Africans of the two northern territories, concluded that "Federation cannot, in our view, be maintained in its present form."¹⁴⁸

The majority of the commission recommended a drastic revision of the federal structure. Among its recommendations was the suggestion that, in order to make the Federal Assembly representative of the broad mass of African and European opinion, seats in the Assembly should, without delay, be equally divided between Africans and Europeans and the franchise revised.¹⁴⁹ In order to remove the fear of federation as a barrier to political advance, immediate and substantial advances in the territorial constitutions towards self-government were advised. Other recommendations included the rejection of the division of powers on racial lines, the transfer of considerable functions and finances to the territorial governments, the strengthening of the machinery for inter-governmental cooperation, and the improving of existing safeguards and the addition of new ones, including a Bill of Rights and Councils of State, the latter acting as a barrier to discriminatory legislation.¹⁵⁰ Since the term "federation" had become to many Africans

a term of abuse, the commission also concluded that the federal association, in its new form, must start with a new name. One of the commission's most controversial decisions was that the new federal structure should be "on approval," willingness to try the new scheme being obtained by means of a right of secession after a trial period.¹⁵¹

The review conference met late in 1960 but the real work of reviewing the federal constitution was postponed. In the meantime, the British Government undertook a program of constitutional advances in all three territories. The result in Nyasaland was the triumph in 1961 of the Malawi Congress party, led by Dr. Hastings Banda, an avowed advocate of secession, when it won control of the territorial legislature and executive council. Nyasaland's continued membership in the federation now depended upon the decision of its African leaders. Soon afterwards constitutional advances in Northern Rhodesia also brought into power African nationalist leaders committed to secession. During the period between 1960 and 1963 the Conservative Government in Britain gradually shifted towards a realization that the federal experiment had failed and should therefore be terminated. Despite a determined rearguard action by the pro-federal settlers, bitter at the gradual withdrawal of British support, the handwriting was on the wall when the Imperial Government agreed late in 1962 to permit Nyasaland to secede. When the African Government of Northern Rhodesia likewise insisted upon its own separate independence, Britain proceeded to dissolve the federation on December 31, 1963.

VI. *The West Indies Federation*

During the seventeenth, eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Britain acquired by settlement and by conquest from the Spanish, French and Dutch a large number of West Indian islands. In the eighteenth century these West Indian colonies were the most important part of the British Empire, far outranking the colonies of the North American mainland in economic and strategic importance. The form of government generally in operation was "the old representative system," the representative institutions being dominated by the white oligarchy. In the nineteenth century, however, when economic and social difficulties followed the drop in sugar prices, soil exhaustion and the abolition of the slave trade and slavery, the constitutional structure of nearly all the islands was altered to non-representative Crown Colony government. It was only in the twentieth century that representative government was reintroduced, this time advancing by gradual stages to a democratic basis.¹⁵²

During the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth centuries, there were numerous official and unofficial proposals for federating the West Indian islands.¹⁵³ The various proposals differed widely in the scope of the territories to be included, in the justifications offered for federal union and in the degree of power and influence to be conferred on the central government. Most of these schemes were characterized by a Benthamite preoccupation with the administrative and economic advantages of federal association and therefore failed to stir public imagination. This, coupled with the difficulty and cost of transportation between the scattered islands, resulted in little being achieved in the direction of a federation of all British Caribbean colonies.

Nevertheless, some projects for limited federations and unions within the British West Indies did actually come into operation. At various times from the seventeenth century on, the Leeward Islands and the Windward Islands were grouped under common governors, and a federal constitution was enacted for the Leewards in 1705, but it soon lapsed. In 1871 a new federation of the Leewards was achieved, although a few years later the projected wider federation of the Leewards, Windwards and Barbados was abandoned when it provoked the "Confederation Riots" in Barbados. The Leeward Islands federation, consisting of Antigua, St. Kitts, Nevis, Dominica, Montserrat and the Virgin Islands lasted right up to 1956. The federation was of a very loose order, the central legislative and financial powers being very limited, and the central legislature, composed of delegates from the local legislatures, being inhibited from developing any power that would rival those of the component units. The result was "a weak central government, involving additional expenditure to no effectual purpose" and it was the target of much criticism throughout its existence.¹⁵⁴ This lesson, it would appear, was not, however, sufficiently taken into account by those planning a wider federation after 1945.

During the nineteenth century several intercolonial unions were also undertaken in the West Indies. Most significant perhaps was the federation of Tobago with Trinidad in 1887, followed by the complete amalgamation in 1898, for the fate of Tobago did not pass unnoticed in the smaller islands of the Caribbean. Other unions of West Indian islands took place when the diminutive Cayman Islands and the Turks and Caicos Islands were brought under the Jamaican legislature in 1863 and 1873, and when St. Kitts and Nevis were united as a single presidency within the Leeward Islands federation in 1882.

For a time British Honduras was under the jurisdiction of the governor of Jamaica, but it became a separate colony in 1884. An intercolonial link of a different sort was the West Indian Appeal Court set up in 1919.

On the issue of a wider British Caribbean federation, however, there was little progress before 1945. Indeed, the Closer Union Commission of 1933 had reported unfavourably and the West India Royal Commission of 1938-9 had advised caution. Both pointed to the strength of local pride and to the difficulties of communication and suggested that public opinion in the British West Indies was not yet ripe for federation, although the latter commission suggested that British West Indian unity was the ideal to which policy should be directed.¹⁵⁵

Events during the war of 1939-45 fostered the growth of opinion in favour of political federation in the West Indies. One of the most important developments was the extension of interisland communication by air, facilitating contact between island leaders on a scale previously impossible. During the war, regional organization of one kind and another came into being and these led to a growing appreciation of the value of a regional approach to the solution of social and economic questions. The ferment of the Second World War affected ways of thought in both the imperial power and the West Indian peoples. The British government set upon a policy of implementing independence for the colonies but considered that in the Caribbean this would only be practicable if the islands were federated.¹⁵⁶ Among the people of the islands, the enunciation of the Atlantic Charter and the establishment of the American bases without reference to West Indian opinion fostered West Indian nationalism. The issue of West Indian unity was brought

into focus late in the war by meetings of the Associated Chambers of Commerce and the West Indian Conference in Barbados in 1944, and by the newly formed Caribbean Labour Congress which at its first session in 1945 demanded a conference for the purpose of considering West Indian federation.

Early in 1945, when it was clear that the war would soon be over, Oliver Stanley, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, in a dispatch to all the governors of the British Caribbean colonies, initiated discussions on two programs of federation, one for federating the Windward and Leeward Islands and the other, a larger plan, for linking all the British Caribbean colonies.¹⁵⁷ The smaller federation was not looked upon as an alternative but rather, as the Moyne Commission had suggested, as an important "experimental" step towards the wider federation. Following a conference of delegates from the Windward Islands in 1945, the Colonial Secretary submitted in 1946 proposals for the amalgamation of the Windwards and Leewards under "a strong central government with wide powers over all matters of general administration."¹⁵⁸ A conference on closer union of the Windward and Leeward Islands, held at St. Kitts early in 1947, agreed that a central government should be established, with a wide range of powers assigned to it and a legislative council directly elected by the people, thus differing greatly from the existing Leeward Islands federation.¹⁵⁹ Nevertheless, the persistence of strong insular feeling was evident for the delegates were clearly in favour of an orthodox federation instead of amalgamation.

Although the Moyne Report had suggested that the question of a wider British West Indian federation be deferred until experience with the Windward-Leeward federation had been obtained, Arthur Creech Jones, then Secretary of State for the Colonies, suggested in 1947 that there was no need to postpone a conference to consider the question since all the British Caribbean colonial legislatures, except the Bahamas, had already shown support for the wider federation when debating Stanley's dispatch. Accordingly, in September 1947, a conference on closer association of the British West Indian colonies was held under the Colonial Secretary's chairmanship at Montego Bay.¹⁶⁰ After a general discussion of the issues involved in federation, the conference agreed on "a federation in which each constituent unit retains complete control over all matters except those specifically assigned to the federal government."¹⁶¹ The conference also agreed upon the establishment of machinery to work towards this aim. A Standing Closer Association Committee, composed of delegates from each of the colonial legislatures, was to consider and report on the form the federal constitution should take, special commissions were to examine the problems of a customs union and of the unification of the public services, and a small regional economic committee was to study and report on matters of common economic significance and to advise territorial governments on economic policy.¹⁶² So general was the agreement that after the Montego Bay conference hopes ran high and federation was regarded as imminent. But while there had been general support for the resolutions of the conference, its proceedings indicated some of the probable difficulties in store. The strength of insular particularism was indicated by the resolution that the political development of the individual territories "must be pursued as an aim in itself, without prejudice and in no way subordinate to

progress towards federation.”¹⁶³ The reluctance expressed by the Jamaicans and especially of Bustamante, to more than functional cooperation for fear that federation would retard Jamaica's progress to self-government, indicated Jamaican doubts in spite of their support at the end of the conference for its conclusions. The hesitance of the representatives of the mainland British Caribbean territories, British Guiana and British Honduras, foreshadowed their later refusal to join the federation when it was formed.

The decision to proceed with the British Caribbean federation, without awaiting the results of the narrower experimental federation in the Windwards and Leewards, raised the problem of the role of the smaller federation within the larger one. In their proposals, the Colonial Secretaries had suggested that the Windward-Leeward colony might be one unit in the wider federation. The St. Kitts proposals had, however, assigned to the smaller federal government powers and revenues which were likely to be those of the central government in the wider federation. In the end, the combination of insularity and desire to participate in the larger federation led to the abandonment of the smaller middle-tier one, for the islands preferred to participate in the British Caribbean federation as individual units. Indeed, the problem evolved into one of dissociation, the existing Leeward Islands federation being defederated in order that its components might become separate units in the larger federation.¹⁶⁴

Two years after the Montego Bay conference the Standing Closer Association Committee submitted its proposals on the form the British Caribbean federal constitution should take.¹⁶⁵ It recommended a division of powers patterned on the form of the Australian model, with federal and concurrent fields of legislation enumerated and all residual powers remaining with the territorial governments. In view of the existing social and economic diversity and the strength of local political and other traditions, the list of “federal” functions was limited chiefly to external relations and interterritorial communications.¹⁶⁶ The gradual accretion of central functions “as the region grows together” was envisaged, however, and to make this possible provisions enabling the territories to delegate powers to the central government were suggested.¹⁶⁷ The S.C.A.C. insisted that for effective federal government, the central government must have its own independent source of revenue. Since it considered the establishment of a customs union as “the foundation of a federal structure,” it suggested that customs was the appropriate major source of central revenue.¹⁶⁸ But because customs revenue would exceed for many years the central requirements, and alternative sources of territorial revenue were limited, it was proposed that 75 per cent of the net customs receipts should be returned unconditionally to the territories in proportion to their consumption of dutiable goods. Thus the central government was to be left financially weak also.

The report advocated a bicameral central legislature in order that the Senate, consisting wholly of nominated members, might represent the equality of the constituent units and serve as a revisionary house. The House of Assembly was to be elected by universal suffrage and to represent the territories in something like proportion to population, except that the representation of the larger territories was considerably reduced to prevent Jamaica, with nearly half the British Caribbean population, from dominating the House. The central executive was to be a Council of State in which the

prime minister would be elected by the House of Assembly, an interesting innovation in British constitutional practice.

Other recommendations included setting up a Supreme Court on the Australian model, establishing separate federal and territorial civil services, placing the capital in Trinidad, and relying on British Orders in Council for constitutional amendments. The committee also examined the cost of federation in order to contradict exaggerated ideas that had become current,¹⁶⁹ and recommended certain forms of pre-federal joint action, although it insisted that these were no substitute for political federation. During 1949 and 1950 the Holmes Commission also reported in favour of immediate unification of the public services¹⁷⁰ and the McLagan Commission reported that a customs union, whether preceding or accompanying political federation, was both practically and economically desirable.¹⁷¹

After the publication of the S.C.A.C. report, discussions became involved and difficult as the special interests, ambitions and fears in each island came to the fore. Parochialism grounded deep in generations of history continued to exert itself. A complicating factor was the introduction of adult suffrage and rapid constitutional progress in the individual islands after 1944, making some political leaders eager to consolidate their political gains and fearful that in federation they might lose them. Moreover, the S.C.A.C. proposals for the central government, and especially the central executive, represented a Crown Colony constitution of an advanced type, but slightly less advanced than the constitutions already in force in several territories. Thus, for the politicians who hoped for a speedy advance towards dominion status through federation, the proposals were a distinct disappointment. The S.C.A.C. report was debated in the legislatures of the various islands. Jamaica, a thousand miles from the other islands and more self-contained, was at first doubtful, and Barbados, fearful of Jamaican domination, was unenthusiastic. But eventually all the islands, with the exception of the Virgin Islands, accepted federation in principle, although some proposed modifications to the S.C.A.C. scheme. The mainland territories of British Guiana and British Honduras, fearing they might be swamped by the surplus population from the islands, conscious of their own undeveloped resources and cherishing dreams of continental destinies, declared themselves against participation.

As a result of the problems and disagreements which had emerged following the publication of the S.C.A.C. report, constitution-making proved to be a long, drawn-out and difficult process. Between 1953 and 1956 three constitutional conferences were held and four commissions appointed to examine particular aspects of federation.¹⁷² The major issues of contention were the assignment to the central government of finances and particularly customs,¹⁷³ the power to levy income tax, and the control of external public borrowing; the assertion of the principle of freedom of internal movement which aroused Trinidad's fears of migration from the smaller islands; whether to permit simultaneous membership in central and territorial legislatures; where to place the constitutional amending power—whether in the West Indian legislatures or the British government; the site of the federal capital; and the "dependent" character of the central government. Not infrequently decisions made at earlier conferences were reversed at later ones.¹⁷⁴

The compromises arrived at on the issues of central control of free internal movement, customs union and income tax were similar—"an agreement in principle and postponement of its realization."¹⁷⁵ In the case of the restriction of internal movement, the ultimate control would after five years lie with the central government, but until then the territories were left with some initiative. Similarly, although the concurrent power to levy taxes on income and profits, and customs and excise duties, was recognized, for the first five years central revenue was limited to the profits on the issue of currency, a mandatory levy on the territorial governments, and receipts from certain scheduled customs and excise duties. The net effect was that, at least for the initial five years, the central government would be even weaker than under the S.C.A.C. recommendations. On the issues of simultaneous membership in legislatures and procedure for constitutional amendment, the 1956 conference reverted to the S.C.A.C. proposals in prohibiting the former and leaving the latter to British Orders in Council. The demand for a less "colonial" central government resulted in alterations to the membership of the Council of State and the powers of the governor-general, although the governor-general still retained considerable discretionary power and the British government held reserved powers. Disagreement over the federal capital site necessitated a special commission, but its recommendation of Barbados in terms offensive to West Indian nationalism resulted in the Standing Federation Commission choosing Trinidad instead.¹⁷⁶ For some time the United States refused to give up its naval base on that site and Port-of-Spain served as the temporary federal capital, but later the United States agreed to vacate the area required for the federal capital by the end of 1962.

In January 1958, after thirteen years of negotiations, the constitution of the West Indies Federation finally came into effect.¹⁷⁷ As implemented, the federation consisted of ten islands or groups of islands with wide variations in size, population and wealth. Jamaica alone contained 52 per cent of the federal population, 58 per cent of the total area and 42 per cent of the total revenue, while Trinidad held a further 27 per cent of the population, 26 per cent of the area and 42 per cent of the revenue, representing more than the eight other territories combined. The chief characteristic of the division of powers was the extreme weakness of the central government in legislative authority and financial resources. Indeed the central government was little more than an improved version of the pre-federal Regional Economic Committee. The list of exclusive central powers was niggardly, although the more extensive concurrent list provided scope for a transition later to greater centralization. The central government's lack of finances dramatized its weakness; with one-tenth the revenue of either Trinidad or Jamaica, it would hardly be in a position to achieve the hoped-for economic transformation. The West Indies Federation was also unique among modern political federations in commencing without a customs union, the implementation of this being delayed, awaiting the report of a Commission on Trade and Tariffs.

The first federal elections were held early in 1958, and in these the Federal Labour party, a loose alliance of island socialist parties, emerged narrowly victorious. As its major leaders, Norman Manley and Eric Williams chose to remain as the premiers of Jamaica and Trinidad, Grantley Adams of Barbados became the federal prime minister. The opposition Democratic Labour party, a heterogeneous coalition of parties, which claimed to be

anti-socialist and opposed to undue federal encroachments over the units, did better than expected, capturing a majority of the federal seats in both Trinidad and Jamaica. As a result, in the early years of the federation the two largest territories were both seriously under-represented in the central executive.

The achievement of federation did not end disagreements over the federal structure. The constitution had deferred the implementation of the customs union, the central right to tax income and profits, and central control of internal movement, and had also provided for a general review of the constitution within five years, thus encouraging continued contention.¹⁷⁸ In the discussions on these issues, Trinidad emerged as the champion of central power and Jamaica as the proponent of the view that the central government should have no more power than necessary for its recognition as an international entity. The key issue was whether the central government should have powers of direct taxation and control of economic development. The Jamaican government had undertaken its own program of economic development and, attributing its rapid expansion to these efforts, was determined to prevent the central government from interfering with the Jamaican economy. It therefore opposed federal control of income and taxation of profits, and argued for a longer period than that recommended by the Trade and Tariffs Commission within which to accommodate its existing high protective tariffs to a customs union. Jamaicans, realizing also that without control of the federal legislature, their economy might be placed at the mercy of the federation, demanded that they should receive representation in the House of Representatives proportional to their population, and insisted that this problem be settled before the others were dealt with.

These issues came to a head in a long series of intergovernmental negotiations beginning in 1959 and culminating in the constitutional review conference in June 1961.¹⁷⁹ The outcome was a continuous, if often unwilling, dance to the Jamaican tune and the result, an emasculated federal structure. Because it was feared that a federation without Jamaica could not be viable, concessions were made on most issues. Jamaican representation in the House of Representatives was increased, direct taxation and the control of economic development were placed outside federal competence, any transfer of these to federal control being in effect subject to Jamaican veto, and the introduction of the customs union was to be phased over nine years.¹⁸⁰

In spite of these concessions and the promise of federal independence in May 1962, the federation failed, however, to hold Jamaica. Premier Norman Manley, a professed supporter of federation, had announced early in 1960 that Jamaica would hold a referendum on the issue of secession. Conceived as a weapon both to extort concessions for Jamaica in the constitutional bargaining and to undermine the Jamaican critics of federation, it succeeded in achieving the former but backfired in the latter, for when the referendum was held in September 1961, a majority of Jamaicans voted against federation. Faced with this expression of Jamaican opinion, the British Government quickly agreed to permit Jamaica to secede and seek its own independence.¹⁸¹ With the withdrawal of Jamaica, the Trinidad Government decided to seek its own independence also. Thereupon, the British Government decided simply to dissolve the federation.¹⁸²

Handicapped by the failure to give the central government effective power and by the parochialism of its leaders, the West Indies Federation, which had been floundering unhappily since its formation, finally sank altogether and was dissolved on the very day it was to have achieved independence.

*I. The Constitution of India (adopted 1950)¹**Fundamental Rights**Article 15*

- 1) The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them.
- 2) No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them, be subject to any disability, liability, restriction or condition with regard to
 - a) access to shops, public restaurants, hotels and places of public entertainment; or
 - b) the use of wells, tanks, bathing ghats, roads and places of public resort maintained wholly or partly out of State funds dedicated to the use of the general public.
- 3) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any special provision for women and children.
- 4) Nothing in this article or in clause (2) of article 29 shall prevent the State from making any special provision for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes.²

Article 16

- 1) There shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State.
- 2) No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, descent, place of birth, residence or any of them, be ineligible for, or discriminated against in respect of, any employment or office under the State.
- 3) Nothing in this article shall prevent Parliament from making any law prescribing, in regard to a class or classes of employment or appointment to an office (under the Government of, or any local or other authority within, a State or Union territory, any requirement as to residence within that State or Union territory)³ prior to such employment or appointment.⁴
- 4) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any provision for the reservation of appointments or posts in favour of any backward class of citizens which, in the opinion of the State, is not adequately represented in the services under the State.
- 5) Nothing in this article shall affect the operation of any law which provides that the incumbent of an office in connection with the affairs of any religious or denominational institution or any member of the governing body thereof shall be a person professing a particular religion or belonging to a particular denomination.

Article 25

- 1) Subject to public order, morality and health and to the other provisions of this Part, all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion.
- 2) Nothing in this article shall affect the operation of any existing law or prevent the State from making any law
 - a) regulating or restricting any economic, financial, political or other secular activity which may be associated with religious practice;
 - b) providing for social welfare and reform or the throwing open of Hindu religious institutions of a public character to all classes and sections of Hindus.

Explanation I. The wearing and carrying of kirpans shall be deemed to be included in the profession of the Sikh religion.

Explanation II. In sub-clause (b) of clause (2), the reference to Hindus shall be construed as including a reference to persons professing the Sikh, Jaina or Buddhist religion, and the reference to Hindu religious institutions shall be construed accordingly.

Article 26

Subject to public order, morality and health, every religious denomination or any section thereof shall have the right

- a) to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes;
- b) to manage its own affairs in matters of religion;
- c) to own and acquire movable and immovable property; and
- d) to administer such property in accordance with law.

Article 27

No person shall be compelled to pay any taxes, the proceeds of which are specifically appropriated in payment of expenses for the promotion or maintenance of any particular religion or religious denomination.

Article 28

- 1) No religious instruction shall be provided in any educational institution wholly maintained out of State funds.
- 2) Nothing in clause (1) shall apply to an educational institution which is administered by the State but has been established under any endowment or trust which requires that religious instruction shall be imparted in such institution.
- 3) No person attending any educational institution recognised by the State or receiving aid out of State funds shall be required to take part in any religious instruction that may be imparted in such institution or to attend any religious worship that may be conducted in such institution or in any premises attached thereto unless such person or, if such person is a minor, his guardian has given his consent thereto.

Article 29

- 1) Any section of the citizens residing in the territory of India or any part thereof having a distinct language, script or culture of its own shall have the right to conserve the same.
- 2) No citizen shall be denied admission into any educational institution maintained by the State or receiving aid out of State funds on grounds only of religion, race, caste, language or any of them.

Article 30

- 1) All minorities, whether based on religion or language, shall have the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice.
- 2) The State shall not, in granting aid to educational institutions, discriminate against any educational institution on the ground that it is under the management of a minority, whether based on religion or language.

Directive Principles

Article 46

The State shall promote with special care the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections of the people, and, in particular, of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, and shall protect them from social injustice and all forms of exploitation.

Parliament

Article 120

- 1) Notwithstanding anything in Part XVII, but subject to the provisions of article 348, business in Parliament shall be transacted in Hindi or in English:
Provided that the Chairman of the Council of States or Speaker of the House of the People, or person acting as such, as the case may be, may permit any member who cannot adequately express himself in Hindi or in English to address the House in his mother tongue.
- 2) Unless Parliament by law otherwise provides, this article shall, after the expiration of a period of fifteen years from the commencement of this Constitution, have effect as if the words “or in English” were omitted therefrom.

The State Legislature

Article 210

- 1) Notwithstanding anything in Part XVII, but subject to the provisions of article 348, business in the Legislature of a State shall be transacted in the official language or languages of the State or in Hindi or in English:
Provided that the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly or Chairman of the Legislative Council, or person acting as such, as the case may be, may permit any member who cannot adequately express himself in any of the languages aforesaid to address the House in his mother tongue.
- 2) Unless the Legislature of the State by law otherwise provides, this article shall, after the expiration of a period of fifteen years from the commencement of this Constitution, have effect as if the words “or in English” were omitted therefrom.

Special Provisions Relating to Certain Classes

Article 330⁵

- 1) Seats shall be reserved in the House of the People for
 - a) the Scheduled Castes;
 - b) the Scheduled Tribes except the Scheduled Tribes in the tribal areas of Assam; and
 - c) the Scheduled Tribes in the autonomous districts of Assam.
- 2) The number of seats reserved in any State (or Union territory)⁶ for the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes under clause (1) shall bear, as nearly as may be, the same proportion to the total number of seats allotted to that State (or Union territory)⁶ in the House of the People as the population of the Scheduled Castes in the State (or Union territory)⁶ or of the Scheduled Tribes in the State (or Union territory)⁶ or part of the State (or Union territory)⁶ as the case may be, in respect of which seats are so reserved, bears to the total population of the State (or Union territory).⁶

Article 331⁷

Notwithstanding anything in article 81, the President may, if he is of opinion that the Anglo-Indian community is not adequately represented in the House of the People, nominate not more than two members of that community to the House of the People.

Article 332⁸

- 1) Seats shall be reserved for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, except the Scheduled Tribes in the tribal areas of Assam, in the Legislative Assembly of every State. . . .⁹

- 2) Seats shall be reserved also for the autonomous districts in the Legislative Assembly of the State of Assam.
- 3) The number of seats reserved for the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes in the Legislative Assembly of any State under clause (1) shall bear, as nearly as may be, the same proportion to the total number of seats in the Assembly as the population of the Scheduled Castes in the State or of the Scheduled Tribes in the State or part of the State, as the case may be, in respect of which seats are so reserved, bears to the total population of the State.
- 4) The number of seats reserved for an autonomous district in the Legislative Assembly of the State of Assam shall bear to the total number of seats in that Assembly a proportion not less than the population of the district bears to the total population of the State.
- 5) The constituencies for the seats reserved for any autonomous district of Assam shall not comprise any area outside that district except in the case of the constituency comprising the cantonment and municipality of Shillong.
- 6) No person who is not a member of a Scheduled Tribe of any autonomous district of the State of Assam shall be eligible for election to the Legislative Assembly of the State from any constituency of that district except from the constituency comprising the cantonment and municipality of Shillong.

Article 333¹⁰

Notwithstanding anything in article 170, the Governor, . . .¹¹ of a State may, if he is of opinion that the Anglo-Indian community needs representation in the Legislative Assembly of the State and is not adequately represented therein, nominate such number of members of the community to the Assembly as he considers appropriate.

Article 334¹²

Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provisions of this Part, the provisions of this Constitution relating to

- a) the reservation of seats for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes in the House of the People and in the Legislative Assemblies of the States; and
- b) the representation of the Anglo-Indian community in the House of the People and in the Legislative Assemblies of the States by nomination,

shall cease to have effect on the expiration of a period of ten years from the commencement of this Constitution:

Provided that nothing in this article shall affect any representation in the House of the People or in the Legislative Assembly of a State until the dissolution of the then existing House or Assembly, as the case may be.

Article 335¹²

The claims of the members of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes shall be taken into consideration, consistently with the maintenance of efficiency of administration, in the making of appointments to services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or of a State.

Article 336¹³

- 1) During the first two years after the commencement of this Constitution, appointments of members of the Anglo-Indian community to posts in the railway, customs, postal and telegraph services of the Union shall be made on the same basis as immediately before the fifteenth day of August, 1947.

During every succeeding period of two years, the number of posts reserved for the members of the said community in the said services shall, as nearly as possible, be less by ten per cent than the numbers so reserved during the immediately preceding period of two years:

Provided that at the end of ten years from the commencement of this Constitution all such reservations shall cease.

- 2) Nothing in clause (1) shall bar the appointment of members of the Anglo-Indian community to posts other than, or in addition to, those reserved for the community under that clause if such

members are found qualified for appointment on merit as compared with the members of other communities.

*Article 337*¹³

During the first three financial years after the commencement of this Constitution, the same grants, if any shall be made by the Union and by each State...¹⁴ for the benefit of the Anglo-Indian community in respect of education as were made in the financial year ending on the thirty-first day of March, 1948.

During every succeeding period of three years the grants may be less by ten per cent than those for the immediately preceding period of three years:

Provided that at the end of ten years from the commencement of this Constitution such grants, to the extent to which they are a special concession to the Anglo-Indian community, shall cease:

Provided further that no educational institution shall be entitled to receive any grant under this article unless at least forty per cent of the annual admissions therein are made available to members of communities other than the Anglo-Indian community.

Article 338

- 1) There shall be a Special Officer for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes to be appointed by the President.
- 2) It shall be the duty of the Special Officer to investigate all matters relating to the safeguards provided for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes under this Constitution and report to the President upon the working of those safeguards at such intervals as the President may direct, and the President shall cause all such reports to be laid before each House of Parliament.
- 3) In this article, references to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes shall be construed as including references to such other backward classes as the President may, on receipt of the report of a Commission appointed under clause (1) of article 340, by order specify and also to the Anglo-Indian community.

*Article 339*¹⁵

- 1) The President may at any time and shall, at the expiration of ten years from the commencement of this Constitution by order appoint a Commission to report on the administration of the Scheduled Areas and the welfare of the Scheduled Tribes in the States...¹⁶
The order may define the composition, powers and procedure of the Commission and may contain such incidental or ancillary provisions as the President may consider necessary or desirable.
- 2) The executive power of the Union shall extend to the giving of directions to (a State)¹⁷ as to the drawing up and execution of schemes specified in the direction to be essential for the welfare of the Scheduled Tribes in the State.

Article 340

- 1) The President may by order appoint a Commission consisting of such persons as he thinks fit to investigate the conditions of socially and educationally backward classes within the territory of India and the difficulties under which they labour and to make recommendations as to the steps that should be taken by the Union or any State to remove such difficulties and to improve their condition and as to the grants that should be made for the purpose by the Union or any State and the conditions subject to which such grants should be made, and the order appointing such Commission shall define the procedure to be followed by the Commission.
- 2) A Commission so appointed shall investigate the matters referred to them and present to the President a report setting out the facts as found by them and making such recommendations as they think proper.
- 3) The President shall cause a copy of the report so presented together with a memorandum explaining the action taken thereon to be laid before each House of Parliament.

Article 341

- 1) The President (may with respect to any State¹⁸ (or Union territory),¹⁹ and where it is a State...²⁰ after consultation with the Governor...²¹ thereof), by public notification,²² specify the castes, races

or tribes or parts of or groups within castes, races or tribes which shall for the purposes of this Constitution be deemed to be Scheduled Castes in relation to that State (or Union territory, as the case may be).¹⁹

- 2) Parliament may by law include in or exclude from the list of Scheduled Castes specified in a notification issued under clause (1) any caste, race or tribe or part of or group within any caste, race or tribe, but save as aforesaid a notification issued under the said clause shall not be varied by any subsequent notification.

Article 342²³

- 1) The President (may with respect to any State²⁴ (or Union territory)²⁵ and where it is a State . . .²⁶ after consultation with the Governor. . .²⁷ thereof), by public notification,²⁸ specify the tribes or tribal communities or parts of or groups within tribes or tribal communities which shall for the purposes of this Constitution be deemed to be Scheduled Tribes in relation to that State (or Union territory, as the case may be).²⁵
- 2) Parliament may by law include in or exclude from the list of Scheduled Tribes specified in a notification issued under clause (1) any tribe or tribal community or part of or group within any tribe or tribal community, but save as aforesaid a notification issued under the said clause shall not be varied by any subsequent notification.

Official Language

Article 343

- 1) The official language of the Union shall be Hindi in Devanagari script.
The form of numerals to be used for the official purposes of the Union shall be the international form of Indian numerals.
- 2) Notwithstanding anything in clause (1), for a period of fifteen years from the commencement of this Constitution, the English language shall continue to be used for all the official purposes of the Union for which it was being used immediately before such commencement:
Provided that the President may, during the said period, by order authorise the use of the Hindi language in addition to the English language and of the Devanagari form of numerals in addition to the international form of Indian numerals for any of the official purposes of the Union.
- 3) Notwithstanding anything in this article, Parliament may by law provide for the use, after the said period of fifteen years, of
 - a) the English language, or
 - b) the Devanagari form of numerals, for such purposes as may be specified in the law.

Article 344

- 1) The President shall, at the expiration of five years from the commencement of this Constitution and thereafter at the expiration of ten years from such commencement, by order constitute a Commission which shall consist of a Chairman and such other members representing the different languages specified in the Eighth Schedule as the President may appoint, and the order shall define the procedure to be followed by the Commission.
- 2) It shall be the duty of the Commission to make recommendations to the President as to
 - a) the progressive use of the Hindi language for the official purposes of the Union;
 - b) restrictions on the use of the English language for all or any of the official purposes of the Union;
 - c) the language to be used for all or any of the purposes mentioned in article 348;
 - d) the form of numerals to be used for any one or more specified purposes of the Union;
 - e) any other matter referred to the Commission by the President as regards the official language of the Union and the language for communication between the Union and a State or between one State and another and their use.
- 3) In making their recommendations under clause (2), the Commission shall have due regard to the industrial, cultural and scientific advancement of India, and the just claims and the interests of persons belonging to the non-Hindi speaking areas in regard to the public services.

- 4) There shall be constituted a Committee consisting of thirty members, of whom twenty shall be members of the House of the People and ten shall be members of the Council of States to be elected respectively by the members of the House of the People and the members of the Council of States in accordance with the system of proportional representation by means of the single transferable vote.
- 5) It shall be the duty of the Committee to examine the recommendations of the Commission constituted under clause (1) and to report to the President their opinion thereon.
- 6) Notwithstanding anything in article 343, the President may, after consideration of the report referred to in clause (5), issue directions in accordance with the whole or any part of that report.

Article 345

Subject to the provisions of articles 346 and 347, the Legislature of a State may by law adopt any one or more of the languages in use in the State or Hindi as the language or languages to be used for all or any of the official purposes of that State:
Provided that, until the Legislature of the State otherwise provides by law, the English language shall continue to be used for those official purposes within the State for which it was being used immediately before the commencement of this Constitution.

Article 346

The language for the time being authorised for use in the Union for official purposes shall be the official language for communication between one State and another State and between a State and the Union:
Provided that if two or more States agree that the Hindi language should be the official language for communication between such States, that language may be used for such communication.

Article 347

On a demand being made in that behalf, the President may, if he is satisfied that a substantial proportion of the population of a State desire the use of any language spoken by them to be recognised by that State, direct that such language shall also be officially recognised throughout that State or any part thereof for such purpose as he may specify.

Article 348

- 1) Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provisions of this Part, until Parliament by law otherwise provides
 - a) all proceedings in the Supreme Court and in every High Court,
 - b) the authoritative texts
 - i) of all Bills to be introduced or amendments thereto to be moved in either House of Parliament or in the House or either House of the Legislature of a State,
 - ii) of all Acts passed by Parliament or the Legislature of a State and of all Ordinances promulgated by the President or the Governor. . . ²⁹ of a State, and
 - iii) of all orders, rules, regulations and bye-laws issued under this Constitution or under any law made by Parliament or the Legislature of a State,shall be in the English language.
- 2) Notwithstanding anything in sub-clause (a) of clause(1), the Governor. . . ³⁰ of a State may, with the previous consent of the President, authorise the use of the Hindi language, or any other language used for any official purposes of the State, in proceedings in the High Court having its principal seat in that State:
Provided that nothing in this clause shall apply to any judgment, decree or order passed or made by such High Court.
- 3) Notwithstanding anything in sub-clause (b) of clause (1), where the Legislature of a State has prescribed any language other than the English language for use in Bills introduced in, or Acts passed by, the Legislature of the State or in Ordinances promulgated by the Governor³⁰ of the State or in any order, rule, regulation or bye-law referred to in paragraph (iii) of that sub-clause, a

translation of the same in the English language published under the authority of the Governor³⁰ of the State in the Official Gazette of that State shall be deemed to be the authoritative text thereof in the English language under this article.

Article 349

During the period of fifteen years from the commencement of this Constitution, no Bill or amendment making provision for the language to be used for any of the purposes mentioned in clause (1) of article 348 shall be introduced or moved in either House of Parliament without the previous sanction of the President, and the President shall not give his sanction to the introduction of any such Bill or the moving of any such amendment except after he has taken into consideration the recommendations of the Commission constituted under clause (1) of article 344 and the report of the Committee constituted under clause (4) of that article.

Article 350

Every person shall be entitled to submit a representation for the redress of any grievance to any officer or authority of the Union or a State in any of the languages used in the Union or in the State, as the case may be.

*Article 350A*³¹

It shall be the endeavour of every State and of every local authority within the State to provide adequate facilities for instruction in the mother-tongue at the primary stage of education to children belonging to linguistic minority groups; and the President may issue such directions to any State as he considers necessary or proper for securing the provision of such facilities.

Article 350B

- 1) There shall be a Special Officer for linguistic minorities to be appointed by the President.
- 2) It shall be the duty of the Special Officer to investigate all matters relating to the safeguards provided for linguistic minorities under this Constitution and report to the President upon those matters at such intervals as the President may direct, and the President shall cause all such reports to be laid before each House of Parliament, and sent to the Governments of the States concerned.

Article 351

It shall be the duty of the Union to promote the spread of the Hindi language, to develop it so that it may serve as a medium of expression for all the elements of the composite culture of India and to secure its enrichment by assimilating without interfering with its genius, the forms, style and expressions used in Hindustani and in the other languages of India specified in the Eighth Schedule, and by drawing, wherever necessary or desirable, for its vocabulary, primarily on Sanskrit and secondarily on other languages.

Eighth Schedule (Articles 344(1) and 351).

1. Assamese
2. Bengali
3. Gujarati
4. Hindi
5. Kannada
6. Kashmiri
7. Malayalam
8. Marathi
9. Oriya
10. Punjabi
11. Sanskrit
12. Tamil
13. Telugu
14. Urdu

II. Constitution of the Republic of Pakistan (adopted 1962)³²

Principles of Law-making and of Policy

Article 6, Principle 2

Equality of citizens

- 1) All citizens should be equal before the law, be entitled to equal protection of the law and be treated alike in all respects.
- 2) This Principle may be departed from where
 - a) in the interest of equality itself, it is necessary to compensate for existing inequalities, whether natural, social, economic or of any other kind;
 - b) in the interest of the proper discharge of public functions, it is necessary
 - i) to give to persons performing public functions powers, protections or facilities that are not given to other persons; or
 - ii) to impose on persons performing public functions obligations or disciplinary controls that are not imposed on other persons; or
 - c) it is necessary in the interest of the security of Pakistan or otherwise in the interest of the State to depart from this Principle,
 but, where this Principle is departed from, it should be ensured that no citizen gets an undue preference over another citizen and no citizen is placed under a disability, liability or obligation that does not apply to other citizens of the same category.
- 3) This Principle shall not be construed as preventing a legislature from making laws different from laws made by any other legislature.

Article 6, Principle 7

Freedom of religion

No law should

- a) prevent the members of a religious community or denomination from professing, practising or propagating, or from providing instruction in, their religion, or from conducting institutions for the purposes of or in connection with their religion;
- b) require any person to receive religious instruction, or to attend a religious ceremony or religious worship, relating to a religion other than his own;
- c) impose on any person a tax the proceeds of which are to be applied for the purposes of a religion other than his own;
- d) discriminate between religious institutions in the granting of exemptions or concessions in relation to any tax; or
- e) authorize the expenditure of public moneys for the benefit of a particular religious community or denomination except moneys raised for that purpose.

Article 6, Principle 12

Public educational institutions

- 1) No law should, on the ground of race, religion, caste or place of birth, deprive any citizen of the right to attend any educational institution that is receiving aid from public revenues.
- 2) This Principle may be departed from for the purpose of ensuring that a class of citizens that is educationally backward shares in available educational facilities.

Article 6, Principle 14

Protection of languages, scripts and cultures

No law should prevent any section of the community from having a distinct language, script or culture of its own.

*Article 8, Principle 3**Fair treatment to minorities*

The legitimate rights and interests of the minorities should be safeguarded, and the members of minorities should be given due opportunity to enter the service of Pakistan.

*Article 8, Principle 4**Promotion of interests of backward peoples*

Special care should be taken to promote the educational and economic interests of people of backward classes or in backward areas.

*Article 8, Principle 5**Advancement of under-privileged castes, etc.*

Steps should be taken to bring on terms of equality with other persons the members of the under-privileged castes, races, tribes and groups and, to this end, the under-privileged castes, races, tribes and groups within a Province should be identified by the Government of the Province and entered in a schedule of under-privileged classes.

*Article 8, Principle 6**Opportunities to participate in national life, etc.*

The people of different areas and classes, through education, training, industrial development and other methods, should be enabled to participate fully in all forms of national activities, including employment in the service of Pakistan.

*Article 8, Principle 14**Entry into service of Pakistan not to be denied on grounds of race, etc.*

- 1) No citizen should be denied entry into the service of Pakistan on the grounds of race, religion, caste, sex or place of residence or birth.
- 2) This Principle may be departed from where, in the public interest
 - a) it is desirable that
 - i) a person who is to perform functions in relation to a particular area should be a resident of that area; and
 - ii) a person who is to perform functions of a particular kind should be of a particular sex; or
 - b) it is necessary so to do for the purpose of ensuring that, in relation to the Central Government, persons from all parts of Pakistan, and, in relation to a Provincial Government, persons from all parts of the Province concerned, have an opportunity of entering the service of Pakistan.

*Article 8, Principle 16**Parity between the Provinces in Central Government*

Parity between the Provinces in all spheres of the Central Government should, as nearly as is practicable, be achieved.

*Article 8, Principle 17**Service in the Defence Services*

Persons from all parts of Pakistan should be enabled to serve in the Defence Services of Pakistan.

*Relations between the Centre and the Provinces**Article 145 (4)*

A primary object of the Council in formulating the plans referred to in clause (3) of this Article shall be to ensure that disparities between the Provinces, and between different areas within a Province, in relation to income per capita, are removed and that the resources of Pakistan (including resources in foreign exchange) are used and allocated in such manner as to achieve that object in the shortest possible time, and it shall be the duty of each Government to make the utmost endeavour to achieve that object.

*Miscellaneous**Article 211*

- 1) The Capital of the Republic shall be Islamabad situated in the district of Rawalpindi in the Province of West Pakistan at the site selected for the Capital of Pakistan before the enactment of this Constitution.
- 2) The area of the Capital (in this Constitution referred to as "the Islamabad Capital Territory") shall be determined by the Central Legislature, but shall not be less than two hundred square miles.
- 3) There shall be a second Capital of the Republic at Dacca in the Province of East Pakistan.
- 4) The area of the second Capital (in this Constitution referred to as "the Dacca Capital Territory") shall be determined by the Central Legislature.
- 5) The principal seat of the National Assembly shall be at Dacca.
- 6) The principal seat of the Central Government shall, subject to clause (7) of this Article, be at Islamabad.
- 7) Until provision is made for establishing the Central Government at Islamabad, the principal seat of that Government shall be at Rawalpindi in the Province of West Pakistan.

Article 215

- 1) The national languages of Pakistan are Bengali and Urdu, but this Article shall not be construed as preventing the use of any other language and, in particular, the English language may be used for official and other purposes until arrangements for its replacement are made.
- 2) In the year One thousand nine hundred and seventy-two, the President shall constitute a Commission to examine and report on the question of the replacement of the English language for official purposes.

Article 240

Subject to the observance of the Principle of Policy that parity between the Provinces in all spheres of the Central Government should, as nearly as is practicable, be achieved, any quota relating to the recruitment of persons to the service of Pakistan in relation to the affairs of the Government of Pakistan that, immediately before the commencing day, applied to a particular region shall continue to apply until the expiration of a period of ten years after that day.

*III. Constitution of the Federation of Malaysia (effective 1963)³³**Fundamental Liberties**Article 8*

- 1) All persons are equal before the law and entitled to the equal protection of the law.
- 2) Except as expressly authorised by this Constitution, there shall be no discrimination against citizens on the ground only of religion, race, descent or place of birth in any law or in the appointment to any office or employment under a public authority or in the administration of any law relating to the acquisition, holding or disposition of property or the establishing or carrying on of any trade, business, profession, vocation or employment.
- 3) There shall be no discrimination in favour of any person on the ground that he is a subject of the Ruler of any State.
- 4) No public authority shall discriminate against any person on the ground that he is resident or carrying on business in any part of the Federation outside the jurisdiction of the authority.
- 5) This Article does not invalidate or prohibit
 - a) any provision regulating personal law;
 - b) any provision or practice restricting office or employment connected with the affairs of any religion, or of an institution managed by a group professing any religion, to persons professing that religion;
 - c) any provision for the protection, wellbeing or advancement of the aboriginal peoples of the Malay Peninsula (including the reservation of land) or the reservation to aborigines of a reasonable proportion of suitable positions in the public service;

- d) any provision prescribing residence in a State or part of a State as a qualification for election or appointment to any authority having jurisdiction only in that State or part, or for voting in such an election;
- e) any provision of a Constitution of a State, being or corresponding to a provision in force immediately before Merdeka Day;
- f) any provision restricting enlistment in the Malay Regiment to Malays.

Article 11

- 1) Every person has the right to profess and practise his religion and, subject to clause (4), to propagate it.
- 2) No person shall be compelled to pay any tax the proceeds of which are specially allocated in whole or in part for the purposes of a religion other than his own.
- 3) Every religious group has the right
 - a) to manage its own religious affairs;
 - b) to establish and maintain institutions for religious or charitable purposes; and
 - c) to acquire and own property and hold and administer it in accordance with law.
- 4) State law may control or restrict the propagation of any religious doctrine or belief among persons professing the Muslim religion.
- 5) This Article does not authorise any act contrary to any general law relating to public order, public health or morality.

Article 12

- 1) Without prejudice to the generality of Article 8, there shall be no discrimination against any citizens on the grounds only of religion, race, descent or place of birth
 - a) in the administration of any educational institution maintained by a public authority, and, in particular, the admission of pupils or students or the payment of fees;
 - b) in providing out of the funds of a public authority financial aid for the maintenance or education of pupils or students in any educational institution (whether or not maintained by a public authority and whether within or outside the Federation).
- 2) Every religious group has the right to establish and maintain institutions for the education of children and provide therein instruction in its own religion, and there shall be no discrimination on the ground only of religion in any law relating to such institutions or in the administration of any such law; but federal law may provide for special financial aid for the establishment or maintenance of Muslim institutions or the instruction in the Muslim religion of persons professing that religion.
- 3) No person shall be required to receive instruction in or to take part in any ceremony or act of worship of a religion other than his own.
- 4) For the purposes of clause (3) the religion of a person under the age of eighteen years shall be decided by his parent or guardian.

Relations between the Federation and the States

Article 89

- 1) Any land in a State which immediately before Merdeka Day was a Malay reservation in accordance with the existing law may continue as a Malay reservation in accordance with that law until otherwise provided by an Enactment of the Legislature of that State, being an Enactment
 - a) passed by a majority of the total number of members of the Legislative Assembly and by the votes of not less than two-thirds of the members present and voting; and
 - b) approved by resolution of each House of Parliament passed by a majority of the total number of members of that House and by the votes of not less than two-thirds of the members voting.
- 2) Any land in a State which is not for the time being a Malay reservation in accordance with the existing law and has not been developed or cultivated may be declared as a Malay reservation in accordance with that law:

Provided that

- a) where any land in a State is declared a Malay reservation under this clause, an equal area of land in that State which has not been developed or cultivated shall be made available for general alienation; and
 - b) the total area of land in a State for the time being declared as a Malay reservation under this clause shall not at any time exceed the total area of land in that State which has been made available for general alienation in pursuance of paragraph (a).
- 3) Subject to clause (4), the Government of any State may, in accordance with the existing law, declare as a Malay reservation
- a) any land acquired by that Government by agreement for that purpose;
 - b) on the application of the proprietor, and with the consent of every person having a right or interest therein, any other land;
 - c) in a case where any land ceases to be a Malay reservation, any land of a similar character and of an area not exceeding the area of that land.
- 4) Nothing in this Article shall authorise the declaration as a Malay reservation of any land which at the time of the declaration is owned or occupied by a person who is not a Malay or in or over which such a person has then any right or interest.
- 5) Without prejudice to clause (3), the Government of any State may, in accordance with law, acquire land for the settlement of Malays or other communities, and establish trusts for that purpose.
- 6) In this Article “Malay reservation” means land reserved for alienation to Malays or to natives of the State in which it lies; and “Malay” includes any person who, under the law of the State in which he is resident, is treated as a Malay for the purposes of the reservation of land.
- 7) Subject to Article 161A this Article shall have effect notwithstanding any other provision of this Constitution; but (without prejudice to any such other provision) no land shall be retained or declared as a Malay reservation except as provided by this Article and Article 90.

*Public Services**Article 136*

All persons of whatever race in the same grade in the service of the Federation shall, subject to the terms and conditions of their employment, be treated impartially.

*General and Miscellaneous**Article 152*

- 1) The national language shall be the Malay language and shall be in such script as Parliament may by law provide:
- Provided that**
- a) no person shall be prohibited or prevented from using (otherwise than for official purposes), or from teaching or learning, any other language; and
 - b) nothing in this clause shall prejudice the right of the Federal Government or of any State Government to preserve and sustain the use and study of the language of any other community in the Federation.
- 2) Notwithstanding the provisions of clause (1), for a period of ten years after Merdeka Day, and thereafter until Parliament otherwise provides, the English language may be used in both Houses of Parliament, in the Legislative Assembly of every State and for all other official purposes.
- 3) Notwithstanding the provisions of clause (1), for a period of ten years after Merdeka Day, and thereafter until Parliament otherwise provides, the authoritative texts
- a) of all Bills to be introduced or amendments thereto to be moved in either House of Parliament, and
 - b) of all Acts of Parliament and all subsidiary legislation issued by the Federal Government shall be in the English language.

- 4) Notwithstanding the provisions of clause (1), for a period of ten years after Merdeka Day, and thereafter until Parliament otherwise provides, all proceedings in the Federal Court or a High Court shall be in the English language:

Provided that, if the Court and counsel on both sides agree, evidence taken in the language spoken by the witness need not be translated into or recorded in English.

- 5) Notwithstanding the provisions of clause (1), until Parliament otherwise provides, all proceedings in subordinate courts, other than the taking of evidence, shall be in the English language.

Article 153

- 1) It shall be the responsibility of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong to safeguard the special position of the Malays and the legitimate interests of other communities in accordance with the provisions of this Article.
- 2) Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, but subject to the provisions of Article 40 and of this Article, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong shall exercise his functions under this Constitution and federal law in such manner as may be necessary to safeguard the special position of the Malays and to ensure the reservation for Malays of such proportion as he may deem reasonable of positions in the public service (other than the public service of a State) and of scholarships, exhibitions and other similar educational or training privileges or special facilities given or accorded by the Federal Government and, when any permit or licence for the operation of any trade or business is required by federal law, then, subject to the provisions of that law and this Article, of such permits and licences.
- 3) The Yang di-Pertuan Agong may, in order to ensure in accordance with clause (2) the reservation to Malays of positions in the public service and of scholarships, exhibitions and other educational or training privileges or special facilities, give such general directions as may be required for that purpose to any Commission to which Part X applies or to any authority charged with responsibility for the grant of such scholarships, exhibitions or other educational or training privileges or special facilities; and the Commission or authority shall duly comply with the directions.
- 4) In exercising his functions under this Constitution and federal law in accordance with clauses (1) to (3) the Yang di-Pertuan Agong shall not deprive any person of any public office held by him or of the continuance of any scholarship, exhibition or other educational or training privileges or special facilities enjoyed by him.
- 5) This Article does not derogate from the provisions of Article 136.
- 6) Where by existing federal law a permit or licence is required for the operation of any trade or business the Yang di-Pertuan Agong may exercise his functions under that law in such manner, or give such general directions to any authority charged under that law with the grant of such permits or licences, as may be required to ensure the reservation of such proportion of such permits or licences for Malays as the Yang di-Pertuan Agong may deem reasonable; and the authority shall duly comply with the directions.
- 7) Nothing in this Article shall operate to deprive or authorise the deprivation of any person of any right, privilege, permit or licence accrued to or enjoyed or held by him or to authorise a refusal to renew to any person any such permit or licence or a refusal to grant to the heirs, successors or assigns of a person any permit or licence when the renewal or grant might reasonably be expected in the ordinary course of events.
- 8) Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, where by any federal law any permit or licence is required for the operation of any trade or business, that law may provide for the reservation of a proportion of such permits or licences for Malays; but no such law shall for the purpose of ensuring such a reservation
 - a) deprive or authorise the deprivation of any person of any right, privilege, permit or licence accrued to or enjoyed or held by him; or
 - b) authorise a refusal to renew to any person any such permit or licence or a refusal to grant to the heirs, successors or assigns of any person any permit or licence when the renewal or grant might in accordance with the other provisions of the law reasonably be expected in the ordinary course of events, or prevent any person from transferring together with his business any transferable licence to operate that business; or

- c) where no permit or licence was previously required for the operation of the trade or business, authorise a refusal to grant a permit or licence to any person for the operation of any trade or business which immediately before the coming into force of the law he had been *bona fide* carrying on, or authorise a refusal subsequently to renew to any such person any permit or licence, or a refusal to grant to the heirs, successors or assigns of any such person any such permit or licence when the renewal or grant might in accordance with the other provisions of that law reasonably be expected in the ordinary course of events.
- 9) Nothing in this Article shall empower Parliament to restrict business or trade solely for the purpose of reservations for Malays.
- 10) The Constitution of the State of any Ruler may make provision corresponding (with the necessary modifications) to the provisions of this Article.

Article 161

- 1) No Act of Parliament terminating or restricting the use of the English language for any of the purposes mentioned in Clauses (2) to (5) of Article 152 shall come into operation as regards the use of the English language in any case mentioned in Clause (2) of this Article until ten years after Malaysia Day.
- 2) Clause (1) applies
 - a) to the use of the English language in either House of Parliament by a member for or from a Borneo State; and
 - b) to the use of the English language for proceedings in the High Court in Borneo or in a subordinate court in a Borneo State, or for such proceedings in the Federal Court as are mentioned in Clause (4); and
 - c) to the use of the English language in a Borneo State in the Legislative Assembly or for other official purposes (including the official purposes of the Federal Government).
- 3) Without prejudice to Clause (1), no such Act of Parliament as is there mentioned shall come into operation as regards the use of the English language for proceedings in the High Court in Borneo or for such proceedings in the Federal Court as are mentioned in Clause (4), until the Act or the relevant provision of it has been approved by enactments of the Legislatures of the Borneo States; and no such Act shall come into operation as regards the use of the English language in a Borneo State in any other case mentioned in paragraph (b) or (c) of Clause (2), until the Act or the relevant provision of it has been approved by an enactment of the Legislature of that State.
- 4) The proceedings in the Federal Court referred to in Clauses (2) and (3) are any proceedings on appeal from the High Court in Borneo or a judge thereof, and any proceedings under Clause (2) of Article 128 for the determination of a question which has arisen in proceedings before the High Court in Borneo or a subordinate court in a Borneo State.
- 5) Notwithstanding anything in Article 152, in a Borneo State a native language in current use in the State may be used in native courts or for any code of native law and custom, and in the case of Sarawak, until otherwise provided by enactment of the Legislature, may be used by a member addressing the Legislative Assembly or any committee thereof.

Article 161A

- 1) Subject to Clause (2), the provisions of Clauses (2) to (5) of Article 153, so far as they relate to the reservation of positions in the public service, shall apply in relation to natives of a Borneo State as they apply in relation to Malays.
- 2) In a Borneo State Article 153 shall have effect with the substitution of references to natives of the State for the references to Malays, but as regards scholarships, exhibitions and other educational or training privileges and facilities Clause (2) of that Article shall not require the reservation of a fixed proportion for natives.
- 3) Before advice is tendered to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong as to the exercise of his powers under Article 153 in relation to a Borneo State, the Chief Minister of the State in question shall be consulted.
- 4) The Constitutions of the Borneo States may make provision corresponding (with the necessary modifications) to Article 153 with the changes made by Clause (2).

- 5) Article 89 shall not apply to a Borneo State, and Article 8 shall not invalidate or prohibit any provision of State law in a Borneo State for the reservation of land for natives of the State or for alienation to them, or for giving them preferential treatment as regards the alienation of land by the State.
- 6) In this Article "native" means
 - a) in relation to Sarawak, a person who is a citizen and either belongs to one of the races specified in Clause (7) as indigenous to the State or is of mixed blood deriving exclusively from those races; and
 - b) in relation to Sabah, a person who is a citizen, is the child or grandchild of a person of a race indigenous to Sabah, and was born (whether on or after Malaysia Day or not) either in Sabah or to a father domiciled in Sabah at the time of the birth.
- 7) The races to be treated for the purposes of the definition of "native" in Clause (6) as indigenous to Sarawak are the Bukitans, Bisayahs, Dusuns, Sea Dayaks, Land Dayaks, Kadayans, Kalabits, Kayans, Kenyahs (including Sabups and Sipengs), Kajangs (including Sekapans, Kejamans, Lahanans, Malays, Punans, Tanjongs and Kanowits), Lugats, Lisums, Melanos, Muruts, Penans, Sians, Tagals, Tabuns and Ukits.

Article 161B

- 1) In so far as any provision made by or under an Act of Parliament, by removing or altering a residence qualification, confers a right to practise before a court in the Borneo States or either of them on persons not previously having the right, that provision shall not come into operation until adopted in the States or State in question by an enactment of the Legislature.
- 2) This Article shall apply to the right to practise before the Federal Court when sitting in the Borneo States and entertaining proceedings on appeal from the High Court in Borneo or a judge thereof or proceedings under Clause (2) of Article 128 for the determination of a question which has arisen in proceedings before the High Court in Borneo or a subordinate court in a Borneo State.

Article 161C

- 1) No Act of Parliament which provides as respects a Borneo State for special financial aid for the establishment or maintenance of Muslim institutions or the instruction in the Muslim religion or persons professing that religion shall be passed without the consent of the Governor.
- 2) Where under any provision of federal law not having effect as respects Sabah, or not having effect as respects Sarawak, any such aid as aforesaid is given by way of grant out of public funds in any year, there shall be paid by the Federation to the Government of Sabah or Sarawak, as the case may be, and applied for social welfare purposes in that State, amounts which bear to the revenue derived by the Federation from that State in the year the same proportion as the grant bears to the revenue derived by the Federation from other States in that year.
- 3) For the purposes of Clause (2) the revenue derived by the Federation from any State or States shall be the amount after deduction of any sums assigned to States under Article 110 or the Tenth Schedule; and there shall be disregarded any contributions received by the Federation out of the proceeds of lotteries conducted by the Social and Welfare Services Lotteries Board together with any amounts applied to such aid as aforesaid out of or by reference to those contributions.

Article 161D

Notwithstanding Clause (4) of Article 11, there may be included in the Constitution of a Borneo State provision that an enactment of the State Legislature controlling or restricting the propagation of any religious doctrine or belief among persons professing the Muslim religion shall not be passed unless it is agreed to in the Legislative Assembly on second or third reading or on both by a specified majority, not being a majority greater than two-thirds of the total number of members of the Assembly.

Article 161E

- 1) As from the passing of the Malaysia Act no amendment to the Constitution made in connection with the admission to the Federation of a Borneo State shall be excepted from Clause (3) of Article 159 by Clause (4) (bb) of that Article; nor shall any modification made as to the

application of the Constitution to a State be so excepted unless the modification is such as to equate or assimilate the position of that State under the Constitution to the position of the States of Malaya.

- 2) No amendment shall be made to the Constitution without the concurrence of the Governor of the Borneo State or each of the Borneo States concerned, if the amendment is such as to affect the operation of the Constitution as regards any of the following matters:
 - a) the right of persons born before Malaysia Day to citizenship by reason of a connection with the State, and (except to the extent that different provision is made by the Constitution as in force on Malaysia Day) the equal treatment, as regards their own citizenship and that of others, of persons born or resident in the State and of persons born or resident in the States of Malaya;
 - b) the constitution and jurisdiction of the High Court in Borneo and the appointment, removal and suspension of judges of that court;
 - c) the matters with respect to which the Legislature of the State may make laws, and the executive authority of the State in those matters, and (so far as related thereto) the financial arrangements between the Federation and the State;
 - d) religion in the State, the use in the State or in Parliament of any language and the special treatment of natives of the State;
 - e) the allocation to the State, in any Parliament summoned to meet before the end of August, 1970, of a quota of members of the House of Representatives not less, in proportion to the total allocated to the other States which are members of the Federation on Malaysia Day, than the quota allocated to the State on that day.
- 3) No amendment to the Constitution which affects its operation as regards the quota of members of the House of Representatives allocated to a Borneo State shall be treated for purposes of Clause (1) as equating or assimilating the position of that State to the position of the States of Malaya.
- 4) In relation to any rights and powers conferred by federal law on the government of a Borneo State as regards entry into the State and residence in the State and matters connected therewith (whether or not the law is passed before Malaysia Day) Clause (2) shall apply, except in so far as the law provides to the contrary, as if the law had been embodied in the Constitution and those rights and powers had been included among the matters mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (e) of that Clause.
- 5) In this Article "amendment" includes addition and repeal.

Article 161F

Notwithstanding anything in Article 152, until otherwise provided by enactment of the Legislature of Singapore, the English, Mandarin and Tamil languages may be used in the Legislative Assembly of Singapore, and the English language may be used for the authoritative texts of all Bills to be introduced or amendments thereto to be moved in that Assembly, and of all enactments of that Legislature, and of all subsidiary legislation issued by the government of Singapore.

Article 161G

Nothing in Clause (2) of Article 8 or Clause (1) of Article 12 shall prohibit or invalidate any provision of State law in Singapore for the advancement of Malays; but there shall be no reservation for Malays in accordance with Article 153 of positions in the public service to be filled by recruitment in Singapore, or of permits or licences for the operation of any trade or business in Singapore.

Article 161H

- 1) No amendment shall be made to the Constitution without the concurrence of the Governor if the amendment is such as to affect the operation of the Constitution in relation to Singapore as regards any of the following matters
 - a) citizenship of Singapore, and the restriction to citizens of Singapore of the right to be a member of either House of Parliament for or from Singapore, or to be a member of the Legislative Assembly of Singapore, or to vote at elections in Singapore;
 - b) the constitution and jurisdiction of the High Court in Singapore and the appointment, removal and suspension of judges of that court;

- c) the matters with respect to which the Legislature of the State may make laws, the executive authority of the State in those matters, the borrowing powers of the State and the financial arrangements between the Federation and the State;
 - d) the discharge of functions of the Public Services Commission or of the Judicial and Legal Service Commission by a branch established for the State, and the constitution of any such branch;
 - e) religion in the State, the use in the State or in Parliament of any language and the special position of the Malays in Singapore;
 - f) the allocation to the State, in any Parliament summoned to meet before the end of August, 1970, of a quota of members of the House of Representatives not less, in proportion to the total allocated to the other States which are members of the Federation on Malaysia Day, than the quota allocated to the State on that day.
- 2) In this Article "amendment" includes addition and repeal.

IV. The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (adopted 1963)³⁴

Fundamental Rights

Section 24

- 1) Every person shall be entitled to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, including freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or in private, to manifest and propagate his religion or belief in worship, teaching, practice and observance.
- 2) No person attending any place of education shall be required to receive religious instruction or to take part in or attend any religious ceremony or observances if such instruction, ceremony or observances relate to a religion other than his own.
- 3) No religious community or denomination shall be prevented from providing religious instruction for pupils of that community or denomination in any place of education maintained wholly by that community or denomination.
- 4) Nothing in this section shall invalidate any law that is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society
 - a) in the interest of defence, public safety, public order, public morality or public health; or
 - b) for the purpose of protecting the rights and freedom of other persons, including their rights and freedom to observe and practise their religions without the unsolicited intervention of members of other religions.

Section 28

- 1) A citizen of Nigeria of a particular community, tribe, place of origin, religion or political opinion shall not, by reason only that he is such a person
 - a) be subjected either expressly by, or in the practical application of, any law in force in Nigeria or any executive or administrative action of the Government of the Federation or the Government of a Region to disabilities or restrictions to which citizens of Nigeria of other communities, tribes, places of origin, religions or political opinions are not made subject; or
 - b) be accorded either expressly by, or in the practical application of, any law in force in Nigeria or any such executive or administrative action any privilege or advantage that is not conferred on citizens of Nigeria of other communities, tribes, places of origin, religions or political opinions.
- 2) Nothing in this section shall invalidate any law by reason only that the law
 - a) prescribes qualifications for service in an office under the state or as a member of the armed forces of the Federation or a member of a police force or for the service of a body corporate established directly by any law in force in Nigeria;
 - b) imposes restrictions with respect to the appointment of any person to an office under the state or as a member of the armed forces of the Federation or a member of a police force or to an office in the service of a body corporate established directly by any law in force in Nigeria;
 - c) imposes restrictions with respect to the acquisition or use by any person of land or other property; or

- d) imposes any disability or restriction or accords any privilege or advantage that, having regard to its nature and to special circumstances pertaining to the persons to whom it applies, is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society.

Parliament

Section 59

The business of Parliament shall be conducted in English.

Miscellaneous

Section 159

- 1) There shall be a board for the Niger Delta which shall be styled the Niger Delta Development Board.
- 2) The members of the Board shall be
 - a) a person appointed by the President, who shall be chairman;
 - b) a person appointed by the Governor of Eastern Nigeria;
 - c) a person appointed by the Governor of Mid-Western Nigeria; and
 - d) such other persons as may be appointed in such manner as may be prescribed by Parliament to represent the inhabitants of the Niger Delta.
- 3) A member of the Board shall vacate his office in such circumstances as may be prescribed by Parliament.
- 4) The Board shall be responsible for advising the Government of the Federation and the Governments of Eastern Nigeria and Mid-Western Nigeria with respect to the physical development of the Niger Delta, and in order to discharge that responsibility the Board shall
 - a) cause the Niger Delta to be surveyed in order to ascertain what measures are required to promote its physical development;
 - b) prepare schemes designed to promote the physical development of the Niger Delta, together with estimates of the costs of putting the schemes into effect;
 - c) submit to the Government of the Federation and the Governments of Eastern Nigeria and Mid-Western Nigeria annual reports describing the work of the Board and the measures taken in pursuance of its advice.
- 5) Parliament may make such provision as it considers expedient for enabling the Board to discharge its functions under this section.
- 6) In this section, "the Niger Delta" means the area specified in the Proclamation relating to the Board which was made on the twenty-sixth day of August, 1959.
- 7) This section shall cease to have effect on the first day of July, 1969, or such later date as may be prescribed by Parliament.³⁵

*V. The Constitution of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (adopted 1953)*³⁶

Preamble

Whereas the Colony of Southern Rhodesia is part of Her Majesty's dominions and Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland are territories under Her Majesty's protection;

And whereas the said Colony and territories are the rightful home of all lawful inhabitants thereof, whatever their origin;

And whereas the Colony of Southern Rhodesia should continue to enjoy responsible government in accordance with its constitution;

And whereas Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland should continue under the special protection of Her Majesty, to enjoy separate Governments for so long as their respective peoples so desire, those Governments remaining responsible (subject to the ultimate authority of Her Majesty's Government in

the United Kingdom) for, in particular, the control of land in those territories, and for the local and territorial political advancement of the peoples thereof;

And whereas the association of the Colony and territories aforesaid in a Federation under Her Majesty's sovereignty, enjoying responsible government in accordance with this Constitution, would conduce to the security, advancement and welfare of all their inhabitants, and in particular would foster partnership and co-operation between their inhabitants and enable the Federation, when those inhabitants so desire, to go forward with confidence towards the attainment of full membership of the Commonwealth;

Now, therefore, the said Colony and territories shall be associated in a Federation in accordance with the following provisions:

General

Article 7

- 1) The official language of the Federation shall be English and, except as may be provided by any law of the Federal Legislature
 - a) all proceedings, records and Bills of the Federal Assembly;
 - b) any law of the Federal Legislature and any instrument made under any such law or under this Constitution;
 - c) all documents issued by the Federal Government; and
 - d) all proceedings and records of the Federal Supreme Court or of any body authorised or established by or under this Constitution or by any law of the Federal Legislature,shall be in the English language:

Provided that nothing in this article shall be deemed to prohibit the use of any other language as well as English for the purpose of bringing any matter to the notice of any person concerned therewith.

The African Affairs Board

Article 67

- 1) There shall be a Standing Committee of the Federal Assembly, to be known as the African Affairs Board, consisting of the following members of the Federal Assembly, that is to say
 - a) the two specially appointed European members and the specially elected European member; and
 - b) one specially elected African member from each of the three Territories, to be selected by a majority vote of the specially elected African members and the members referred to in sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph acting together.
- 2) The Governor-General in his discretion shall appoint a chairman and a deputy chairman from among the members of the Board.

Article 68

- 1) Any decision of the Board shall be made by a majority vote of the members present and voting.
- 2) At any sitting of the Board at which any decision is taken
 - a) the chairman or, in the absence of the chairman, the deputy chairman shall preside, who shall be entitled to vote as a member of the Board and, in the event of an equality of votes, shall in addition have and exercise a casting vote;
 - b) the quorum of the Board shall be three.
- 3) In exercising his casting vote, the chairman or deputy chairman shall vote in such a manner as to enable further consideration to be given to the matter.

Article 69

Subject to the last foregoing article the Board may sit and act

- a) notwithstanding any vacancy among its members; and
- b) notwithstanding that the Federal Assembly is adjourned or prorogued,

and in the event of a dissolution of the Assembly the persons who immediately before that dissolution are members of the Board may continue to sit and act as the Board until the Assembly first meets after that dissolution.

Article 70

It shall be the general function of the Board

- a) to make to the Prime Minister, or through the Prime Minister to the Executive Council, such representations in relation to any matter within the legislative or executive authority of the Federation as the Board may consider to be desirable in the interests of Africans;
- b) if the Government of any Territory so request, to give to that Government any assistance which the Board can provide in relation to the study of matters affecting Africans, and in particular assistance in the exchange of information relating to any such matter.

Article 71

- 1) It shall be the particular function of the Board to draw attention to any Bill introduced in the Federal Assembly and any instrument which has the force of law and is made in the exercise of a power conferred by a law of the Federal Legislature if that Bill or instrument is in their opinion a differentiating measure; and for that purpose they shall have the powers conferred by the subsequent provisions of this Chapter of this Constitution.
- 2) In this article and in the subsequent provisions of this Chapter of this Constitution, the expression "differentiating measure" means a Bill or instrument by which Africans are subjected or made liable to any conditions, restrictions or disabilities disadvantageous to them to which Europeans are not also subjected or made liable, or a Bill or instrument which will in its practical application have such an effect.

Article 72

There shall be paid out of moneys provided by the Federal Legislature to the Board or to the members thereof such special allowances and other sums as that Legislature may determine for the purpose of enabling the Board and the members thereof to discharge their functions under this Chapter of this Constitution.

Article 73

Before any Bill is introduced in the Federal Assembly, a copy of the proposed Bill shall be sent to the Board unless the Governor-General in his discretion has certified in writing that the proposed Bill

- a) is of such a nature that it is not in the public interest that it should be published before its introduction in the Assembly; or
- b) is so urgent that it is not in the public interest to delay its introduction in the Assembly until a copy has been sent to the Board.

Article 74

If at any stage during the passage of any Bill through the Federal Assembly that Bill, whether as originally introduced or as amended at any stage, is in the opinion of the Board a differentiating measure, the Board may lay before the Assembly a report on the Bill stating their reasons for considering the Bill to be such a measure; and, if at any time after such a report has been laid the Board no longer consider the Bill to be such a measure, they may lay before the Assembly a further report to that effect.

Article 75

- 1) On the passing of any Bill by the Federal Assembly the Board may present to the Speaker of the Federal Assembly a request in writing that the Bill shall be reserved by the Governor-General for the signification of Her Majesty's pleasure on the ground that it is a differentiating measure, and any such request shall include the reasons why in the opinion of the Board the Bill is such a measure, and, if the decision to make the request was not unanimous, a statement to that effect.
- 2) Where such a request is received by the Speaker, he shall cause it to be delivered to the Governor-General when the Bill is presented to him for assent.

- 3) Where such a request is delivered to the Governor-General, then, except as provided in paragraph (4) of this article, he shall not himself assent to the Bill but shall reserve it for the signification of Her Majesty's pleasure and send the Board's request to a Secretary of State together with the Bill.
- 4) Notwithstanding any such request by the Board, the Governor-General in his discretion may himself assent to the Bill
 - a) if he satisfies himself that it is not a differentiating measure and that the reasons given by the Board for considering it to be such a measure are of an irrelevant or frivolous nature; or
 - b) if he is satisfied, upon representations made by the Prime Minister, that it is essential in the public interest that the Bill be brought into immediate operation;
 but if he does so assent the Governor-General shall forthwith send to a Secretary of State the Bill to which he has assented together with the Board's request and a statement of his reasons for assenting.
- 5) Nothing in paragraph (4) of this article shall be construed as authorising the Governor-General himself to assent to any Bill which he is required by article ten or article ninety-seven of this Constitution to reserve for the signification of Her Majesty's pleasure.

Article 76

The provisions of the two last foregoing articles shall not be construed as prejudicing any additional provision which may be made by Standing Orders of the Federal Assembly with respect to the referring of Bills or proposed amendments thereto to the Board for the Board's report thereon at any stage or with respect to the action to be taken by the Assembly on any report by the Board.

Article 77

- 1) If any instrument which has the force of law and is made in the exercise of a power conferred by a law of the Federal Legislature is in the opinion of the Board a differentiating measure, the Board may at any time within thirty days after the publication of the instrument send to the Prime Minister a report in writing to that effect stating the reasons why in the opinion of the Board the instrument is such a measure.
- 2) When such a report in respect of any instrument is received by the Prime Minister, he shall within thirty days, unless the Board have in the meantime by notice in writing withdrawn the report, send the report and his comments thereon to the Governor-General, and the Governor-General shall forward the report and the Prime Minister's comments thereon to a Secretary of State.
- 3) A Secretary of State may at any time within twelve months after receiving such a report with respect to an instrument disapprove of that instrument, and after receiving notification of such a disapproval the Governor-General shall cause notice of the disapproval to be published in the official Gazette of the Federation and the instrument shall be deemed to be annulled as from such date, not being earlier than the publication of the notice, as the Governor-General in his discretion may by that notice appoint.
- 4) On the annulment of any instrument under this article, any other instrument or law amended, revoked or repealed by the instrument annulled shall have effect from the date of the annulment as if the instrument annulled had not been made, but save as provided in the foregoing provisions of this paragraph the provisions of subsection (2) of section thirty-eight of the Interpretation Act, 1889, shall apply to that annulment as they apply to the repeal of an Act of Parliament.

VI. The Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation (adopted 1874)³⁷

Article 4

All Swiss are equal before the Law. In Switzerland there is neither subjection nor privilege of locality, birth, family, or person.

Article 5

The Confederation guarantees to the Cantons their territory, their sovereignty within the limits of Article 3, their Constitutions, the freedom and the rights of the people and the constitutional

rights of citizens, as well as the rights and powers which the people has conferred upon the authorities.

Article 14

When a dispute arises between two Cantons they shall not take any independent action nor resort to arms, but are to submit duly to the decision of the Federation.

Article 27

The Confederation is entitled to establish a Federal university and other institutions of higher education, in addition to the already existing Polytechnic School, and to subsidize institutions of this nature.

The Cantons provide for adequate primary education, which shall be exclusively under the control of the civil authority. Such education is compulsory and, in the public schools, free.

The public schools shall be such that they may be attended by adherents of all religious sects without any offence to their freedom of conscience or belief.

The Confederation shall take the necessary measures against Cantons which fail to fulfil these obligations.

Article 27 bis

Subsidies shall be paid to the Cantons to help them fulfil their obligations in the field of primary education.

The details shall be settled by law.

Organization, control, and supervision of primary schools remain Cantonal matters, subject to Article 27.

Article 31 bis

Within the limits of its constitutional powers, the Confederation shall take measures to increase the general welfare and to ensure the economic security of the citizens.

While safeguarding the general interests of the national economy, the Confederation may regulate the exercise of trades and industry and take measures in favour of particular economic classes or professions. In the exercise of this power the Confederation shall respect the principle of Freedom of Trade and Industry, except as provided in paragraph 3.

When the public interest justifies it the Confederation has the power to make provisions infringing, if necessary, the Freedom of Trade and Industry:

- a) to preserve important economic classes, or professions, whose survival is threatened, and to encourage independent producers in such economic classes or professions;
- b) to preserve a strong peasantry, to encourage agriculture, and to strengthen the position of rural property-owners;
- c) to protect districts whose economic life is threatened;
- d) to prevent harmful social or economic effects of cartels or similar organizations;
- e) to take precautions against the event of war.

Professions and economic classes shall only be protected under the headings (a) and (b) if they have themselves taken such measures of mutual assistance as can be fairly expected of them.

Federal legislation under (a) and (b) shall safeguard the development of groups based upon mutual assistance.

Article 49

Freedom of conscience and belief is inviolable.

No one may be compelled to be a member of a religious association, to receive a religious education, to take part in a religious ceremony, or to suffer punishment of any sort by reason of religious opinion.

The father or guardian has the right of determining the religious education a child shall receive, in conformity with the principles stipulated above, until the child's sixteenth birthday.

Exercise of civil or political rights may not be restricted by any religious or ecclesiastical conditions or prescriptions whatever.

No one is released from performance of his civil duties by reason of his religious beliefs.

No one is obliged to pay taxes devoted especially to the special expenses of the ritual of a religious community to which he does not belong. Further execution of this principle is reserved to Federal legislation.

Article 50

The free practice of religious ceremonies is guaranteed within the limits of public order and decency.

The Cantons and the Confederation may take the necessary measures to maintain public order and peace between adherents of different religious communities, and to combat the encroachments of ecclesiastical authorities on the rights of citizens or of the State.

Conflicts of public or private law arising out of the creation of new religious communities or a schism of old ones may be brought on appeal before the competent Federal authorities.

No bishoprics may be set up on Swiss territory without the consent of the Confederation.

Article 51

The order of Jesuits and societies affiliated thereto can be received in no part of Switzerland, and are forbidden to take any part in Church or school affairs.

A Federal *Arrêté* may extend this prohibition to other religious orders whose activity is dangerous to the State or disturbs the peaceable relationship of religious denominations.

Article 52

The founding of new convents or religious orders, and the re-establishment of those which have been suppressed, are both prohibited.

Article 60

Cantons are obliged to treat the citizens of other Confederate States as favourably as their own citizens, in legislation and before their courts of law.

Article 107

Members and deputy members of the Federal Tribunal shall be elected by the Federal Assembly, which shall see that the three official languages of the Confederation are represented upon it.

A Law shall provide for the method of organization of the Federal Tribunal and the sections thereof, the number of its members and deputy members, their term of office and their pay.

Article 116

German, French, Italian, and Romanche are the national languages of Switzerland.

German, French, and Italian shall be deemed the official languages of the Confederation.

Chapter I

1. See App. A, Table A.2, for distribution by cantons of linguistic groups in Switzerland.
2. See App. A, Tables A.3-A.8, for the distribution of linguistic or racial groups in these new federations. For a detailed comparative study of these new Asian and African federations (without reference to their relevance to Canadian problems) see R. L. Watts, *New Federations: Experiments in the Commonwealth* (Oxford, 1966).
3. See App. A, Table A.3.
4. See App. A, Table A.4.
5. See App. A, Tables A.5 and A.6.
6. See App. A, Table A.7.
7. See App. A, Table A.8, for distribution of races.
8. See B. T. G. Chidzero, "The Meaning of Good Government in Central Africa," in Colin Leys and Cranford Pratt (eds.), *A New Deal in Central Africa* (London, 1960), 170-81.
9. See, for instance: Constituent Assembly of India, *Reports of Committees*, Three Series (New Delhi, 1947-9); C. A. I., *Report of the Linguistic Provinces Commission* [Dar] (New Delhi, 1948); Indian National Congress, *The Report of the Linguistic Provinces Committee* (New Delhi, 1949); *White Paper on Indian States* (rev. ed., New Delhi, 1950); *Report of the Finance Commission*, 1952, 1957, 1961 (New Delhi, 1952, 1957, 1962); P. H. Appleby, *Public Administration in India, Report of a Survey* (New Delhi, 1953); *Report of the States Reorganization Commission*, 1955 (New Delhi, 1955); P. H. Appleby, *Re-examination of India's Administrative System* (New Delhi, 1956); *Report of the Official Language Commission*, 1956 (New Delhi, 1957); *Report of the Committee of Parliament on the Official Language* (New Delhi, 1958); *Statement Issued by the National Integration Conference*, 1961 (New Delhi, 1962); *Report of the Committee on Emotional Integration* (New Delhi, 1962); *Annual Reports of the Commissioner for Linguistic Minorities* (New Delhi, annually).
10. For examples of the consideration of Canadian precedents and experience see: Constituent Assembly of India, *Debates*, V, 164; VII, 37, 43; XI, 647; Constituent Assembly of India, *Draft Constitution* (1948), 192 n.; *Report of the Official Language Commission*, 1956, 13, 16-7; A. K. Brohi, *Fundamental Law of Pakistan* (Karachi, 1958), 20, 223-6, 245, 267-70, 685; *Report of the Constitution Commission, Pakistan, 1961* (Karachi, 1962), par. 68; Col. no. 330/1957, *Report of the Federation of Malaya Constitutional Commission*, 1957 (London, 1957), par. 137; Harry Miller, *Prince and Premier* (London 1959), 137.
11. Patrick Gordon Walker, "Federalism in the Commonwealth," *Journal of the Parliaments of the Commonwealth*, XLII (1961), 351-9.

12. See, for instance, A. V. Dicey, *Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution* (10th ed., London, 1961), Chap. III.

13. For a general picture of the Swiss federal system see G. A. Coddington, *The Federal Government of Switzerland* (Cambridge, Mass., 1961) and Christopher Hughes, *The Federal Constitution of Switzerland* (London, 1954). For a general account of the Australian political system see J. D. B. Miller, *Australian Government and Politics* (2nd ed., London, 1958), and S. R. Davis (ed.), *Government of the Australian States* (Melbourne, 1960).

Chapter II

1. For a history of ideas of federalism see Sobei Mogi, *The Problem of Federalism, A Study in the History of Political Theory*, 2 v. (London, 1931).

2. K. C. Wheare, *Federal Government* (4th ed., London, 1963), especially Pt. I. For other statements agreeing substantially with Wheare see W. P. M. Kennedy, *The Constitution of Canada* (London, 1922), 407-8; J. A. Corry, *Democratic Government and Politics* (2nd ed., Toronto, 1951), 551-3; J. Quick and R. R. Garran, *Annotated Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia* (Sydney, 1901), 333.

3. Wheare, *Federal Government*, 10.

4. See, for example, Constituent Assembly of India, *Debates*, V, 37; Col. no. 255/1950, *British Caribbean Standing Closer Association Committee, Report [Rance]* (London), par. 22; Cmd. 8233/1951, *Central African Territories, Report of Conference on Closer Association*, par. 46.

5. Wheare, *Federal Government*, 242-3.

6. J. A. Corry, "Constitutional Trends and Federalism," in A. R. M. Lower [and others], *Evolving Canadian Federalism* (Durham, N.C., 1958), 122.

7. See, for instance, Jane Perry Clark, *The Rise of a New Federalism* (New York, 1938); "A Symposium on Co-operative Federalism," *Iowa Law Review*, XXIII (1938), 455-616; G. C. S. Benson, *The New Centralization* (New York, 1941). Later the term was also used by A. H. Birch, *Federalism, Finance and Social Legislation in Canada, Australia and the United States* (Oxford, 1955), 304-6; Corry, "Constitutional Trends".

8. M. J. C. Vile, *The Structure of American Federalism* (London, 1961), Chap. X.

9. D. J. Elazar, *The American Partnership* (Chicago, 1962), Chap. I.

10. The evidence for this claim will become apparent in subsequent chapters, but for a full exposition of this view of the newer federations see Watts, *New Federations*, Chaps. I, X, XIV.

11. Wheare, *Federal Government*, Chap. II.

12. Such a criticism of Wheare himself would be unfair for he warns against this pitfall and does examine the operation of federal governments. But some other writers following Wheare appear to have become absorbed with the problem of classification.

13. This aspect is dealt with in Chap. V.

14. This aspect is dealt with in Chap. VI.

15. This aspect is dealt with in Chap. VII.

16. W. S. Livingston, *Federalism and Constitutional Change* (Oxford, 1956), 1.

17. The idea of such a spectrum was first suggested by Livingston, *ibid.*, 3-5. It is further developed in Watts, *New Federations*, especially 93-5.

Chapter III

1. On the function of language for the individual and for society see R. B. LePage, *The National Language Question* (London, 1964), Chaps. I and II.

2. W. H. Morris-Jones, *Parliament in India* (London, 1957), 18-19.

3. The Dravidian group of languages are Telegu, Tamil, Kannada, and Malayalam spoken mostly in the southern states. See App. A, Table A.3.

4. *States Reorganization Act, 1956* (37/1956); *The Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956*. See also *Report of the States Reorganization Commission, 1955* (New Delhi, 1955). See also Chap. IV.

5. *The Constitution of India, 1950*, Eighth Schedule. See App. E. A fourteenth language so specified was Sanskrit, but this was not a regional language.

6. See App. A, Table A.4.

7. See App. A, Table A.7.

8. In 1962 the Action Group split and thereafter western regional politics was a struggle between it and the United People's party. The U.P.P. with the addition of some western N.C.N.C. elements in 1964 became the Nigerian National Democratic party (N.N.D.P.).

9. See App. A, Table A.7.

10. See App. A, Table A.2.

11. These three languages together with Romanche are further recognized as "national" languages.

12. *Government of India Act, 1935*, 26 Geo. V, Chap. 2.

13. *Annuaire statistique de la Suisse, 1953* (Official statistical information published since 1891),

40. For a study of the problems of the complex cultural diversity in Switzerland see Kenneth D. McRae, *Switzerland: Example of Cultural Co-Existence* (Toronto, 1964).

14. See F. G. Carnell, "Political Implications of Federalism in New States," in U. K. Hicks [and others], *Federalism and Economic Growth in Underdeveloped Countries* (London, 1961), 46-7.

15. See, for instance, Second Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, *Debates*, I, 1818-9, 1845-7, 1909-10, 1942, 1998, 2016-7, 2049-50, 2072, 2083, 2100-2, 2119, 2122-3, 2232-6, 2271-2.

16. In 1953, southerners, mainly Ibos, held 82 per cent of all posts in the clerical service of the north. Carnell, "Political Implications of Federalism."

17. H. O. Davies, *Nigeria: The Prospects for Democracy* (London, 1961), 21.

18. Because the franchise favoured the settlers 75 per cent of the federal electorate was located in Southern Rhodesia, and this electorate controlled 47 per cent of the seats in the federal legislature.

19. See, for instance, *Report of the States Reorganization Commission, 1955* (New Delhi, 1955), 244-52; and Cmd. 505/1958, *Nigeria, Report of the Commission Appointed to Enquire into the Fears of Minorities and the Means of Allaying Them* (London, 1958), Pt. IV.

20. For an analysis of Swiss political parties see Codding, *The Federal Government of Switzerland*, Chap. VIII.

21. For a detailed analysis of these factors see R. L. Watts, *New Federations*, 41-66.

22. For a fuller development of the significance of this point see Chap. IV, C.

Chapter IV

1. See Chap. III, C.

2. The ways in which central institutions have been organized in an attempt to resolve this issue are discussed in Chap. VII.

3. The methods by which this has been done in other federations are discussed in Chap. V.

4. *The States Reorganization Act, 1956* (XXXVII/1956), Pt. III. For a comment on the operation of these councils see Chap. VI.

5. This is the basis of the appeal which the notion of a *statut particulier* has for some in Quebec. On this subject see D. V. Smiley, "The Two Themes of Canadian Federalism," *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, XXXI (1965), 80-97.

6. *Report of the States Reorganization Commission, 1955*, pars. 154, 233; Cmd. 505/1958, *Nigeria, Report of the Commission on the Fears of Minorities*, 87.

7. For details of relevant constitutional provisions see App. E which contains selected articles and sections from different federal constitutions.

8. *Constitution of India, 1950*, Arts. 12-35; *Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1956*, Arts. 3-22; *Constitution of the Federation of Malaysia, 1963*, Arts. 5-13; *Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1963*, Sects. 18-33. The fundamental rights in the *Constitution of the*

Republic of Pakistan, 1962, Arts. 5 and 6, were not justiciable, but an amendment conceding to the courts some power to review legislation was passed in 1963. Although not grouped separately as fundamental rights the *Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation, 1874* (hereafter *Swiss Constitution*), Arts. 4, 43, 45, 55, 56, 58, 60, correspond.

9. *Constitution of India, 1950*, Arts. 12, 15, 16, 25-30, 350; *Constitution of Pakistan, 1956*, Arts. 13, 14, 18, 19, 21; *Constitution of Pakistan, 1962*, Art. 6, Principles 7, 12, 14; Art. 8, Principles 3, 4, 5, 6, 10, 14, 16; *Constitution of Malaysia, 1963*, Arts. 4(1), 11, 12; *Constitution of Nigeria, 1963*, Sects. 5(1), 24, 28. For similar provisions see *Swiss Constitution*, Arts. 27, 27 bis, 49, 50.

10. *Constitution of India, 1950*, Art. 16; *Constitution of Pakistan, 1956*, Arts. 12, 17; *Constitution of Pakistan, 1962*, Art. 8, Principles 6, 14; *Constitution of Malaysia, 1963*, Art. 8; *Constitution of Nigeria, 1963*, Sect. 28.

11. Cmnd. 505/1958, *Report of the Commission on the Fears of Minorities*, 97-103.

12. *Constitution of India, 1950*, Art. 347.

13. *Ibid.*, Art. 350.

14. Art. 350A as inserted by the *Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956*, Sect. 21.

15. Art. 350B as inserted by the *Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956*, Sect. 21.

16. Arts. 336, 337.

17. For a somewhat similar Swiss provision see *Swiss Constitution*, Art. 31 bis.

18. *Constitution of India, 1950*, Art. 335.

19. *Ibid.*, Art. 338.

20. *Ibid.*, Art. 340.

21. *Constitution of the Federation of Malaya, 1957*, Arts. 89, 90, 153(10).

22. *Malaysia Act, 1963*, Sect. 62 inserting Art. 161A in the *Constitution of Malaysia, 1963*.

23. *Constitution of Malaysia, 1963*, Arts. 161, 161C, 161D.

24. *Constitution of India, 1950*, Arts. 332-4.

25. *Constitution of Pakistan, 1956*, Art. 77(2); *Constitution of Pakistan, 1962*, Art. 71(2).

26. *The Nigeria (Constitution) Order in Council, 1954* (S.I. 1954, no. 1146), Sects. 22, 30, 36; *Constitution of Northern Nigeria, 1960*, Sect. 7(b).

27. *The Establishment of West Pakistan Act, 1955*, Sect. 14; *Constitution, 1956*, Art. 77(5); *Constitution, 1962*, Art. 239.

28. *Constitution of India*, Art. 371 as inserted by the *Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1957*, Sect. 22.

29. Cmnd. 505/1958, *Nigeria, Report of the Commission on the Fears of Minorities*, 12, 96.

30. Cmnd. 569/1958, *Report of the Resumed Nigeria Constitutional Conference* (London, 1958), pars. 54-5.

31. Cmnd. 1149/1960, *Report of the Advisory Commission on the Review of the Constitution of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland*, (London, 1960), App. VI, "Survey of Development Since 1953," 43, 54.

32. *Ibid.*, 33-6, 43-6, 53-4; *Constitution of Pakistan, 1956*, Art. 145. There are no separate electorates under the Pakistan constitution of 1962.

33. *Constitution of India, 1950*, Arts. 244, 275(1), 337-42, Fifth and Sixth Schedules; *Constitution of Pakistan, 1956*, Arts. 103-4, 204-7; *Constitution of Pakistan, 1962*, Art. 223; *Constitution of Malaya, 1957*, Ninth Schedule, List 1, item 16.

34. *Constitution*, Arts. 347, 350A, 350B, 371.

35. *Constitution of Pakistan, 1956*, Art. 145.

36. *Constitution of Malaya, 1957*, Arts. 89-90.

37. Cmnd. 1149/1960, *Advisory Commission on Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Report*, App. VI, 30-1, 47-8, 54-5. The Africans were a majority of the population in each of these territories but a minority of the electorate.

38. J. V. Bondurant, *Regionalism versus Provincialism: A Study in Problems of Indian National Unity* (Berkeley, 1958), 56, 62; W. H. Morris-Jones, *The Government and Politics of India* (London, 1964), 103, 144.

39. Cmnd. 505/1958, *Nigeria, Report of the Commission on the Fears of Minorities*, 94-7; Cmnd. 569/1958, *Report of the Resumed Nigeria Constitutional Conference*, pars. 52, 56.
40. *Constitution of Nigeria, 1963*, Sects. 105-10.

Chapter V

1. Smiley, "Canadian Federalism," 80-97, esp. 81-3.
2. See Chap. III, C.
3. For a more extensive discussion of examples see R. L. Watts, *New Federations*, Chap. III, sect. 3.
4. The West Indies Federation was an exception to this trend.
5. Malaya is the exception, but in the Borneo states of Malaysia a number of the social services are placed under concurrent rather than exclusive central jurisdiction.
6. In these calculations the total cost of joint programs, including the portion financed by federal grants-in-aid, has been attributed to provinces. In most other federations expenditures on such programmes are accounted for in this manner. It is perhaps illustrative of the more centralist Canadian outlook, that the official Canadian accounts usually include this portion with federal rather than provincial expenditures. The percentages above are calculated from statistics published by the Dominion Bureau of Statistics in *Historical Review: Financial Statistics of Governments in Canada, 1952-62* (Ottawa, 1966).
7. *Constitution of Pakistan, 1956*, Art. 108 proviso; *Constitution of Malaya, 1957*, Art. 76(2), and *Malaysia Act, 1963*, Sixth Schedule; *Constitution of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 1953*, Art. 34; *Constitution of Nigeria, 1963*, Sect. 74.
8. *Constitution of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 1953*, Art. 42(2).
9. See, for instance, Col. no. 330/1957, *Report of the Federation of Malaya Constitutional Commission, 1957* [Reid] (London, 1957), par. 33.
10. For examples see App. B.
11. *Constitution of India, 1950*, Arts. 252, 254(2), 258 and 258A as inserted by the *Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956*, Sect. 18; *Constitution of Pakistan, 1962*, Arts. 131(3), 135(b), 143; *Constitution of Malaya, 1957*, Arts. 76, 80, 110(4), 157, and *Malaysia Act, 1963*, Sects. 30(7), 37, 38, 48; *Constitution of Nigeria, 1963*, Sects. 72, 99, 100; *Constitution of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 1953*, Arts. 31, 32, 41, 42(3).
12. The West Indies Federation was a marked exception to the general trend in the newer federations.
13. See App. B, Table B.1 for the actual assignment of taxing powers in the different federations.
14. An exception has been the relatively wide use of conditional grants in India and Pakistan for purposes of capital projects as part of the Five Year Plans.
15. *Constitution of Pakistan, 1962*, Art. 145(4).
16. See A. M. Moore [and others], *The Financing of Canadian Federation*, Canadian Tax Foundation (Toronto, 1966), for a recent survey of federal finance in Canada.
17. Prime examples are the advocates of a *statut particulier* for Quebec. On this subject see also Smiley, "Canadian Federalism," 93-7.
18. *Government of India Act, 1935*, Sects. 6(2), 101.
19. Constituent Assembly of India, *Debates*, VII, 42.
20. *White Paper on Indian States* (rev. ed., 1950), pars. 175, 218-21, 244.
21. *Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956*, Sect. 29 and Schedule amending Arts. 259, 278, 291 and 306 of the constitution.
22. See *Constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order, 1954*, especially Sects. 2(6)(b), 2(22)(b), made under article 370 of the *Constitution of India, 1950*. See also B. R. Sharma, "The Special Position of Jammu and Kashmir State in the Indian Constitution," *Indian Journal of Political Science*, XIX (1958), 282-90; M. P. Jain, *Indian Constitutional Law* (Bombay, 1962), 597-600.
23. *Constitution (Thirteenth Amendment) Act, 1962*.
24. Azad Kashmir is the portion of Kashmir held by Pakistan.

25. *Constitution of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 1953*, Federal List, items 24, 25, 26, 30. See also Northern Rhodesia, *The Non-African Agriculture (Transfer to the Concurrent List) Ordinance, 1955* (N.R. Ordinance 61/1955) (Lusaka, Northern Rhodesia, 1955).

26. Cmnd. 1148/1960, *Report of the Advisory Commission on Rhodesia and Nyasaland*, par. 125.

27. *Malaysia Act, 1963*, Fourth Schedule. See App. B. See also Cmnd. 1954/1963, *Malaysia, Report of the Inter-Governmental Committee, 1962* (London, 1963), pars. 16, 17, 21-3, and Annex A.

28. Singapore with 17 per cent of the federal population was given only 15 seats in the House of Representatives with 159 members. On the federal franchise restrictions upon Singapore citizens outside Singapore see *Malaysia Act, 1963*, Sect. 31. It is perhaps significant that neither of these disabilities applied to Sabah or Sarawak.

Chapter VI

1. *Constitution of India, 1950*, Arts. 280-1. To date Finance Commissions have reported in 1952, 1957 and 1962.

2. *Constitution of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 1953*, Art. 96. The first commission reported in 1957.

3. *Malaysia Act, 1963*, Sects. 47, 48.

4. The Nigerian constitutions of 1960 (Art. 153) and 1963 (Art. 164) provided for such commissions "from time to time."

5. *Constitution of Pakistan, 1956*, Art. 118; *Constitution of Pakistan, 1962*, Art. 144; *Constitution of Malaya, 1957*, Art. 108.

6. Under the 1956 constitution of Pakistan the decisions of the National Finance Commission were binding, but up to the time of the suspension of that constitution in 1958 the commission had not been convened.

7. *Constitution of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 1953*, Arts. 88-92; Cmnd. 481/1958, *Nigeria, Report of the Fiscal Commissioner* (London, 1958), pars. 158, 166.

8. *Constitution of India, 1950*, Arts. 257(4), 258(3); *Constitution of Pakistan, 1956*, Art. 129; *Constitution of Malaya, 1957*, Art. 80(6); *Constitution of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 1953*, Art. 31(3).

9. *Constitution of Pakistan, 1956*, Arts. 116(4), 129; *Constitution of Malaya, 1957*, Art. 87; *Constitution of India, 1950*, Art. 262.

10. Morris-Jones, *Government and Politics of India*, 143.

11. *Constitution of Malaya, 1957*, Arts. 92(1), 108.

12. *Ibid.*, Arts. 91, 92(1).

13. The regional governments are represented on the statutory boards of the Electricity Corporation of Nigeria, the Nigerian Ports Authority, the Nigerian Railway Corporation and the Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation.

14. Its membership included the central prime minister and six central cabinet ministers, the chief ministers of seven states, other major political leaders, the military chiefs of staff, and some officials and technical and scientific advisers.

15. Subsequently, the *Constitution (Sixteenth Amendment) Act, 1963* prohibited the advocacy of secession.

16. *Statement issued by the National Integration Conference* (Delhi, 1961).

17. Government of India, Ministry of Education, *Report of the Committee on Emotional Integration* (New Delhi, 1962).

18. *Constitution of India, 1950*, Art. 263.

19. On the zonal councils, see Bondurant, *Regionalism versus Provincialism*, Chaps. III, V, VI; M. V. Pylee, *Constitutional Government in India* (Bombay, 1960), Chap. XLII; B. N. Schoenfeld, *Federalism in India* (Washington, 1960), 16-18; Morris-Jones, *Government and Politics of India*, 103, 144.

20. Art. 130.

21. A body composed of the rulers or governors of all the states in the federation.

22. *Constitution of Malaya, 1957*, Art. 38(3). This provision continues in Malaysia.

23. See Hughes, *The Federal Constitution of Switzerland*, 122-4, regarding Art. 113 of the constitution.

24. See *ibid.*, 100-3, regarding Art. 89.

25. *Constitution of Pakistan, 1962*, Arts. 57(2), 133(1).

26. *Federation of Malaya Agreement, 1948*, Clauses 66, 153.

27. See, for instance, Jacques-Yvan Morin, "Vers un nouvel équilibre constitutionnel au Canada," in Paul-A. Crépeau and C. B. MacPherson (eds.), *The Future of Canadian Federalism; L'avenir du fédéralisme canadien* (Toronto, 1965), 153.

28. The *Swiss Constitution* (Art. 107) does stipulate that the three official languages are to be represented on the Federal Tribunal, but does not specify their proportional representation. In practice the Assembly has seen that the main parties and both religious denominations are represented on the Federal Tribunal, as well as the three official languages.

29. *Constitution of India, 1950*, Art. 124(7); *Constitution of Pakistan, 1956*, Art. 150(2).

Chapter VII

1. Basic Principles Committee, *Interim Report* (Karachi, 1950), par. 30-9; Basic Principles Committee, Franchise Sub-Committee, *Report* (Karachi, 1952), 1, 4; Basic Principles Committee, *Report* (Karachi, 1952), pars. 36-80; Basic Principles Committee, *Report* (as adopted, 1954), pars. 39-87.

2. *Constitution of Pakistan, 1956*, Art. 43.

3. *Constitution of Pakistan, 1962*, Art. 19.

4. *Constitution of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 1953*, Art. 97(5).

5. *Swiss Constitution*, Art. 80.

6. Hughes, *The Federal Constitution of Switzerland*, 88-9.

7. An important factor also was the Malay desire to limit the extent of Chinese political influence.

8. *Swiss Constitution*, Arts. 95-104.

9. *Constitution of Pakistan, 1962*, Arts. 9-18, 25, 31-6, 165-7.

10. Art. 96.

11. In Nigeria, the regions are the autonomous political units, but these are themselves subdivided into administrative provinces.

12. Malaysia is unique in having an elected monarch. He is elected by the Conference of Rulers from among the hereditary rulers of the states. The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, which was dissolved before it achieved independence, had a governor-general.

13. The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was an exception, of course. There was no overt attempt to assign a senior ceremonial post to anyone from one of the African groups, thus contributing to the general alienation felt by the Africans in the northern territories towards the federal system.

14. *Report of the States Reorganization Commission*, pars. 123, 786-91.

15. *Constitution of India, 1950*, Arts. 16, 335, 336, 338. These are among the articles reproduced in App. E, I.

16. Art. 16. The term "the State" here includes the government and parliament of India, the government and legislature of each state, and all local authorities. See Art. 12.

17. On selection procedures and the organization of the civil service see Asok Chanda, *Indian Administration* (London, 1958), 104, 114-18; Morris-Jones, *Government and Politics of India*, 120-41.

18. See, for instance, Second Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, *Debates*, I (1956), 1845, 1909-10, 1998, 2049-50, 2104, 2122-3. See also K. B. Sayeed, *Pakistan, the Formative Phase* (Karachi, 1960), 384-5.

19. Second C.A.P. *Debates*, I, 2050.

20. *Constitution of Pakistan, 1962*, Art. 8, Principles 3, 6, 14, 16, 17. These are among the sections reproduced in App. E, II.

21. Art. 8, Principle 16.

22. Art. 240.
23. In 1961 the creation of three new all-India services was authorized—the Indian Service of Engineers, the Indian Forest Service and the Indian Medical and Health Service.
24. Morris-Jones, *Government and Politics of India*, 121.
25. Sayeed, *Pakistan*, 401.
26. *Constitution of Malaysia, 1963*, Art. 8 (see App. E, III).
27. *Ibid.*, Art. 136.
28. *Ibid.*, Arts. 153, 161A.
29. R. O. Tilman, "Policy Formulation, Policy Execution and the Political Elite Structure of Contemporary Malaya," in Wang Gungwu (ed.), *Malaysia* (London, 1964), 352-3.
30. *Constitution of Nigeria, 1960*, Sect. 27; *Constitution of Nigeria, 1963*, Sect. 28 (see App. E, IV).
31. E. O. Awa, *Federal Government in Nigeria* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1964), 172.
32. *Constitution of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 1953*, Arts. 67-77 (see App. E, V).
33. Cmnd. 298/1957, Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, *Constitution Amendment Bill, 1957* (London, 1957); Cmnd. 362/1958, Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, *Electoral Bill, 1958* (London, 1958).
34. For a discussion of these questions in some recent federations see Col. No. 328/1956, *Report of the British Caribbean Federal Capital Commission* (London, 1956), 3, and Chap. II; Cmd. 8934/1953, *Report by the Conference on the Nigerian Constitution* (London, 1953), Annex V; Cmnd. 1148/1960, *Report of the Advisory Commission on Rhodesia and Nyasaland*, pars. 263-6.
35. See J. Harvey Perry, *Report on the Financial and Administrative Arrangements in Capitals of Federal Territories* (Lagos, 1953).
36. Regarding India see: *Constitution, 1950*, Arts. 239-41 and First Schedule, *Government of Part C States Act, 1951* (XLIX of 1951), Sect. 21; *Report of the States Reorganization Commission*, pars. 580-94; *Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956*, Sects. 2, 17; *Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957* (66 of 1957). Regarding Pakistan see G.G.O. 14/1948, and *Establishment of West Pakistan Act, 1955*, Sect. 2. Regarding Nigeria see Cmnd. 207/1957, *Report by the Nigeria Constitutional Conference* (London, 1957), pars. 55-6, and Cmnd. 569/1958, *Report of the Resumed Nigeria Constitutional Conference*, pars. 22-4.
37. *Constitution of Malaya, 1957*, Art. 154 and Federal List items 6(e), 7(h); *Constitution of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 1953*, Art. 6; *Constitution of the West Indies Federation, 1957*, Art. 6; *Constitution of Pakistan, 1962*, Art. 131(4).
38. See, for instance, Col. no. 328/1956, *Report of the British Caribbean Federal Capital Commission*, Chap. II.
39. Second Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, *Debates*, I, 2119.
40. The Muslim League won only 10 out of 309 seats in the 1954 provincial election in East Bengal and never recovered in that province.
41. *Report of the Constitution Commission, 1961* (1962), par. 25.
42. Named National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons until the secession of the Southern Cameroons.
43. Of the six proclamations of emergency rule in the states before 1963, five struck down legislatures which supported opposition of coalition ministries or had unseated a Congress ministry.
44. An example was the role of certain key chief ministers in the states in the selection of Mrs. Indira Gandhi as Prime Minister Shastri's successor.
45. See *Statement Issued by the National Integration Conference, 28 September-1 October 1961* (Delhi, 1962), 11-13.

Chapter VIII

1. See tables in App. A for the distribution of population by language in each of these federations.
2. *Ibid.*, Tables A.1 and A.2.

3. Keith Callard, *Pakistan, A Political Study* (London, 1957), 182.
4. Basic Principles Committee, *Report* (as adopted, 1954), par. 276.
5. Art. 214.
6. Art. 215.
7. *Constitution of India, 1950*, Arts. 343-9, and Eighth Schedule (see App. E, I for these provisions).
8. *Report of the Official Language Commission, 1956*.
9. *Constitution of Malaya, 1957*, Art. 152. This is reproduced in App. E, III, *Constitution of Malaysia*, Art. 152.
10. *Constitution of Malaysia, 1963*, Arts. 161, 161F (see App. E, III).
11. *Constitution of Nigeria, 1963*, Sect. 59.
12. *Constitution of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 1953*, Sect. 7.
13. English has also been so recognized for an interim period in Pakistan.
14. *Swiss Constitution*, Art. 116 (see App.E,VI).
15. *Ibid*.
16. For the actual constitutional provisions in these federations see App. E.
17. See Chap. V and App. B. Malaya and Rhodesia and Nyasaland (with respect to settler education) were the only significant exceptions.
18. See Chap. VII, D.
19. For the details of these guarantees, see Chap. IV, D.

Appendix D

1. For the history of the British provinces up to 1935 see P. N. Masaldan, *Evolution of Provincial Autonomy in India* (Bombay, 1953), Chaps. I, II, VI.
2. Further Indian Councils Acts in 1892 and 1909 enhanced the legislative powers of the provincial legislatures, and the financial settlements of 1870, 1877, 1882, 1904 and 1912 enlarged the sphere and reduced the uncertainty of provincial finance. The ultimate supremacy of the central government was, however, retained intact.
3. Sir Reginald Coupland, *Report on the Constitutional Problem in India* (London, 1943), Pt. I, 141 (hereafter *Coupland Report*).
4. The establishment of the federation was to be conditional upon the accession of the Rulers of States with at least half the total population of all the states (*Government of India Act, 1935*, 26 Geo. V, Chap. 2, Sects. 5, 6).
5. *Coupland Report*, Pt. I, 141.
6. *Government of India, (Distribution of Revenues) Order, 1936*.
7. The provincial autonomy intended by the Act was in a sense negated, however, since the Congress provincial ministries were closely supervised and controlled by the Congress central "high command" and after 1939 the Muslim League developed the same sort of control over the domestic politics of the Muslim provinces.
8. The growth of Muslim support for the League was aided by the political vacuum resulting from the outlawing of the Congress 1942-5.
9. *Coupland Report*, Pt. III, Chap. 11.
10. Cmd. 6821/1946, *Statement by the Cabinet Mission*.
11. *Indian Independence Act, 1947*, (10 & 11 Geo. VI, Chap. 30).
12. *Ibid.*, Sect. 8(2) (c). The Governor's emergency powers under Sect. 93 of the 1935 Act were also omitted from the interim constitution as a result of this provision.
13. See Constituent Assembly of India, *Debates*, I-XII, and *Reports of Committees*, Series I-III.
14. "The Resolution on Aims and Objects," C.A.I., *Debates*, I, 57; *Report of the Union Powers Committee*, 17 April 1947, C.A.I. *Debates*, III, no. 1, App. 13, 375-8, or C.A.I. *Reports of Committees (First Series) 1947*, 1-5.
15. *Second Report of Union Powers Committee*, 5 July 1947, C.A.I. *Reports of Committees (First Series) 1947*, 70-1.

16. On the integration of the Indian states see Government of India, *White Paper on Indian States* (rev. ed., New Delhi, 1950); V. P. Menon, *The Integration of the Indian States* (Calcutta, 1956).
17. *The Constitution of India, 1950*, Art. 370; *The Constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order, 1950*.
18. *Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir, 1956*, Art. 3.
19. Constitution, Seventh Schedule, Lists I, III; Arts. 253, 256-8, 268-81, 292-3, 3.
20. B. K. Ambedkar, C.A.I., *Debates*, VII, 43.
21. *Ibid.*, 34-5.
22. On the reorganization of the states see *Report of the States Reorganization Commission, 1955*; Bondurant, *Regionalism versus Provincialism*; S. S. Harrison, *India, The Most Dangerous Decades* (Princeton, 1960); C. H. Alexandrowicz, *Constitutional Developments in India* (London, 1957), 171-93.
23. *Report of the Linguistic Provinces Commission* (1948), in C.A.I., *Reports of Committees (Third Series)*, 180-239; Indian National Congress, *Report of the Linguistic Provinces Committee* (New Delhi, 1949) (called JVP after the initials of its three members Jawaharlal Nehru, Vallabhbhai Patel, and Pattabhi Sitaramayya).
24. *Report of the States Reorganization Commission 1955*, Pt. II.
25. *The States Reorganization Act 1956* (37/1956) and *The Constitution (Seventh) Amendment Act 1956*.
26. One of the 14 states, Jammu and Kashmir, still retained, however, a special status of its own under Art. 370 of the constitution and *The Constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order, 1954* (C.O. 48).
27. *States Reorganization Act 1955*, Pt. III.
28. See App. A, Table A.3.
29. *Report of the Official Language Commission, 1956*.
30. *Report of the Committee of Parliament on the Official Language*.
31. Callard, *Pakistan*, 13.
32. *Indian Independence Act 1947*, 10 & 11 Geo. VI, Chap. 30, Sect. 8.
33. On the interim federal constitution and its operation see *Government of India Act 1935*, 26 Geo. V, Chap. 2; *Indian Independence Act 1947*, 10 & 11 Geo. VI, Chap. 30; *Pakistan (Provisional Constitution) Order 1947* (G.G.O. 22/1947); Callard, *Pakistan*, 101-18, 155-93.
34. The federal capital, Karachi, was detached from Sind and placed under an Administrator. In 1952 it became a Chief Commissioner's province.
35. The sharing of the net proceeds of the income tax was abandoned at the establishment of Pakistan; the administration of sales tax was taken over by the central government (although a proportion of receipts was transferred to the provinces and states); the right to levy succession and estate duties was appropriated by the central government.
36. *Report of the Financial Enquiry Regarding Allocation of Revenue between the Central & Provincial Governments* (1952).
37. *Government of India Act 1935*, Sect. 102. This section was successively amended in 1947, 1948, and 1950 to enlarge its scope, particularly to meet the situation caused by the movement of population after partition.
38. The original Sect. 93 of the 1935 Act giving the central government this power was removed by the *Pakistan Provisional Constitution Order 1947* (G.G.O. 22/1947). But a new Sect. 92A was inserted by Jinnah, acting under his extraordinary powers (*Indian Independence Act 1947*, Sect. 9), restoring similar powers to the central government (G.G.O. 13/1948). These powers remained in force until a modified version was inserted as Sect. 93 by the *Government of India (Amendment) Act, 1955*. The central government exercised these powers in Punjab 1949-51, Sind 1951-3, E. Bengal, March 1954, E. Bengal 1954-5.
39. *Indian Independence Act 1947*, Sect. 8(1). Between March 1948 and September 1954 the first Constituent Assembly made 44 amendments to the interim constitution.
40. The Act was passed in 1949 and repealed in 1954.
41. The Muslim League secured only 10 of the 309 seats at stake.

42. On the deliberations of the first Constituent Assembly see Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, *Debates*; C.A.P. Basic Principles Committee, *Interim Report*, 28 Sept. 1950; *Report*, 27 Dec. 1952; *Report as adopted*, 21 Sept. 1954.

43. Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, *Debates*, V, no.1, 1.

44. The Constituent Assembly's compromise consisted in the recognition of both Urdu and Bengali, but with an expression of hope that the state would take measures for developing a common language.

45. On the work of the second Constituent Assembly see especially Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, *Debates*, I (1955-6).

46. Callard, *Pakistan*, 193.

47. *Constitution of Pakistan*, 1956.

48. *Constitution of Pakistan*, 1956, Fifth Schedule, Provincial List now included 94 items as compared with 55 in the *Government of India Act*, Seventh Schedule, List II (as amended to 1956). Article 109 assigned residuary legislative power to the provinces.

49. Constitution, 1956, Arts. 118, 199.

50. Arts. 25, 197, 198.

51. Art. 1(1).

52. Arts. 191-6.

53. Arts. 125-8, 104.

54. Art. 183.

55. Arts. 110(2), 119.

56. Keith Callard, "Pakistan," in G. McT. Kahin (ed.), *Major Governments of Asia* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1958), 417.

57. From March 1956 to October 1958 there were four central prime ministers, three West Pakistan chief ministers and six East Pakistan ministries.

58. *President's Proclamation*, October 7, 1958.

59. M. Ahmad, *Government and Politics in Pakistan* (Karachi, 1959), 233. See also Mohammad Ayub Khan, "Pakistan Perspective," *Foreign Affairs*, XXXVIII (1960), 547-56.

60. M. Ayub Khan, *ibid.*, 553.

61. *The Constitution of Pakistan*, 1962, preamble.

62. *Report of the Constitution Commission*, 1961, Chap. IV.

63. Constitution, 1962, Article 131(2).

64. Sir Frank A. Swettenham, *British Malaya* (3rd ed., London, 1948), Chap. XII; F.M.S., *Treaty of Federation*, 1895, in Cmd. 4276/1933, *Report on a Visit to Malaya*, App. III. On a strict interpretation of the treaty, the term "federation" was a "misnomer" (see Cmd. 4276/1933, 6). The treaty neither established a central government nor attempted a division of powers, beyond stating that the rulers agreed to accept a resident-general whose advice they would follow in all matters of administration other than those touching the Mohammedan religion (F.M.S., *Treaty of Federation*, 1895, Art. 4). On the contrary, it preserved all the former powers of the rulers in their states (*ibid.*, concluding clause). In practice, however, the treaty did "effect substantial changes" as power became concentrated in the federal secretariat under the resident-general (Cmd. 4276/1933, 6).

65. Cmd. 4276/1933, 7-10 and App. IV. In 1909 a Federal Council was created as the main legislative and financial authority, the resident-general reduced in status to a chief secretary, and an attempt made at a division of powers; in 1927 the states were given greater financial autonomy and the Federal Council was reconstituted to restore the prestige of the rulers.

66. Johore had confided control of its foreign affairs to Britain by a Treaty of 1885, but it was only in 1914 that an agreement was concluded for the appointment of a British officer as general adviser.

67. Cmd. 6724/1946, *Malayan Union and Singapore, Statement of Policy on Future Constitution*, par. 3.

68. Col. no. 194/1946, Sir Harold MacMichael, *Report on a Mission to Malaya*.

69. *Malayan Union Order in Council*, 1946. See also Cmd. 6749/1946, *Malayan Union & Singapore, Summary of Constitutional Arrangements*. Of the three Orders in Council planned, i.e.,

Malayan Union Order, Singapore Order and Malayan Union Citizenship Order, only the first two were duly made, the last due to criticisms never being implemented (Cmd. 7171/1947, *Federation of Malaya, Summary of Revised Constitutional Proposals*, par. 2).

70. S.I. 1948, no. 108, *The Federation of Malaya Order in Council 1948*. See also Cmd. 7171/1947, *Malaya, Summary of Revised Constitutional Proposals*; Col. no. 330/1957, *Report of Federation of Malaya Constitutional Commission*, pars. 22-35.

71. *Federation of Malaya Agreement*, 1948, clauses 67-76. A Standing Committee of two rulers represented the rulers in signifying assent to federal bills (clauses 75-6).

72. Col. no. 330/1957, *Report of Federation of Malaya Constitutional Commission*, par. 33. See also pars. 23, 26.

73. D. Sington, *Malayan Perspective* (London, 1953), 7.

74. Col. no. 330/1957, *Report, Malaya Constitutional Commission*, pars. 33, 86, 101, 102, 103, 105-6, 120.

75. *Report of Committee to Review Financial Provisions of Federation of Malaya Agreement*, 1948 (Kuala Lumpur, 1955).

76. *Federation of Malaya Agreement* 1948, clause 153.

77. *Ibid.*, clauses 3, 6.

78. Cmd. 9714/1956, *Report by the Federation of Malaya Constitutional Conference*, pars. 74-5.

79. Col. no. 330/1957, *Report, Malaya Constitutional Commission 1957* [Reid]; Cmnd. 210/1957, *Constitutional Proposals for the Federation of Malaya*.

80. S.I. 1957, No. 1533, Annex: First Schedule, *Constitution of Malaya*, 1957, Arts. 73-112, 9th and 10th Schedules.

81. Art. 76(1) (a).

82. Art. 76(1) (b), (3) (4).

83. Art. 92(1).

84. Arts. 149-51, 71.

85. Arts. 76(1) (c), 80(4, 5).

86. Arts. 87, 91, 108.

87. Arts. 159, 2.

88. Art. 38 and 5th Schedule.

89. *Federation of Malaya Independence Act 1957*, 5 & 6 Eliz. II, Chap. 20; S. I, 1957, no., 1533, *Federation of Malaya Order in Council*, Sects. 1, 2.

90. See App. A, Table A.6.

91. Singapore Cmd. 33/1961, *Memorandum Setting Out Heads of Agreement between Federation of Malaya and Singapore*.

92. See Cmnd. 1563/1961, *Federation of Malaysia: Joint Statement by the Governments of the United Kingdom and of the Federation of Malaya* (London); Cmnd. 1794/1962, *Report of the Commission of Enquiry, North Borneo and Sarawak*, 1962 (London); Cmnd. 1954/1963, *Malaysia, Report of the Inter-Governmental Committee* (London); Cmnd. 2094/1963, *Malaysia, Agreement Concluded between the United Kingdom, the Federation of Malaya, North Borneo, Sarawak and Singapore* (London).

93. Lord Hailey, *An African Survey* (rev. ed. London, 1956), 307.

94. Obafemi Awolowo, *Path to Nigerian Freedom* (London, 1947), 47-8.

95. Margery Perham in Joan Wheare, *Nigerian Legislative Council* (London, 1950), x.

96. In 1885 at the Berlin Conference the British claim to a sphere of influence over the Niger Basin was recognized, and following this Lagos was severed from the Gold Coast and given its own governor, the Oil Rivers Protectorate was established (extended and renamed the Niger Coast Protectorate in 1893 and renamed the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria in 1900), and the Royal Niger Company was given its charter. In 1898 the British and French governments signed a convention regulating boundaries and in 1900 the administrative rights and powers of the Royal Niger Company were taken over by the British Crown to form the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria.

97. J.S. Coleman, *Nigeria: Background to Nationalism* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1958), 46.

98. Governor's despatch, par. 3, in Cmd 6599/1945, *Proposals for the Revision of the Constitution of Nigeria* (London).

99. Cmd. 6599/1945, *Proposals for the Revision of the Constitution of Nigeria*.
100. *Ibid.*, Governor's Despatch, par. 3.
101. S.R. & O. 1946, no. 1370, *The Nigeria (Legislative Council) Order in Council 1946*, S.8.
102. Nigerian Government, *Review of the Constitution (Regional Recommendations) 1949* (Lagos, 1949); *Report of the Drafting Committee on the Constitution* (Lagos, 1950); *Proceedings of the General Conference on the Review of the Constitution, Ibadan, 1950* (Lagos, 1950); *Report of the Select Committee of the Legislative Council on the Constitutional Review* (Enugu, 1950); *Legislative Council Debates*, 16 Sept., 1950.
103. S.I. 1951, no. 1172, *The Nigeria (Constitution) Order in Council, 1951*. The constitution was usually so named after Sir John Macpherson, Governor of Nigeria, 1948-55, although the constitution itself was the product of the series of conferences.
104. Nigerian Government, *Report of the Commission on Revenue Allocation* [Hicks-Phillipson] (Lagos, 1951), par. 33. The 1951 constitution has also been compared in form to the "democratic centralism" in the Soviet Union, 1923-36. See Birch, *Federalism, Finance and Social Legislation*, 297. For a general analysis of the 1951 constitution see Kalu Ezera, *Constitutional Developments in Nigeria* (Cambridge, 1960), Chaps. VI-VIII.
105. Cmd. 8934/1953, *Report by the Conference on the Nigerian Constitution* (London); Cmd. 9059/1954, *Report by the Resumed Conference on the Nigerian Constitution*, (London); S.I. 1954, no. 1146, *The Nigeria (Constitution) Order in Council, 1954*; S.I. 1954, no. 1147, *The Nigeria (Offices of Governor-General and Governors) Order in Council 1954*.
106. Cmd. 8934/1953, *Report on the Nigerian Constitution*, par. 7.
107. Coleman, *Nigeria: Background to Nationalism*, 402.
108. S.I. 1954, no. 1146, *The Nigeria (Constitution) Order in Council, 1954*, Sect. 88.
109. As a result of the 1954 federal elections, which resulted in no overall majority in the House of Representatives (184 seats), the Northern Peoples' Congress which won the most seats, 79 members, all from the Northern Region, gained the right to nominate the three ministers for that region; the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons, with a total of 56 seats, but capturing a majority in each of the Eastern and Western Regions, won the right to nominate the six ministers for those two regions; and the Cameroons National Congress, with all six seats in the Southern Cameroons, nominated the single minister representing that territory.
110. Nnamdi Azikiwe (national leader of the N.C.N.C.), the Sardauna of Sokoto (national leader of the N.P.C.), Obafemi Awolowo (National leader of the Action Group) and E. M. L. Enderley (leader of the K.N.C.) each chose to remain as a regional premier, leading respectively the Eastern, Northern, Western and Southern Cameroons governments. During the decade, 1951-61, different parties were in power in the three regions, the N.P.C. holding a majority in the Northern Region House of Assembly, the N.C.N.C. doing so in the Eastern Region House of Assembly, and the Action Group controlling the Western Region House of Assembly, throughout the period.
111. Cmnd. 207/1957, *Report by Nigeria Constitutional Conference* (London); Nigerian Government, *Report of Ad Hoc Meeting of Nigeria Constitutional Conference in Lagos 1958* (Lagos, 1958); Cmnd. 569/1958, *Report by Resumed Nigeria Constitutional Conference*.
112. Cmnd. 481/1958, *Report of the Fiscal Commissioner* (London); Cmnd. 569/1958, *Report by Resumed Nigeria Constitutional Conference*, pars. 36-43.
113. Cmnd. 505/1958, *Nigeria, Report of the Commission on the Fears of Minorities*, Chap. 14.
114. Cmnd. 569/1958, *Report by Resumed Nigeria Constitutional Conference*, pars. 44-50. The new states issue remained alive, however, being hotly disputed in 1959 federal elections.
115. *Ibid.*, pars. 6-7. About 10 of the 30 days of the conference were spent on this subject.
116. *Ibid.*, pars. 8-17.
117. Distribution of seats in House of Representatives after 1959 federal elections (source, Electoral Commission, *Report on the Nigeria Federal Elections* (Lagos, 1959), App. I):

	N.R.	E.R.	W.R.	Lagos	Total	Support in H. of R.
N.P.C.	134	—	—	—	134	148
N.C.N.C.	—	58	21	2	81	81
N.E.P.U.	8	—	—	—	8	8
A.G.	25	14	33	1	73	75
Small parties & Independents	7	1	8	—	16	—
	174	73	62	3	312	312

118. *Nigeria Independence Act, 1960*, 8 & 9 Eliz. II, Chap. 55; S.I. 1960, no. 1652, *The Nigeria (Constitution) Order in Council 1960*.

119. Cmd. 569/1958, *Report by Resumed Nigeria Constitutional Conference*, par. 77.

120. *The Constitution of Nigeria* (1963, no. 20).

121. *Mid-Western Region Act, 1962* (1962, no. 6); *Mid-Western Region (Transitional Provisions) Act, 1963* (1963, no. 18); *Constitution of Mid-Western Nigeria Act, 1964*.

122. Cmd. 3234/1929, *Report of the Commission on Closer Union of the Dependencies in Eastern and Central Africa* (London), 282-3.

123. Cmd. 3573/1930 (London).

124. Cmd. 5949/1939, *Report of the Rhodesia and Nyasaland Royal Commission* [Bledisloe] (London), 215-19; Cmd. 8233/1951, *Central African Territories: Report of Conference on Closer Association*, par. 14.

125. For negotiations 1948-53 leading to federation see: Cmd. 8233/1951, *Central African Territories, Report of Conference on Closer Association*; Cmd. 8411/1951, *Closer Association in Central Africa* (London); Cmd. 8573/1952, *Draft Federal Scheme* (London); Cmd. 8671/1952, *Report of Judicial Commissioner* (London); Cmd. 8672/1952, *Report of Fiscal Commissioner* (London); Cmd. 8673/1952, *Report of Civil Service Preparatory Commission* (London); Cmd. 8753/1953, *Report by Conference on Federation* (London); Cmd. 8754/1953, *The Federal Scheme* (London).

126. Cmd. 8233/1951, *Central African Territories, Report of Conference on Closer Association*, pars. 38-9.

127. *Ibid.*, pars. 40-5.

128. *Ibid.*, pars. 43, 49, 50-2, 95, Annex III.

129. Cmd. 8411/1951, *Closer Association in Central Africa*, Annex, pars. 6, 10.

130. Cmd. 8573/1952, *Draft Federal Scheme*.

131. Cmd. 8753/1953, *Report by Conference on Federation*; Cmd. 8754/1953, *The Federal Scheme*.

132. *Rhodesia and Nyasaland Federation Act, 1953*, 1 & 2 Eliz II, Chap. 30.

133. S.I. 1953, no. 1199, *The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (Constitution) Order in Council, 1953*, was made August 1, 1953, and went into effect September 3, 1953.

134. S.I. 1953, no. 1199, Annex, *Constitution of Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland*, 2nd Schedule, items 24, 30.

135. Constitution, Art. 97. Normally support of two-thirds of the members of the Federal Assembly and assent by Her Majesty were required for constitutional amendment. If within 60 days a territorial legislature or the African Affairs Board objected to the bill, Her Majesty's assent had to be by order in council after the draft had been before the British Parliament for 40 days. See Chap. 12.

136. Constitution, Art. 40(2).

137. Constitution, Arts. 67-77.

138. Africans formed less than 3 per cent of the total federal electorate in this election, in part due to the boycotting of the election by many African groups.

139. Cmd. 1148/1960, *Report of the Advisory Commission on Rhodesia and Nyasaland* [Monckton], par. 52.

140. Arthur Hazlewood and P.D. Henderson, *Nyasaland, The Economics of Federation* (Oxford, 1960), esp. 88-91; W. J. Barber, "The Economic Argument," in C. Leys and C. Pratt (eds.), *A New Deal in Central Africa* (London, 1960), Chaps. 7, 8; S. Williams, *Central Africa: The Economics of Inequality* (London, 1960), Chaps. 5-7.

141. Cmnd. 1148/1960, *Report of the Advisory Commission on Rhodesia and Nyasaland*, Chap. 4.

142. Even G. H. Baxter, who as Assistant Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations had been chairman of the officials' conference in 1951, and who was one of the federation's staunchest friends in Britain, was in 1959 critical of the "very slow" progress towards racial partnership in Southern Rhodesia. See A. J. Hanna, *The Story of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland* (London, 1960), 272.

143. Cmnd. 1148/1960, *Report of the Advisory Commission on Rhodesia and Nyasaland*, par. 34.

144. *Ibid.*, par. 41.

145. Cmnd. 298/1957, *Constitution Amendment Bill, 1957* (London); Cmnd. 362/1958, *Electoral Bill, 1958* (London).

146. Cmnd. 814/1959, *Report of the Nyasaland Commission of Inquiry* [Devlin] (London), esp. pars. 2, 179-86, 254-7, 258, 275-86.

147. Article 99 of the constitution had specified such a conference between seven and nine years after the commencement of the federal constitution.

148. Cmnd. 1148/1960, *Report of the Advisory Commission on Rhodesia and Nyasaland*, pars. 27, 41, 49.

149. *Ibid.*, Chap. 6.

150. *Ibid.*, Chap. 12.

151. *Ibid.*, Chap. 16.

152. Election by universal adult suffrage was finally achieved in Jamaica in 1944, in Trinidad in 1946, and in Barbados, the Windwards and the Leewards in 1951.

153. Lloyd Braithwaite, "Progress Toward Federation, 1938-1956," *Social and Economic Studies*, VI, (1957), 133-7.

154. *Ibid.* 135, 144.

155. Cmd. 4383/1933, *West Indian Closer Union Commission Report* (London), 1-9; Cmd. 6607/1945, *West India Royal Commission (1938-9) Report* [Moyné] (London), 326-8.

156. Cmd. 7120/1947, *Closer Association of the British West Indian Colonies* (London), App. I, pars. 1-3.

157. *Ibid.*, App. I.

158. St. Vincent, *Government Gazette Extraordinary*, LXXIX (March 21, 1946; date of despatch, March 14), Despatch, 7(a). See also Braithwaite, "Progress Toward Federation," 140-1. In his despatch, the Secretary of State pointed to the experience of the Leewards as indicating the disadvantages of a federation with weak central government.

159. Leeward Islands, *Gazette, Supplement*, Feb. 3, 1947, Minutes of Conference on Closer Union of Windward and Leeward Islands held at St. Kitts on Saturday, 1 February, 1947. See also Braithwaite, "Progress Toward Federation," 142-3.

160. Cmd. 7291/1948, *Conference on Closer Association of B.W.I. Colonies, Report* (London); Col. no. 218/1948, *Conference Proceedings*.

161. Cmd. 7291/1948, *Conference on B.W.I. Colonies, Report*, par. 15, Resolution 1.

162. Resolutions 6, 7, 14, 9. A shipping committee, a central organization of primary producers, and a British Caribbean Trade Commissioner Service were also to be set up immediately (Resolutions 3, 4, 5).

163. Resolution 2.

164. *Leeward Islands Act, 1956*, 4 & 5 Eliz. II, Chap. 23.

165. Col. no. 255/1950, *Standing Closer Association Committee Report* [Rance].

166. *Ibid.*, pars. 21, 24; App. 5, pars. 6-7. Many of the suggested activities of the central government were to be functions of an advisory nature such as those previously performed by the Development and Welfare Organization (*ibid.*, par. 27).

167. *Ibid.*, par. 28.

168. *Ibid.*, par. 30.

169. *Ibid.*, pars. 107-12. Concern about the additional cost of federation was a recurring theme in the development of the West Indian Federation, and subsequent reports presented revised cost estimates to contradict the continued fears of the cost of federation. See "Development and Welfare Organization in the W.I.," *Financial Aspects of Federation, Report* (Bridgetown, 1953), pars. 4-5, and Annexes 2, 3, 4; Cmd. 9618/1955, *The Plan for a British Caribbean Federation, Report of the Fiscal Commissioner* [Caine] (London), pars. 18-50.

170. Col. no. 254/1949, *Commission on the Unification of the Public Services Report* (London), esp. par. 157.

171. Col. no. 268/1950, *Commission on the Establishment of a Customs Union, Report* (London), esp. par. 135.

172. Cmd. 8837/1953, *Report by the Conference on West Indian Federation, 1953* (London); Col. no. 315/1955, *Report of the Conference on Movement of Persons within a British Caribbean Federation* (London); Cmd. 9733/1956, *Report by Conference on British Caribbean Federation* (London); Cmd. 9618/1955, *Report of the Fiscal Commissioner* [Caine]; Cmd. 9619/1955, *Report of the Civil Service Commissioner* [Blood] (London); Cmd. 9620/1955, *Report of the Judicial Commissioner* [Smith] (London); Col. no. 328/1956, *Report of the British Caribbean Federal Capital Commission* [Mudie]. A Standing Federation Committee established by the 1956 conference approved the final draft of the constitution and settled certain decisions of detail regarding the federal civil service, the judicial organization and the site of the federal capital that were still outstanding after the conference.

173. Jamaica was particularly sensitive on the issue of customs union because such a large proportion of its revenue was derived from its high tariffs.

174. For instance, decisions made at the 1953 conference concerning arrangements for internal free movement, customs union, dual membership in legislatures, constitutional amendment procedure and site of the federal capital were reversed later.

175. Morley Ayearst, *The British West Indies* (London, 1960), 236.

176. Col. no. 328/1956, *Report, British Caribbean Federal Capital Commission*.

177. *British Caribbean Federation Act, 1956*, 4 & 5 Eliz. II, Chap. 63; S.I. 1957, no. 1364, *The West Indies Federation Order in Council 1957*.

178. Constitution, Art. 118.

179. Cmnd. 1417/1961, *Report of the West Indies Constitutional Conference, 1961* (London).

180. *Ibid.*, pars. 11, 20, 26.

181. Cmnd. 1638/1962, *Report of the Jamaica Independence Conference* (London).

182. U.K., House of Commons, *Debates*, DCLIII, 6 Feb. 1962, cols. 230-5; DCLVI, 26 March 1962, cols. 849-940.

Appendix E

1. Published by the Government of India Press, Delhi, 1950. Subsequent amendments are to be found in *The Gazette of India* (Government of India Press, Delhi), and in the *All India Report* (A.I.R.) published annually.

2. Added by the *Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951*, Sect. 2. In its application to the State of Jammu and Kashmir, reference to Scheduled Tribes in clause (4) of Art. 15 is omitted.

3. Substituted by the *Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956*, Sect. 29 and Schedule, for "under any State specified in the First Schedule or any local or other authority within its territory, any requirement as to residence within that State."

4. In clause (3), Art. 16, the reference to the State was construed as not including a reference to the State of Jammu and Kashmir.

5. In its application to the State of Jammu and Kashmir, Art. 330, references to the "Scheduled Tribes" were omitted.

6. Inserted by the *Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956*, Sect. 29 and Schedule.

7. Arts. 331 and 332 did not apply to the State of Jammu and Kashmir.
8. Arts. 331 and 332 did not apply to the State of Jammu and Kashmir.
9. The words and letters "specified in Part A or Part B of the First Schedule" omitted by the *Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956*, Sect. 29 and Schedule.
10. Art. 333 did not apply to the State of Jammu and Kashmir.
11. The words "or Rajpramukh" omitted by the *Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956*, Sect. 29 and Schedule.
12. In its application to the State of Jammu and Kashmir, Arts. 334 and 335, references to the State or the States were to be construed as not including references to the State of Jammu and Kashmir.
13. Arts. 336 and 337 did not apply to the State of Jammu and Kashmir.
14. The words and letters "specified in Part A or Part B of the First Schedule" omitted by the *Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956*, Sect. 29 and Schedule.
15. Art. 339 did not apply to the State of Jammu and Kashmir.
16. The words and letters "specified in Part A and Part B of the First Schedule" omitted by the *Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956*, Sect. 29 and Schedule.
17. Substituted *ibid.*, for "any such State."
18. Substituted by the *Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951*, Sect. 10, for "may, after consultation with the Governor or Rajpramukh of a State."
19. Inserted by the *Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956*, Sect. 29 and Schedule.
20. The words and letters "specified in Part A or Part B of the First Schedule" omitted *ibid.*
21. The words "or Rajpramukh" omitted *ibid.*
22. See *Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950*, published with Ministry of Law Notification no. C.O. 19, dated August 10, 1950, *Gazette of India, Extraordinary*, Pt. II, Sect. 3, 163 and *Constitution (Scheduled Castes) (Part C States) Order, 1951*, published with Ministry of Law Notification no. C.O. 32, dated September 20, 1951, *Gazette of India*, Pt. II, Sect. 3, 1198.
23. Art. 342 did not apply to the State of Jammu and Kashmir.
24. Substituted by the *Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951*, Sect. 11, for "may, after consultation with the Governor or Rajpramukh of a State."
25. Inserted by the *Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956*, Sect. 29 and Schedule.
26. The words and letters "specified in Part A and Part B of the First Schedule" omitted *ibid.*
27. The words "or Rajpramukh" omitted *ibid.*
28. See *Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950* published with Ministry of Law Notification no. C.O. 19, dated August 10, 1950, *Gazette of India, Extraordinary*, Pt. II, Sect. 3, 163 and the *Constitution (Scheduled Castes) (Part C States) Order, 1951*, published with Ministry of Law Notification no. C.O. 32, dated September 20, 1951, *Gazette of India*, Pt. II, Sect. 3, 1198.
29. The words "or Rajpramukh" omitted by the *Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956*, Sect. 29 and Schedule.
30. The words "or Rajpramukh" omitted *ibid.*
31. Inserted *ibid.*, Sect. 21.
32. Published by the Government of Pakistan Press, Karachi, 1962.
33. *The Constitution of the Federation of Malaya, 1957* (found in S. I. 1957, no. 1533, Annex, London, 1957) and in *Malayan Constitutional Documents*, 2 v. (2nd ed., Kuala Lumpur, 1962), as amended by the *Malaysia Act, 1963* (Malayan Act F.26/1963, Kuala Lumpur, 1963).
34. 1963, Act no. 20 (Lagos, 1963).
35. The Niger Delta is an area inhabited by ethnic groups which are in a minority in both the regions adjacent to the Niger Delta.
36. S.I. 1953, no. 1199, Annex (London, 1953). The Constitution as amended to September 1, 1959, was also published by the Government Printer, Salisbury, 1959.
37. English translation in Christopher Hughes, *The Federal Constitution of Switzerland*.

BINDING SECT.

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